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INTRODUCTION 
The existence or exiled regimes of one sort or another is a fre-
quently reourring historical faot. ~ome were eventually able to re-
turn in triumph to their home territory, others languished in alien 
surroundings and then were slowly forgotten. 
The Seoond World War saw a remarkable growth of suoh governments-
in-exile. In ll:>ndon were to be found governnen:t;s of Poland, Norway, 
Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Yugoslavia. A Greek Government-in-
exile was looated in Cairo. , " In addition there were emigre groups 
from other oountries which, While not reoognized as valid governments, 
furnished a rallying point around whioh both mtionals of the country 
and Allied offioiala oould oonoentrate suoh efforts as might be under-
taken with regard to the territory in question. 
This dissertation is an examination of the relations between one 
government-in-exile and its oooupied territory. The regime ohosen is 
that of the Netherlands, 'llhioh was looated in ll:>ndon from May, 1940, 
until May, 1945. 
The reader is oautioned from the outset that the faots am suoh 
underlying prinoiples as seemed to have governed relations of the 
N.etherlands Govermnent in ll:>ndon with the oooupied territory are not 
necessarily applicable to all other exiled regimes, either those op-
erating in World War II or at other times in history. Factors suoh 
as the geographical location of Hollanl. in relation to England, the 
sooial oomposition of the population, administrative arrangements of 
1 
the occupying power, whioh varied from country to country, and the 
progress of' the Allied war ef'f'ort, all served to make the Dutch oase 
at least a little different from that of' other exiled regimes. The 
writer does believe that some obvious principles of' fairly general 
application may be drawn from this dissertation, particularly in re-
gard to the maintenance and operation of' communications with an 0 cou-
pied territory. 
The problem of' the government-in-exile is a continuing one. The 
example which most readily comes to mind at the present writing is the 
Republic of' China, which is still recognized by one major power and 
several minor ones as the valid government not only of' the island of' 
Formosa but of' mainland China as well. A nunber of' emigre organizations 
made up of' refugees from eastern European countries is also to be found 
in various western countries. While none of' these can aoourately be 
described as a government-in-exile, many of' them attempt to maintain 
at least some sort of' contact with their former countries of' residence 
and hence share some common problems with a bona fide government-in-
exile. 
The reader is again cautioned that both the Republic of China 
~ ~ 
and the various emigre groups mentioned find themselves in radically 
dif'f'erent circumstances than the various ~on governments in World 
War II. They are not a part of' a war ef'f'ort which has as ita short 
or long term objectives the liberation of' their respective home ter-
ritories. Note must also be made of' the fact that both present and 
~ ~ future gover:anents-in-exile or emigre groups find or will find them-
selves faced with a rapidly changing technology, so that the methods 
2 
of maintaining contact with an occupied territory appropriate to the 
conditions of 1942 may be completely obsolete in 1961. 
scope 
This dissertation is limited 1n subject matter and geographic 
area to various sorts of contact between the London Goverment of 
the Netherlands and the Geman-occupied territory. It is limited in 
a temporal sense to the period between the German invasion of the 
Netherlands in May, 19401 and the Ge:nnan capitulation of May, 1945. 
Occasional reference is made to evezzts prior to May, 1940, for pur-
poses of supplying background information. 
Premises 
This dissertation seeks, in essence, to examine the question of 
whether one particular goverll!lBnt-in-exile 1n World War II, that of 
the Netherlands, was actually able to govern its absent population, 
and what sort of contact it was able to establish with that population. 
One might begin with the basic postulate that the Dutch Govern-
ment in-exile lftluld have bean able to maintain contact 1fi th the occu-
pied territory, so as to keep itself informed of ths state of Nether-
lands society; see to the maintenanoe of domestic order; take some 
measures to provide for the common eeonomic welfare; protect its pop-
ulation against excesses of the occupying power; serve as a focus for 
national unity; and maintain its existence in order to assume author-
ity at the time of liberation. This thesis will be tested and an anal-
ysis made of the extant and nature of those attributes of goverment 
which the Dutch regime in London actually demonstrated in its relations 
with the occupied territory. It will be necessary, the writer believes, 
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to include more material of a descriptive or narrative nature than 
would ordinarily be appropriate to a doctoral dissertation. as the 
subject matter is likely to be almost entirely ~ to the Jmerican 
reader. 
In the first section the establishment of the Netherlands Govern-
ment-in-exile1 is outlined• as is the establishment of German civil 
agencies in Holland. Various views of the raison d•~tre of the London 
Goverment are presented. The Ordipanoes of 1937 • which contained 
guide linea for civil servants in the event of an enemy invasion or 
occupation of the Netherlands are described. together with the Com-
mentary of 1943, which served to amplify and make more specific the 
earlier Ordinances. 
The nature of the authority of Dutch civil servants left behind 
in Holland. particularly the acting department heads. the Secretaries-
General. 1a examined. together with their experience both with the 
London Government and the occupying power. It is in the light of this 
vital experience that the basic postulate dealing with the actual 
functions of the London Goverment will be tested. 
--- --- ---
lHereafter to be referred to as. "The London Government". 
Where reference is made to the United Kingdom Goverment this will 
be so indicated. 
4 
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CHAPTER I 
FORMATION OF THE LONDOK GOVERNMENT 
The German Invasion 
The London Government came into being less as the result of any 
long range planning than as the immediate result of improvisation in 
the face of sudden danger. 
Studied Netherlands neutrality in the Second World War came to an 
unpleasantly abrupt end on May 10~ 1940, at approximately 4:00 A.M. Central 
European Time. At that hour German aircraft attacked the Hague, doing 
limited damage in three different neighborhoods. In less than half an 
hour reports were received indicating that severe damage had been done to 
air fields located at Schiphol (Amsterdam), Waalhaven, Bergen, and 
Vlissingen (Flushing). German parachutists, it was reported, had landed 
t . . t 2 a varlous po1n s. 
The Dutch Council of Ministers met at 5:00 A.M. at the home of the 
Minister President Mr. D..J. de Geer and soon agreed on the text of a 
proclamation to be forwarded to Her Majesty ~een Wilhelmina for her 
S'ignature. It read as follows:. 
My Fellow Countrymen: 
Although our country has anxiously observed strict neutrality 
2A •. Q. H. Dijxhoorn, testimony of, April 13, 1948, given before 
statengenera.r~ rweede Kamer, Enquete Commissie, (Estates General, 
Second Chamber, Inquiry Commission), stenographic note number 7401. 
Such testimony cited hereafter in this form: A. Q. H. Dijxhoorn, 
April 13, 1948, 7401. 
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these recent months, with no intention of deviating from this course, 
we were suddenly attacked last night by German armed forces, without 
any warning whatsoever. This occurred in spite of the solemn assur-
ances we had received that our neutrality would be respected so long 
as we respected it ourselves. I hereby protest in the strongest 
possible terms against this unprecedented breach of trust and this 
assault on the principles binding civilhed states in their rela-
tions with one another. Both I and my Government will do their duty. 
We expect you to do yours, in whatever circumstances, at whatever 
post you serve, with the utmost industry, and with the inner peace 
and dedication which a clear conscience affords. 
WIL!-!ELI.!nlA. 3 
Soon after the Council of Ministers agreed on the proclamation it was 
signed by ttueen Wilhelmina. At 6:00 in the JllOrning, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, vr. E. N. van Kleffens. received the German Ambassador, 
Herr Zech. Herr Zeoh reiterated Germany •s peaceful intentions, saying 
that if free passage through Holland was granted to German forces, the 
oonsti tutional form of Dutch government would not be disturbed. Germany 
had a sacred trust to protect the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg 
from an imminent invasion by Great Britain. Should Holland resist Gar-
many's altruistic efforts, however, all possible means would be employed 
against her. The German Ambassador was given his passport and informed 
that a state of war existed between the Netherlands and Germany. He 
departed shortly thereafter.4 
After another meeting of the Council of Ministers • Mr. E. N. van 
Kleffens, together with Mr. C. J. I. M. Welter, drove to the seaside 
resort of Scheveningen where, about noon, they boarded a sea plane and 
flew to England to request British military assistance.5 
~lhelmina van Oranje-Na.ssouw, Eenzaam Maar Niet Alleen (Amster-
dam: w. Ten Have, 1959), p.270. 
~. N. van Kleffens, Ma.y 18, 1948. 11997. 
~!. P. L. Steenberghe, Ma.y 19, 1948, 12194. 
7 
During the next day, May 11, Dutch defenses crumbled rapidly. Con-
tinued resistance, at least for a period of several days, did appear pos-
sible in the southern province of Zeeland. Some discussion took place in 
the Council of Ministers about the possibility of urging the royal family 
to retire to Zeeland. 6 
In London, meanwhile, Ml'o van Kleffens delivered to Prime Minister 
Churchill a telegram which the Dutch Embassy in London had just received 
from Minister-President de Geer in HOlland: 
Situation so bad that, if immediate Allied help to stem the 
German advance is not forthcoming, w:e must surrender. Immediate 
assistance can still salvage the situation. 
IN THE NAME OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, 
D. J. de GEER7 
Winston Churchill advised Mr. van Kleffens that very little help was 
available owing to pressing British commitments elsewhere.8 
By May 12 the Council of Ministers -s discussing the possible depart-
ure of the Government for E:cgland. 9 On that same day, in the evening, Prin-
cess Juliana, Prince Bernhard, and the two Princesses, departed for Eng-
land. By later that same evening the Minister of Defense had become con-
vinced that Queen Wilhelmina should also leave the country.10 
6p. s. Gerbrandy, April 14, 1948, 8196. 
7Netherlands, Statengeneraal, Tweede Kamer, Enquete Commissie, Reger-
lngsbeleid. 1940-19451 (Estates General, Second Chamber, Inquiry Commis-
sion, Government Direction' 1940-1945), (ts• Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerl~­
en-uitgeverijbedrijf, 1948 , Vol. IIa, P• 65. Cited hsreai'ter in this 
form: E~. IIa, 65. 
~~. IIa, appendix, cxxxviio 
9J. van den Temple, April 13, 1948, 7171. 
10H. Go Winkelman, April 14, 1948, 7704. 
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While hostilities continued the Council of Ministers debated whether 
such a continuance was des irah le. Although the Commander-in-Chief of the 
armed forces (not a member of the Council) stated his opposition, it was 
decided that capitulation was inevitable and that little was to be gained 
by prolonged resistance.ll 
On the morning of May 13 the British Admiralty advised that by 10:00 
it would have in position near the Hook of Holland five destroyers of the 
Royal Navy. At 9 rOC in the oorning Her Majesty Queen Wllhelmina departed 
for the Hook. Meanwhile, in the Hague, the Council of Ministers tried to 
decide whether to depart for nearby or more distant points. Two Ministers 
failed to agree with the majority. the rest left for the Hook of Holland. 
In the temporary seat of the Government, in a fortress at the Hook, the 
Portfolios of Trade, Industry. and Shipping, as well as Agriculture and 
Fisheries • were thus unrepresented. Conferences with these absent Minis-
ters were held by telephone, a service that seemed to deteriorate by the 
minute.12 From this vantage point the Netherlands Government issued the 
following communique: 
A~ this time, in view of the nature of hostilities, the Govern-
ment considers it necessary, in the national interest, in the inter-
est of the overseas territories, and for the protection of freedom 
and trade, to transfer the seat of government. 
Accordingly, Her Ma.iesty the Queen and Her Ministers have 
decided to go elsewhere.13 
The Council of Ministers decided that the Commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces, General H. G. Winkelman, would be given the task of ar-
ranging the capitulation of the armed forces themselves. This was not 
llrbid., 7711. 12Dijxhoorn, loc. cit., 7405. 
l3ENQ, IIa, appendix, oxxxxiii. 
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to be a capitulation of the Govel'nlllent. General Winkelman was to be en-
trusted with sufficient civil authority, of an essentially temporary na-
ture, to accomplish this task. This decision was accordingly communicated 
to the two Minister!! who had remained behind in the Hague, 1Vho then person-
ally vested General Winkelman 111 th this" speo5.al authority. Then the Min-
isters, Messrs. Steenberghe end van Rh:l.jn, departed to join their col~ 
league• at the Hook of Holland.l4 
Departure of the Govel'nlll8nt from Holland 
In the afternoon Queen Wilhelmina left the Hook, on board the Brit-
ish torpedo boat H. Mo S. Heretlal"do Her illlmediate destination was still 
not England, but Breskens, in .Z.elando Word was 110on received on board 
the Hereward that Breskens had been bombed by German aircraft, hence the 
Here'llard proceeded directly to Englam, reaching there about 7:00 in the 
evening. At about that same hour the Council of :Ministers was departing 
the Hook of Holland on board a British destroyer, H. Mo s. Windsor. Left 
behind in the Ministries were the Secretaries-General, the second in oom-
me.m.l5 
At around 8:00 ~een Wilhelmi:na arrived in London, to be met by King 
George VI, ~een Elizabeth, Princess Juliana, Prince Bernhard, and the two 
earlier arrived Ministers, van Kleffens and 1felter.16 Later that same eve-
ning Queen Wilhelmina released from BUckingham Palace the first official 
proclamation of the Netherlands London Government, directed to the Dutch 
peoplet 
l4oijxhoorn, lac. oit. 
15
r. Beelaerts van Blokland, May 20, 1948, 12728. 
16 Kleffens, loc. cit., 12057. 
After it had become abundantly clear that We and Our Min-
isters could no longer freely continue our Government, it was 
necessary to make the difficult decision to move the seat of the 
Government abroad for so long as it was unavoidable, with the in-
tention of returning to Holland as soon as possible. 
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The Government is now located in Erlgland. In this 11ay they 
will forestall a Government capitulation. In this way Netherlands 
territory, whether in Europe, the East or West Indies, remains one 
sovereign state, 'Whose Toioe, as a full-fledged member of our allies, 
can continue to be beard. 
The military command, and in [the] highest position, the ec.n-
ma:rrier-in-chief, will take suoh meaaurelt as are necessary from a 
military po:i.ilt of vi81Fo 
There, 'Where the usurper dominates, local civil authorities 
must continue to oo 'What is neOeB8ary to further the public inter-
est, and, primarily, oo8perate for the maintenance of peace and 
order. 
Our heart goes out to our oountr.Ymen in the fatherland 'Who 
shall experience hard times. But Holland, with God's help, shall 
one day reconquer its European territory. 
You will recall earlier disasters centuries ago, out of which 
Holland has arisen. That shall happen this time again. 
Do not despair. Do, all of you, 'What is in the national inter-
est. We will oo ours. Long live the fatherland& 
WIIllE:WINl17 
Establishment of the Government in London 
The Council of Ministers arrived in London the next morning, May 14, 
around 9tOO. At about this hour, in Holland, General Winkelman, issued a 
proclamation 'Wherein he clearly desori bed himself as, "'••. [The] highest 
authority in the country representing the [London] Goverll!lent ••• " •18This 
19 proclamation had the prior approval of the London Government. 
During the afternoon of the same day the German Luftwa:f'fe bombarded 
Rotterdam, doing considerable damage. Utrecht was similarly threatened. 
General Winkelman notified the German military attaoht in the Hague of his 
17 '" E • .,., IIa, 67o 19 .. ne,t'fens, leo. eito 
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intention and desire to capitulate. He signed the articles of capitula-
tion at around 9t20 the next morning.20 
After three weeks residence in Buckingham Palace, Queen Wilhelmina 
21 
moved to her own house in Eaton square. 
The Council of Ministers established lodgings and offices in Gros-
venor House Hotel in London's West End. Meetings of the Council were 
held in an unused and nearly unfurnished suite. All correspondence and 
all directives were typed by the Ministers themselves on Grosvenor House 
stationery. After a time the British Ministry of Supply lent a steno-
grapher-typist, who it rapidly developed, could neither take dictation 
nor type, even though English was employed as an official language at 
this point., Royal proclamations were painfully dictated by a full Minis-
22 ter, a letter at a time, to the type setter. 
Soon the British Unilever Company, a subsidiary of the Dutch parent, 
took pity on the London Government and lent suitably trained personnel. 
For a time Unilever and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
seemed almost synonymous. One person recalls that the Bank of England 
refused to honor a currency exchange order signed by ~~. de Gear, the 
Dutch lc:nister-President. The order • Bank officials persisted, must 
be signed by Mr. Beyen, a Unilever official.,23 
After a few weeks the Government moved to Stratton House, a residence-
hotel better suited to its needs. 
20J. T. Furstner, April 21. 1948, 9083. 
21Blokland. loc. cit • .., 12722. 
22J. R. M. van Angeren, April 20, 1948, 8845. 
2ZT• F._ Mo. Schaepman.., April 21, 1948, 9226. 
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In the early days in London, the Netherlands Minister of Education, 
Arts, and Sciences, Dr. G. Bolkestein, noted what seemed to him to be 
the reasons for the establishment of the London Government, It came into 
being, Dr. Bolkestein felt: 
So that Germany could not gain control of Dutch colonies. 
So that the Netherlands navy could proceed to Englar~ and 
continue to take part in the war. 
So that a Netherlands legion (composed of ground forces) could 
be raised, equipped, and managed. 
So that Dutch enterprises abroad could not be expropriated by 
the Germans or German agents. 
So that the end of the war would find a Netherlands Government 
oapable of functioning to protect Dutch interests.24 
Once the German occupation of the Netherlands became an accomplished 
fact, the Rules of Land Warfare, as embodied in the Hague Convention of 
1007 b" d" 25 ~· were 1n 1ng. 
Relevant portions of the Rules of ~nd Warfare are reproduced below: 
Article 25, 
towns, villages, 
pro hi bi ted, 
The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of 
dwellings • or buildings which are undefended is 
Article 42. Territory is considered occupied when it is 
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. 
Article 43, The authority of the legitimate power having in 
fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take 
all the measures in his power to restore, and insure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless abso-
lutely prevented, the laws in force in the country, 
Article 46. Family honor and rights • the lives of persons • 
and private property, as well as religious convictions and prac-
tice, must be respected, 
2~n:a. IIa • 137. 
25
aoth the Netherlands and German Governments regarded the Rules 
of Land Warfare as binding on May 10, 1940. Neither Government speci-
fically renounced this instrument subsequently. 
Article 47. Pillage is formally forbidden. 
Article 52. Requisitions in kind and services shall not be 
demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs 
of the army of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the 
resources of the country, and of such a nature as not involve the 
inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in the military 
operations against their own country. 
Such requisitions and services shall only be demanded on 
the authority of the commander in the territory occupied. 
Contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid 
for in cash; if not, a receipt shall be given and the pay-
ment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible. 
Article 55, The occupying state shall be regarded only 
aa administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real 
estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the 
hostile state, and situated in the occupied territory. It 
must safeguard the capital of these properties and administer 
them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.26 
On the possibility that the government of an occupied territory 
might remove itself to another country, the Rules of Land Warfare are, 
regrettably, silent. The statement in Article 43, " ••• The authority of 
the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occu-
pant ••• •·. seems to imply that while "authority"' passes into the hands 
of the occupying power, sovereignty may reside elsewhere. 
After World War II an Inquiry Commission of the Second Chamber 
(lower house) of the Netherlands Parliament, 'llhioh examined the London 
Government in considerable detail, addressed itself only rather oblique-
ly to the problem of whether such a regime possessed competence urner 
international lmw to attempt to give direction to those in the occupied 
territory. Several Dutch experts ~th special knowledge of the law took 
the general view that the technical realities of communications, as 
26James B. Scott (ed.), Texts of the Peace Conferences, {Boston: 
Ginn, 1908), pp. 209ff. 
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they existed at the time of the framing of the Rules of Iapd Warfare, 
were such that it must have seemed that an exiled regime 'lfOuld posses• 
no adequate means of communicating with the occupied territory. Dr. 
J, H, w. Verzijl, of Leiden University, stressed the role which radio 
communication could and did play in the process, both in making the 
wishes of the exiled regime felt and in bring messages from the oo• 
cupied terri tory to London by means o:f clandestine transmitting sta-
tions, Professor Verzijl further maintained that in attempting to 
block such communication an occupying power 'lfOUld have to employ larger 
numbers of personnel than might be spared from other duties. As a 
result the exiled government might continue successfully to reach the 
population in the occupied territory, even though satisfactory tech-
nical counter measures were theoretically available,27 
Baron F, M. van Asbeok, also of the Leiden faculty, stressed the 
role of air power in the maintenance of communications. He described 
the value of air transport to the exiled regime as affording a means 
of transporting goods and persons to occupied Rolland.28 
14 
As far as its status under the Rules of Land Warfare was concerned, 
the most the London Government could claim was that its creation was not 
specifically forbidden by that instrument. Changed circumstances do not, 
of themselves, dissolve particular international obligations. Neither 
the German govermnent nor the London Government renounced the Rules of 
I.and Warfare. Indeed, in a radio broadcast of May 20, 1940, to the 
Netherlands people, the then Minister-President, Mr. D, J, de Geer, 
27J, H, w. Verzijl, August 22, 1950, 82233, 
28F, ll. Baron van Asbeck, August 301 1950, 83770, 
specifically stated the Netherlands Government's intention to adhere to 
the Rules of land Warfare.29 
Whether of dubious legitimacy or not the London Goverllment did in 
fact exist and operate. It was established for the soundest of utilita-
rian reasons. Dutch property of every description existed in abundance 
outside of European Holland. A sizeable merchant marine stayed free. 
A large portion of the Netherlands Navy was able to reach Britain or 
British Commonwealth ports safely. The Dutch East Indies, the West 
Indies, and Surinam were still free to be governed. 
The London Government was aoceptsdwithout question by both the 
Netherlands overseas possessions and most other governments. It raised 
15 
a volunteer anny, to which recruits came from all over the 110rld.30 It 
rescued and continued to operate nearly all units of the Netherlands 
Navy.31 It supplied aircraft for Dutch squadrons attached to the British 
Royal .Air Force and assisted in their training.32 Arrangements were made 
so that the Netherlands merchant marine and the Dutch airline (K.L.M.) 
would not fall into enemy hands and would continue operation.33 The Lon-
don Goverment took steps to insure that the overseas assets of Dutch 
concerns 'WOUld not fall into enemy handa, 34 and collected an income tax 
imposed on Dutch nationals living abroad.35 A semi-official Dutch radio 
station was located in London, utilizing transmitters of suoh power that 
it could be clearly heard over the entire world.36 A court of law, 
29vri1 Nederland (London), October 25, 1941, P• 388. 
30Ibid., July 4, 1942, 726. 31.!!!.!£., June 7, 1941, 583. 
32!2!.!!·· Novamber 16, 1940, 370. 3S:Ibid., 1.~y 2, 1942, 420. 
34Ibid., September 7, 1940, 138. 35Ibid., October 8, 1941. 
36Ibid., August 3, 1940, 11. 
with jurisdiction over Dutch subjects was established in London.37 
As will be seen, the London Governnent made virtually no attempts 
to operate through the still-existing Dutch civil service in German-
occupied Holland. It was able to make its influence felt indirectly 
through an impressive array of private organizations, many of them 
clandestine in nature. By means of radio OOliiil!IUli cation it was able to 
give direction and advice to the general public. For example, in 1944 
when the London Government decreed a general strike of railway employees 
in the occupied territory, the Netherlands public obeyed. The strike 
continued in force for the duration of World war II and seriously im-
peded German communications in the Low Countries.38 
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to ascertain whether 
the Netherlands London Government possessed competence in the law of 
nations or not. Germane to the di scusdon is the de facto existence 
and operation of the organism. 
In 1937 the Netherlands Council of Ministers promulgated certain 
ordinances, commonly known as the Ordinances of 1937, to govern the 
policy of civil servants of the national, provincial, and municipal 
governments, as well as those of various special-purpose districts, 
in the event of an e:aem;y invasion or occupation. Covered also by the 
Ordinances were the employees of transportation systems in the service 
of any of the govel'Dl!lental units already mentioned. The Ordinances, 
reproduced below, deal specifically With the nature of the duties of 
Dutch civil servants in occupied territory. 
37Ibid., June 27, 1942, 698. 
38A subsequent section deals With the railway strike of 1944. 
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Article I. General. 
1. As a general rule, the persons who make up the competent 
organs of the Royal Government, Provincial Goverlllllents, 
MUnicipal Governments, Boards of Surveyors of Dikes, Marsh-
land Districts, and Marsh Polders, including transport 
workers under the direction of the foregoing, are, in the 
event of an enany imasion, to remain at their posts ••• 
These civil servants shall strike to wo!'k in the national 
interest so that their services 111AY adapt themselves to 
the necessarily changed ot.roumstanoes [..Jhioh are likely 
to prevail]. 
Above all, the civil servants are, in so far as they have 
jurisdiction, to be ohaJ:'ged with: 
a. Informing the civilian population in regard to the 
attitude which it 1hall take towards the enemy 
and his various agencies. 
b. The distribution with equity 111ncng the population 
of the burdens normally associated with an occu-
pation. 
o. Acting, when necessary, as an intermediary be-
tween the enemy and the civilian population. 
d. Registering immediate a:td. strong protest with the 
proper authorities whenever either these author-
ities or those acting under their direction cam-
mit acts in violation of the rules of internat-
ional law. 
2o In regard to the general rule stated above, that admin-
istrative organs end those serving them are to remain on 
duty in the event of an enany invasion, an exception is to 
be JllAde of those individuals whose continuance of their 
regular duties would serve the interests of the enemy more 
than those of the oiv1l:l.an population. Persons whose duties 
are of this nature are to be so informed by the proper auth-
orities. 
3. It is of particular importance that, for the adequate per-
formance of the duties described in Paragraph l, civil 
servants be thoroughly familiar with the rules of inter-
national law, particularly the Rules of Land Warfare, • • • 
Article III. Relation of the authorities of the army of occu-
pation to the Netherlands administrative organs in the occu-
pied territory. • • • 
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6. Although by oonseque:ooe of the occupation actual power may 
rest in the hands of the occupying power, the Netherlands 
Government still remains the legal sovereign •••• 
Anyone in the occupied territory, irrespective of whether 
he is in an administrative position or not, is strictly 
bound to follow the orders of the Netherlands Government. 
He is absolved of this responsibility only when the action 
taken by the enemy against him makes ths performance of his 
duties literally impossible. 
Article IX. The action to be taken by civil servants. • • • 
3lo The reason for which a Dutch civil servant rsnains at his 
post [in time of occupation] is that this is in the inter-
est of the oi viHan population. The damage that results 
from his service to the enany is in general less than the 
greater damage which would result from the civilian popu-
lation not having its own administration. In the event 
that the civil servant, by remaining in his position, is 
of greater service to the enemy than the need that the 
civilian population has for his services, then that civil 
servant must leave his post.39 
The Ordinances of 1937 came into being because various Cabinet Min-
isters in the Netherlands feared that a second world war was possible or 
probable, and that Holland might, after the fashion of Belgium in the 1914-
1918 conflict, be occupied by German troops • Thus it was with Belgian ex-
perienoe in mind that the Ordinances interwove portions of the Rules of 
Land Warfare and general administrative directives, applicable to Dutch 
administrators should Rolland be occupied and treated in the manner of 
Belgium in World lfar I. While German conduct in its World War I ocoupat-
ion of Belgium had left something to be desired, the Rules of l@nd War-
fare had formed a fairly satisfactory working basis for governing relat-
ions between the Belgian administration, much of which continued to func-
tion, and the occupying power.40 
Civil servants gradually discovered that, under the German occupation 
40 G. E. Mathon, September 22, 1950, 85306o 
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of the Netherlands, Dhe Rules of Land Warfare were not to be an accurate 
guide for the behavior or the occupying power. Civil servants generally 
were thrown off their guard by the first few weeks of the occupation, 
during Which the Germans generally behaved in a "correct" fashion. un-
fortunately this German policy did not continue. Property of all sorts, 
private and public, was taken with little or no compensation. A system 
of voluntary labor whereby Hollanders could work in Germany at non-bel-
ligerent tasks gave way, by degrees, to one of forced conscription for 
all sorts of work to be perfol'll!ed all over the "Greater" Reich. 41 Special 
German officers headed "press" gangs which roamed the countryside in 
search of additional laborera.42 Dutch Jews, regardless of age or sex, 
were collected and transported to Poland for extermination.4S Substant-
ial numbers of prominent Hollanders were held as hostages for past or 
possible future illegal acts against the occupying power.44 
Thus, it will be readily observed that the QrdlpRpCes. in so far 
as they were based on the Rules of Land Warfare, were not a particul-
arly pertinent guide for civil servants in the occupied territory. 
The civil servants themselves had varying views on the value of 
the Ordinances of 1937 in pradtioe. 
It will be recalled that when the Ministers departed for England 
the seconds in command, the Secretaries-General, remained behind. As 
will be seen, these Secretaries-General continued in the somewhat anom-
alous and divided position of being in a caretaker position for the London 
4lvrij Nederland (London), August 1, 1942, P• 3. 
42 rbid., July 11, 1942, 750. 43Ibid., .August 1, 1942, 3. 
44Ibid., July 11, 1942, 752. 
Government and, at the same time, being charged with certain aspects 
of civil administration by the occupying power. we are concerned at 
this juncture with the reaction of these Secretaries-General to the 
Ordinances of 1937, so clearly intended to serve as a guide for their 
conduct during the occupation. 
In the view of llr. Bosch van Rosenthal, not himself a Secretary-
General, but Royal COI!IIllissioller for the Province of Utrecht, the .2!:,£-
inances were one of the few sources of guidance that a civil servant 
possessed. He recalled how, after he was removed from office in Feb-
ruary, 1941, "countless" visitors in various civil service capacities 
came to him seeking guidance as to their future conduct under the .Q!:g,-
inances. To him the Ordlnances possessed almost incalculable value in 
guiding the civil servant in the attitude that he or she must take in 
various situations.45 
One Secretary-General felt that the Ordinances were useful in 
that they made the provisions of the Rules of !.and Warfare much more 
widely known and understood than would have otherwise been the case.46 
others regarded the value of the Ordinances as "n1111 • Some ar-
gued that those portions of the ordinances based on the Rules of Land 
Warfare, as they had been pertinent to Belgian experience in World War 
I, were largely irrelevant. No complex legal verbiage was needed to 
tell anyone that he should resign or depart his post if his actions 
benefited the enemy more than the Dutch population.47 
46t. H. N. Bosch ridder van Rosenthal, August 26, 1949, 64335. 
46H. M. Hirschfeld, January 15, 1952, 95431. 
47D. G. W. Spitzen, Jamary 22, 1952, 95901. 
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Article r. Section 2, of the Or'tiinances·, provided that civil ser·-
vants whose duties were. ipso facto, likely to be of greater benefit to 
the enemy than the civilian population, were to be so informed by the 
proper authorities. None of the secretaries-General knew of any instance 
in which any civil service post waS' so designated by authorities.48 
In 1943. three Hollanders in the occupied territory prepared the 
Commentary of 1943 which attempted to clarify and bring up to date the 
Ordinance~r of 1937.. Dr. t. H. N. Bo~roh ridder van Rosenthal, the for-
mer Royal Colm!lissioner for the Province of Utrecht, and Dr. J. H;. w. 
Vertijl. Professor at the University of utrecht, were assisted in their 
task by Mr. M. L. van Holthe· tot Echten. They were faced with several 
aspects of the Ordinances which needed urgent clarification. Since 
London could scarcely publish its official acts and resolves in the 
occupied territory it had taken to broadcasting them as a part of the 
programs of the Dutch radio station in London, Radio Orange. While 
theS'e could be heard on any ordinary radio they offered a special problem: 
Were civil servants in the occupied territory bound by these broadcast 
pronouncements. particularly in view of the fact that listening to Radio 
Orange was· a punishable crime? other problems plagued the civil servant 
who tried to follow the Ordinanoe~r. The Germans had used or attempted to 
use parts of the Dutch administrative machinery in their forced-labor 
recruitment ltervice. What was the responsibility of Dutch civil servants 
in these administrative areas-? What of the C,erman-proclaimed policy of 
"'total war"'-- how were the Ordinances• to be applied? These were !JOme of 
48K. J. Frederika, January 16, 1952, 95702. 
the questions which the Commentary of 1943 sought to anmwer.49 
In the beginning, it should be stressed, the Commentary of 1943 
was not an official document. It was circulated among some civil serv-
ants in the occupied territory and reached London by microfilm. Lon-
don approved the Commentary and Minister-President Gerbrandy announced 
that it was to have an official status. 50 
Reactions to the Commentary were as mixed as they had been to the 
earlier Ordinances. Some reasoned that it placed unreasonably severe 
restrictions on civil servants, restrictions devised by "irresponsible" 
resistance workers who had no understanding of either the conflicting 
interests to be evaluated or the risks to the civil servants involv-
ed. 51 others felt that the Commentary could as readily be used by a 
civil servant as a justification for remaining at his post longer than 
the Ordinances taken alone, might have permitted.52 
The extent to which the Commentary was actually circulated, either 
in clandestinely duplicated form or via Radio Orange, was raised by 
several. Some never received a copy but heard "mention" of it in 
London radio broadoasts.53 others never learned of the existence of 
the Commentary until after the war,54 or came to understand its sub-
stance through articles appearing in the underground press, along with 
49:eosenthal, loa. cit., 64336. 
50Vrii Nederland (London), October 30, 1943, P• 429. Excerpts 
of the Commentary are to be found in the appendix to this dissertation. 
51Rosenthal, loa. cit., 54369. 
52J. c. Tenkink, March 18, 1952, 96327. 
53spitzen, loo. cit., 95942. 
54o. E. w. Six, January 30, 1952, 96007. 
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radio broadcasts, 55 while still others received copies sent to them 
by persons unknown. 56 
It will be recalled that, in the period ~diately before the 
capitulation of the Netherlands armed forces located in Holland, civil 
authority was temporarily entrusted to the Dutch General H. G, Winkel-
man. The Secretaries-General were to continue as acting department 
heads, in the absence of the responsible Minister. This continued to 
be true even after the installation of Artur Seyss-Inquart as Reichs-
Commissioner, on May 29, 1940. The responsible Ministers, of course, 
continued to be "absent" for the duration of World War II, as they 
stayed in London. Administrative acts were, Herr Seyss-Inquart in-
formed Secretary-General Tenkink of the Ministry of Justice, no longer 
to be done "in the name of the Queen"' but "'in the name of law".57 
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On or about June 21, 1940, there was posted in all public places 
in the Netherlands one or the first of a seemingly endless stream of 
proclamations, with Dutch and German in parallel columns: 
ORDEREDJ 
By the Reichs-commissioner for the occupied Dutch territory, 
regarding the authority of the Secretaries-General of the Nether-
lands ministries. 
In accordance with Paragraph 5, of the FUhrer's indulgence re-
garding the competence of governmental units in the Netherlands 
territory, dated May 18, 1940, I hereby order: 
Paragraph 1. 
(1) The Secretaries-General of the Netherlands Ministries are 
empowered, within the limits of their responsibility, to 
take such measures as are necessary for the maintenance 
55J. van Dam, April 1, 1952, 96669, 
56R, A. Verwey, April 1, 1952, 96619. 57Tenkink, loc, cit., 96281. 
of public order and safety; in particular they are 
authorized to charge their subordinate$ with such re• 
aponsibilities. 
(2) If the authority granted in (1) is exoeeded those re-
sponsible are liable for the most severe punishment. 
Paragraph 2. 
(1) The Reichs-commiasioner for the oecupied Dutch territory 
reserves the right to. in particular circumstances. reduce 
or take .way the authority delegated in Paragraph 1. 
Paragraph 3. 
(1) This order becomes effective immediately. 
Tlte Hague. June 21, 1940. 
The Reiehs-commissioDer tor the 
Occupied Netherland a Tg§l'i tory, 
SEYss-nqr.ART 
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There thus began a sort o£ fencing, at first polite, then more deter-
mined, that 'IIIla to oontime for the duration of the war, between th.e Dutch 
administration left in Bolland and the Reiohs-Commissioner and his subordi-
nates• The Searetaries-Gemral still tried to act aa though they function-
ed in trust for the absent Ministers in London. The Gemana aought to in-
volve or implicate the Secretariea-Ge:neral in every possible phaae of the 
occupation. Wherever posai ble the endorsement of a German-sponsored reg• 
ulation 'by a Dutch Secretary-General w.s aought. The Beoretaries-Ganeral 
signed some regulations, still others were signed after desired changes 
had been incorporated, and a nuaber -re not sigaed at all. 59 
On the basis of his order of June 21, 1940• just queted, the Reiohs• 
Commissioner appointed tour Commissioners-General• all o£ whom were German. 
They 11'8re: Wimmer, for "general order and justiee"; Rauter, fer "public 
5!\:~. VIIa, appendix. xviii. 
59 Tenkink, loo. cit., 96284. 
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saf'etyJ Fisohboek, f'or "economy and f'inanoe" l and Schmidt, f'or assorted 
tasks, particularly the dissemination of' National Socialist "ideals". 
The Secretaries-General were linked to the Reiohs-commissioner and to 
the Commissioners-General U,y means of' a sort of' liaison of'f'icer, called 
a Referent ("reporter" or "reviewer"). While the German Referent was 
interposed in theory, in practice the Secretaries-General frequently 
dealt with both the Reiohs-commissioner and the Commissioners-General 
directly. This is not to say that these oontaots were oordial.60 
Secretary-General Tenkink, then in the Ministry of' Justice, re-
called "endless" debates with the Gennans over proposed regulations 
that appeared to be in oonf'lict with the Rules of: Land Wart'are. When 
the Germans desired a partieular ordinance they would forward the draf't 
text to the Ministry concerned by way of' the Referent, " ••• to ascertain 
if: it is technically correot".61 »ry ohanges to be made by the Ministry 
had, of' oourse, to be approved U,y the Beiohs-cammissioner. Mr. Tenkink: 
reported that, on oooasion, Dutoh civil servants were able to ef:f'eot 
ohanges in regulations which were of: real value.62 
Mr. Tenkink•s sucoessor in the Ministry of: Justice, Mr. J. P. 
Hooykaa.a, regarded any changes in ordinances which he was able to make 
as of' very little importance. It made no dii:f'erence who signed the 
ordinances, Hooykaas maintained, they were still German ordinances and 
they, the Secretaries-General, were German civil servants, deriving 
their authority, such as it was, f'rom the Reiohs-commiasioner.63 
SOJ. H. Posthumus, "Order and Disorder," Mne.ls of: the .Amerioan 
Aoadm. CCXLV, P• 2 • 
61Tenkink, loo. cit., 96346. 62Ibid., 9635lo 
-
63J. P. Bocykaas, March 191 1952, 96416. 
Dr. G. A· van Poelje, the former Secretary-Gemral of' Education, 
Arts and Sciences, still felt that, as a sort of caretaker for the l!1n-
1ster in London, he had a legal responsibility to the London Govel'lllllent, 
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as well as those obligations to the oooupyiDg power which were imposed on 
him by the Rules of' Land Warfare. Dr. van Poelje on several occasions re-
fused to prepare ordinancerr desired by the Gennana. This often accomplished 
JJOthing, he rapidly discovered, aa the Stlllle ordinances might very well be 
64 proclaimed directly qy the Reiehs-comm!asioner. Thus, in his view, Dr. 
van Poelje had two masters to serve: The Reichs-commissioner, who had S!_ 
facto authority, and the Gover:rment in London with whom sovereignty rest-
ed. 55 
Yr. C. RingeiiDg, Secretary-General of the Department of' Defense on 
:May 10, 1940, never felt that he had two masters --he began his career 
under the occupation by refusing to draw end sign an order, based on a 
request dated June 9, 1940, 'Whereby a Dutch army arsenal auld manufacture 
artillery shells for the Gennans. This was also the end of' Mr. Bingeling•s 
career as a Secretary-General during the oceupation. When he came to 
'IIOrk on June ll, 1940, he found the way barred by several German soldiers 
who blandly intonned him that his successor had bean chosen and already 
installed in of'ti oe. 66 
Mr. D. G. w. Spitzen, Secretary-General of' Transport and Waterways, 
never looked on his position as one in ~ich he had two masters. He 
had one, the absent Gover.nment in London, whose interests he tried to pro-
toot, while an intruder, " •• ,.J. -dman ~o held a revolver to my head ••• ," 
64G. A. van Poelje, January 22, 1952, 95881. 65Ibid., 95854. 
66 c. Ringeling, March 19, 1952, 96469. 
gave him various orders. Mr. Spitzenwished to make clear that the 
position of the Secretaries-General was far from one of powerlessness, 
however. His Ministry was in a particularly vital position, as it 
helped provide a working system of transportation, needed in feeding 
the city populations of the highly-urbanized Netherlands. Mr. Spitz en 
was able, for example, to delay the enao'bnent of a new German trans-
port law for a period of one year, and he was able to effect various 
changes in this law before it went into foroe.67 
It was never simply a matter of the Germans replacing the fre-
quently recalcitrant Secretaries-General or other civil servants with 
Dutch Nazis. As in Germany, the Dutch National Socialist movement was 
sometimes called, "The revolution of the retarded"· With few except-
ions Dutch National Socialists were men and women of extraordinarily 
limited intellectual or professional accomplishment. Many Dutch civil 
servants were turned out of offios and National Socialist replacements 
readily located. Many other loyal Dutch civil servants remained at 
their posts because both the Germans and the Dutch National Socialists 
realized that no adequate replacement was available. Thus special 
qualifications which made some individuals partially indispensable 
gave them a limited amount of bargaining power.68 
At the end of 1941 the Dutch National Socialist Party was de-
clared by the Reiohs-commissioner Seyss-Inquart to be the only pol-
itical party in the Netherlands.69 
67spit~en, loc. cit., 95954. 
68H. R • de Zaaijer, "I.e.w Enforcement,"' Annals of the .t.!nerican 
Academy• CXLV, p. 12. 
69New York Times, December 15, 1941, P• 12. 
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In December, 1942, the Dutoh Nazi leader, .Anton Mussert, was pro-
claimed "leader" of the Nel:herlands people. While his supporters held 
elaborate ceremonies, his installation seams to have met with little 
publio aoolaim. 70 
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In February, 1943, Mussert installed a "Secretary of State", who was 
supposed to preside over a "cabinet" of sorts. 71 
Time 'III!.S soon to prove that the Mussert "cabinet" meant nothing. It 
possessed no exeCUtive power, its only duty being to advise German offi-
oials in the execution of their oooupation duties. It was aooorded scant 
respect by either the Dutoh people or German oooupation authorities. 72 
The original Dutch Ministries and subordinate bodies remained more 
or less intaot, although a number of oivil servants resigned for fear 
their rEI!laining would lend prestige to the Mussert "cabinet:". 
A brief examination of several instames of more extreme German 
pressures on the Secretaries-General and their departments will serve to 
demonstrate the limited nature of possible resistance measures or delay-
ing actions available to the Dutoh oivil servant. 
That only a small minority of Dutoh Jews survived the Seoond World 
War is mute testimony • finally, to the inadequacy of attempts by the 
Secretaries-General to offer protection to their fellow countrymen. That 
these attempts were made is worthy of mention. 
In May of 1941 there came to the attention of Mr. J. P. Hooykaas, 
Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice, the fact of an extraordi-
narily high death rate among young Dutch Jews who had been interned and 
70 71 Ibid., December 14, 1942, 3. ~·• February 9, 1943, 1. 
72Posthumus, loa. cit., 4. 
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were sent to a camp at Mauthausen. Of some 300 internees between 80 and 
100 had died, with "heart failure" being offered as the cause of death in 
all instances. Since this seemed a rather high incidence of cardiac trou-
ble among young adults, loth Mr. Hooykaas and his colleagues registered 
strong protests with the German Commissioner-General, Rauter. Rauter prom-
ised to see what he could do, and shortly thereafter the Jewish Council 
(Joodse Re.e.d) in Holland reported that there had been, indeed, substantial 
improvements brought alout in the conditions of interment of Dutch Jfffi'S 
in Me.uthausen. These changes had occurred, the Council reported, shortly 
after a visit to the camp by Commissioner-General Rauter. These improve-
ments continued in force for alout one year. 73 
Secretary-General Frederika was present at meetings of the College of 
Secretaries-General, a semi-official Consultative body, when the question 
of the German order to remove all Jewish civil servants was discussed. It 
was decided, with considerable reluctance, to comply with the order on the 
grounds that, given the Gel'lllan attitude toward Jews, a Jewish civil servant 
would find it impossible to discharge his duties. Dr. Frederika felt that 
the civil servants were able to stall and delay many anti-Jewish measures, 
indeed wholesale persecution and deportation did not come until 1943. Had 
the civil servants taken a firm stand on the issue of the discharge of Jew-
ish civil servants the result, he argued, might very well have been simply 
the removal from office of all ooncerned. There was talk of the resign-
ation of some or all of the Secretaries-General over this issue-- Dr. 
Frederika recalls . having communicated with a !.!r. Cohen of the Jewish 
Council on this question and being told in return: "In the name of God 
73Hooyke.as, loo. cit., 96434. 
74 
stay at your post, otherwise all is lost." 
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In the Department of Social .Ufairs it 11&1! possible to delay the 
discharge of Jewish civil servants for a number of winter months, thereby 
preserving their means of livelihood as long as possible.75 
In 1943, when the wholesale deportations of Jews took place, there 
was tragically little that the surviving Secretaries-General could do. 
The entire process was completely in the hands of various German police, 
intelligence, and transport agemies and not even wilful sabotage on the 
part of' the Dutch administration would have affected the process one iota. 76 
In opposing forced reorui"bnent of Dutchmen for service in the Great-
er Reich the most that could be done by the Secretaries-General was to 
fight a delaying action. Informed conjecture suggests that the Dutch ad-
ministration may have been able to alter German actions so that relative 
improvements did result. In 1942 the Ge:nnans promulgated an ordinance 
providing that both Dutch men and women within wide age limits would be 
liable for forced labor outside of the Netherlands. Secretary-General 
Verwey, of the Ministry of Social Affairs, conferred with his colleagues, 
including the directors of' regional employment offices. He discretely 
excluded those who were Dutch National Socialists. Substatttial agree-
ment was reached on a course of action. Mr. Verwey then went in person 
to Commissioner-General Schmidt with the information thus collected. 
Herr schmidt was told that it Verwey and his associates were forced to 
proclaim the ordinance in question they would resign. Mr. Verwey pointed 
out that the ordinance was a blatant violation of the Rules ot Tend 
7~rederika, loo. cit., 95721. 7Cverwey, loo. oit., 96626. 
76apitzen, loo. oit., 99272. 
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lrarfare. and that its application would remove sufficient agricultural 
workers so that the task of feeding the Dutch civilian population would 
become very diffiouJ.t. lrhile Herr SChmidt did not seem impressed by the 
arguments based on the Rules of Tend Warfare, he promised to make certain 
changes if Verwey and his colleagues would not resign. Dutch women would 
be completely excluded from the operation of the ordinanoe, and special 
consideration would be given to persons engaged in the production or dis-
tribution of food, Mr. Verwey and his colleagues, apparently feeling that 
this was all that could be aooomplhhed, agreed. While those in the pro-
duction and distribution of food were frequently included in the labor 
draft, Dutch women were apparently not drafted for service in Germany. 77 
The affair which Dr. H. 11. Hiraohfeld, then Secretary-General of the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Agriculture calls, "De tweeds distribut-
iestamkaart"· ("The second ration card"), was significant because 1 t pro-
duced just a ration card and no more. Rations in the German-occupied 
Netherlands, when they were available at all, were obtainable only with 
the surrender of the inevitable ration stamps, based, in turn, on a 
ration card. The cards themselves were based on the vital statistics 
registers maintained by the municipalities. It was common kno~edge, 
both on the part of the Dutch and the Germans, that all was far from in 
order in the maintenance of the vital statistics registers. The reg-
isters frequently disappeared completely, or at the very least a page or 
two might be missing. Ration cards were issued to false entries in the 
registers, actually for the benefit of Jews or resistance personnel in 
hiding. Tlms, in late 1942 or early 1943, when it became knovm that the 
77verwey, loo. cit,, 96624. 
Germans favored the issuance of an entirely new ration card, many civil 
servants feared that such a document 'Wbuld be used as a device to correct 
errors in the municipal vital-statistics registers, or that it would be 
used to collect the names of additional persons for service in forced-
labor units. Dr. Hirschfeld was able to "stall" the issuance of the new 
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cards for several weeks. Finally the Germans suggested to him that, unless 
his "thinking" became more "constructive", force might be applied against 
his person. Dr. Hirschfeld wnt to the Nazi police chief, Commissioner-
General Rauter, and said: "We do not trust your motives in regard to 
this contemplated second ration card-- we fear that you are going to 
use it to try to locate persons in hiding or as a means of drafting per-
sons for service in Germany."· Dr. Hirschfeld was told that the card 
110uld not be so used if he 'lllluld acquiesce in its issuance. He did agree 
to such an issuance, with the express understanding that information gained 
in this way was not to be made available to aey police agency of any sort. 
Dr. Hirschfeld agreed, when asked about this after World War II, that his 
action may have been sheer naivete on his part, but in any event the Ger-
man promise was honored and the second ration card never abused,78 
The College of Secretaries-General was created by inter~inisterial 
agreEIIl!ent, ani met more or less regularly to discuss goverl:lmental matters 
common to the Ministries. 79 
The College tended to meet frequently at the start of the occupation, 
and to do as much as possible as a tm.it, both to present a stronger fro:r:rt 
to the Germans ani because the occupying powe'l' at times spoke of the col-
78Hirschfeld, loo, cit., 95484, 
79A. M, Snouck Hurgronje, April 20, 1948, 8705. 
leotive responsibility" of the Seore:taries-General, even though they 
granted no official recognition to the College. 80 
Mr. Tenkink reported that the secretaries-General met to discuss 
a wide range of subjects. The oppression of the Jews, riots caused 
by Dutch National Socialist organizations, :forced-labor recruitment, 
growing shortages of :fuels and :foodstuffs, and the transportation 
system were among the most :frequent topics treated. Such measures as 
oould be taken to influence or alter German actions were :frequently 
discussed in meetings of the College.81 
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Dr. van Poelje remembers the infonnal character of the College 
during this period. He :feels that it had no real o:f:fioial status but 
served more as an informative, consultative gathering. There was an 
episode that cast less than complete credit on the College--it did agree 
to an sign unanimously a statement requested by the Germans which urged 
Dutchmen to refrain :from acts of sabotage, suggesting that retaliation 
of a severe nature might result were such acts committed. While this 
statement was actually in accord with the Rules of Land Warfare, its 
appearance in the traditional double-column :form, Dutch on one side, 
German on the other, did nothing to increase confidence in the College, 
either in Eolland or in London.82 
When more and more National Socialist Secretaries-General appeared 
as replacements :for those who had resigned or were driven :from o:f:fioe, 
meetings of the College grew steadily less :frequent and shorter. The 
loyal members held one of their last meetings at a dinner in the 
80Tenkink, loo. oit., 96292. S1Ib1d., 96316. 
82Poelje, loo. oit., 95867. 83spitzen, loo. cit., 95908. 
83 Hotel de Doelen in Appeldoorn. 
34 
Dr. Hirschfeld recalls that Reioha-Gommissioner Seyss Inquart, on 
receiving an involved written complaint signed, "The College of Secre-
taries-General", replied that he did not recognize the College of Secre-
taries-General as an official administrative body, but if the Secretaries-
General wished to gather to discuss administrative or ministerial matters 
he had no objeotion.84 
Dr. Hirschfeld recalls that the last meetings of the College, by that 
time badly infiltrated by Dutch National Socialists, were held in the 
SUIIllllEir of 1943, He feels that the College definitely contributed assist-
anoe in countering German actions in such fields as the forced recruit-
ment of labor, and in developing policies concerning food distribution.85 
During the Second World War direct contact of any sort between the 
Landon Goverrunent and the Secretaries-General and their departments was 
practically non-existent. Although the Ordinances of 1937, as has been 
noted, provided for both the continuance in office of civil servants, 
subject to certain contingencies, and for the possibility that the sov• 
ereign in London might give orders to the administration, this almost never 
occurred directly through orders or messages sent to the Secretaries-Gen-
eral. As things developed Landon preferred to work through a vast array 
of clandestine resistance organizations, some created unilaterally in 
Holland, some the work of Landon agents or persons in contact with Lon-
don. 
Secretary-General Spitzen never received a communication from Lon-
don during his entire tenure of office, which terminated in August, 
83Spitzen, loc. cit., 95908. 
85
.I!!!9.., 954II. 
84nirsohfeld, loo. cit., 95389. 
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1943.86 
Mro Spitzen did not believe that it would have been a wise course of 
action for London to have attempted to give oonorete, detailed instruct-
ions to the administration in Holland. The exiled regime had too little 
knowledge on day-to-day administrative problems in the occupied territory. 
Moreover, even if consultation had been technically feasible, it would 
have been of little use in many instances. The Germans, he pointed out, 
sometimes followed the praotioe of announcing at"4:00 P.M. that a oer-
87 
te,in measure was to beOome effective at 6:00 A.M. on the following day. 
In 1952 Dr. Frederika was asked about his contacts, as a Secretary-
General, with the London Government: 
Question: Did you receive a:ey instructions from London? 
Dr. Frederika: No. The Govemment left us- to our own devices 
when it departed. They went to London and then sent messenger 
after messenger to the continent, to Jan, Piet, and Klaas, [ord-
inary resistance figures] but they never sent any messengers to 
me. No one ever even delivered a eopy of the Commentary of 1943 
to me. I found a copy of it one day which was lying in the street. 
The Government and the resistance steed shoulder to shoulder. 
Magnificent! But not one word was said to the administration. 
We remained as the trusted servants of the London Government, at 
least until they specifically withdrew that trust. As far as we 
knew, until the last day of the occupation 11'11 had the legal right 
to be regarded as trusted servants of the Government. The Govern-
ment placed the administration in Holland in the most difficult 
position imaginable by stabbing it in the back with the dagger of 
the resistance movements. I do not criticize the resistance as 
such, but the resistance press, which launched vicious attacks on 
us, caused our administration to lose a great deal of prestige, 
not so much with the civilian population as with the Germans. 
It happened one day that I oomplained to a German official 
about a particular proposed regulation on the grotmds that it ran 
contrary to the spirit of the Netherlands people. Do you know what 
he did? He pointed to a pile of illegal, clandestine newspapers on 
his desk and said: 11 You can•t speak in the name of the Netherlands 
people. Do you know what these papers, which are nothing but 
B6spitzen, loc. cit., 95945. 87Ibid. 
mouthpieces of the London Government, say about you?" 88 
Dr. Frederika believed that most civil servants during the period 
of the occupation would have loyally oo8perated with direction given 
them by the London Goverment. Dr. Frederika realized that the fre-
quent communiques from Radio Orange, some of them containing specific 
orders for all persons in the occupied territory, were addressed to the 
civil servants as 11811. Dr. Frederika regarded this as a dangerously 
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public way of communicating with the administration, and felt that more 
coherent policies might have been evolved in London had the Secretaries-
General been consulted.B9 
Dro H1rschfeld could recall no single occasion on Which instruct-
ions were received by the administration in Holland from London. 
Now to be sure, this happened during the railway strike of 1944. On 
another occasion in 1943, London gave general instructions via Radio 
Orange that on no account were civil servants to ocllperate in acy way 
with the German 4rbeitseinsatz ("Labor Pool"). Dr. Hirschfeld regarded 
this order as clear evidence that London had insufficient data on the 
matter. By this time, Dr. Hirschfeld explained, fully seventy-five 
per cent of Holland's mayors had been replaced by Dutch Nazis. Local 
servants, largely loyal to London, served under them. These civil serv-
ants, rather than1heir Nazi superiors, had actual charge of the crucial 
vital-statistics registers, so important to the concealment of persons 
who had fled the occupying authorities. These functionaries granted the 
Ausweise ("Exemptions"), documents excusing the bearer from the Labor 
Pool, and thus needed by any person Who had to move about at all in ooou-
88Frederiks, loa. cit., 95670. 89 Ibid., 95455. 
pied Holland. Since these civil servants were able to sabotage the 
Arbeitseinsatz from within it made no sense for them to refuse to work 
with it -- they lft>uld simply be replaced by Dutch Nazis, were they to 
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resign. Accordingly, these civil servants were prone to say, ~es, in 
this area we are insubordinate, but we can judge better than the gentle-
men in London who are not as close to the misery as we are.90 
Through indirect contacts that Dr. Hirschfeld had w:i. th the London 
Government he got the impression that the departed Ministers themselves 
continued to trust their subordinates who had remained behind. The pass-
age of time brought into office in !Alndon some persons who had not pre-
viously been Dutch Ministers. They, it seemed to Dr. Hirschfeld, were 
less likely to be well disposed toward those in the administration in 
Holland.9l 
Dr. Hirschfeld regarded the order of the !Alndon Goverment to suspend 
all Secretaries-GeMral, announced at the time of liberation, as manifest-
ly unfair. I:f' London had felt displeasure it ·could have taken steps to 
notify the Secretaries-General and other civil servants of this faot, 
telling them that their services were no longer required. As it -s, 
!Alndon left them to make the best of a nearly impossible situation, and 
to do so within the framework of vague and badly-dram instructions.92. 
Secretary-General Verwey did encounter one attempt on the part of 
the London Goverment to give instructions to his Ministry. :[j)ndon had 
forbidden~ civil servants to ask, give, or accept Ausweise to the 
German labor conscription drive being conducted in the winter of 19440 
The Germans offered A!lsweise for civil servants engaged in the process 
9~irschfeld, loc cit., 99246. 91Ibid., 95473. 92 Ibid. 
- -
of providing essential services in the distribution of food. The 
Dutch administration had established an elaborate system for the supply 
of food to the Dutch cities, where starvation was already widespread. 
This activity had been made much more difficult since the Germans re-
quisitioned not only most available vehicles, but stocks of repair 
parts and fuels as well. The Ministry of Social Affairs, through the 
elaborate ruse of maintaining two complete accounting systems on stocks 
of replacement parts and fuels, one false for German inspection, one 
accurate for operational use, had been able to steal and hold back just 
enough supplies to keep road and barge traffic moving, albeit at a 
greatly curtailed level. Thus it was that the civil servant$ concerned 
with this work needed the German Ausweise very much indeed.93 
Under these circumstances Verwey telephoned Dr. Hirschfeld for ad-
vice. Dr. Hirschfeld urged him to ask for Ausweise for the personnel 
concerned, without including the address of the person for whom it was 
claimed. This was done, and a great ma~ Ausweise for civil servants 
engaged in this category of work were requested and granted. Verwey 
felt that he had adhered to the spirit of the Government's direct-
ive, apparently intended to forestall the Germans using the Ausweise 
as a means of collecting names and addresses for possible future labor 
recruitment. At the same time Verwey was keenly aware that he had not 
adhered to the letter of the London order. By a round-about route he 
presently received a message from the London Government to the effect 
that it approved his action. It was the only such communication he 
received from London during the entire war--he prized it highly. 94 
93verwey, lee. cit., 96631. 94Ibid., 96638. 
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According to Minister-President Gerbre.ndy of the London Govermnent, 
the possibility of giving direction to civil servants in the occupied 
territory was considered. However, in the early days of the occupation 
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communications between England and Holland were so poor as to rule out 
this possibility. tater, whan limited, reliable channels of oommunioat-
ion were established, it seamed of more immediate value to devote such 
facilities to the gathering of military information which might be of 
direct valm to the Allied war effort. After time passed, Gerbrandy 
recalled, the College of Secretaries-General beo!lllle infiltrated with 
Dtrtoh Nazis, making any remote administration efforts out of the quest-
ion. The appeal, signed by all members of the College, urging the poP-
ulaoe to refrain from acts of sabotage, had done nothing to increase 
confidence in London in regard to the administration of the Seoretaries-
General.95 
In regard to the aoouaation of Dro Frederika, that London had le.f't 
the civil servants to their own devices, sending messengers to, ""J~ 
P1et, and Klaas" 1 but never to Dr. Frederika, President Gerbrandy replied 
that, on more than one occasion, Radio Ora~e had given directions that 
ware particularly for the attelll;ion of civil servams, and that a:ey in-
struotions sent via radio to the Netherlands people as a whole were tor 
the advice and attention of civil servants as well. This fact made Dr. 
Frederika' complain seem less than valid, President Gerbrandy arguedo 
Time attar time, when messages had been sent to the occupied territory 
via Radio Ora~e, London subsequently learned that the word had been 
spread with "incredible speed"' over the entire country. 96 
95p. s. Gerbrandy, July 21, 1963, 97583. 96rbid., 97572. 
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According to Minister-President Gerbrandy the general reaction of 
the London Government to reports that came from the oooupied territory 
regarding the activities of Messrs. Frederika, Hirschfeld, and Verwey, 
was that they were not "good" and must be removed. The question then 
arose of 'Whether it '1111ls opportune to announce this intention and how 
such an order could be implemented. Making a public announcement of 
their removal could, the London Government reasoned, be unwise, as im-
plementation might prove impossible. In any event, according to Ger-
brandy, the consensus of London opinion in regard to these three Sec-
retaries-General was, "Away with theml 1197 
To the then Minister of Justice in the Inndon Government, Mr. J. 
R. M. van Angeren, there was the basio problem of whether London had 
sufficient information in regard to administrative problems in occu-
pied Holland. Testifying in 1953, Mr. van Angeren noted that London 
had no knowledge of the restrained, 11oorrect11 manner in which the Ger-
mans conducted themselves in their relations with civil servants for 
the first few months--a thoroughly disarming experience for many civil 
servants. !!.r. van .«ngeren had asked the Government as it 11ent into 
exile in May, 1940, several questions: "Must not the Secretaries-Gen-
eral be given some instructions? What 1s to be the extent of their 
authority? What of their dB¥-to•day deoi llions, be they good or bad? 
Are their acts to be accepted?" Mr. vanAngeren said that he never 
got any an8Wers to these queationa••indeed, no one even tried to an-
mwer--he still felt they were good questions, however.98 
In any event no instructions were specifically prepared for the in-
97 
.!!!!S:.·· 97592. 98Angeren, loo. oit., 98139 • 
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formation of the Secretaries-General. This did not mean, Mr. van Angeren 
felt, that the Secretaries-General could say, "ire had no instructions. 
we did not know what we had to do.• They had the Ordinances of 1937 
ani the 1943 Commentary on the Ordinances, vague though they were in 
places. They had the constant direction of the Government as expressed 
in Radio orange broadcasts. It did seem to Mr. van .Aingeren that the 
Secretaries-General could and should have been given specific, direct 
instructions during the time of the oooupaticn, above and beyond those 
99 
already mentioned. 
Minister of Waterways, J. w. IJ.be.rde., thought that instructions 
communicated through secret ohamlels ma.Y have actually been sent to the 
Secretaries-General, but that these would have gone through the office 
of Minister-Presidant Gerbrandy, who might be the only person liho would 
know of suoh action. .&J.barde. eould recall no specific instancerr of such 
communication. On several occasions he made "telegraphic" inquiries of 
his subordinates in Holland in efforts to learn of the oondi tion of cer-
'lain waterways and dikes. Several times he received replies, although the 
nature of the replies in nearly every instance made him question the rel-
iability of hie channel of communication.1QO 
Minister Albe.rda said that radio broadcasts from time to time enun-
ciated basic principles to be followed in the occupied territory, prin-
ciples that oould be implemented by the Secretaries-General. These 
broadcasts defined the national interest in general terms, and as such 
were rrubject to various interpretations by the civil servants and others, 
who had to apply them to concrete situations. Mr. AJ.barda did not be-
lieve that Dr. Gerbrandy's statlll!lent in regard to Messrs. Hirschfeld, 
99Ibido lOOJ. W • .Ubarde., September 3 1 1953, 98050. 
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Verwey, and Frederika, ("'.Away with them"), was an acourate s1.tillllBry of 
the London Government's position. While there was sharp criticism of 
these gentlemen and their polioierr in Ministerial oirolea in London, they 
could not simply be c!isoharged without a thorough investigation. Min-
ister Albarda !teemed to imply that the thorough investigation would have 
to be held in Holland at the conclusion of hostilities, although he did 
not say precisely that.10l 
Conclusion& 
One must, on the basis of the evidence presented in Chapter I, re-
ject part of the original postulate that the London Government was or 
could have been able to see to the maintenance o£ domestic order in the 
occupied territory, to provide for the economic welfare, or to protect 
its absent population against the emesaea of the oooupying power. It 
must be postulated instead that the London Government could not really run 
affairs through some sort of remote administration, that the most it could 
do vis a vis the occupied territory was to maintain contact and gather 
information from that territory, lending assistance to selected organ-
izations there, some of which might perform tasks in the general welfare 
which in other cirounstances a gover:t~~Dent might be expected to perform. 
It may be further postulated that London was more likely to be success-
ful in these endeavors when it utilized the services o£ person or organ-
izations already located or in being in the ocoupied territory, rather 
than attempting to dispatch perecns to Holland or create such organiza-
tions from the vantage point of London. Valid functions of the London 
Government, it can still be assuned, continued to be those of acting as 
lOllbid., 98061. 
a foous for national unity and the maintenance of ita own existence, 
in order to be available to govern the Netherlands at liberation. 
A$ Minister Bolkestein saw the original purposes of the London 
Government (supra, P• 12), almost none had to do with the occupied 
territory at all, but with Dutch persons and property outside Holland. 
This was, after all, the personal opinion of one individual. Moreover, 
there was nothing to prevent the Landon Government from performing func-
tions and fulfilling purposes that were not envisaged or expressed at 
the time of its coming into being. 
The blunt fact of the matter is that no one made aDY real plans 
for the formation of a Dutch Government in London in advance of its 
actual formation. The Ordinances of 1937 were intended to cover a 
possible military administration of the sort whioh Belgium had under-
gone in World War II. The authors of the Ordinances could scarcely 
have imagined that Holland would not have a military administration 
but a supplemental German civil administration grafted onto the Dutch 
structure already in operation. There is no evidence that the authors 
of the Ordinances of 1937 foresaw the possibility of the "total" war 
that was waged, with civilian populations mobilized as part of the in-
dustrial potential of the occupying power, and with bombardment directed 
as much against industrial and civil objectives as those of a military 
nature. NOte must also be made of the fact that the Ordinances of 1937 
were very little known both within and without the Dutch administration. 
Although they were an act of the Netherlands Council of Ministers they 
apparently made so little impression on those involved that the Dutch 
Minister-President of 1940, D. J. de Geer, did not know of their exist-
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enoe. 
The position of civil servants was one difficult of precise defi-
nition, It is doubtful if either the Ordinances of 1937 or the Com-
mentary, which sought to explain and amplify the Ordinances, were of 
a~ great use, The most guidance any meaningful formulation could 
offer was that, unless told the opposite by London, a civil servant was 
to stay at his post as long as the sum total of his acts served the 
interests of the Dutch populace more than it served those of the occu-
pying power. It is not the purpose of this dissertation to pass moral 
judgment on either those who may have departed prematurely or stayed 
at their posts too long. It is probably true that some Dutch civil 
servants possessed in this connection some room in which to manuver1 
as the Germans often preferred to have the endorsement by Dutch ad-
ministrators of German actions, even at the prioe of making changes in 
proposed regulations, as has been seen. Some other Dutch civil serv• 
ants possessed special technical skills, 10 that their replacement 
would have been a difficult task for the Germans, who seldom had any 
illusions about the real ability of Dutch National Socialists. The 
oft-repeated arguments made by civil servants, that to stay at their 
post would keep it from being filled by a Dutch Nasi, may not have al-
ways been germa:m. There were \Dldoubtedly times when the public interest 
might have better been served if undesirable German regulations were 
promulgated by a Dutch Nazi who was kJJown to the public as such, 
The nature of the creation of the Commentary on the Ordinances 
of 1937 tends to support the thesis that London's contacts with the oc-
cupied area were most satisfactory when the services of persons or or-
ganbatio:ns already located or in being in the oooupied territory were 
utilized, since the Commentary of 1943, as has been noted, was the work 
ot persona then in Holland. 
The Secretaries-General received m instructions intended for them 
personally, although as Dutoh subjects they were included in general 
directives broadcast by Radio Orange. Thus they might be told, alODg 
with all Hollanders, not assist in any way with the deportation of 
Dutoh Jews, or to retrain from giving any assistance to the recruit-
ment of laborers tor service in Germany. 
One oan onl-y oonolude from the evidence presented in Chapter I 
that any detailed remote administration by the London Government was 
impossible. The simple fact of the presence of the German oivil organs, 
with a loosely-defined but very extensive grant of authority, plus the 
progressive Nazitioation of the Dutoh eivil service, would have pre-
cluded this possibility ab initio. 
MOreover, in order to issue a~ detailed instructions to oivil 
servants, London 110uld have had to be in possession of detailed iuf'or-
mation on conditions in the occupied territory. As will be seen in 
subsequent sections, the London Government laoked such detai•d infor-
mation in any significant quantity until at least the latter montha of 
1943. Such Allied intelligence oontaots as were laboriously and peril-
ously brought iDto being in the early part of the occupation were util-
ized for the gathering of military rather than eoonomio, political, or 
social information. 
A single episode of remote administration by the London Government, 
the railway strike, is to be examined in a later seotion. 
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CHAP!'ER II 
THE LONDON GOVERNMENT AND CONTACT WITH RESISTANCE ORGANIWIONS--I 
Introduction -
The s~nd chapter begins with an outline of those London Govern-
ment agencies established to maintain contact with German-occupied 
Holland. Va:ious types of resistance activities engaged in in the oocu~ 
pied territory are then desoribed. 
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There follows a seotion devoted to the National SUpport Fund• & very 
special sort of resistance organization which financed many varied sorts 
of underground a.otivity and whose payments were guaranteed by the Iondon 
Government. The National Support Fund serves as a model to test the 
thesis that London was able to function best through the utilization of 
persons or organizations already located or in being in the occupied 
terri tory. 
The seoond chapter is completed with detailed examinations of two 
large and very different armed resistance organizations, the Council of 
Resistance and the Order Service. The formation, evolution, activities• 
relationship to the IDndon Gavernment and to other organizations of each 
is traced. Both also serve as models to test the thesis referred to 
above. 
Both the Council of Resistance and the Order Service operated 
armed resistance organizations and engaged in military espionage as 
well. The espionage activities of both organizations are treated in a 
later section. This chapter deals with them and their relationship to 
the London Government in their capacity as armed resistance organize.-
tions only. 
Intelligence and Contact Agencies in Outline 
As has appeared from the material previously presented, direct ad-
ministration by the London Government acting through the existing ad-
ministrative structure in Holland -• virtually non-existent. 
Dr. Frederika, as a Secretary-General, correctly stated that Lon-
don sent messengers to resistance workers ("Jan, Piet, and K1aas").l02 
During the Seeond World lfe.r the London Netherlands Governnent and the 
united Kingdom Government sent quite a few "messengers" to German-ooou-
pied Holland. Some were engaged in the ancient art of espionage. 
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others were entrusted with technical missions involving specialized aid 
to be given to the resistance organizations, particularly in the field ot 
sabotage. Still others had missions comgining a score of objectives, 
embracing both categories of activity. It -s customary in Allied 
circles in London to refer to most or all of the governmental agencies 
directing this activity as "intelligence agencies"• "Intelligence and 
other contact agencies" might serve as a more apt description. Npte 
must be made of the fact that a clear-cut distinction between the two 
activities sometimes was not made in the actual administration of in-
telligenoe work and other "contact• activities, however the formal 
lines of organization may have been drawn • 
. A short historical outline of the "intelligence" and "contact" 
agencies must be offered at this point. 
When the Netherlands Government arrived in London it brought with 
l02Frederiks, loc, cit., 95670, 
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it no real intelligence service, Division G, s. III of the Dutoh General 
Staff • charged w1 th military intelligeme, hacf made no advance plans hav-
ing to do with the possible establishment of an exiled government, Thus 
no ready-made channels existed to provde contact with the occupied terri-
tory.le3 
G, s-. III was allowed to remain dormont in London. An intelligence 
organization, the Centrale Inlichtingendienst ("tentral Intelligence 
Service"), was established on July 19, 1940, The Central Intelligence 
Service was placed under the control of the Minister of Juatioe,104 Oll 
August 14, 1941 it was transferred to the Ml.nistry of Foreign Aft'airs,105 
and from Foreign Affairs to the Jlinistry of .Marine Affairs, thia last 
change taking place on February 51 194.2,
106 By the IIUIDlller of 194.2 the 
position of the Central Intelligence Service was more or less one of sus-
pended animation, partly as the result of frequent changes of its direot-
ion, partly because it had not enjoyed the best relations with its British 
opposite number, the Secret Intelligence Service, A stu~ of Dutch intel-
ligenoe organizations was made at the request of the Minister-President, 
Dr, Gerbra:aly • with the result that the Central Intelligence Service 
•• abolished lllld in its place was substituted the Bureau Inliohtingen 
("'Intelligence Bureau") .1°7 The Intelligeme Bureau was placed under the 
control of the Minister of War, with import1111t charges made to try to en-
sure that reports gathered from the occupied terri tory W>Ul.d promptly 
reach the appropriate government deparbnents in London, a field in 'Which 
the old Central Intelligence Service had often left much to be desired, 
103oijxhoorn, loo, cit,, 19982, lO~~. IVa, appendix, v, 
lOSibid,, appendix, vii, 106Ibid,, appendix, viii. 
107Ibid,, appendix, x. 
An agency with a more speciali&ed purpose, the Bureau Voorbereid-
ing van de Terugkeer naar Nederland ("Bureau for the Preparation of the 
Return to Rolland"), was established on December 20, 1941.108 As its 
name :Implies• it was concerned with the ctolleotion of data pertinent to 
the eventual return of the Govel'lllllent to Holland. i'he Bureau for the 
Preparation of the Return thus wa.a not concerned with general intelli-
gence gathering. In May, 1942, the non-military aspects of its 1r0rk 
were transferred to the newly-created Departement voor .AJ.gemene Oorlog-
voering van het Koninkriik (~ar Conduct Department of the Kingdom"). 
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Its purely military functions were passed on to another new organization, 
the Bureau Militaire Voorbereiding Terugkeer ("Military Bureau for Prep-
aration of the Return").l09 
With the creation of the Intelligence Bureau, described above, that 
organization 'Was given sole control over agents to be sent to the occu-
pied territory.11° Before that time some had been sent by the Central 
Intelligence Service, and some by the Military Bureau for the Preparation 
of the Return, the latter organization often acting in eonjunotion 11'1 th 
the British Special Operations Ezeoutive, a body concerned almost entire-
ly with sa~tage activities rather than the gathering of intelligence. 
This division ot authority had often made for coBrdination that was either 
poor or entirely lacking. 
The Intelligence Bureau was instrumental in exploiting routes of 
communication to the occupied territory operated through neutral coun• 
tries, and maintained what it often called "observation poets" at Ber.ne, 
108Ibid., appendix, xvi. 109Ibid., appendix, ix. 
llOibid., appendix, xiv. 
Stockholm, Lisbon, and Madrid. When, in the fall of 1944, the Nether-
lands Government returned to Holland, following the liberation of the 
southern provinces, the Intelligence Bureau was able to establish 
offices in the south, at Eindhoven, from where communications with the 
remaining occupied territory were established.lll 
In a final development the Dutch established, on uarch 15, 1944, 
the Bureau Bi1zondere Opdrachten ("Special Service Bureau"), their own 
sabotage organization. The Special Service Bureau worked closely with 
its British counterpart, the Special Operations Executive. The Bureau 
was charged with sending agents to contact resistance organizations en-
gaged in sabotage work, as well as those agents sent to perform special 
sabotage assignments without enlisting the aid of specific groups.112 
The Various Types of Resistance Organization 
In the lerloon of many people in Holland the word "resistance" meant 
and continues to mean "armed resistance", used to describe those organ-
izations which engaged in active, more or less violent opposition to the 
enemy. Thus, by their definition, an organization which concealed fugi-
tives, as long as it had no "armed" aspects to its work, would not qual-
ify as a "resistance" organization. Suoh a body might be described as 
"illegal", or "clandestine" • or "underground", but not as "resistance" 
in oharaoter. The writer has used the word "resistance" in the broader 
sense, to denote all clandestine organizations engaged in the aot of 
opposing the oooupying power or aiding those who engaged in suoh oppo-
sition. 
lllThe northern provinces were liberated in Yay, 1945. 
ll2Eiq, IVa, 10. 
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Brief note must be made of the fact that souroas dealing with re-
sistance organizations are necessarily incomplete. Some resistance 
organizations maintained archives, although the risks involved made 
them the exceptions rather than the rule. Many potentially important 
witnesses did not survive. Some of those who did, in relating events 
already several years in the past, were often lees than completely ac-
curate. There was often a hUIIllUI. dulra to justify past actions. 
Thoaa resistance organizations whose primary function was that of gath-
ering intelligence information are dealt with in a subsequent section 
devoted to the intelligence activities of the London Government. The 
reader ahould not assume, however, that resistance organizations all 
confined themselves to a single type of activity. Some engaged in in-
telligence work and performed other tasks as well. 
While the phrase "resistanoe organization" conjures up a romantic 
picture, Dutch resistance organizations were often engaged in activ-
ities that were not immediately dramatic. 
unarmed resistance organizations included the clandestine press, 
those concealing persons, clandestine technical services wh1oh kept 
the Dutch transportation system in partial operation, the forgery of 
identity papers, am the supplying of money needed to finanoe all re-
sistance work. Only after mention of these types of activity, and 
the list is illustrative rather than inclusive, oan one add the more 
expected example of the armed resistance organization. 
The armed reshtanoe organisation was not nearly as prevalent as 
ana would suppose. That the requieite oourage was 110t laokiDg oan be 
sean in both the fact that daring acta of violence were entered into, 
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and in the risks taken Qy the various organizations already outlined. 
Faced with the sober realties of the occupation, discretion dictated 
moderation in a number of instances. There were few acts of sabotage 
that were worth the risks of reprisals, particularly the German habit 
of "stockpiling" numbers of hostages in anticipation of illegal sots. 
Since the persons selected as hostages were often prominent citizens, 
persons with unusual and varied professional skills, there was all too 
often the possibility that a given list of hostages might not only in-
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clude the innocent but might, quite unknown to the Germans, include 
vitally important resistance workers, thereby seriously crippling a spe-
cialized underground organization whose daily work might be of vastly 
greater importance than any simple act of violent resistance. Political 
assassination, that most potentially beneficial of all crimes against 
the person, was not nearly as attractive in the German-occupied Nether-
lands as elsewhere. As has been said, Dutch Nazis were, with few ex-
ceptions, persons of meager intellectual or professional attainment. 
Thus their removal soaroely seemed worth the effort. 
It must be noted that there was by no means total agreement 11111ong 
armed resistance organizations with the oonoept of moderation just ex-
pressed. While at least one military-type resistance organization felt 
that its main task was to maintain public order at the moment of liber-
ation, others believed that immediate, violent action taken against 
the occupying power was worth the risks, both to participants and to po-
tential hostages. The disorganization and demoralization that could be 
caused within ene~ ranks by such activity, it was argued, was greater 
than was commonly believed. The outcome of the war was by no means sure, 
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particularly in the first two yearS' or so of the occupation. Waiting 
until the moment of liberation to strike was senseless, they reasoned, 
if there was to be no liberation. Short of a total German victory, there 
was always the possibility that a negotiated peace might leave the ooun-
try either oooupied by or in a position subservient to Germany. 
As will be seen, one organization which was affiliated with the 
largest of the groups devoted to the concealment of persons, employed 
acts of violence in achieving limited objectives. 
The National Support Fund 
The );fationaal Steun-Fonds ("National Support Fund" or "1i.S .F."), 
which peid out several hundred million guilders to aid resistance organ-
izations and 1nd1v1duals, may have been the most important of all resist-
ance activities. Through its efforts many resistance activities flour-
ished which might otherwise have been unfeasible. The National Support 
Fund came into being originally with one special purpose in mind-- the 
granl;ing of aid to dependents in Holland of Dutch seamen in the Allied 
service. In a Radio Orange broadcast of April 17, 1941, Dutch Minister 
of Economic Affairs, Mr. Mo P. L. Steenberghe noted that German author-
it~ea had threatened Dutch sailora in the Allied service with the with-
drawal of support payments still being made to their families resident 
in Holland, should they continue in such service. It was in this con-
nection, Mr. Steenberghe stated, that the London Goverment stood ready 
to guarantee the eventual repayment of all sums adVanced in the ccoupied 
territory for the support of the dependents of merchant seamen in the 
Allied Service.ll3 
113!~, VIla, appendix, xxxi. l1ortions of this broadcast are to 
be found in the appendix to this dissertation. 
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In the occupied territory, an .Amsterdam banker, Mro Gijsbert van 
Hall, who had earlier organized a i'ur.d for survivors of those conduct-
ing a protest strike of February, 1941, set about arranging that relatives 
oi' seamen were paid regularly and that an accurate accounting of amounts 
disbursed was kept. It early oocurred to Mr. van Hall and his brother, 
who assisted him in this work, that the money paid out represented a 
claim against the Netherlar.ds Gover:mnent, and oould be used as seourity 
for a i'urther loan of funds to i'inance resistance activity. outright 
gifts were also paid into the fund, so that a sizeable surplus was aoou-
mulated. So it was that the National Support Fund came into being. The 
institution i'rom which it evolved had its origins in London,'.the struct-
ure was erected in the oooupied territory and, in due course, recognized 
by London. Even in this early period the National Support Fund was able 
to borrow modest amounts of money. Still the need was greater than the 
funds availableo114 
Mr. van Hall had known the Minister-President of the London Govern-
ment, Dr. Gerbrandy, before the war. It seemed likely to Mr. van Hall 
that, 1i' someo:ne who had his oonfidence were to travel to London and 
present the problem to Minister-President Gerbrandy, suitable guaran• 
tees oi' financial assistance 110uld be forthcoming. Suoh an individual 
was found in the person of Mr. H. P. L. Linthorst Homan, the Royal Colllll-
issioner for the Province of Friesland, who was about to undertake the 
perilous journey. Yro Linthorst Homan did arrive safely in London, at 
the end of 1943, and presented the problem to the Netherlands Govermnent 
there.115 
ll4G. van Hall, March 24, 1950, 77119. 115 Hall, loo. cit., 77123o 
As he reported to the Inquiry Commission after the war, Mr. Lint-
horst Roman was by no means certain that his efforts did, indeed, re-
sult in the rather massive support for the Fund which the London Gov-
ernment announced shortly after his arrival. He discussed the matter 
with various officials in the London Government, but persons other than 
himself, possibly the Minister oflrar, Mro 0. c. A· van Lidth de Jeude, 
may have been muoh more influential in the Whole matter. Mr. Linthorst 
Homan got the distinct impression that London had a more or less regular 
contact with the National Support Fund, through the intermediary of an 
intelligence agent 'llho employed radiotelegraphy. He received a tele-
gram from Holland, forwarded by the (Dutch) Intelligence Bureau, that 
clearly indicated his safe arrival was known in Holland a:nd, none too 
politely, inquired into the status of his mission to raise money for 
the resistance organizations 0 116 
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In any event, oopies of the following letter were soon delivered in 
Holland, carried on the person of a parachuted agenta 
War Conduct Ministry, 
Regent 2141. 
VERY SECRET 
Arlington House, 
Arlington street, 
London, s.w.l, 
10 January 1944. 
The Netherlands Government guarantees the repayment of a sum 
not to exceed thirty million guilders, which is intended for the 
support of persons in hiding, persons who have avoided reporting 
for internment as prisoners of war, persons avoiding the labor 
draft, for the support of their families, and for the support of 
related objectives to be expended at your discretion, with the 
understanding that there is to be made available immediately at 
most ten million guilders. The remainder (at most twenty million 
guildera) !.s not to be made available until your National Support 
Fund accounts of disbursements for a given period of time are 
reported to this office and approved here. 
116H. P. Linthorst Homan, August 23, 1950, 82588. 
The Minister of War Conduct. 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 
P. So GERBRANDYll7 
When the first ten million guilders had been expended. the National 
support Fund sent a request for authorization of the expenditure of the 
remaining twenty million. The reply. dated August a. 1944• was deliver-
ed by another agent parachuted into the occupied territory.ll8 
While distribution of the sum requested was authorized• London ex-
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pressed its concern at not having complete reports concerning the expend-
1 ture of the first ten million. At the same time 1 t broadened the scope 
of Fund activities which it intended to support: 
The Goveril!!lent 1lli shes to express as a goal• (the principle) 
that the money will be used for support of all persons who in any 
way find thamselves financially involved in resistance actiVity--
this is to apply equally to their dependent• or survivors. 
For further di atribution it is desirable. where possible• to 
to utilize existing organization• 1 the (National] Support Fund• 
the L.o •• and others. It ~rhould be ascertained 'to what degree the 
financial distribution agencies of Medisoh Contact ("Yedical 
Contaot"). those of the L. 0., and others oan be incorporated. 
The Government is aware th.t. in the interests of seo1rity• 
it is not feasible to keep accounts of the money paid to in-
divid!e.l persons or families. It will be satisfied with e. rough 
~ooounting of suma expended• at your discretion. 
The bearer of this letter is autho~ized to initiate an 
investigation. in aooordanoe with the above-enunciated principles• 
into the expe:aiiture of the firat ten million guilders. He will 
advise the Government of the further progress of the support 
aot!i.iri ty. 
Chairman of the Council of Ministera.liS 
117E~. VIla, 225. ll8Ibido• 226. 
119-IOide -The ~.O."' mentioned here refers to the Tendelijke 
anisatie voor e.an O:aie uiker ("'National Fugitive Aid 
organization • the largest of the groups devoted to the concealment 
of persona. 
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Mr·. van Hall reported to the Inquiry Commission that, the broad terms 
of the grant above notwithstanding, the National support Fund made a sub-
stantial effort to determine both the real needs and actual validity of 
prospective recipients of N.S.F. aid. Mr. van Hall has no doubt that 
this caused more than a little resentment, particularly among smaller 
resistance groups. When 01111 was undertaking dangerous v.o rk, it seemed 
like an insult to be asked the precise purpose to which aid was to be 
devoted and then to be asked for a subsequent accounting of funds ex-
pended. Mr. van Hall received the energetic and capable assistance of 
his brother in this work. His brother, unfortunately, did not survive 
the oooupation.120 
.lfter the twenty million guilder sum was also exhausted, some time 
in the fall of 1944. the need for a~ditional funds was rapidly on the 
increase. Communications with London were by no means certain, and the 
arrangement of additional authorintions -s always uncertain. After 
consultation with the College van Vertrouwenamannen ("'College of Bonds-
men•)l2l: it was decided to go ahead with the distribution of additional 
funds, the authorizations would simply have to follow. Follow they did. 
although they generally seemed to have trailed expenditures by a consid-
erable margin. The Railway Strike. alone, cost some seven to eight 
million guilders per month.I22 
After September, 1944, with the Allied liberstion of the southern 
provinces of the Netherlands, less accurate records were kept by the 
N.S.F. Mr. van Hall believes· that the organization had, by 'lf.ay, 1945 
12~~11~ loo. cit •• 77134. l2l:To be discussed later. 
l 22:Hall, loo. cit. 
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paid out 100 million guildera.l2Z 
Until September, 1944,. all receipt!t for n.s.F. aid were collected 
and recorded in a central card file in Amsterdam. This was done, as Mr. 
van Hall puts it, ~ ••• tess out of love for bookkeeping perfection ••• ~ 
than because the N.S.F. wanted to be certain that those persons supposedly 
in receipt of aid were, in fact, being paid regularly. Experience in mak-
ing payments to the dependents of seamen, the earliest of these aotivi-
tie!t• had shown that messengers sent to deliver funds soon developed the 
habit of deliberately arriving at irregular intervals, partly to avoid the 
very appearance of regularity. When it appeared that someone earlier in 
receipt of aid was not being paid, a letter of inquiry was promptly dis-
patched to the organization rnember!t concerned. The Allied invas-ion of 
September, 1944,. (the northern provinces remained under occupation till 
May. 1945). meant that centralized records could not be maintained. 
Accordingly, local National Support Fund officials were instructed to 
collect receipts on a local basis. By this time the number of persons 
receiving N.S.F. aid was in the tens of thousands.124 Many of the receipt!t 
themselve!twere standard, printed forms whioh, if they fell into German 
hands, would appear to be for payment of rent. others were prepared to 
resemble those of a life insurance company, complete with a· ,.damage!t 
paid for accidental injury"' table printed on the rear.125 
The N.S.F. dealt, essentially, in claims. It kept track of money 
advanced by private persons or institutions for the use of other private 
123~ ... 77135 
124The population of the European Netherlands at the time in que!t-
tion walt about 9.ooo,ooo. 
l25Hall• loc .. cit. 
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persons or institutions. In keeping track of creditors and the sums that 
would eventually be paid to them, it was obviously necessary to arrange 
aooount books in suoh a fashion as to make possible the future identifi-
cation of the persons in question and yet not maintain an incriminating 
list that could be seized by the Germans, makil:lg possible the apprehen-
sion of the persons in question. Mre van Hall recalled having considered 
the theoretical pcssiblity that he might be captured, his account books 
located, and their true purpose discovered. How could the idenbity of 
aooounts be preserved in an anonymous fashion? Initially, the lenders were 
identified with the sum due and a minute description of some personal 
possession of distinctive character. Then, on the future day of payment, 
the owner of the possession would simply offer it for identification. As 
the books of the N.S.F. took on the appearance of the records of a lost 
property department, a:rJother device was adopted: The creditors were 
identified with the sum due snd the serial number of a piece of paper 
currency which they held. This, Mr· van Hall explained, meant that no 
amount of German pressure could force him to disclose who held a one-
guilder note number such-and-suoh, for the simple reason that he did not 
know~ The holder could simply appear for "redemption" after the 1111.r.126 
Apart from its direct finanoial aid to individuals, the N.S.F. gave 
out a great deal of assistance to resistance organizations, some of 
which, in turn, aided individuals. A word describing the organizations 
receiving aid is, thus, in order. 
A major organization receiving N.S.F. assistance was the largest of 
those devoted to the concealment of parsons, the Landelijke Organisatie 
126Ibid. 
voor Hulp aan Onderduik:ers ("National Fugitive Aid Organization"', or 
"L.a.•). In an agreement reached in 1943 between Mr. van Hall of the 
N.S.F. and Messrs. Slomp, Dienske, and Coops, of the L.a., the N.S.F. 
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was to provide aid to the relatives of those who had gone into hiding, 
while the L.a. would be primarily responsible for the support of the 
fugitives themselves. The L.a. 1n those days was able to raise a oonaid-
arable amount of money through direct donations, including special church 
offerings aolleoted on their behalf. This money was expended with no ex-
pectation of repa:yment, whereas the N.S .F., of course, dealt largely in 
funds borrowed from individuals, 111. th po st1ar :repa:yment guaranteed. By 
the aummer of 1944, when the number of persona in hiding under L.a. 
auspices had reached truly staggering proportions, and was soon to be 
increased still further by the railway strikers, the organization was 
receiving fl 100,000 per month from the London-guarantee4 N&tional Support 
Fund. Part of this went for the support of an organization affiliated 
with the L.o., the Knokploegen Ploegen ("Kwokle Ga.Dg"), a strong-e.rm 
body devoted to breaking and entering buildings in search of ration stamps 
or cards, oommunity vital-statistics registers, and other documents needed 
for the survival of those in hiding,I27 
The underground press was a major recipient of N.S.F. aid •. J. number 
of different papers received N.S.F. tucds, although sane were :zwt aware 
of the source until after the war,128 
Those anned resistance movements receiving N.S.F. assistance were 
several. The Orde Dienst (•Order Service), a military organization, had 
as its principal goal, as much as one oan be certain, the maintenance of 
l27H. van Riseen, July 13, 1950, 81661. 128Hall, loc. cit., 77164. 
law and order at the time of liberation and the orderly restoration of 
civil authority. The Raad van Verz:et ("'Council of Resistance"), was 
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devoted to active sabotage, as well as physical violence directed against 
the persons of Dutch Nazis and German security police. The Nederlandse 
Binnenlandse Strijdkraohtep ("Netherlands Forces of the Interior"), was 
organized in 1944 on direct orders from the London Governnent. It was 
formed from three large military-type resistance organizations, the 
Order Service, the Council of Resistance, and the Knuckle GaDgso This 
Netherlands Forces of the Interior organization was to provide a militia 
for both combat and police 1111rk, to be employed at the time of Allied in-
~sion and liberation.129 
The National Support fund aided at least two organizations that were, 
in turn, primarily intended to oo8rd1Date the activities of various resist-
ance organizations. The N!tio•••l Comite van Verzet ("National Resistance 
Committe•"), placed particular emphasis both on the exchange of technical 
information between organizations and the problem of keeping the Duteh 
public sufficiently well informed of its role in resistance activ1 ty.130 
The Contact Commissie. ("Contact Commiasion•), was formed in 1944 at the 
request of the London Government, to oo8rdinate and, where possible, 
combine the activities of numerous resistance organizations, and to act 
as a sort of liaison betwe&'n the resistance organizations and the London 
Goverr:anent, both during the occupation and at the time of liberation.131 
Two organizations supplying special technical assistance received 
N.S.F. assistance. The Persoonsbswi.isoentrale ("Forgery Central"), an 
organization devoted to the G'Omplex job ot oounterfeiting an incredible 
129Ibid., 77156. 130Ibid., 77157. 131Ibido 
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variety of personal identity cards and official German doouments of every 
description, was almost entirely supported by the N.S .F • during its 
period of greatest aotivity.l3a The patura Group, also aided by the 
N.S.F., supplied food and clothing both to those engaged in resistance 
activity and to their dependents. It had its origins in an earlier 
operation which supplied these same commodities to the dependents of 
Dutoh seamen in the Allied service, the original beneficiaries of the 
Fund.l33 
The National SUpport Fund was very actively engaged in the &aaist-
anoe &nd support of intelligence-g&thering groups, some of which were in 
direot, almost daily contact w1 th London.l34 
A number of misoell&neoua- groups were also aided by the Nation&! 
Support Fund. That these organizations are placed in such a classifi-
cation h not to sugges-t that they were noessarily of minor importance. 
These included: Medisoh Verzet ("Medical Resistance"), made up, as its 
name implies, of physicians; KUnstenaarsteun ("Artist Support"). a group 
helping artists who did not wish to af:filiate themselves with the Nazi-
inspired Cultuurkamer ("Chamber of Culture"); frofessorenverzet ("Pro-
feasor Resistance"), for and by persons in academic life; and Student-
enverzet ("Student Resistame"), similar in character to Professoren-
verzet.l35 
An accounting of National Support Fund disbursements, broken down 
by recipients and believed to be reasonably accurate, is located on the 
following page. 
Neither the writer nor those persons who were active in the work: of 
the National Support Fund would like to leave the impression that the 
l 32Ibid., 77164. l33Ibid. • 77166 • l34Ibide l35Ibid., 77157 • 
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TABLE 1 
NA.TIONA.L SUPP~T FUND DISBUIISEMENTS 
Purpose .AIIIount in guilders 
Support of individual&•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 39, 000, 000 
"J"' Group, concealment of Jews•••••••••••••••••• 4, 500, 000 
National Fugitive Aid Organization•••••••••••••• 676, 000 
Aoademio, medical, cultural groups•••••••••••••• 837, 000 
Railway strike of 1944•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 37, ooo, 000 
Armed resistance organizations, including the 
Order Service, Council of Resistance, Knuckle 
Gang, and Netherlands Forces of the Interior.... 5, 200, 000 
underground press••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 531, 000 
Natura organization (food and clothing)......... 825, 000 
Intelligence-gathering organizations•••••••••••• 973, 000 
Various support groups under the supervision of 
the National FUgitivaAid Organization, not 
including the ":J"l' GrouP••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3, 000, 000 
Aid to the dependents of Dutch seamen in the 
Allied senioe••••••• ••••••••• ••• •••••·••••• •• ••• 
Forgery Central••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Total••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
5, 200, 000 
2. 500. 000 
100, 242, ooo136 
Fund was the only support organization or that all support funds were 
disbursed by it. NUmerous organizations were entirely self-supporting. 
Some organizations deliberately avoided ths N.S.F. as they feared the 
Fund's aooourrbing methods might place them in a hazardous position. In 
Meppel, for example, the N.S.F. was never active because the Meppelaren 
frankly said that they felt N.S.F. activities to be conducted in such a 
136Ibid. 
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fashion as to make detection~ the German security police too easily 
possible. There were several 
the southern provinces of the 
entirely separate 
137 Netherlands. 
support organizations in 
Since the National Support Fund was the main link between some re-
sistance activity within the occupied region and the London Government, 
N.S.F. "'security" was, indeed, a most important matter. Presumably the 
arrest of Mr. van Hall at aey time prior to September, 1944, partioul-
arly if some or all of his records were captured, would have done at 
least some damage to the organization. No doubt payments would have 
been continued, as they were after the Allied invasion of September, 
1944, following a greater decentralization of the accounting operation. 
As a matter of fact, as far as can be determined, no arrests of N.S.Fo 
personnel had any real influence on its work. A number of N.s.F. work-
era in Hilversum were arrested and executed, but the organization was 
sufficiently separated into individual "cells" so that a single arrest 
could not lead in turn to arrests in other regiona.138 
The Co~cil of Resistance 
While the precise date C!f the formation of the Raad van Verzet 
("Council of Resistance"), can not be determined it grew out of meet-
ings held in the second half of 1943. Instrumental in the founding of 
the Council was a famous resistance personality, Jan Thijssen, often 
called, lange Jan ("Long Jolm"). Thijssen headed the radio branch of 
the Order Service, which linked the Service not only with England but 
alae with its local affiliates in Holland. Thijssen had become in-
creaaillgly unhappy with the Order Service, and with its strategy of 
137rbid., 771ao. 138rbid., 77166. 
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reserving its main effort for the moment of liberation. Thijssen was 
willing to agree that the maintenance of peaoe and order at the time of 
an Allied invasion was important, but he regarded the successful con-
clusion of hostilities against the Germans as of even greater importance. 
To this end acts of sabotage and armed resistance se1111ed to be of more 
immediate value.l39 
The Council, as it was originally organized by Thijssen, was intended 
to co8rdinate the work of small, local groups. Arter the fashion of maey 
another resistance organization the Council came into being as a body of 
co8rdination and developed into a full-fledged operating organization in 
its own right.l40 
The Council did include, among other bodies, the Communist resistance 
organization, the Militaire Groep (~ilitary Group"). The Military Group 
was brought into the Council by one of its own founders, Gerben Wagenaar, 
'Who subsequently became a leading personality on the Council. The Group 
had yet aJJother name, one bestowed on it by Dutch-speaking German security 
police, MOord Central (~urder Central"), in recognition of the tact that 
it sometimes eliminated German personnel, as well as sabotaging Gennan 
communications end installations.141 The C~ists did not, however, 
come to dominate the Council of Resistance, as they did a number of other 
resistance movements in various German-occupied countries. The presence 
of Communists on the Council, plus the fact that the Council was oriented 
to the left of center quite apart from anything else, was a cause of 
concern, both in Holland and in England. One could say most accurately 
that the Council tended to "submerge" its Communist members, rather than 
139J. A· Engel, November 12, 1954, 98803. 140Ibid., 98805 0 
141G. Wagenaar, December 19, 1951, 95219. 
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the reverse taking place. 
Thijasen, Wagenaar, and Jacob van der Gaag, a geophysicist employed 
by the }lataafsohe Petrole~m~ Yaatsohappij ("Batavian Petroleum Corpora-
tion") 1 made up the high OoiDID&nd of the Council. .All three travelled ex-
tensively and came into frequent contact with the leadership of local 
groups. Jan Thijaaen, with hie experience gained as head of Order Serv-
ice radio communications, set up the Council's radio system, which served 
to link the organization with London and to interconnect various Council 
branches within the Netherlams, 1n much ths same fashion as the radio 
division of the Order Service. Council meetings held at the top level 
were presided over by Jan Thijssen. Items likely to appear on the 
agenda included sabotage assignments, 1nformation on aiding fugitives; 
the supply of ration cards and coupons; current oha~es in identity 
papers, am related subjects. To the Order Service, with its military 
members, the Council was incredibly badly organi~ed. There was no neat 
chain of oommand, with corresponding channels for transmission of mate-
rial from below to headquarters. There was no general staff, other than 
the Council itself, and there were no orderly promotions on the basis of 
seniority. A local Council commander might be a Dutch army officer who 
had gone "'mderground", lut he would have to prove himself to be a capa-
ble officer for Council purposes before he was chosen, and he might as 
easily find himself serving llllder a grocery deli very boy who had proven 
to be better qualified for the task in question.I4a Added light on the 
exact "character" of the Council appeared after World War II in testimony 
given by Mr. van der Gaag.ll43 
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'J. van der Gaag, March 31, 1950, 77763. 
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Portions of this testimony are to be found in the appendix. 
In Ootober, 1943, the London Governnent received from the oooupied 
territory a rather fiery Council MRnifesto, the work of Jan Thijssen, 
which urged the populace to aid in acts of resistance; castigating 
those who in one way or another stood in the path of resistance work, 
and offering practical suggestions to those who would confound the 
occupying power.144 The M!nifesto had been transmitted to London on 
microfilm, through the "SWiss Route", operated in Geneva by the Dutch 
General Secretary of the World Council of Churohea, Dr. w. A. Visser 
•t Hoof't:. J,coOlllpanying the Manifesto was a commentary supplied by the 
.Amsterdam terminus of the SWiss Route, operated by the staff of the 
clandestine newspapers, vrq Nederland ("Free Netherlands"). The 
commentary described the plans of the Council as "pretentioua" and 
indicated that the Council enjoyed the support of Communists.l45 
In a series of telegrams exchanged between the London Government 
and the Order Service, London first inquired into the reliability of 
the Cou:noil of Resistance and then advised the Order Service that an 
organization of the London Goverment would shortly place itself in 
contact with the Council directly. The Order Service, for its part, 
characterized the Council as having a tendency to aot rashly, but did 
not, in the exchange in question, aaoribe to the Council a questionable 
political charaoter.l46 
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London apparently did :not consider the Council of Resistance to be a 
Communist-dominated organization. Kinister-President Gerbrandy reported 
l'"Elq, VIIa, 267. Excerpts of the Manifesto are in the appendix. 
l45Ibid. Excerpts of the "cover• letter from the staff of I..tlJ. 
Nederland (Amsterdam) are in the appendix. 
l46BNQ, VIIa, 268. 
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that the impression in London, particularly as time went on, was that 
the Council _, .,.oriented to the le.t't"' .. but walt non..Coiii!I1Unist in nature. 
This feeling Walt strengthened late in 1944 with the arrival in London 
of Mr. van der Gaag, of the Council. Vander Gaag was. in the l'«lrds 
of Dr. Gerbrandy ...... certainly no Communilttl"-147 
That London came to accept the Council of Re~ristance is a mmple 
fact. It dispatched nunilers of agentS' with the express task of working 
with and aiding the Council. It gave the Council specific sabotage 
assignments and furnished it with the weaponS' and supplies· necessary 
for their completion. Agents dropped came from both the Intelligence 
Bureau and from the Dutch Special Servi oe Bureau,. the sabotage agency 
organized in 1944.148 
London's freight ••shipments"' pre~rented lll!l.l:ly problems. Allied 
aircraft were. first of all• faced with the problem of reaching a given 
point in the Netherlands--no easy matter when conditions of war made 
many ordinary radio navigationa;l devices unfeaaible, when a (Jerman-
imposed blackout extinguished nearly all light& in a country with 
pra;otioa.lly no distinctive landmarks as viewed from the air. "Check"' 
pointlt often were lakes • river~r. or canal intersections. and there 
are a great many of these in Holland. Te Allied airmen they often 
seemed all alike. 
A prospective "'dropping,. terrain had to be chosen with very great 
care indeed. If the adjoining property was awned by a Dutch Nazi 
the l1lr"'8a in question was, obviovsl'Y., unsuitable. It had to be suffi-
147P. s. Gerbrandy, July 21, 1953, 97670. 
l48Engel, loa. cit •• 98832. 
oiently secure so that heavy. bulky consignments of arms, mrumunition~ 
explosives. and the like could be removed for storage rmd distribution. 
Shipments had to be prepared in such a way that they could be brol£en 
down into loadlt which one person, often not in very good physical condi-
tion, could oar;ry. By 1943 private vehicles were virtually all out of 
operation. The mere use of a motor vehicle 110uld have been enough to 
arouse very great su~rpioion. 
Blinking lights were used to guide air or aft to "dropping'" 8i tes 
lit first, then a triangular formation of dim red lights was imployed. 
Visible red light was later supplanted with invidble infra-red sources,, 
which could be made visible to Allied aviators by means of a special 
viewer. 11. final refinement came in the form of a British-designed radio 
transmitter, oe.J.led "Eureka"', which was supplied to ground parties and 
directed aircraft to its location by broadcasting automatically a tight 
"bundle"' of very high frequency wavu directed in a narrow arc skyward. 
Altogether the material delivered to the Council of Resistance 
must have been on the scale of thousands of weapons and corresponding 
quantities of explosives expressed in kilograms.149 
Clandestine arms shipments were not only intended for receipt by 
the Council, but were also dispatched for the use of the Knuckle Gang, 
a dater organization of the National Fugitive. Aid Organization. 
In the middle of April, 1945• the German Reichs-commisaioner for 
the occupied Netherlands, Ji.rtur Seyss-Inquart, let it be known that 
he was willing to enter into negotiations with a Dutch representative. 
Mr. van der Gaag, of the Council of Rea·istance, was chosen as the 
149one kilogram equals z.z pounds. 
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the Dutch emissary, and crossed from the liberated south into the oc-
cupied territory. Mro van der Gaag held conversations with Seyss-
Inquart who, while he was not yet prepared to surrender, was willing 
to make certain concessions, on specified conditions. Seyse-Inquart 
was willing to permit food shiiJllents to travel to the large Dutch 
oitiea, Where a German embargo on such shipments, instituted in re-
taliation for a strike by Dutch railway workers, had resulted in wide-
spread starvation. In return the Allies were to promise, for the time 
being, not to try to oooupy the northeru and western parts of the Neth-
erlanda. If these conditions were not met, Seyss-!nquart threatened, 
explosive charges placed on dikes 'II'Ould be detonated in such a fashion 
as to flood a number of places in the occupied territory. The Allies 
had ten days in which to aooept these conditions. Mr. van der Gaag, 
proceeding under German "'safe oonduot" arrangements which he did not 
entirely trust, returned to the unoccupied territory and delivered 
the German terms which were forwarded to the SUpreme Headquarters 
Allied Expeditionary Force. General Eisenhower announced aooeptanoe 
of the German conditions, providing they were not referred to in writing 
as "conditione", shortly before the expiration of the time limit. This 
agreEI!Ient, as it turned out, was largely meaningless, as it went into 
force at the end of April, 1945, leas than a week before the final 
German capitulation. That this would be the case was by no means oar-
tain when M.r. van der Gaag entered into the negotiations, however. 
The Council, which greatly assisted van der Gaag in this enterprise, 
deserves considerable credit for the successful conclusion of a del-
icate series of negotiationa.150 
lSOGaag, loo. oit., 77873. 
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Me:ation must be made of the dhagreement which existed between the 
Council of Resistance and the Order Service. This was a feud of classic 
proportions, one that was reflected, at times, in London policies. 
71 
Sources of the disagreement were various. One was clearly based on 
differing philosophies of resistance. To the Council the Service's basic 
plan, that of reserving its main effort for the moment of an Allied in-
vasion, represented a waste of personnel and materials. With the war yet 
to be brought tc a successful conolua:l.on, the Service "sat" on precious 
stocks of arms and ammunition. To the Service; the Council's policy of 
active, armed resistance before any invaaion or hint of Ge:nnan departure 
was simply reckless. Many acts of sabotage or violence, the Order Service 
believed, did little to further an Allied victory and might call forth 
excessive Ge~ reprisals. Another source of discord was ideological. 
The Council regarded the Service as authoritarian, more or less reaction-
ary, and sometimes suspected that the Service planned to establish a 
military dictatorship after the Allied liberation. To the Service the 
Council appeared to be under the domination, if not of Communists, of men 
of the extrsne lett. Another source of friction lay in differing philos-
ophies of the proper organization of a resistance body. To the Council 
the staff and chain of command of the Order Service seemed most unwise. 
It might be a proper arrangement for the Dutch armed forces but it was 
reckless for a ol&Ddestine organization. German arrests of any personnel 
of the higher echelons could too readily lead to the demise of large parts 
of the entire body. To the Order Service the loosely-articulated, some-
times informal relationships involved 1n the Council's plan of organ-
izations were very badly adapted to the tasks at hand. It the CoW!.Cil 
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had to maintain a campaign of active warfare at least it should try to 
take advantage of the accumulated experience of the military in this 
regard. .A. personal factor served to divide the two organizations. Jan 
Thijssen, the founder and head of the Council of Resistance, was not one 
to brook criticism. He had a talent for underground work, this was gen-
erally agreed, but many people found him difficult to work with, in-
eluding some in his own organization. He was often at odds with Colo-
nel Six of the Order Service. 
The Order Service had a special grievance having to do with weapon 
deliveries. Since the Service was not the direct recipient of arms 
shipments from London, it was agreed in meetings between the Service, 
the Council, am the Knuckle Gang that some of the weapons received by 
the latter two organizations would be shared with the Service. This 
agreement was not, apparently • adhered to .151 
ior, 
Mention has already been made of the Netherlands Forces of the Inter-
152 created on September 4, 1944, established so that the big 
resistance organizations, the Council of Resistance, the Order Service, 
and the Knuckle Gang might be accorded combatant status by the enemy. 
London may very well have had another motive in placing these bodies in 
the seme organization, that of neutralizing the suspicions that they had 
of each other and, as well, any political ambitions they harbored. 
London did hope that the three organizations might work together more 
harmoniously under this new arrangement. This hope was not entirely 
151Engel, loo. cit., 98780. 
152n • .A.. van Hilten, Van Capitulatie tot Capitulatie (Leiden: 
.A.. W. Sijthoff, 1949) P• 244. 
realized, as will be seen.l53 
While His Royal Highness, Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, -s 
llllllled as Commander-in-chief o:f the Ns1:berlands Forces o:f the Interior, 
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it was also necessary to :find a commander to serve as his deputy in the 
occupied territory. This was no easy task. Since the o:f:fioer in question 
would be dealing with resistance workBra it was :felt preferable to choose 
someone who had apen:t the "nr years in ooeup!.ed Holland. He should be o:f 
sufficient stature to command respect and yet not be at:filiated, i:f this 
could possibly be avoided, with any o:f the three organizations comprising 
the Foroea o:f the Interior. Moreover, since it was expected that the 
Forces might engage in combat, the commander tor the oooupied terri'tt>ry 
should haVe tol'!n&l mil1 "tiary experience. Since & nUDber o:f high Dutch 
o:f:fioers were in prisoner-of-war oampa, finding suoh an individual was 
no easy task. ot those qualified, maey had soma :formal &:ftiliation with 
the Order Service. The persons required was lceated in the person o:f 
General Henri Koot, a reserve ot:ficar in the Netherlands East Indies 
J;rmy, who was accordingly appointed. General Koot was not in any way 
& part of the Order Service, although as an of:fioer in the military 
serTice he had many personal contacts with order Service members. Even 
an indirect oonneotion with the order Servioe was enough to make the 
Council uneasy about General Koot. The Council simply did not completely 
trust the "military mind"'• 
By the tall o:f 1944 Jan Thijsun h&d had a :falling out with hh own 
organization all4 was no longer its head. Since he was a man o:f undoubted 
ability in the :field o:f resistanoe work, e:f:forts ware made to :find a 
153 Gaag, loa. oit., 7718~. 
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position 110rthy of his talents. l:le declined an offer of the post of 
head of or~iDance of the Foroea of the Interior, on the grounds that he 
was more of a combat commander and leaa suited for such a task. He pro-
bably also regarded the post as a more minor one than he d'eaerved.154 
Ef'forta ware still being made to find an acceptable role for JIUl 
Thijssen when, aa he was driving between Amsterdam and Rotterdam, he was 
arrested by German seourity police. He was eventually executed.155 
MQch baa been said about the alleged "betrayal"' of Jan Thijssen. 
Some persona reported that ;the German security police had been told in 
advanoe of the route and time of his last trip. The Council said he had 
been betrayed by the Order Service, or at least hinted as much. The 
Service thought it likely that Communists had done the deed. The writer 
baa heard persistent rumors indicating that the German officers arresting 
Thijssen had no advance warning of his route, itinerary, or eTen that he 
was to be present. According to this version the vehicle Which he waa 
driving was stopped for a routine check and the investigating officer 
recogni.r;ed Thijssen from photographs appearing on "Wanted" posters which 
had been widaly circulated.lS6 
A description of the Council of Resistance, particularly as regards 
its relations with the London Government, would not be complete without 
a few notes on the Rotterdam Council of Resistance. 
The Rotterdam branch of the Council of Resistance oame into being at 
about tha same time as the rest of the organization. It enjoyed a oon-
154 ~oogeweegen, loa. cit., 96103. 151L ~Wagenaar, loo. oit., 95228. 
156rhe writer has been unable to confirm this latter aoooUJTt, al-
though he believes it to be the correct version of what transpired. 
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siderable degree of independence from the Counoil•s national organiza-
tion, indeed, after the death of Jan Thijssen, Rotterdam had no ready 
oontaot with the rest of the organization. Jan Thijsaen alone kept the 
body in touoh with the headquarters in Amsterdam. The Rotterdam Council 
of Resistame felt itself more \Blder the command of IDndon than of Amst-
erdarn.I57 IDndon had assigned it certain specific tasks, in particular 
it was charged with the protection, particularly against German sabotage, 
of the electrical, water, and gas works, as well as other speoifio objeo-
tiveu.l58 The Rotterdam Council of Beaistance had ita own "dropping 
area"' tor the receipt of arms ahipnents from !Dndon, and its own radio 
oomrnuni cations with IDndon. It was to a oonaidera ble extent finano ially 
self supporting.l59 On several oooasions IDndon even sent instructors 
to train Rotterdam Council workers in the use of firearms, explosives, 
radio equipment, and other needed 8kills.l60 
Co8peration between the Rotterdam Council and other organizations 
in the port oity appears to have been excellent. A division of labor 
was made with the K:D;uokle Gang, whereby eaoh organization would be respon-
sible for oertain tasks. One would see to the intermittent, "accidental" 
sinking of 1111all boats so as to obstruct German mvigation in the port, 
the other would protect the vital vehicular tunnel under the Maas (Meuse) 
River, and so on. A unified command of the two organizations was set up 
under Mro Staal, the Comrnhdoner of Police in Rotterdarnol61 
Rotterdam was the one plaoe, possibly the only plaoe, where the 
Counoil and the Order Service 110rked well together. This may have been 
l57Hoogeweegen, loo. cit., 96099. 158Ibido 
169 T .A.W. Buys, January 16, 1952, 95543. 160Ibid., 95568. 
l6~oogeweegen, loo. oit., 96088. 
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due in part to the fact that the personality of Jan Thijssen was less in-
volved with the Rotterdam seem. While Thijssen was. as has been said. 
virtually the sole tangible link between the Rotterdam Council and the 
organization elsewhere, Rotterdam Council workers had much leas contact 
with Thijssen than those at other places in Holland. This history of 
ooBperation in Rotterdam was of epeoial value to London when the time 
came to join the Council, the Order Service. and the Knuckle Gang in the 
Netherlands Forces of the Interior. This combination was achieved much 
more harmoniously and much more rapidly in Rotterdam than elsewhere.I622 
The Order Service 
Something of the character of the Qrde Dienst ('"Order Service") has 
been presented in eonneetion w.l.th the dilausBion of the Council of Resist-
ance. While its avowed purpose, during mat of its history, was the 
performame of certain tasks at the thne of German departure and/or Allied 
invasion, the Order Service c!id, in fact, engage in various activities 
prior to liberation. One of its principal contributions, that of 
operating a highly efficient espionage network forthe benefit of the 
London GoTerlllllent. will be desori bed in a fortheoming section dealing 
with intelligence organizations. 
The Order Service was best known to the operators of the "Swiss 
Route". the clandestine network that forwarded material from Holland to 
London via SWitzerland. for its having .pied on the latter organization 
for a protracted period. This episode will be dealt with brieny in 
connection with a discussion of the Swiss Route. 
After the manner of so man;y other organizations one of the earliest 
l62rbid., 96112. 
purpoltelt of the Order s-ervice• which ree:lly came into being in late 
J'uly or .August;,. 1940• ,_to ooBrdinattt the activities- of other resis-
tanoe organiza-tions. One of the fotmders was Lt. General Willem R&ell,. 
who seema to have given the order service its name. The or1gina.l 
intent of the Order s-ervice eoon came- to be modified, so that it walt 
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that of creating a s-ort of clmdestine a.rmy that would, when it a;ppeared 
Ill; all ponible, ejeot the German ocoupyi:ag force. It waar lliltiJUJJied that 
thiar would be done in oonneotion with an invasion, real or threatened, 
by British forces. General Rhll felt it expedient to let it be known 
that the- tad: of the Order Service was the maintenance of peace and 
order within the country ones the Germans- departed, whatever the reason 
for &Uch a departul"tt might be. This- was intended as 11 10cover10 story • 
a.ooording to General Rhlll• ainoe it .._d J!II'Obable that the Germans 
~ld learn of the orgmhation,. and would be less likely to take- severe 
countermeas-ures; if such a limited purpon !teemed to be the true intent 
163 
of the organimtion'•' foundera. This veraion of the Order s-erv1oe•a 
raison d•~a -:y have aa:ved General R8e1Its life. Be:fore the end of 
.tugus-t,. 1940• he was in the German concentration oemp at Buchemald,. 
trying to further clarify the position of the organiz-ation. 
When I 11&8 in Buchenwald the gentlemen asked me: '"Is- it: 
your intention to create a new an~T!"' I replied: '"I'd be glad 
to try 11' you would give me some weapons,. but with pitchforks 
and !tickles; this- unf'ortumrtely illn•t po&sible."'l64 
General Rl!'ell•&· position at Buche maid was apparently s:> mething 
len than that at' an ordinary prilr03er. The Germans, who habitually 
referred to him as- their "'guest"' • were collecting prominent Dutchmen 
l6ZL 
-w • R8ell, Qotober lM, 1951, 94337 • 164Ibid. 
&It hostageEt., in reprisal for the internment in the Netherland~~< East 
Indies of numbers of German nationals· reddent there. One such hostage., 
and fellow prisoner with R8di.,- a former Dutch East India: phydcia:a.. 
who carefully mchooled General R!'ell in the symptoms of a heart art:taa:tr: .. 
so that such manifestationm could be reported to the Germans. They were 
so reported and General R88Il 1a oaptorEt promptly returned h~ to Holland 
i . 165 via a. special railway oar and took h 111 to hls home. 
While Rlell ·had been released by the Germans, the Order Service 
'!IlL$ naturally rather reluctant to attempt to make contact with him. 
Genel'lll R8ell did oonta«* the orga:airlation through the agency of hia 
aon-in-1-. Johann Sch:bmnelpezminck. a wine dealer who was studying for 
a graduate degree in eoonomiclt. Bl!l'ell•~~< mucansor as commander of the 
Order Service was Lieutenant Colonel Westerveld,. who continued in· this-
capacity until his own arrest in jpril of 1941.16" 
In the aeoond or third week of June. 1941. the Order Service ._,., 
IUII&lgamated with a larger organization, the Legioe Oud Frontaoldaten 
("'Legion of Old Front Soldiers11')• The resulting organization continued 
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the lUL1Il8 of the Order Service. The Legion of Old Front Soldiers, &Coord·-
i:ng to one of its founders,. l!r. J. J;. van Heerde, was founded imme-
dia-tely after the capitulation of 1940,. with the purpose of continuing 
hostilities by means of armed reeistanoe. A service to engage in espion-
age and to set up radio contact with England was re.lso planned by Mr. 
van Heerde, then employed by the Department of Publio Works in the Hague. 
Mr. van Heerde worked closely in this effort with his friend and coll-
eague., Mlr. de T"ourton Bruij~~~;~, of A)nsterdarn. The Legion felt that it111 
mission included the creation of an armed force that could rise and 
fight the Gemans at the correct moment, preall!l&bly at the time of an 
.l].lied invasion. The Legion appears to have differed from the orcrer 
Service 1n that the former organization felt that acts of armed resist-
ance prior to the time of an invasion might well be worth carrying out 
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in certain circumstances, whereas the Order Service is generally believed 
to have felt that the risks attendant on suoh activity did not justify 
possible aooomplisbnenta. The Legion had !.e.Vt.ilable some 180,000 rifles, 
hidden in a military small-arms cache located near Sohiphol (Amsterdam) 
Airport. The Legion constructed and tested clandestinely a number of 
highly successful flamethrowers. Carefully engineered components were 
actually supplied by the Germans, who labored under the illusion that 
the project in question was legally manufacturing, "••. a mw type of 
installation for spraying and ridding Dutch agriculture of troublesome 
insect pests ••• "· There was, Mr. van Heerde observed, a certain amollllt 
of trust in this desoription.167 
The Legion actually had very limited contact with London. It had, 
just at the time of merger with the Order Service, supplied some espi• 
onage material to Mr. J. J. Zomer, a parachuted agent of the (Dutch) 
Central Intelligence Servioe.l68 
The Legion, during the twelve or thirteen months of its separate 
existence, never received any direct material assistance from London, 
nor did it receive any aid from the National Support Fund.l69 Arrests 
of both Order Service and Legion officers took place with increased 
frequency during this period.l70 
167J. A. van Heerde, October 24, 1951, 94292. 
168s~, IVa, appendix, lxviii. 169Heerde, loc, cit, 170Ibid, 
Following the arrest or Colonel Westerveld, in April of 1941, the 
Order Service oame under the command or Lt. Colonel Versteegh of the 
Royal Constabulary. Colonel Versteegh was assisted in this work by 
Colonel Quarles van Ufford who, in spite of very poor health, continued 
to serve almost until his death, which occurred in March, 1942. Colonel 
Versteegh brought into Order Service work Colonel Pieter J. Six, who 
became Chief of Staff of the Order Service District for Amsterdam.171 
Since Colonel Versteegh considered his own arrest as inevitable, he 
trained as his adjutant Jonkheer Johann Sohimmelpenninok, who was to 
serve as his sucoessor.l72 
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This provision turned out to have been a wise one, as Colonel 
Versteegh was arrested on September 12, 1941. Jonkheer Sohimmel-
penninok, who had long been active in Order Service affairs, assumed 
command. Often designated by the code name, "Uncle Alexander", presum-
ably because he lived on the Uexanderstraat in the Hague, Jonkheer 
Schimmelpenninok provided a vigorous, expert leadership for the brief 
period in 'Wbioh he was in oomma.nl. He, in turn, was arrested by the 
Germans in Iiovember, 1941. The next commander, who served on an "acting" 
basis, was Midshipnan G. A. Dogger or the Royal Netherlands Navy. The 
Order ~ryice was rapidly exhausting its supply or offioers.l73 
Colonel Six, who held a reserve commission in the Royal Cavalry, 
found himself approached by two officers of the Order Service, Navis, 
an artillery Lieutenant of the Netherlands East Indies Army, and Cornet 
of Cavalry, Dudok van Heel. Messrs. Navis and van Heel were, it appeared 
empowered to offer Colonel Six no less than the perilous pleasure of 
171p. J. Six, loc. cit., 98612£f. lT.arbid. 173rbid. 
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succeeding Midshipman Dogger who, by some miracle, had survived as acting 
Order Service Commander from November, 1941, until January, 1942, when he 
departed for England on a special mission. Colonel Six at first declined 
the offer, saying, "You must have a staff officer." He was told, a little 
tartly, that the surviving "staff" consisted in toto of Navis and van Heel. 
Thus he was the ranking officer.174 
Colonel Six assumed his new duties as Commander of the entire Order 
Service. Among the more pressing matters facing him was the need for 
establishing some sort of regular oontaot with the London Government. 
Midshipman Dogger's mission was thus of vital importanoe.l75 
Dogger departed for England on the night of January 30, 1942, 
together with Peter Tazelaar, who had earlier arrived in Holland as a 
part of a special mission sent by the London Goverrnnent, a matter to be 
discussed presently. They travelled by rail to Switzerland, thence to 
Bilbao in Spain, 'Where, "Thanks to the stinginess of the Netherlands 
Consular Service," they ran out of money. The Netherlands Consul in 
Bilbao, a l!r. Blitz, regarded Dogger and Tazelaar as persons of very 
little importance, and in several afternoon conferences refused to give 
more than the barest financial support for the continuation of their 
joumey. They finally proceeded on their way as cremnen of an antique 
Spanish merchant vessel, the Cabo de Hornoso They left the Cabo de Hornos 
at Lisbon and reported to the Dutoh Legation, where they were given air 
passage to London.176 
Dogger arrived in England at a time when an active Netherlands 
intelligence service soaroely existed. This did nothing to facilitate 
174rbido 175Ibido 17~1;q, VIIa, 240-245. 
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the speed or efficiency with which his mission was handled. He was soon 
granted e.n audience by !rer Majesty Queen Wilhelmine., 'Who urged that 
he prepare e. report on the Order service. Dogger complied with this 
request, and submitted his report on April 17, 1942.177 
One might have expected that the Dogger report would have caused e. 
certain amount of consternation in Landon. With its naive distrust of 
political parties and its faith in e. militaristic organization headed by 
either one or three men, the Order Service, as described by Dogger, must 
have seemed like the ideal of all mUite.ry autocrats every'Where. Surely 
no one with any olee.r understanding of the role of political parties in 
a democracy would seriously have proposed such a device as the Reo0llllll8l1d• 
e.tiona Committee, to consist, in part, of political leaders who would be 
expected to give public endorsement to the every act and pronouncement 
of the ruling clique. 
Certainly in the Order Service view of things as presented by Dogger 
the London Governnent had a limited future. It was, first of all, asked 
to supply various sorts or aid to the Order Service, then it was expected 
to step gracefully aside while the Service provided a "temporary" admin-
istration, since Hollanders would not want to be governed by those who 
had spent the war years outside of the European Votherle.l'ldo At some in-
definite time in the future a "reborn" kingdom was then to be proffered 
to Her Majesty the Queen. One is led to suepect that, whatever Mid-
shipnan Dogger's strong subjects at the Royal Netherlands Naval .A,cad-
EIIIlY may have been, constitutional law was not among them. In Holland, 
as in the United Kingdom, the monarch is in actual fact merely ceremonial 
177 Portions or this report are to be found in the appendix. 
head of state, This being the case, llhat of the political regime that 
would actually form the real Netherlands government, when the arisen 
kingdom was finally to be "returned" by the patriotic Order Service to 
the House of Orange? 
The plain fact of the matter is that there were a number of things 
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in the Dogger report of which other members of the Order Service had never 
heard, The Triumvirate, for example, while apparently discussed by some 
Order Service personnel as a theoretical possibility, never existed as a 
formalized institution in the sense described in the Dogger report. 
Jonkheer R8ell, one of the founders of the Order Service, and the person 
who gave the organization its name, had never heard of the Triumvirate 
until the Inquiry Commission asked him about it after the war.l78 
To the extent that Dogger overstated the authoritarian aspects of 
the Order Service he may have done the organization a positive disservice 
in London. Yet, as will be seen in another section, there were repeated 
reports of alleged Order Service designs on the democratic life of the 
postwar kingdom, usually emanating from other resistance organizations, 
so that London 110uld never have lacked such accounts. 
Some indication of the spirit in which the Dogger report was received 
in London can be inferred from the treatment accorded !Iidshipnan Dogger. 
Arter his reception by Queen Wilhelmina, and after he rendered his report 
and was interviewed by various intelligence organizations, he was for some 
time simply ignored, His only source of sustenance for a 'lilile aeems to 
have been funds given him by the head of the British Special Operations 
Executive. Colonel Rabagliatti, an organization with which Dogger had no 
17~oell, loa. oit., 94344. 
formal oonnection.l79 
Dogger was finally attached to the War Conduct Ministry where, on 
August 1, 1942, he received e. commission in the Netherlands Navy. He 
was subsequently detached for duty with the Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and sent to Gibraltar as Vice-consul, to help deal 
with the growing ntmber of Dutch refugees who were appearing in Spain 
and finding their way to the British fortress. As the result of a 
rather incredible mistake Dogger never reached Gibraltar. He was mis-
understood by the Netherlands Legation in Lisbon as having been sent 
as a replacement for their departed First-secretary, Mr. Luna. AO-
cordingly, Dogger served as First-secretary of the Dutch Legation until 
March or April of 1943, when he requested and was granted a return to 
active sea duty. Dogger was later to feel that "political consider-
ations" had prevented more serious attention being given to his report, 
to his personal future in intelligence work, or to the creation in Lon-
don of closer links with his beloved Order Service.lBO 
Aside from the treatment accorded Dogger after he presented his 
report, other evidence of London's reaction to this document is avail-
able. Minister-President Gerbrandy said this about the Dogger report: 
Gerbrandy: It was repeatedly e. point of discussion in the 
Government. Therein was reported the entire history of the Order 
Service. We had just about come to the conclusion, perhaps an 
incorrect one, that the Order Service inteDded to maintain peace 
and order just after liberation and was not, in the ordinary 
sense of the word a "combat" resistance organization, as many 
people believe [it to have been] today. 
Question: You did not see the Order Service as a "combat" 
organization in the same sense as the Council of Resistance or 
the Knuckle Gang? 
179G. A. Dogger, February 16, 1949, 41409. lBOibid., 41412. 
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Gerbrandy: It oame down to about that, yes. 181 
Minister-President Gerbrandy aould remember that the Lahdon 
Government was greatly disturbed by the authoritarian appearance of the 
Order Service. Some of his colleagues had used the word "fascist" in 
this oonneotion. Dr. Gerbrandy 'Wished it made clear that he himself bad 
always had "faith" in the Order Servioe.l82 
That London's suspicion of the Order Service was not uniformly 
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shared by all Dutch Ministers oan been seen in a telegram which the Order 
Service reoeived from the Netherlands Minister of War in London, on 
August 13, l943t 
From Minister of War to G.H~. Order Service: 
Consider every action you take with eye towards forming a 
nucleus of authorized administrative persons, approximately 
40 in number, trained and prepared, to be replaced after short 
service, then to serve, if needed, as advisers. 
Can you also provisionally keep in mind the possibility of 
supplying the following persons: 
First: Twenty officers or militarized civilians with general 
experience, at least 40 years of age, for high office in provinces 
and large cities. 
Seoond: For eaoh province one to three individuals to govern 
medium-sized cities. 
Third: For eaoh province three to twelve authorized officers 
or civilians, to be militarized, possessing general knowledge. 
Persons in the first category would serve under a military 
government, those in the seoond and third categories 110uld be 
under the1~!rection of those ohosen for service in the first category. 
The Order Service apparently considered this communication from the 
lBlp. S. Gerbrandy, December 13, 1954, 98915. 
182Ibid., 98976. lB!L ""E!;q, VIla, 251. 
Minister of War as an order. In an;y event, they set about the task of 
collecting and training such persona. Since, in nearly all cases, a 
civilian administration was smoothly and fairly promptly restored at 
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the time of liberation, no e:rtenai ve apparatus of the sort described in 
the telegram waa required. As a result, Dl!llbers of persons who had been 
selected and trained for such posts received none at all. Mr. Calje, 
'Who had rearuited some of the potential administrators in the Order 
Service, succeeded in prevailing on authorities of the Netherlands 
Forces of the Interior to take into their organization some of those 
in question, with the understanding that they would be utilized in such 
temporary administrative positions as might be available. 
:Mr. Calje, testifying after the war, acknowledged that the Order 
Service may have misinterpreted the communication from London, partic-
ularly in not regarding the phraseology in the first paragraph, " ••• to 
be replaced after short service ••• if needed, as advisers •••• " as con-
trolling. Mr. Calje could recall only too well his embarrassment at 
realizing that elderly, retired General van Nijnatten, who expected to 
become "Military Commissioner" for the Province of Brabant, 110uld have 
to be told that his services were not required for that job or for any 
other position. Realizing the dilemma in this case, ~~. van der Scheur-
en, Royal Commissioner for the Province of Overijssel, asked General van 
Nijnatten to serve him as a "special adviser".l84 
Dogger's mission, as stated in terms of his report, should not be 
seen as a total failure.185 He gained a sort of royal recognition of the 
Order Service, in that communications were frequently sent to the Service 
184c. J. F. Calje, March 30, 1950, 77338. 185wra, appended report. 
by the wndon Government, acting in it~r official capacity. While he 
gained no immediate financial support,. the patt-ern of aid recommended 
by Dogger is strikingly similar to that eventually incorporated into 
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the London-guaranteed National SUpport Fund. During nearly all of the 
period following Dogger's arrival, reasonably reliable communications 
were maintained between various of the wndon intelligence and contact 
agencies and the Order Service in Holland. As will be seen in another 
section,. the Order Service made a very real contribution in the intelli-
gence field. Colonel Six handled this phase of the operation very well 
indeed. 
There remained the important question of whether London was to arm 
the Order Service. Some of the reserve of arms taken from private supp-
lieS' or inherited from the Legion of Old Front Soldiers had since been 
captured by German security police. The question was eventually decided 
by London in the n!!Jgative. 
Minister-Preddent Gerbrandy explained tl"at, since the Order Service 
'Walt apparently not a "'com bet"' res:l.lltance organization,, but primarily 
concerned with the maintenanc& of peace and order at fue time of li bera-
tion,. it ~reamed reasonable to exclude it from arms shipment~r, as both 
the Council of Resistance and the Knuckle Gang would have more imme-
diate use for weapons.l86 
Colonel Six did not k:naN vib:y the Order Service had been so excluded. 
He had heard that the London Government feared the Order Service and 
denied it weapons as a result. Another variation on the theme had it 
that British officers, possibly those of the Special Operations Exeou-
186Gerbrandy, loo. cit.,. 989!5. 
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auti ve .. advised the Dutch to withhold weapons· from the Order Service,. 
in view of their own experience in other countries where London-supplied 
weapons had been put to uses other than those for which they were ori-
ginally intended. Colonel Six did not know if either of these versions 
was true. He - told by the Inquiry Comission of the testimoey of 
a:nother witneS'S• :Mr. Klijaing,.l8? who quoted a British intelligence 
officer as saying that the S}eeial Operations Exeautive advised the 
Dutch against m'llling the Order Service.,.as it appeared that German infil-
tration of the latter organiza~ionwas too extensive. Colonel Six had 
no knowledge as to the accuracy of Mr. Klijzing'lf account.188 
Once the need for weapons became of utmost importance, at the time 
of the Allied invasion, the Order Service was able to get some arms by 
virtue of the fact that it had become entitled to the same supplies as 
other members of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, in which it 
had been incorporated. Three days after the Forces came into being., 
Colonel lUx walt finally able to restore his disabled ra.dio cirouits to 
London and send a ~sharp~ telegram proteltting his not having received 
U'llllf shipments. He,.received an "'equally sharp"' reply. By November 2, 
1!944,. the Netherlands Forces of the Interior co:mmand was in a position 
to smuggle into .ansterdam• from the Province of North Hcrlla.nd, same 
10,.000 weapons. most of which had earlier been dropped to the Council of 
Resistance and to the Knuckle Gang,. both of whom were designated to 
receive arms shipments from the London Government. These 10,000 weapons 
were distributed in Amsterdam to Foroes of the Interior personnel 
l87F. J. Klijzing, July 28,. 1948,. 21713. 
18Bp. J. Six, March 10, 1949• 44838. 
without regard to their earlier affiliations. As it turned out the 
Order Service did rather well in this distribution. While Amsterdam-
North was in the hands of the Knuckle Gang. Amsterdam-south was almost 
entirely Order Service, with the eastern and western sectors mixed, 
containing many members of both organizations. 
Colonel Six sharply resented his not having received weapons ear-
lier. This caused him to lose "race" with other organizations.190 
Colonel Six also resented the fact that the Dutoh Special Service 
Bureau, created on March 151 1944, specifically to assist resistance 
organizations, took very ~le notice of the Order Service. Colonel 
Six oould reoall all too clearly having gone to the so-called Thursday 
Noon Meetings, where the Service, the Council, and the Knuckle Gang 
met to discuss mutual problems. and being told that the Council and the 
Knuckle Gang both had received detailed instructions from the Bureau. 
Colonel Six had had to admit that the Order Service had received no such 
191: instructions from the Bureau or from any other source in London. In 
view of the success of the Order Service in its intelligence 'WOrk it 
seemed unreasonable to exclude it from Bureau directives.192 
As far as London was ccncerned the Service was still primarily an 
organization to maintain peace and order at the time of liberation, 
although once it was incorporated into the Netherlands Forces of the 
Interior it assumed the same character as the rest of the organization, 
that of a sort of combined home guard and auxiliary police force. 
Minister-President Gerbramy stated the official view on the Order 
service in a letter of February 5. 1944. forwarded by the Swiss Route; 
189Ibid., 44837. 190rbid., 44835. 19Irbid., 44809. 192rbid. 
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••• The relation of the Government to the (Order] Service 
can be simply stated. We will very gladly make use of their serv-
ices aimed at the maintenance of peace, law, and order, providing 
that they, immediately upon assuming their duties, place themselves 
under the command of a militar9 organization to be provided for 
(by the London Government] ••• l 3 
From data now available some additional information on the organ-
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ization, operations, and membership of the Order Service must be offered. 
Some of this information. it should be pointed out, was not available to 
the London Government, either through the Dogger report or from other 
sotroes. 
As Dogger reported, the Order Service organizational plan divided 
the country into Regions.l94 The Regions were, in turn, divided into 
Districts. the Districts into Localities. District Commanders tried to 
see that a Locality existed for each inhabited place of village size or 
larger. In spite of the relatively formal relationships implied, with 
their apparent defects in terms of aecuri ty ao nsiderations, relationships 
were essentially based on a ~cell" system, with a Commander at one level 
not knowing the identity of his equals, or for that matter. of all of his 
subordinates. The most that any given District Comnander was likely to 
know was the nunber of men organized in the Groups in his various IDeal-
itiea, together with the identity of some of his Locality Commanders. 
"Cover" names, or aliases, were used as much as possible. The total 
number of Order Service members by August, 1944, was 1000 000, making the 
service the largest clandestine organization in Holla.nd.195 
While the personnel of the Order Service is primarily thought of as 
193E1Jl, VIla, 252 • 
194Nineteen in number and not twenty, as reported by Dogger. 
195p. J. Six, loc. cit., 44768. 
being military by profession, pe.rtioularly because of the sizeable 
inrusions from the Legion of Old Front Soldiers, note must be made of 
the m.unerous persons of a purely non-military background found in the 
organization. To be sure, the Order Service contained manw military 
personnel, including a number of military cadets, some of whom were used 
as couriers. When, on May 15, 1942, the Germans arrested all career 
military officers, Order Service ranks were seriously depleted. This 
order did not include reservists, retired officers, officers of various 
Netherlands East Indies military units, or persons holding certain spe-
cialized commissions. Only a few of the regular officers were able to 
avoid imprisonment. They were the subject of a thorough and continuing 
Gestapo hunt. The German occupation authorities ordered mobilization of 
reservists between May and July of 1943. .A. great m.unber of those so 
ordered simply did not report and continued their duties with the Order 
Service. Colonel Six felt it necessary, in testifying after the war, to 
emphasize tha use the Order Service made of persons with no military 
91 
baokgrotmd, particularly when this waa the best means of establishing 
vital personal contaots.l96 There were, since the Order Service was 
nationwide in saope, areas inwhioh practically no military persons were 
to be found, particularly in the Province of Zeelam.l97 
Members of the Order Service in some areas were frequently members of 
other organizations as well. In the Province of Drenthe, for example, 
there appears to have been a great deal of dual membership between the 
National Fugitive Aid Organization and the Order Servioe.198 
Whether the Order Service was really a resistance organization in 
196Ibid., 44759. 197Ibide 198Ibid., 44780. 
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the "active"' or "armed"' sense, as it claimed when protesting its exclusion 
from London arms shipnents, or whether it was simply intended to maintain 
law end order after a German departure, a role 'llhich it also frequently 
claimed, is a question not easily answered. One must not lose sight of 
the intelligence activities of the Service, that they were very real is 
a fact to be presented and described later. 
Different individuals within the leadership of the Service had 
varied views of its true nature, some shifting '!lith changing conditions. 
Thus, while Jonkheer B8ell might well feel, shortly after the group was 
founded, that he was building a clandestine amy to directly influence a 
German defeat or departure, end that the "law and order" version was 
simply a good "'cover story"', others in the Service might regard suoh an 
objeoti ve as an aoo1.1l'ate statement of ths organization 1 s true aims, and 
all that might letimately be expeoted.199 
By the same token. Midshipnan Dogger, in his report written in 
London in April, 1942, might honestly believe that the organization was 
devoted only to duties to be performed ai'ter the German departure, since 
extensive arrests which the organization had experienced just prior to 
his leaving Holland had made aey wide-scale armed resistance seem a 
most perilous activity. 
As Mr. Calje remembers it, Colonel Six held, with remarka~ little 
variation, to the view that the Order Service's activities were to be 
devoted to the time of liberation, and that assorted acts of sabotage 
engaged in by teams of resistance workers, while heroic, might accomplish 
little in the total war picture and might engender reprisals out of all 
199R8ell, loo. oit., 94338. 
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proportion to their limited value. Colonel Six did wish it clearly 
understood that this did not mean that the Order Service was non-
combatant in the sense that it refused the hazardous task of clandestinely 
assembling firearms, ammunition, explosives and related supplies. This 
it did do, and the sheer problem of storing such weapons and supplies 
was one of major proportions. At one point in Amsterdam the Order SerYioe 
issued a written "camouflage"' order, urging members to turn in their 
weapons, largely acquired through theft from arsenals. This order, Mr. 
Calje explained, was intended purely for German consumption and was never 
executed. It served its purpose admirably, with various copies known to 
have fallen into the hands of the German seouri ty police. 200 
Colonel S"ix shifted ground somewhat as the war progressed and an 
Allied victory seemed close at hand. By the spring of 1944 he had come 
to feel that, while sabotage engaged in b,y resistance workers operating 
against the German •r effort in general was still not a fruitfUl sort of 
endeavor for Order Service attention, sabotage by workers regularly em-
ployed in factories working on German orders could be a valuable under-
taking. Order Service assistance in such work was, therefore, lent.201 
By J{ay or June of 1944 Colonel Six had decided that his "troops" 
could at least be used to harass German oommunioations. Accordingly, 
orders went out to the Regional COI!lllllmders that small groups were to be 
organized to hinder and impede German activities, particUlarly, it was 
implied, if the enemy should be forced to withdraw from part or all of 
the Netherlands. These activities were, for the time being, to be oon-
fined to any that did not involve the direct use of weapons. As examples 
200 201 Calje, loo. oit,, 77310. P. J. Six, loo. oit., 44780, 
of appropriate acts he suggested the disabling of German motor vehicles 
and the strewing of sharpened spikes on roadwaya.2oa 
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The writer has been unable to ascertain whether the contents of this 
Order Service directive became known in London, Communications betwssa 
the Service and the It>ndon Govermnent were not in the best order during 
this period. In June, 1944, the Order Service lost to the German secu-
rity police its last radio operator. Accordingly, important Order Serv-
ice messages were given to an 1Ddependent 1ntelligenoe-gathering organ-
ization, the Groep J;lbreoht ("Albrecht Group"'), which the Order Service 
had earlier helped and, on oooaslon. supplied with radio operators, The 
Albrecht Group reported having forwarded to London the messages in ques• 
tion, but, according to Colonel Six, this was not the oase, the Order 
Service messagea were never tranamitted to London. It 11as not until 
late September or early October that Colonel Six was able to re&stablish 
direct radio oontaot with It>ndon,203 By this time the Order Service had 
been incorporated into the Netherlands Foroea of the Intarior,204 In any 
evant, had It>ndon been aware of this directive there would have atill 
existed sufficient grounds to question the •armed resistance" character 
of the Order Service, as the directive 1peoifioally exoluded actions 
1nvolving the use of weapons, 
A legitimate function performed by the Order Service was that of 
ob:!eoten-bahoud ("'object protection") • or the guarding, as much as 
possible, of vital objectives suoh as transportation terminals, civil-
zoaCalje, loc, cit.. 203p. J. Six, loo, oit., 44S09. 
204Another Order Service channel to lt>ndon, the SWiss Route, was 
much slower. During the period in question It>ndcn was seriously behi:ad 
in processing material received via the SWiss Route, 
ian communications centers of various sorts, and public utilitiea. 205 
It was widely feared and believed that the Germans, on their depart-
ure, planned a program of wholesale destruction and sabotage of both 
civilian and military centers of vital importanoe.206 
Once it has been stated that the Order Service did not. as an of-
ficial poli~. organize or even condone acts of armed violence by its 
members against the enemy, note must be made of the simple truth that a 
very great many such acts, including various sorts of very active sabo-
tage, falling into every conceivable category of resistance activity. 
were er.gaged in by Order Service members. acting not only as individuals 
but in groups as well. Like all individual acts of armed resistance 
these had varying degrees of real value. Whatever the intrinsic value 
of these acts may have been they were committed without the aupport or 
direction of the Order Service, and were engaged in in direct violation 
of its orders.207 
This writer has been unable to determine the precise political 
character or ultimate aims of the Order Service. Some opinions from 
witnesses more or lees intimately involved with the Services are offered 
herewith. 
Minister-President Gerbrandy said that he never doubted the basic 
loyalty o:f the Order Service. He noted that nu!lilers of his colleagues 
had serious reservations in this regard• however.2°8 
205calje. loc. cit •• 77308. 
206rhat this was not simply an ideal fear is shown by the fact 
that the Germans eventually did do just what -s fearedo 
207p. J. Six. loc. cit •• 44758. 208Gerbrandy, loc. cit •• 98976. 
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Dr. 1f1llem Drees, Dutch Minister-President for several years after 
World War II, first met Order Service officers, including General R8ell, 
when he and they were inmates of the German concentration camp at Buchen-
wald. As individuals he had the highest regard for them. He felt that 
there were many varying vifJIIPO ints within the Order Service itself 1 that 
it could not be simply characterised. There were authoritarians, partic-
ularly among the military, there were also many per~~ thoroughly devoted 
to the free processes of a democratic sooiety,209 
Critical views of the Service are not difficult to find. Mr. H. M. 
van Randwijk, editor-in-chief of the underground newspaper Vrij Nederland 
(Amsterdam), worked with the Swiss Route, helping process material to be 
sent to Switnrland and thence to Le11don, He had llUIIIerous oontaote With 
the Order Service, as the Swiss Route had transmitted much Order Service 
material to London. Mr. van Randwijk could remember forwarding a detailed 
blueprint of proposed post"''fal' Netherlende govermnental structure, prepared 
by Order Service members in Haarlem. Under the plan all units of local 
and provincial self-goverunent were to be abolished and replace& by 
provincial and town "directors". He further recalled a sol~ Order 
service communication to London, reporting the discovery, in the Dutch 
Province of Brabant, of a French pretender, and reoommending that this 
faot be transmitted to General de Geulle so that the person in question 
could become French monarch, Mr. Tll.n Randwijk did feel that, since the 
circumstances of war sharply limited normal oommunioations, both between 
individuals and organizations, the Order Service may have been subjected 
to undue and unfair criticism cite to simpll' ignorance of its ultimate 
209vf. Drees, September 7, 1949, 65178, 
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aims and character. 
Jonkheer L. H. N. Bosch Ridder van Rosenthal, former Royal COilllll-
issioner of the Province of Utrecht, and Chairman of the College of 
Bondsmen, a resistanoe-coSrdinating organization set up the London Gov-
ernment, moat decidedly believed that the Order Service desired a mil-
itary dictatorship. Thia was, Bosch Bidder van Rosenthal said, "no 
secret" in Order Servioe circles. Too many Order Service people were 
unable to distinguish between Social Democrats and Communists, regard-
ing both as an equal menace.211 
Mr. J. J. Vorrink, a prominent member of the Dutch Social Demo-
cratic Party, as well as an active resistance worker, had had numerous 
contacts with the Order Service. He felt that many Order Service work-
ers were "magnificent persons" but that they had not properly recog-
nized, "Nhat went on in the minds of R8ell and Six." Mr. Vorrink had 
felt it necessary on several occasions to warn the London Government 
about the "reactionary" political view$ of the Order Service. He re-
called a conversation with a young naval officer, in hiding from the 
Germans and working with the Order Service, a "good man" but a "pol-
itical illiterate" who wondered if a return to free elections after the 
war In Hellam would be possible or desirable.212 
Mr. van der Gaag, of the Council of Resistance, often came in con-
tact with the Service. At times "contact" and "conflict"' almost seamed 
synonymous. Yet, in the end, in spite of misgivings, Mr· van der Gaag 
210H. M. van Randwijk, Spetember 9, 1949, 66937. 
211Rosenthal, loc. cit., 64383. 
212J. J. Vorrink, September 21, 1949, 67973. 
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had the definite feeling that the Order Service did net really strive 
for an authoritarian system of government. While he, "Couldn •t look: 
into Order Service souls.• he felt that whatever preferences the Serv-
ice expressed or felt for auoh a ayatem were intended to bridge over a 
difficult transition period0 one in which the formation of a popularly-
elected parliament would be well-nigh 1mpossible.213 
:Mr • Jan Meijer0 fol'l!ler eo-editor of the clandestine newspaper, .l!!!:! 
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Parool (The Jatohll'ord) 0 remembered that it was popular during the occu-
pation to criticize the pre-war political parties0 since there was a con-
siderable tendency on the part of many Netherlanders to blame "politic-
ians" for the disaster of 1940. This being the case, the Order Service's 
oft-repeated statements about being "non-political" or "above politics" 
limply reflected a very widely held view.214 
General B8ell stated most emphatically that a military government 
had not been one of the aims of the Service. The organization had been 
careful to avoid identification with any political party so that all 
persons might feel free to affiliate themselves with the Service. Gen-
eral B8ell had never felt that. in the event of a "political vacuum"• a 
"triumvirate" or any similar body ahould assume power. temporarily or 
otherwise. He had never heard of the "triumvirate" concept described 
in the Dogger report. until after the war.2l5 
Mr. c. J. F. Calje0 an Amsterdam insurance man, and officer of the 
4lgemeen Hoofdkwartier ("General Headquarters"), of the Order Service 
213Gaag, loo. cit., 77898. 
2l4J. Meijer, September 1, 19600 84009. 
2l~8ell, loa. cit., 94356. 
was certain that the Service had never contemplated "taking over" the 
government in any W1lY• Mr. Calje could remember that, oil very many 
occasions, Colonel Six had reminded all those associated with him that 
Order Service members, as much aa any other Hollanders, wera citizens of 
a demooratio country, and, as such, were bound to observe both the forms 
and spirit of demooratio political prooeaaes.216 
Conclusions 
The National Support Fund W1lS an activity whose value -s very ex-
tensive indeed. In supporting organizations whioh sheltered, fed, and 
provided Hollanders with identity papers, even if it had done no more, 
it W1ll to make possible the aaving of very many lives. 
In terms of the thesis that Londo•'• efforts were most successful 
when the servioea of persons and institutions located or already in 
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being in the oooupied territory were utilized, the National SUpport Fund 
represents a speoial oase. lrhile ~ouaded and administered in Holland it 
might well not have come into being as aoon or on as comprehensive a 
scale without the original I.ondon guarantee to the dependents of mer-
chant seamen in the Allied service. Moreover, its continued active op-
eration -s dependent on repeated f'isoal guarantees by London. Tlms this 
-• not a simple instance of the London Government tald.Jig advantage of a 
prellxisting situation in the oooupied territory, any more than it W1ls one 
of the Govel'lllllent•a having established the organization from 'llithout. 
Rather, it represents a unique case of interdependence between London and 
the oooupied territory, and as suoh serves only to partly prove the thes1a 
advanced above for such si tuation11o 
216 ~A~ Calje, looo ott., 77~. 
It is t:o bs doubired that Ltmdon could. have pla~ed a!\Y more active 
a partr. in the financing of resistance activities than it did through 
the National SUpport Fund. The IDndon Government could hardly be ex-
pected to have aey detailed li:oowledge of the da~-to-day pl"'blems· of 
such finance. li. s ooncerrur the many and Val'ied enterprises aided by 
the National Sllpport Fund,. this was again a realistic relationship 
between the London Government snd tha occupied territory. lacking 
accura:ts· information on the problems facing these organizations, or 
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even on the organi&ationa themseivelt in some instances, London supplied 
or gll&ll'anteed ths one thing most needed for their continued operationlt-
the requisite funds'• 
IAI.ter authorizations' of additional funds by the London Government,. 
it will be noted., !tpeoified some of the purposes for which the monielt 
guaranteed were to be expended. From the final accounting of the Fund, 
it will be observed that numerous purposes never specifically authorized 
by the London Government were served. It was London's good fortune that 
the direction of the N.tiond Slllpport Fund W&lf in the mature,. able banda 
ef the van Hall brothers-.. and that ferr funds were expended on fri volou~r 
purpoaes·. It wee- further fortunate that the :-Communist contingent w1 thin 
the resistance movements waa smaller and less significant than in some 
other German-occupied countries. 
The Council of Resistance repr-ented a special dilemma for London,. 
indeed, it was in some res-pects a catalog of problems faced by the exiled 
Dutch regime in its dealings with armed resistance organizations. In 
the Manifesto of Jan Thijssen the problem of uncompromisingly violent 
resistance offered to the occupying power is squarely faced--was it in 
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the interest~ of the Netherlands people for the London Government to 
underwrite acts of armed resistance which might lift the morale of the 
participants but might also engender German reprisals out of all propor-
tion to the damage inflicted on the enemy? London was similarly faced 
with the problem of haw desir&ble it was to support an organization 
known to be to the left in the political spectrum. London's reaction 
for some time was one of uncertainty~ hence little initially was done 
' vis-a-vis the Council,. a fact that itB memberS" bitterly resented, as 
arms and related supplies· would have been of very great value during 
the early period. To a certain extent this resentment may be taken as 
symptomatic of a problem endemic in the relations between London and the 
resistance organizations. To· those in the resistance organizations Lon-
don was distant, inept, ignorant of their aims. problems, and accomplish-
mentlf. Requests for aid or recognition were likely to be treated with 
indifference or not even acknowledged. From London's vantage point it 
8&\V a mass of unknown resistance organizations. staffed by faceleS"S per-
sons of varying degrees of competence, some with unrealistic aims, who 
sometimes approached the Government with grandiose claims of strength or 
membership not based on fact. In the early period London often failed 
to aend arms, ammunition, or explodves that were urgently requested., 
as they were simply not available. The Dutch might have the requisite 
fundS" to pay for themr but the British lacked sufficient weapons for 
their own use. let alone for the benefit of other~. 
The London GoverrJnent was probably fortunate in the political com-
position of the Council, since, in effect, that organization took some 
of the more militant Comnunist resistance workerS" and submerged them in 
an organization which, while leftist, was not Communist. It was ex-
tremely fortunate that the Communists did not capture control of the 
Council, 
By 1944, London, convinced of the reliability of the Council, em-
ployed its services both in an espionage and sabotage capacity; as has 
been noted, Once again the exiled Netherlands regime employed an ex-
isting institution in the occupied territory rather than creating one 
of its own, a utilization which was further extended when the London 
Government selected the Council of Resistance for inclusion in the 
Netherlands Forces of the Interior, The Council Chairman, Mr. van der 
Gaag, was commissioned by the London Government to enter into direct 
negotations with the German Reichs-commissioner for the Netherlands, 
Seyss-Inquart, an assignment which was carried out, 
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In the collective person of the Order Service the London Government 
was once again faced with the problem of an organization whose true aims 
appeared to be in doubt, It was very difficult for London to tell if 
the Service intended simply to maintain law and order at the moment of 
German departure or capitulation, as it said, or to establish some 
sort of junta "above politics", a standard military reaction to the com-
plexities of political life in a democratic society. Surely the report 
rendered to the London Government by Midshipman Dogger did nothing to 
reassure one. Resistance organi£ations frequently deplored the lack of 
any sort of personal contact with London and sometimes sought to send 
their representatives to London. Midshipman Dogger represented in some 
respects a convincing argument against this sort of personal represent-
ation, as he ascribed to the Order Service authoritarian sentiment not as 
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widely or as intensely held in the organization as his report indicated. 
Londo~ utilized the Order Service in the field of military espionage, 
in which capacity the organization served with very great distinction. 
In the area of armed resistance activity, London finally followed a 
taok with the Service which may heve been arrived at by Machiavellian 
cunning or by sheer chance but still repreaented a practical solution to 
the problem of the servioe•a ultilllate aims. The Order Service said that 
ita aim was to maintain law and order at the time of liberation, very well• 
it was to be taken at ita word. It •• to be largely excluded from Lon-
don anae shijJilente as 1 t would not serve as an active anaed resistance 
organization. When the London Government created the Netherlands Forces 
of the Interior the Order Service found itself in largely •non-combatant" 
uni ta. relegated, with some exceptions. to various aorta of guard duty. 
As nearly as this writer h able to detenaine. the telegram which 
the Order service received on August lS. 1943, from the London Minister 
of war, was not intellded as a radical departure from the London Govern-
ment's policy in regard to the Service but was rather an inquiry intended 
to determine whether the organir.ation oould render assista!IDe to a possi-
ble interim administration, should thh be establhb.ed. 
A recurring problem for London -• the ll!U'tual antagonism between 
varioua resistance organizations. There were few feuds of the resist-
ance period of the magnitude and aoope of that between the Order Servioe 
and the Couno:l.l of Resistanoe. There -s little London offered or oould 
offer in the way of praotioal solutions. Silloe the two bodies not only 
b.ad sharp ideological differenoea. but were in disagreement over both 
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the appropriate forms or organization for resistance work and its proper 
objectives, it was insufficient to simply urge them to work together and 
forget their differences. This was doubtless part or London's motivation 
in forming the Netherlands Forces of the Interior• in which the Council 
and the Service were placed under one command. This effort, it must be 
noted, was by no means a complete success. A littls arter the manner or 
two old regiments with long and distinctive histories, combined in a 
wave or military reorganization, the two resistance bodies continued to 
display some independence. 
The Order Service, like the Council or Resistance, had come into being 
in the oooupied territory at the impetus or local people, eaoh with its 
own view or the problem or resistance and eaoh with its own very differ-
ent solutions. Once again they have served as models or activity which 
London oculd encourage, or which it could and did take advantage, but in 
whose creation it played no part. This experience would seam in aooord 
with the basic assumptions advanced in this connection in the conclusions 
to Chapter I, that the London Government was best able to function when 
it took advantage or persons or organizations already located or in being 
in the occupied territory. 
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CHAPTER III 
TEE LONDON GOVERNMENT AND CONTACT WITH RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS--II 
Introduction 
The third chapter begins with an examination of another of the 
largest armed resistance organizations. the Knuckle Gang. As a resist-
ance organization whose operations were limited to a more or less precisely 
defined area of activity. the Knuckle Gang offers additional insight into 
the problem of what sort of contact London could best maintain with the 
armed resistance. 
The section immediately following explores the role played by the 
tonaon Government in regard to resistanoe organizations engaging in more 
highly specialized services. Included are the National Fugitive Aid 
Organization. various groups specializing in the forgery of identity 
papers and other vital documents. md the cli>.ndestine press. All of 
these groups offer additional models to test the thesis that London waa 
best able to function in its oo!Itaot with the occupied territory when it 
utilized local people and local organizations. rather than importing its 
own personnel or superimposing organizational forms from without. The 
technical organizations included here offer a particularly intriguing 
field of study since they often found themselves short of both materials 
and the specialized knowledge needed to perform their tasks. The extent 
to which London found it possible to render technical assistance to some 
of these organizations is considered. The actual development of these 
services and their relationship to London is also treated. 
There then follows an examination of London's relationship to vari-
ous political an~or intellectual resistance organizations, as well as 
those aiming at the co8rdination of resistance activity. Some of these 
organizations could be of use to London. both in long-range planning 
and in helping bridge a possible political "vacuum" occurring at the 
moment of liberation. Some also had political ambitions, thus posing 
a 11peoial problem for the London Government. 
The extent to which London utilized the specialized organizations 
is examined here. together with the first example of London's creating 
an organization, the College of Bondsmen. to replace one already in 
being in the occupied territory. 
A second example of London •s creating an organization. the Neth-
erlands Forces of the Interior. follows. This section seeks to deter-
mine to how great an extent the Forces of the Interior offers an ex-
ception to the thesis of London's finding it more efficient to uti-
lize organizations already in being in the occupied territory. 
Chapter III concludes with the only major act of remote adminis-
tration attempted by the London Government. the railway strike which 
London ordered in September. 1944. Pertinent to the subject is an ex-
amination of Whether the railway strike episode tends to undermine the 
thesis advanced in the conclusions to Chapter I, that remote, direct 
administration by the London Government was impossible. or whether 
the affair in question simply represents a special exception. 
The Knuckle Gang 
While the English phrase "Knuckle Gang" is a reasonable translation 
of the Dutch Xnokrloegen Ploegen0 the reader should not infer that the 
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organization represented the criminal element of Netherlands society, or 
that it was in any way loosely or informally organiz:ed. Far from being 
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a loosely-articulated agglomeration of toughs, it was a carefully organ-
ized body, nation-wide in scope, containing a number of sober and respect-
able citizens. 
The Kmokle Gang came into being as the resUlt of special needs of 
the National Fugitive Aid Organization. llhioh, by the late SU!IIIDElr of 1943, 
had developed several uses for a •strong arm• auxiliary. By this time 
the number of persons in hiding under the auspices of the Fugitive Aid 
Organization was considerable. Ration coupons were needed in order to 
feed many of those concealed, thus raids on ration office~r were e:ogaged 
in by members of the Fugitive Jid Organization as a means of securing such 
coupons. Later some counterfeit coupons were to be produced, but this was 
never a very attractive course of action as the bona fide coupons were, 
after all, intended to facilitate the fair distribution of available food-
stuffs. Raids on vital-records regilttries were another early activity, 
in that the removal of such records was often necessary in order to con-
ceal the existence of persons who had gone into hidi:og, or the faot that 
persons were employing fictitious nemes. While the production of forged 
ration coupons was a comparatively late development, the preparation of 
fake identity papers began much earlier. Their existence gave rise to 
yet another activity, that of forcibly removing from Gover:nnent officea 
blank identity papers and the numerous rubber stamps employed in their 
authentication. 
By late ,l'Ugust or early September, 1943, it became obvious to the 
leadership of the National Fugitive Aid Organization that these activ-
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ities of a more forcible nature needed to be separated from the parent 
organization, deToted as it was to the shelter and care of those in hiding. 
Accordingly, the Knuckle Gang, deToted to more violent occupations, came 
into being at that time.217 
Soon the organization had extended its activities still further, to 
include raids on the agenoiea administering the German forced-labor pro-
gram, and to acquire the blank forma tor preparation of the Ausweise, or 
"heptiona" to forced labor service. On occasion, the Knuckle Gang re-
sorted to political assassination, again with the limited objective ot pro-
tecting persona in hiding. Those liquidated were often the Dutch-Nazi 
heads of local vital-recorda registries who were betraying sensitive data. 
Several raids on jails and prisons released numbers of political prison-
era.218 
By December, 1943, the Knuckle Gang had expanded its activitiea 
sufficiently so that it could justly be called "national"• National 
ooBrdination was attained through several inter-provincial ooBrdinators, 
one for each of the northern, southern, western, eastern, and central 
regions into which the Netherland& -. divided by the Gang. Serving under 
the oo3rdinators were provincial leadera, who in turn OOI!IIII&Ilded leadera 
ot the individual, local groupa.219 
Mention must be made of the fact that the Knuckle Gang, for much of 
its early period of existence, W&l desperately short of weapons. Fre-
quently raids were made w1 th a total armament ot one loaded pistol which 
217t. Soheepstra, :March 29 • 19500 77192. 218Ibid., 77209. 
219 ~·• 77214-77216. Leaders of local groups had considerable 
discretionary power and could exercise influence over the provincial 
leader•• 
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might oontain one or t.l live rounds o:r IUDJIIUnition, plus one or two un-
loaded weapons. A successful raid on a ration o:t::t:ice in Twente was oon-
ducted with no conventional weapons at all. Ration o:r:rice guards were 
held at bay b,y men displaying ordinary building bricks in a menacing 
fashion. On JUly ll, 1944, the Knuckle Gang entered a Gestapo prison at 
Arnhem and released successfully :t:i~-aix prisoners, again virtually 
without IU'IIIalllent. Included ~aong those released was Frits de ZWernr, 
one o:r the founders o:r the :r.tional Fugitive .lid Organization. Fcrtu• 
llll.tely for de ZWerver, who had just been captured, the rather bulky 
Gestapo dossier oovering his recent past had not yet reached Arnhem, so 
hh captors were unaware o:r the prominmce o:r their prisoner. The 
escapees made their ~ to the railroad station and took the next out-
going train. Some, as they proceeded to the station, walked respeot:rully 
behind the ccrt~ge in the :funeral proceaaion o:r a German o:t::t:icer.220 
The extreme shortage o:r weapons which plagued the Knuckle Gang 
raises the inevitable question o:r contact with and aid from the London 
Governnent. Mr. Scheepatra, the only BUl'TiTing Knuckle Ganc leader c:r 
the first rank, felt that the original &'Cal o:r the body, using :roroe to 
protect persona in hiding, was auoh that contact 'With London was not 
really Titale He 110uld have liked to receive aome small arms and a.mmu-
nit!.on, howenr. The Knuckle Gang did come into contact with the para-
chuted agent Koos Mulholland, and his radio operator, Nol van Du!.n, 
operatiTea o:r the Dutch Special SerTice Bureau in London. Mulholland 
was ae!!l; out primarily to deal 'With the Council o:r Resistance, but Tan 
Duin had been d:l. spatched to sene both Mulholland and another age !!I;, 
220Ibide, 77209. 
Bert de Goede, who was supposed to contact the Knuckle Gang. Mr. 
scheepstra felt that Messrs. MUlholland, van Duin, and de Goede were 
oriented too much along military lines and had no real appreciation of 
the sort of work the Knuckle Gang had to do. Mr. scheepstra a~ his 
associates doubted that the agents in question had very ready access, 
via their clandestine tranllllitter, to high officials in the London Gov-
ernment. It appeared that the material transmitted to London was proc-
essed by lesser military officers who might have lacked the knowledge 
or initiative to deal with non-military matters.221 
Note must be made again of the fact that the Knuckle Gang was in 
receipt of extensive amounts of financial assistance from the London-
guaranteed National Support Fund. The total value of this aid was 
about flo 1,ooo,ooo.222 
By July of 1944, after the .lllied landings in Norma~y, with the 
obvious sabotage possibilities that were presented to armed resistance 
organizations, there had arisen the problem or whether the Knuckle Gang 
should extend its varied activities to include general sabotage assign-
ments. .Among the leadership extensive doubt existed as to whether the 
Knuckle Gang might not imperil the performance of its primary task, 
that of safeguarding fugitives. Several or those in authority consulted 
the internationally known jur:l.at, Dr. Jan Donner, in order to find out 
precisely what status the Knuckle GIUlg posseBSed in international law, 
and whether he advised engaging in general sabotage activities or not. 
Mr. Scheepstra felt that the Knuckle Gang, made up of civilians, had no 
protected status' at all. Dr. Donner, after several days of reflection, 
221Ibid., 77238-77239. 222fiall, loo. cit., 77180-77183. 
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declined to try to answer, urging that the K:nuokle Ga.n& contact the London 
Government and get its views on the matter. If the communications systt.n 
of agents Mulholland and van Duin could deliver no answer from London, 
then Dr. Donner suggested that the Knuckle Gang try to establish contact 
via a clandestine trananitter operated hy Colonel Si:x:•a Order SerTioe. 
While the Knuckle Gang had its d11'ferellCes with the Service, relations 
with the latter organiaation were aut'tioiently goGd so that Dr. Donner 
reasoned that there would be no question o:f' the willingness o:f' the Ser-
"Yioe to transmit the query. The message was sent by both means but was 
no more productive than had been earlier questions o:f' a general nature.W 
Eventually London did decide that the Knuckle Gang was to take part in 
sabotage work. 
The Special Service Bureau in London did give highly speoi:f'io sabo• 
tage assig:mnents to the K:nuokle Gang, many o:f' which were suooess:f'ully 
carried out. In the last months of the war a n~~nber o:f' Bureau agents 
arrived to assist the Knuckle Gang &Dd Tarious supplies were delivered. 
A.dvan:e word o:f' a special train, containing prhoners being trans:f'errecl 
from the German concentration camp at !mers:f'oort to the Veluwe district, 
made possible the carefully timed destruction o:f' rails on the line in 
question and the release by the Knuckle Gang o:f' the captives. This 
aeemed a particularly appropriate aasig:mnent to have given the KJmckle 
Gang, in view o:f' its past experience in protecting fugitives. Sabotage 
supplies, particularly various explosi"Yes, were supplied ~ the Special 
Service Bureau sut':f'ioiently in advance, as a rule, so that those emplo:y-
ing them might gain some acquaintance with the materials in question. 
223soheepstra0 loo. cit., 77233•77239. 
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There were occasions on which Knuckle GaDg operatives found themselves 
using explosive compounds of' British origin with which they were totally 
unfamiliar, and f'or Which no directions at all had been auppliedo224 
That these explosives must not have proved too dif'f'ioult to employ 
oan be seen in the suooessf'ul blocking by the Knuckle Gang of' the vital 
North Holland Canal, built to carry the largest ocean-going vessels. In 
similar operations various oanals elsewhere -re bl ooked. Portions of' 
railway lines were also deatroyed.225 
The supplies received f'ram London arrived by parachute at special 
•dropping~ areas, arranged in aaranoe. 
One might well inquire as to the apparent reasons f'or the Knuckle 
Gang •s having received no IU'IIlB from the London Government for the first 
year of ita eld.atenoe. The answer appears to lie in the simple faot that 
there was no appropriate agency of the London Government to supply the 
type of assistance required. Until the Dutch Special Service Bureau 
was created (on Yaroh 14, 1944), the various Netherlands illtelligenoe 
agencies ~e deTOted to the eolleation and evaluation of' strategic in-
formation. Since the Knuckle Gang, unlike :tDa.ey another Dutch resistance 
organization, did not deal with intelligence matters, they had not had 
ooGaaion to eozrt:aot such London agenoies-"''lllr had the reTerse ever trans-
pired. 
The (Dutch} Bureau for the Preparation of the Return to Bolland might 
have been expected to do something of this sort, however it chose to per-
form thh activity, •in eo8peration•, with the British speoial Operations 
ExeCUtive, which meant 
224Ibid., 77248. 
in actual faot that the Dutch recruited, during this 
225Ibido 
period, Netherlands nationals who performed clandestine tasks in German-
occupied Holland under British direction. During the period in question 
the Special Operations Executive, working in eo8peration ~th the Bureau 
for the Preparation of the Return, concentrated its major Dutch effort 
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on the so-called Plan Holland, to be described elsewhere. unfortunately, 
nery single Plan Holland a&ent and all of the thousallds of poUXIds of 
supplies relating to Plan Holland were captured by the Gel'lllans. 
J. brief examination of the relations between the Knuckle Gant; and 
the other two large reebtance OJ'f;anizaticna should be made. The K.talokle 
Gang had more than a few re1ervatioaa about both the Order Service and 
the Council of Re1istanoe. 
The Knuckle Gang was Oc:lmposed originally almost entirely of member• 
of the Dutch Reformed Church, although it later acquired amne Roman 
Catholic members. The readily identifiable religious affiliations of 
the members may have in1'luenoed the Order Service, which did not regard 
the Knuckle Gang as politically suspect. In Knuckle Gang circles more 
than a ffm doubts about the Order Service existed. There was le1s of a 
fear that the Service planned to •take oTer" after the war-- Order Service 
taotioa of delaying the main effort until actual liberation seemed umrise 
and unrealistic. Too often the Order Sel'V'ice aeemed to be simply •sitting 
on• weapons 'llhich tba Knuckle Ga~ J18eded moat urgently for currelll: uae.226 
When it was finally determined that the Knuckle Gang -• to engage 
in general sabotage work, 10111e of the instruction and assistance 'llhioh it 
reoeiTed came tr0111 the Order Sel'V'ioe. 227 
The attitude of the Council of Resista:cce towards the Rnuokle Gang 
226rbid., 77225-77226. 2lt'7rbid., 77230. 
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was generally one of good will. on several occasions suggestions went out 
from the Council that the two organizations amalgamate. The attitude of 
the Knuckle Gang toward the Council was somewhat more complex. The fact 
that the Council had or appeared to have a leftist political orientation, 
OOIDII!Unicating with the public by means of a "manifesto", oaused some 
reserve to be lhown it by the J!huckle Gang. This was DOt precisely because 
there were CCII!IIliWlists on the Council, although this was widely known and. 
did nothing to reassure many J!huckle Gang members, rather the feeling -. 
more one of believing that the work of the J!huokle Gang was a Jl&tional 
task, one that should be divorced trom political or ideological consider• 
ations. .Uthough the J!huokle Gang was certainly dsvoted to direct, force-
ful, and on occasion, violent action, :l.t shared with some others an aver-
s:l.on to the sort of relentless resistance offered by the Council, which 
approaohed the spirit of a holy war. Too o:f'ten, Mr. Scheepstra felt, the 
Council engaged in acts that were of themselves of little or no value to 
the .&llied war effort or to the Dutch national struggle, acts which brought 
forth a hornets nest of German reprisals, many of them directed against 
inDOoant hostages. There was an occasion on which the Council posted a 
placard announcing that, for every Dutch hostage exeouted by the Germans, 
the Council would kill twc or three Germans. This kind of feud, the 
J!huckle Gang felt, was the sort of thing it -uld do well to avoid. The 
basic aritlmetio of the proclaimed arrangemmt seEed faulty, as in the 
md there was a greater supply of Hollanders than Ge:nnans in the Nether-
lande. Clearly the Council was no organisation with which to become too 
deeply involved. The baste responsibility of the J!huokle Gang remained 
the safeguarding of the hunted, hungry souls in its care. .A side diver-
sion could only bnperil those in hiding 0 228 
The Knuckle Gang also objected to the Council on the grounds that 
the latter body was too authoritarian. Mro Scheepatra said that the 
Council was, "•• .Constructed from the top down .. w1 th local leaders 
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being no more than arbitrarily designated agents of the mtional organ-
ization. He used an English phrase, "brain trust•, to describe the 
Council leadership. The entire atmosphere was tar less democratic than 
that of the Knuckle Gang. the leader of an individual Knuckle Gang group 
was in his position because he was was competent and, above all, because 
he enjoyed the oontidence ot h1s group. Looal group commanders included 
a baker, a police corporal, a olerk in a notary ottice, and a gardener. 
Where former military parsons held positions ot authority it was based 
on their aptitude tor underground Wllrk and not on their pre-war rank. 
The Knuckle Gang teared that amalgamation with the Counci1110uld be 
likely to result in an organization much less democratic and muoh less 
responsive to the feelings of its member1hip0 229 
The National Fugitive Ud Organization 
No account ot the relations between the Netherlands Govermnent ill 
London and the German-occupied territory would be complete without a 
brief description of the activities of the L!ndeliike Organisatie voor 
Hulp &an Onderduikera ("National Fugitive .lid Organization"). 
At the same time it must be noted that there was virtually nodi-
rect contact between the London Goverzment and the National Fugitive J.id 
Organization. London's help -s ot a very real sort, and of the sort 
more needed by the Organization than any other, that of financial assi8t-
228l!!!A•• 77263o 229Ibido 
anoe. The tunds in this case from the London-guaranteed National 
Support Fund and totalled at least fl. 7,ooo,ooo.2SO 
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fhe National Fugitive .lid Organization came into being as the result 
of the fusion of various local groups, all devoted to the concealment and 
care of fugitives. In the eastern and northern proT1nces a sort of ex-
change was created, wherebw represemtatives from various areas were able 
to come together to trade information on likely spota for the conceal-
ment of fugitiTea. This organization, which became the National Fugitive 
.lid Organization, was created at the initiative of Mrs. H. T. Kuypers-
Rietberg, of Wlnterswijk, and Dr. F. Slemp, himself a fugitive concealed 
in the Winterswijk area. 23l 
By the late spring and early aUIIIOOr of 1943 the National Fugitive 
.lid Organization acquired additional scope and aize when it was joined 
bw various groups in the southern (and Catholic) provinces, particularly 
in Limburg. This came about partly as the result of urging by the Roman 
Catholic clergy and hiearohy. Particularly active here were two Roman 
Catholics, J. Naus and~. Jan Hendrikx, who was k:no1m. tmder the "cover" 
name of "Ambrosius~. 232 
The earliest fugitives were Jews. They were soon followed by resist-
anoe 110rkers fleeing the German security pol1oe. These were, in turn, 
joined by an increasing number of men of all ages seeking to escape 
forced labor in German;y. Dutch officers, aupposed to report to German 
authorities for internment, also 1111nt into hiding in same nunbers. The 
National Fugitive Aid Organization was particularly effective in oonneo-
230Hall, loa. cit., 77180-77183. 
231H. van Riessen, July 13, 1950, 81614. Z.32'Ibid. 
tion with the last great Gennan labor drive, the so-called "'Liese"· 
aotion.233 Ya~ carefully planned raids by German press-gangs yielded 
not a soul, an achievement due in part to a special clandestine tele-
phone4arning netwcrk.234 
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A veritable flood of fugitives descended on the Organization in the 
fall and winter of 1944•1945, when the strike of rail~ workers made the 
concealment; of tens of thousands of lldditional persona imperative. 
The total number of peraons in hiding by that last winter of the 
occupation -a estimated at between 200,000 and 4oo,ooo.235 
There were many special problema. Sbould fugitives be housed in 
rural areas or in the cities? There was 1omething to be said for botho 
Urban areas offered anonymity, together with the dangers inherent ill 
dealing with unknown persona. Rural areas offered the advantages of 
deal1ng with known persona, as well as the disadvantages of dealing with 
persons who inevitably would learn a great about the fugitive aid work of 
their neighbors. While they might themselves be reliable, if they had a 
tendency to gossip their listeners might prove to be less reliable. 
Aid in ration matters and in the oorreotion or removal of vi tal 
recorda from registries was provided, as has been noted, by the Knuckle 
Gang, which also removed by assaasl.nation persons who betrayed or 
seriously imperiled the safety of fugitives. 
In time a separate organizatl.on, the so-called ·~ Group, came into 
being with the special task of concealing Jews. Since it was not at all 
times possible to keep fugitivu hidden from view, 1f a fugitive had 
Z33so-oalled after its principal instigator. 
2~iessen, loo. cit., 81622-81624. 235Ibid., 81626-81627. 
markedly Semitic features his concealment was a much more difficult 
activity, and his presence automatically imperiled all others hidden 
with him.236 The "J• Group received aome 4,5000000 guilders from the 
National SUpport Fund.237 
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The total number of members in the National Fugitive Aid Organization 
was about 15,ooo.238 Security in an organization of this size was a pe-
culiar problem, made more extreme by the nature of the activity. Any 
German agent provocateur could gain some sort of entrance into the organ-
ization by simply posing as a fugitive from the security police or from 
labor recruitment. Losses were about 1100 in the Fugitive Aid Organ-
ization and approximately 500 in the Knuckle Gang.239 In October of 1943 
the Organization suffered a severe blow in the arrest, during a meeting, 
of a number of provincial leaders. In April and May of 1944 all but two 
of the top leaders were arrested. The Germans apparently felt that these 
arrests had crippled or totally disabled the organization. As has been 
suggested, the National Fugitive ,tid Organization was decentralized to a 
considerable extent, with its main strength in its broad base and not in 
the higher echelons, an arra~ement worked in anticipation of just suoh a 
group of arreets.240 
:rn Juno, 1944, the Organization's "exchange", which by this time was 
not only exchanging places of comealment but persons as well, was supple-
236 Features supposedly Semi tic are shared by numbers of persons not 
of the Jewish faith, thus it was that the "'J" Group on occasion conoealed 
Protestants or Catholics whose mere appearance might arouse suspicion. 
237Hall, loa. cit., 77180-77183. 
2~iessen, loa. cit., 81626-81627. 
240Ib1d., 81670-81671. 
239Ibid., 81631. 
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mei!I;ed by a central oo8rdinating bureau, an orga.n1zation which turned out 
to be of particularly great help after the ~lied liberation of the south-
ern provinces, since the central bureau was able to process incoming infer-
mation and tran11111it this to both the occupied and unoccupied parts of the 
Netherlands, an arrangement that was more practical tmder the oirclllll-
stanoe• than that of the exoha~e, which could no longer meet on a nation.. 
'IIi de bas ill. 241 
Contact between the :r.tional Fugitive Aid Organization and the It>ndon 
Govermei!I; was limited, as has been llOted. In essence this -• probably 
to be expected. While It>ndon was aware of the existeooe of the Organ-
ization and approved highly of ita aims, there was nothing that the 
Organization could do that -• of immediate, direct assistance to London. 
It did not, as did many &llCther speoialb.ed organization, operate an intel-
ligenoe-gathering unit. It could not carry out any sabotage assignments 
as it was not an armed resistance organization, aside from the special 
duties of the Knuckle G&ng. It>nion, in turn, had little to offer the 
Fugitive Aid Organization. It had no need of weapons or explosives. 
Neither was there any specialized training which could be supplied by 
agema sent from london. The Organization was in a far better poai tion 
to analyze its own problems and devise solutions than the London Govern-
ment, and both parties reCognized this fact. london could and did supply 
money. In the second grant or gua.rantee of repayment of monies to be 
expended by the National Support Fund,London specifically mentioned the 
Organization as one of the intended recipients of such aid.242 
It was partly in connection with the activities of the National 
241Ibid., 81618-81620. 242sNQ, VIIa, 226. 
Support Fund that one oontaot between the National Fugitive Aid Organ-
ization and the London Govermnent came into being. During the night of 
April 18, 1944, Father H. Bleys, whose illegal Il81lle was "Lodewijk"', de-
parted for England.243 F~ther Bleys, who left from the Limburg branch 
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of the National Fugitive Aid Organization, wanted the positive assurance 
of the London Gover:z:unent that the money paid out by the National Support 
Fund would positively be repaid. Father Bleys also desired an opportunity 
to give the London Goverment a 111'uller11' picture of the pert played by 
Catholic organizations engaging in resistance work, a subject on Which he 
felt the Government to be particularly badly informed. Much of London's 
material on resistance activity reached it by the famous Swiss Route, 
channeled through the agency of the Dutch General Seer etary of the World 
Council of Churches in Geneva, Dr. W • .A.. Visser •t Hoof't. Father Bleys 
felt that Dr. Visser •t Hooft had withheld or edited Catholic material 
unnecessarily before pasaing it to London.244 
Father Bleys, on reaching London, -s told that the National Support 
Fund obligations would, indeed, be honored. How much effect his descrip-
tion of Catholic resistance 'lllt>rk had on the London Goverment was difficult 
for him to ascertain. He was quoted as saying that those with whom he 
spoke in London paid very close attention and took voluninous notes. 245 
Dr. Visser •t BOof't, testifying in 1948, reported that the Swiss 
Route, far from withholding or cutting down any Catholic material, had 
actively sought more such material. He could recall having written 
repeatedly to his friem Father Stokman, whose illegal name was "!he man 
243~ •• 218. 244niessen, loo. cit., 81640. 
245Ibid., 81680. 
with the good oigars,•• requesting that more material on Catholic resist-
ance activity be sent. Father Stokman at one point had said, ,.If' I had 
more I'd send more." Dr. Visser •t Hooft recalled that several Catholic 
political reports had been transmitted to London via the Swiss Route, 
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and he oould reoall having not only forwarded several pastoral letters by 
Dut<lh Catholic clergy, but causing them to be published in all Swiss 
newspapers as we11.246 
When, in September of 1944, the Netherlands Forces of the Interior 
was called into being by the London Government, the National Fugitive Aid 
Organization was not specifically included. This was to be expected, ainoe 
the Organization was not of the armed resistance variety. Its related 
organization, the Knuckle Gangs, was made a member. Co6peration between 
the Forces of the Interior and the Fugitive Aid Organization was, never-
theless, close. The Commander of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior 
commissioned the Organization to supply the Forces with food during the 
"hunger winter" of 1944-1945. This commission the Organization was able 
to carry out to some extent. A modest 83110unt of food, ooming from Fries-
Land and various places in the Provinces of Utrecht, North Holland, a!J:l. 
South Holland,was delivered.247 
Mention must be made of the Vri.1e Groepen ("Free Grouplt"), a oo-
8rdinated association of Amsterdam resistance groups, some twenty-five or 
thirty in number, part of which specialized in the concealment and care 
of fugitives, as did the National Fugitive Aid Organization. Several of 
the Free Groups specialized in sheltering Jews. The Free Groups felt 
24£w. A. Visser •t Hooft, December 8, 1948, 37164. 
247Riessen, loo. cit., 81622-81624. 
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that they had received an insuf'fioient share of ration coupons, taken by 
the K:nuok:le Gazt!;s, in spite of an agreement with the Organization whereby 
they were to receive some suoh ooupons.248 Generally the National Fugi-
tive Aid Organization and the Free Groups did work well together, however.249 
The Free Groups received from the London-guaranteed National Support 
Fund sums totalling well over fl. 2,000,ooo.250 
The Forgery Organizations 
At first glimpse the role of the forger in resistance work would 
seem minor. In the Dutch oase this -s most emphatically not so. The 
work of various forgery organizations oould be literally said to have made 
the resistanoe possible. Not only were forged identity papers necessary 
for illegal workers to move about at all, special passes were necessary 
for such persons to enter into restricted areas or to operate during 
ourfew hours. Forged papers of various sorts were also needed to aid 
wide numbers of Dutchmen who were not engaged in illegal work but needed 
to escape the effect of this or that Ge~an regulation. The identity of 
Jews might be oonoealed so that they escaped deportation and extermination. 
Workers might be permitted to escape service at forced labor in Germany, 
students might be given "special"' pe:rmits allowing them to continue their 
studies.251 
Various organizations were aotive in this work. Among the earliest 
of these was one headed by Eduard Vete:rme.n, who began the production, in 
248J. Bommer, october 28, 1954, 98699. 
249A. van MOook, November 12, 1954, 98888. 
250Hall, loo. oit., 77180-77183. 
251 c. J. Rl1bsa.e.m, August 30, 1950, 83615o 
.llllsterdam,. of forged identity p&S8eB,. oo11111enoing early in 1941.252 .& 
aeparate Amsterdam group came into baing at about the same time,. headed 
by G&rrit van der Veen. Van der Vean•s group developed into the well-
ll:nawn Persoorutbewi,ja;oentrale (-rdentity Forgery Central,.),. and was 
able to continue operating after his death, in June of 1944!.253. b 
will be seen the Identity Forgery Central produced a very wide range of 
produote indeed. 
Performing related work 11118· the Persoons: Bewijzen Sectie ("'Personal 
Identity Section"'). The Personal Identity Section, a. branch of the 
National Fugi~ive ,A:id Organiza:tion., had as its primary ta.sk one of 
oh&nging the names or other data in already prepared., otherwbe legi-
timate identity papers. The Personal Identity Section filled in a few 
blank identity passee when thes-e could be obtained. When entirely false 
1111.terials- had to be prepared, thes-e came from the Identity Forgery Cen-
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tral .. even though the latter organizllltion was independent of the NationaJ. 
254 
Fugitive Aid Organizartion. 
Still other groups were active in this field. In Utrecht there 
-It the Vervalltingsburea.u Utrecht ("'Utrecht Forgery Bureau11')~.5S The 
Free Groups-., mentioned in the previous section, also engaged in the 
preparation of forgeries-.2.56 
The National Fugitive Aid Organization, in addition to the Per-
sonal Identity Section, referred to above. produced s:ome ocmplete 
forgeries on ite O'llllo This a:.otivity was generally on a smaller scale 
than that of the Identity Forgery Central. Particularly Wlrthy of note, 
252Ibid. 253Ibid. 83620-8362.1. _ .. 
hO'IM'VEil', was & forgery ring which w&s operated in Germany by Dutch 
students who had been sent there for forced labor-. The group., which 
the Fugitive Aid Orga.nizat"ion Mtirically called by the German word, 
,&ussenministerium ("'Foreign Ministry"'),. rented an office in, of alI 
pl!iioe~t,. Berlin,. and proceeded to I!Bnufacture identity papers author-
bing Dutch students in GerlllB.ny to return to Holland. They regularly 
acquired paper of various sorts from factories in the vicinity of Ber-
lin,. including that used in the preparation of SWedish visas.257 
Myriada of different thinglf were forged or counterfeited. ~ng 
the most important of these were identity passea or papers. This 
required a precise printing job on the correct paper • with approxi-
mately the correct color of ink,ass with the fingerprint of the bearer, 
and official authenticating signaturea. Genuine pa.sses bore a water-
mark,. the device of the Dutch 11on. Each pass was numbered, with a 
corresponding number being entered in the community vital-t'eoordJJ 
regilftry. Finally, a special authorizing stamp of the municipality 
was affixed. Each community used a different stamp, some with different 
l!tyles or aiz- of lettering, some with the some type styles· and IJiZ'EIIJ 
but with different spacing. The Identity Forgery Central published a 
catalog, showing the correct authentication stamp for each coiiD!lunity. 
This catalog contained one thousand examples. To make matters more 
complicated the Germans had a habit of transferring the stamps of one 
community for use in another at the opposite end of the country. 
2.fr'7 Ibid • ., 8365.1. 
258Fortunately there was a good deal of color var-iation among 
the genuine identity papsrs. 
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These and aJzy other changes had to be noted.259 
The saving :factor in acme cases was that the administration o:f' iden-
tity papers was le:f't. o:f' necessity. partly in the hands o:f' ""safe" Dutch 
civil servants. who regularly entered and maintained in good standing in 
the vital-records registries fictitious persons.260 
A particularly troublesome :feature was the watermark. The earliest 
:forged identity passes contained 110 watermark at all. Those preparing 
them were neither proud o:f' nor satis:f'ied with their product. but :felt 
that it was at least sa:f'er to use such a pass rather than a legal one 
bearing the dreaded letter "'J"' :for "'Jew". Later a watermark was simulated 
by glueing together two thin pieces o:f' paper. with the image o:f' the sup-
posed watermark printed lightly on one side o:f' the resultant sandwich. 
This arrangement was little more satisfactory. as the passes produced by 
this process could be "split,. • a discovery that the Gestapo made almost 
immediately. Eduard Vetterman solved the watermark problem :for a time. 
at least. by openly ordering :from a paper manufacturer stock o:f' the 
proper grade. color. and weight. with the correct lion watermark as well. 
This. he explained. was to be used in printing the wrapper for a fict-
itious L8wensei:f'e ("Lion's Head Soap").26l 
On May 31• 1944• members of the Identity Forgery Central raided the 
State Printing Of:f'ice. and carried away "thouaame" o:f' blank identity 
cards. Not only were the cards in question 110t missed. the security 
head o:f' the state Printing O:f':f'ice was not aware that his premises had 
been entered illegally. 262c 
259Rttbsaam. loco cit •• 83640. 260Ibid •• 83653. 261tbid •• 83620. 
262Ibid •• 83618. 
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Forged iderrt:ity papers were not limited to those of the German occu-
pied Netherlands. The Identity Forgery Central turned out suoh exotic 
documents as Czarist Russian baptismal certificates and Paraguayan pass-
ports. Such obscure papers offered one important advarrt:age: They were 
virtually impossible to authenticate. Eduard Vetterman produced Brazil-
ian birth certificates without ever having seen such a document. He 
reasoned that German security forces would never have seen one either. 
His estimate proved to be correct.263 
Other "fantasy papers• 1 as they came to be called, oertified that the 
bearer worked for a Dutch company doing work on German corrt:racts, or thst: 
he had a special mission with this or that German agenoy, sometimes ex-
tant;, sometimes not. On oooasion a resistance worker travelled in the 
restricted area baok of the dune near the Hague, apparently to inspect 
German fortifications. He employed a "fantasy" paper, a supposed letter 
from the Reiohs-cammissioner, Seyss-Inquart, authorizing the bearer, 
Curator of the Amsterdam Rijksmuseum, to enter the area to examine paint-
ings stored there for safekeeping. The person making the trip in question 
actually was the Curator of the Rijkamuseum.264 
By the winter of 1944-1945 the Germans 011111e to require various sorts 
of special "legitimation" papers in rioh abundance for every oonoeivable 
purpose. Of particular importance were the so-called "bicycle• papers. 
With no transportation available other than the bioyole, its use could 
well spell the difference between life and death, as it was often nec-
essary to oyole from the large cities to the countryside in search of 
food. In Amsterdam alone the Identity Forgery Central collected examples 
263Ibid., 83623o 264Ibido 1 83655e 
Gf· seventy different bicycle p&per~. German se~ity forces appareutly 
had decided on such a wide variety a. a method of forestalling fGrgery. 
The result was inevitable: The Forgery Central dutifully produoe.d all 
seventy. lit the end this multipUcity of forms worked to the disad-
'VliJ!tage of the Germans, as no one per1ton at aey check point could 
265 posdbly b& acquainted with more than a fraction of those 8111ployed. · 
The· Identity Forgery Central produced the neceanry paper• for· 
rettouing Dutch Jslf from the German concentration camp at Weltterbcrk, 
'HO'lland. Gerhard Badrian, hilll8elf Jewish., employed a set of these 
papers one afternoon when, -wearing a German tmiform and doing his bert 
imitsl:ion of a Gestapo officer, he entered W'eaterborlt" and removed to 
safety his onw neph-. aea· 
The Identity Forgery Central did a brisk bultiness in the produc-
tion of forged ,tuswehe, or cards certifying the bearer to be exempt 
from forced labor in Germany.26T 
~sl:ion stamps were not counterfeited by the Forgery Central until 
the deaper&te "'hunger winter"' of 1944-1945, for use by the National 
Fugitive Aid Or·ganimtion. Production never exceeded one or two per-
cent of those coupons legally produced. Ration coupons proved most 
difficult to produce. Each aerie• legally produced deliberately bore 
a slightly different shade of color from ita predecessors. Those 
legally manufactured were printed by off-nt. Since no off-set presses 
were available for this clandestine project, varioua of the customary 
methods of simplating off-set had to be tested and evaluated. That 
this was successful can be seen in the fact that, as far as the writer 
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1a- able to determine, the forged r•tion ooupo11s were 11ever detected 
as such. a·sg 
!he Forgery Centre.l walt made up of' i'our technical groups. Each 
technical group had itlf own artist•, photographer~~., engravers, and 
printers. Bach tiso had a representative which met with other group 
representatives i'or daily teChnical dirtoussions under Forgery Central 
auspices, wherein, i'or example, illi'ormation on the latest authentioa-
tion stamp• of' identity passelt -s exchanged. teourity IU"'r'allgements-
-re such that no reprnentative of' a technical group knew the identity, 
i'or example, of' the printer of another group, so that if' a single group 
should be arrested the others could continue unimpeded. The Gerl!lallrt 
never penetrated the Forgery Central, although some mst'birs were arrested 
for other activities•, and the head, Gerrit van der Veen was arrested on 
JUne 1, 1944 (the day after he participated in the suooessi'ul raid on 
the State Printer) when he attempted to rescue a friend imprisoned in a 
German jail in JJnaterdam.269 
Mr. Cornelia J. Rllb8&8111, who played a very important role in the 
Forgery Centra!, teatii'ying in !950.., wished that the vital role played 
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by printers in forgery operations be made clear. Artists, photographers., 
even engravers could move themselves- and their equipment on short no-
tioe, but printers had to stay "'put.,., as printing presses are among the 
least portable of all man made objects-. The printer•s- location not 
only was almost surely known to the authorities, he undoubtedly also did 
a great deal of "'legal"' liiDrk, and had to fulfill his forgery assignments-
in odd hours, when he stood at least a chance of running afoul of' 
269 ~·· 83677. 
va:rious German labor inspection programs or ourfewll'. He might be 
equipped with special permits enabling him to operate at unorthodox 
hours, he may have printed those permits as we11.2:10 
Contact with the London Government was virtually non-existent 
during the early years of the Forgery Central '~r operation. Again, 
London supplied money through the National Support Fund, in the case 
of the Identity Forgery Central some fl. 2:,5oo .. ooo worth. .tf'ter the 
death of Gerrit van der Veen, in June of 1944, the activities of the 
Central were financed completely by the National Support Fund.a71 
Indeed, in its second authorimicn of additional money for the Na-
tional S'Upport Fund, the London Government specifically mentioned the 
Forgery Central as one of the intended recipients of its Aid.272 
To maey a Dutch forger in those d~eys the London Government s·eemed 
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a logical source of falire identity papers, since Britain at least was 
free. The London Government did supply identity passes to the agents 
dropped under its auspices-. To say that these forgeries rrepared in 
London were very bad indeed is probably something of an understatement.273 
At one point a Mr. Cas de Graa£, of the Forgery Central, went to 
London with one of Gerrit van der Veen•s- better products, displayed it 
to the appropriate officials, and said, "' •!his is mat they oan do 
[in ocoupied Holland]. Why oan•t you do it?• n274 
By January, I9.W, the National Fugitive .A.id Organization sent a 
representative to London to inquire if the Netherlands Government could 
270Ibid ... 83640. 271Ball, loa. cit., 77180-77183. 
27%E~, VIla, 226. 273Jc. :Bolle, Jrarch 10 .. 1950, 76903. 
274J!Ilbeaam, loa. cit., 83637. 
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pos.sibly prepare identity papers for use with a new system about to be 
instituted by the Germans in connection with another forced-labor· drive. 
This time a pass book was to accompany the identity pass. The Fugitive 
Aid Organization apparently feared that this new document might prove 
to be beyond the resources of domestic counterfeiters. As a result, 
London did deliver forged identity passes, of greatly improved quality 
and in considerable numbers. The watermark was excellent and the 
general appearance nearly as good. Unfortunately the paper stock was 
too soars~, so that they could not be employed. Inquiries were made 
of London as to when deliveries of improved quality might be expected.275 
In reply the F<r gery Central received its only telegram from the Lon-
don Government: 
:March 27 • 1945. 
There have already been sent from the liberated area: 
thousanda of identity passes IIJld identity-pass seals, together 
with blue identity passes. A forgery specialist ••• from the 
occupied area has been in London ~r quite some time. Identity 
passes will be dropped regularly. 6 
London apparently made other legitimation papers for the occupied 
territory, including some that certified that the bearer worked for 
food distribution serviees·.27'71 
Still later t!r. R11bsaam received from an anonymous oouroe a qUIIJl-
tity of blank identity cards for completion. Although the quality was 
~cellent and his curiosity was greatly aroused he restrained his 
initial impulse to try to ascertain their true origin. They may have 
oome from London, he had no way of knowing.278 
2.75Ibid., 83632.. 27El'rbid. 
277Ibid., 83629-83636. 2.78Ibido 
Dr. J. M. Somer, who was in charge of the Bureau Inlichtingen 
("Intelligence Bureau") in London, was well aware of the shortcomings 
of the identity passes with which agents were equipped. The situation 
did improve while the London Govermnent was still entirely in Ellgland, 
it improved still further when the southern provinces were liberated in 
the fall of 1944. The sources of his forgery difficulties were various. 
The London Government had and continued to have the utmost trouble in 
getting hold of any copies of identity passes for reproduction. jng_-
elandvaarders, whose who crossed from the occupied territory to Eng-
land, almost never brought their identity passes with them, having 
discarded them in the interests of security should they be apprehended 
by the Germans, he reported. Time after time he petitioned the under-
ground through all sorts of contacts to send him a blank identity pass, 
if one could somehow be obtained. This they never dido He knew only 
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too well that various forgery organizations in the occupied territory 
turned out excellent identity passes by the hundreds or even thousands. 
He sought to have a few of these counterfeits sent to him so that he 
might use them in equipping his agents. He could recall having requested 
fifty or so at one point. The "undergrou:rxl." sent clandestine news-
papers "by the bale'•, until his office was piled with more than he 
could read in weeks, but not until the very end did they forward an 
identity card.279 
Dr. Somer had no direct contacts with printers during the time the 
Government was in London. Forged identity passes were prepared by a 
British agency that had a small staff and prepared identity papers for 
279J. M. Somer, February 28, 1960, 76352-76370. 
use in nearly every country in Europe and several elsewhere. It did 
the best it could but was faced with nrious shortages itself. Dr. 
Somer expressed something approaching irritation at the suggestion 
that London was, by virtue of the technical resources that it must 
have had at its disposal, in a better position to produce good forger-
ieee than persons in the German-occupied territory. Once the Dutch 
Intelligence Bureau established a field headquarters in the liberated 
1t0uth, at Eindhoven, a; marked improvement took p~ce in the realm of 
forged identity papers, Dr. Somer reported. It was true, he said, that 
in the spring of 1945 a number of vastly improved identity passes were 
delivered to the occupied territory. He felt certain that at least a 
portion of these were so good that their recipients must have found 
them of use. They had been prepared with the aid of experts from the 
occupied area and with the assistance of a chemist, Dr. van Wijk. 
Dr. Somer oould recall having prepared for use in the occupied north 
forged copies of a particularly elaborate German &usweis. They were 
produoed at a considerable expense by a large Brusseb printing and 
engraving firm. So good was this forgery that one had great diffi-
culty in telling it from the original.260 
Th• Cll&ndestine Press" 
Holland has long been noted for its publishing industry. Aside 
from large orders for foreign account, produced in nearly every con-
ceivable language, a steady stream of all sorts of printed matter is 
turned out for home consumption. The international character of Dutch 
oommeroe has inevitably meant that the Hollander's interests were both 
260Ibid. 
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varied and cosmopolitan. An internal sooial division further increase~ 
the oomple:rlty of Dutch interests and affiliations. not only are there 
various sorts of liberala and conservatives, there are Roman Catholics, 
Orthodox Calvinists, not-so-orthodox Calvinists, ~otestants, Jews~ 
Free Thinkers, to name but a few. 
The clandestine press was an inevitable development, and it was 
inevitable that it reflected many of the divisions existing in Nether-
land~t society. 
The writer makes no claim that he is presenting here an account 
of the underground press as Nch. Those papers selected have been so 
ohosen because they were representative of a type or particular phil-
osbphy, or because they illustrate specific aspects of relations be-
tween the clandestine P' ess and the London Government. 
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It was to be expected that publishing an illegal newspaper was a 
:~&rticularly hazardous profession. One should and often oould place as· 
great a distance as possible, in terms of personal contact, between the 
editorial staff and those actually duplicating or printing the copy which 
had been supplied them. In like manner, an ideal arrangement involved 
e. similar distance between the stenciller or printer and those actually 
distributing the individual copies. Bundles of the finished product 
could be passed to individuals of unknown identity, who then broke 
them down into smaller bundles, again transferring them through inter-
mediaries to the individual reader. No arrangement of anonymity was 
perfect. Sooner or later chance would have it that a reader would 
receive his copy from a known verspreider ("l!preader"') t who might in 
turn actually know the identity of his distributer, and so on. 
Agents provocateur or others who were disloyal could and did find their 
way into the most sophisticated of the clandestine papers. There was, 
quite literally, no way of positively identifying in advance those 
disloyal. There may have been nothing about their behavior or appear-
ance to betray them. They may have been the most conscientious and 
dedicated of 'IR>rkera. One might have known them and/or their flllllilies 
for years before the war. Their references might 'Mill be of the high-
est order, entirely genuine and based on a deep trust and confidence. 
The plain fact of the matter was that arrests, impriso:mnents, and 
e:x:aoutions were a very common feature of the trade. Most of the under-
ground press was seriously hampered in this fashion, some so much so 
that publication was never resumed. 
Some mention must be made of the value of the clandestine press. 
It signified more than a gesture of impudence, a romantic, if possibly 
foolhardy way of ,.putting one over" on the Germans. /1. central feature 
of the occupation period was the fact of intellectual isolation from 
much of the rest of the 'llllrld. The information services of the Thou-
sand Year Reich were never noted for either the objectivity or the 
completeness of their coverage. Persons in all walks of life in the 
Dutch nation had an almost pathetic interest in any news at all from 
countries outside the /I.Xis sphere of influence. Agents parachuted into 
the occupied territory often found as muoh interest expressed in recent 
events in the Allied world as in their own particular official mission. 
On secret radio1 men listened to London, MOscow, Boston, and, until 
early in 1942, to the Netherlands East Indies. Many, of course, did 
not have such an opportunity. For them the clandestine press was the 
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only link with any sort of objective re&lity. When the London Govern-
ment did choose to address itself to the occupied territory in spe-
eific terms the clandestine press published such communications. It 
was through underground papers that the Netherlands public first became 
aware of the Ordinances of 1937 and the later Commentary. Through the 
illegal press Hollanders could learn of the latest German measures in 
euoh matters as the labor draft. Advance knowledge of such measures, 
when it was available to the edi tore, made possible their prior pub-
lication, giving those most likely to be affected a chance to take 
whatever counter measures might be feasible. In a very real sense the 
clandestine press, at least in the earlier period of the war, had to 
teach the public to resist. A population generally accustomed to 
obeying government regulations had to learn dilfObedienoe. University 
students, for example, had to be told not to complete German applica-
tions for ~exemption"' from forced labor service, rather to fill out no 
forms at all and go into hiding as rapidly as possible. Laborers 
being taken to Germany by train had actually to be told, incredible 
though it may seem, to try to escape from such transport. 
The underground press undoubtedly oontri buted, at least in the 
earlier period of the ooo~p.tion, to general Netherlands morale and to 
the general level of expectations. By the fall of 1940 many persons 
in the occupied territory were convinced of a final German victory. 
The mere existence of such fiery publications as Johan Doorn's one-man 
Oranjekrant ("'Orange Paper"'),. which actually was printed on p&per 
stock of an orangeish hue, served as a constant reminder of the 
possibility of Allied victory and of the existence of the Netherlands 
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Gover:anent in London, however much of an artificial creation it must 
have seemed to be in 1940. Despair and ger:eral forebodings of defeat 
were, if a~hing, more intense by the early spring of 1942, which 
saw the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies. With the 
Axis defeats in North Africa, events well covered in the clandestine 
press, general hope revived. Underground editors took a considerable 
delight in describing the German fiasco at Stalingrad. After these 
events it was clear that a complete Axis victory was unlikely, in acy 
event. 
i. final introductory note must be one of caution in assessing 
the circulation figures offered for the olandeetine press. In at 
least some instances these are based on ex post facto estimates. It 
is ilnpcssible to guess the number of readers of any single copy of a 
clandestine nnrsps.per. The writer was told of copies having passed 
through scores of hands until they were literally in tatters. Figures 
presented here are based on the given or estimated output of all kn01m 
printing or stencilling plants. On occasion a single copy of a paper 
reaching a distant town or village might be reproduced locally without 
the knowledge of the publisher, ecmetimes in quite impressive numbers. 
Het Parool (lhe Watchword), was a clandestine ne'lfllpaper of 
independent socialist persuasion, whose politics, greatly muted in 
the interests of national unity, appear to this writer to have been 
similar to those of the British Labour Party. The Watchword was 
founded in January of 1941, appearing weekly in stencilled form. 
Later it was printed and ma.y have been the first large clandestine 
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newBpaper to have been printed.28l Although The WsXchword appeared 
la1;er in Amsterdam and envirozm, lilt a daily • the weekly continued. By 
1944 the weekly, which was printed at The Hague and at Eindhoven, WBiS 
available on matrixes from which type oould be set. A total of four 
different type styles and two different choices of format was avail-
able. Every Thursday morning the matrixes, mercifully easy to conceal 
and transport, since they were both light and flexible, were sent to 
additional printing plants a:t &lmelo. Leeuwarden. Maastricht, Breda,. 
utrecht, and Groningen, where they were set into type.asa 
~ter World War II !lr. Meijer, one of the editors of The Watchword·,. 
was shown, by the War Documentation Service, a collection of under-
ground newspe.pers.- including a pile of back issues of The Watchword 
of totally unfamiliar format. HEI oould only conclude that an inde-
pEindent printer or group must have produced the issuea in question.283 
The source of news for The Watchword, aside from local informants, 
was largely Allied radio broadcasts. Radio Orange, since it was the 
official Dutch station in London, was listened to with great interest, 
although for quite a portion of its earlier life it carried no news 
broadcasts. Local, Germn jamming of Radio Orange made its reception 
often quite difficult, so that 1he Home and Forces Program of the B.B.C. 
was frequently utilized, since it was broadcast on too large a number 
of wavelengths to make jamming effective. The Watchword operated its· 
own radio listening post, complete with a battery-operated receiver, 
where London broadcasts were copied stenographically in somewhat 
aBlJ. Meijer, July 26, 1950,. 62083-82084. 
282rbid •• S2083. 2·83Ibid. 
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abbreviated form.2 84 other clandestine newspapers made similar use 
of Allied broadcasts. 
The Watchword, and other papers as well, were able to utili:e 
a valuable network of clandestine telephone and teletype stations in 
Holland operated by a private intelligence organization, the '"press 
branch~ of the Centrale Inlichtingen Dienst.285 
The "press branch"' of the private Central Intelligence Service 
operated !lit The Hagu& the so-called Centraal Bureau Keeten, thus named 
since it!! two heads both bore the name of Kees. The Kees combination 
lovingly gathered Allied radio broadcasts, including particularly those 
of Radio Orange, on diotaphone cylinder..recordings, thus the texts were 
usually letter-perfect.286 
The Watchword got more than a little assistance from the so-called 
legal press, those papers that appeared with German approval. While 
the legal press took varyil".g positions that were at the least &xtremely 
cautious· and at the most simply pro-~i • it is not to be supposed 
that the persons thus employed were, by any manner of means, automati-
138 
aally collaborators or Na.Z'i sympathis:ers. s·ome of them regularly supplied 
extraordinarily valuable material to the clandestine press, including 
important German pronouncements, in advance of their official publi-
oation. One suoh "Legal"' journalist, la. H. Beishuizen, took down and 
supplied to The Watchword, for an extended period, the entire (British) 
2841bid., 82085. 
285w. E. Sanders, September 13, 1949, 67055. This private 
11Cecntral Intelligence Service" ahould not be oo nfused with the 
Netherlands Government agency of the same name, located in London. 
Reuters press service, copied on an automatic printer, whioh ~~. 
Beishuizen had somehow managed to arrange, no mean feat in the 
German-oooupied Netherlanda.287 
By the time The Watchword appeared on a daily basis in the 
Amsterdam area a vast, institutionalized conspiracy was available for 
its production and distribution. Bach edition closed with the 8:15 
A.M. news broadcast of the British Broadcasting Corporation. ~ke-up 
was decided on, and then twenty-eight stencils were out and twenty• 
seven dispatched U,y courier. The couriers met still other couriers, 
of unknown identity, in churches, offices, and other public places. 
Thus the stencils reached twenty-seven different duplicating machines. 
Each machine produoed between 1,000 and 1,500 copies, Which were di• 
vided into packets of 100 for distribution U,y couriers to the "spread-
ers"• The "spreaders" effected delivery to the reader. By evening 
some 30,000 copies had been delivered.288 
It was a melancholy faot: The larger the circulation of an 
underground paper, the more likely Gestapo interest, penetration, and 
oapture. The Watchword, as a means of misleading the Germans, found 
it useful to publish and distribute through its own organization 
papers of various names and format, some for only a short time. This 
device was also employed U,y other clandestine papers. 289 
Cbrietofoor was a stencilled Catholic monthly, founded in 1942, 
with a oiroulation of between 50 000 and 10,000 oopies. 290 
Mr. L. F. w. Jansen, one of the founders of Cbristofoor, stated 
287Meijer, loo. oit., 82085. 288Ibid. 289vorr1nk, loo. oit. 
290c. J. A· M· ten Hagen, August 300 19500 83690-83694. 
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that the paper was not created because it was felt that Catholics should 
specifically have one of their own, but since so ma~ other publication• 
appeared uuder various banners there might aa well be one that -• Cath-
olio. Chriatofoor worked well with other papers of various perauasions. 
There was a good spirit in those times, Mr. Jall8en felt. Since Chriato-
!2!!!:, was Catholic, Mr. Jansen explained, it could use its "bwn meall8• in 
furthering the reaistanoe. Catholics were thus told that they were re-
quired, as an article of faith, to resist the Germans. Portions of Papal 
pronouncements and pastoral lettera by Catholic Bishops were presented in 
support of this Tiew. Yr. Janaen felt that London placed too little T&lue 
on the Catholic resistance.291 
Publication of Vri.1 Nederlend (J'ree Netherland•) 'began in Septemller 
of 1940, with an issue dated August 31, 1940, the birthday of Queen 
Wilhelmim.292 Vrij Nederland originally appeared in stencilled form 
at irregular intel'ftls in jmaterdam, Hilversum, and at the Hague, with a 
total output of a ffiW' hundred oop:Les.293 In spite of arrest• it grew, 10 
that by 1944 editions appeared in nearly eTery major population center in 
the ooU)Itry. Bach iaaue muat have nt~~~bered -11 in excess of 100,000 
oopie••294 
fhe "politics" of Vrij Nederland were Christian-Protestant (rather 
thea orthodox Calvinist). In terms of social attitudes one might equate 
291L. F. w. Jansen, ,lugust 23, 1955 0 99327. 
292rhe clandestine newspaper Vrij Nederland, here described, must 
not be contused with a magasine of the aame name published during World 
War II in London. 
293F. Hofker, A.ugust 30, 1950, 83457-83464. 
29'aandwijk, leo. cit., 66903-66908. 
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this view with the more liberal elements of the present day (1961) 
British ConserTative Party. Vri1 Nederland maintained eloae contact with 
Dr. Visser •t Hoeft, of the Swiss Routs in Geneva, since part of the staff 
of Vrii Nedsrlam operated the Dutch terminus of the Swiss Routs, which 
ran from Holland to ID!Idon via Dr. Visser •t Hoeft. The SWiss Routs, 
as has already been noted, eonYsysd a prodigious amount of intelligence 
material of varied nature.295 
vrq Nederland felt that it had a duty to protest against 110me of 
the passive attitudes taken by the Netherlands people in regard to the 
oooupying power. Mr. C. Trooat, aa a managing editor of Vrij Nederland, 
published editerials urging Hollanders te be aa distant in their relatieliS 
with the Gsrmana as poasible. He r.membsred an article oonosrning the 
legal paper, De StaDdaard, entitled, -rw1light at pe Standaard~, in which 
he criticised the employmeo::r.t by De Standaard of Max Bloksijl, a pro-Nazi 
journalist. 296 
Relatione with much ot the rest ot the resistance prsaa were excel-
lent. 01:1 an occasion when German arrests ~~&de the publication ot the 
Watohaord impossible it was printed tor several iasuea on the preassa ot 
V£13 Nederland.297 
Trouw (Faith), an orthodox Calvinist elandeatine newapaper, oame into 
being, in part, out of diaeatiafaotion with the liberal views ot Vri1 
Nederlam. It appeared that same of the distributer& ot Vrij Nederland 
in more northern (and more orthodox Calvinist) areas either refused to 
295The SWiss Route is the subjeet of a later IISetion. 
296c. Troost, August 30, 1950, 83513-83515. 
297Randwijk, loc. cit. 
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distribute the publication or were reluctant to do ao, on grounds of "con-
science". 296 Some were quoted as a~ing that they found Vrl1 Nederl•"" 
"too aooialistic"'•299 
Part of the initiative for the creation of Faith alao came from the 
Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party.soo 
Faith began publication in January, 1943, and oontinued ita illegal 
operations until the end of World war II. After the war it conti:aued to 
301 publiah, u did several other of tho elandestine papers. 
Faith campaigned particularly against the ~zificatioa• of Dutoh 
public lifo. At the •- time it rejected aey aort of abaolutlBIII in 
poat-war 'Dutch govorDDent. Generally bftplied was an aversion to pater-
nalistio, or sooialiatio attitude• in government, or to "excessive govern-
me:d;al interference with tho tree~· Faith, as might have been 
expected, auf'fored greatly from German counter measures. In 1943 alone 
twenty persona wore sentenced to death and executed as the direct result 
of having participated in the publication of the paper.302 
Of a quite different viewpoint than that of Faith was the COilliiiWlist 
underground nO'II'IIpaper, De Waarheid (Tho Truth, or Pravda). lh!, Truth 
was created at the behest of Dutch Communi at Party leaders in hiding, in 
in October, 1940, at least according to tho testimony of ita first editor. 303 
The first issue, however, was not publiahed until November 7, 1941.304 
298 G. H. J. van der Molen, July 26, 1950, 82197. 
299J. A· Ho J. So Bruins Slot, July 26, 
300 Molen, 1oc. cit., 82197-82202. 
30Isruins Slot, lcc. cit., 82031-82035. 
S03s. de Groot, May 20, 1952, 96925. 
1950, 62018. 
302Ibid 
-· 
304A. J. Koejemana, December 19 1 1951, 95256·95261. 
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Mr. Saul de Groot, the editor in question, said that the long gap between 
foundation and the appearance of the first issue of The Truth was due 
to the faot that its founders realized that printing and distribution 
facilities would have to be carefully established before it could begin 
regular publication.305 
Mr. de Groot denied that the Nazi-soviet paot of the period had had 
anything to do with the slowness with which The Truth appeared on the 
Dutch scene. He said that the Dutch Communist leadership had never been 
fooled by Soviet "coni'eremes" with the German Foreign Minister, von 
Ribbentrop, that there was "no question" that the Soviet Union and the 
Nazi regime could ever be allies, that "logical deduction"' as well as the 
public speeches of Soviet leaders made it clear that the Soviet union 
would eventually enter the war against Germany. 306 
Truth may have produced as many as 1000 000 copies of a single issue, 
although the figure is uncertain.307 The paper was stencilled in a 
central edition and then duplicated elsewhere, often under other names, 
such as pe Vonk {The spark, or Iskra), or Het Signaal (The Signal), with 
local rews often included in theseeditiona.308 In spite of the quite 
respectable size of the issues Truth did not appear in printed form until 
just before *Y 0 1945.309 
The sources of nsws for The Truth were radio broadcasts from London 
and Moscow, local informants, and the German press. Mr. de Groot, who 
served as editor from the foundation of Truth until J.pril, 1943, found it 
305 306 Groot, loc. cit., 96925-96930. Ibid., 96933-96934. 
307Koejemans, loc. cit., 95266-95273. 
309Koejemans, loo. oit., 95270. 
308 Groot, loo. cit. 
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very helpful to read between the lines of the German publication, 12!.§_ 
Reich, Mr. de Groot was able to reoeive Moscow on an ordinary radio, 
although it was necessary to listen very late at night,310 
The Truth proceeded on the general assumption that the Soviet Union 
was a power whose interests were friendly to those of the Netherlands. 
In April, 1943, Mr. de Groot was removed from the editorship of Truth 
and exiled to OVerijssel to become editor of a provincial edition. Mro 
de Groot had felt that an overriding consideration should be an Allied 
victory, and that issues of postwar social and political organization 
should be stressed less. His sucoessor, Mro Koejemans, felt that more 
311 
stress should be laid on suoh issues. 
During the tenure of office of Mr. de Groot Truth had no real contact 
with any other illegal paper. It was not, he reported, an easy matter 
to get in touch with the editor of, for example, The Watchword.312 
Onoe Mr. Koejemans assumed office The Truth enjoyed somewhat 
closer relations ~th other clandestine newspapers. The Truth co8p-
erated with Vri1 Nederland, Faith, and Christofoor in the joint pub-
lication of an illegal brochure, Qn Neerlands Toekomst (About the Future 
of the Netherlands). 313 
Another clamestine newspaper, De Vonk (The Spark), was founded in 
February, 1941, as a left-wing, socialist, non-stalinist publication. 
It appeared in stencilled form until 1944, and then was printed. The 
printed issues were further reproduced by stencil in several local areas. 
Until 1945 each issue numbered about 51 000 ccpies, after December, 1944 
3l0Grcot, loc. cit,, 96969-96970. 311Ibid., 96933-96941. 
3I2rbid,, 96961-96967. 3l~cejemans, loc. oit,, 95287-95290, 
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the total number of copies equalled about 10,000 or 12,000,314 
The Spark took the attitude that socialists must pursue goals trans-
cending the nation state, that the post-war economy of the world must be 
organized along lines truly international, In addition to its newspaper, 
The Spark published a number of brochures, some of Whioh were in German, 
stating their point of view am urging the German military to desert. 
A few Germans actually did desert, to be hidden by the organization 
surrounding The spark,315 
Je Maintiendrai, a title drawn from the motto of the Netherlands, was 
something almost inconceivable in Holland-- a newspaper, albeit it olan-
destine, without fixed political or religious affiliation. Je Maintien-
drai began in stencilled form in 1940 under the name of B.C. Nieuws,316 
In 1942 B.C. Nieuws became Je Maiutiendraio It was stenoilled in a 
number of places, the most important being in the Peaoe Palace at the 
Hague. It first appeared in printed form at Leeuwarden in July, 1943, 
and appeared printed after that t~e. At first a typical issue numbered 
about 151 000 copies, this was later inoreased to as much as 25,000,317 
The editors found that some persons were confused and bewildered by 
a non-political, non-sectarian paper. The editors learned that Je Jl!in-
tiendrai had been described as a publication representing the interests of 
314w, F. Storm, August 30, 1950, 8374Q-83762. This independent 
paper, De Von!c, should not be confused with looal editions of the 
Communist The Truth, some of which also bore the name, De Vonko 
315Ibido 
316rhe writer has tentatively identified the initials "B.C." as 
having been derived from Groot-Burgeroomite ("Grand Citizens Com-
mittee"), an early resistanoe organization. 
317 K. Viehoff, October 23, 1951, 94091-94095. 
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young Catholic civil servants, or, alternatively, as a socialist pub-
lication. This turned out to be particularly true of the Government in 
London, where one found at least these two contrasting points of view in 
regard to Je :Maintiendrai. The trouble with the London Govermnent, the 
editors felt, was that it felt an urge to place everything in nice, neat 
compartments, a method not always wall suited to the German occupied 
Netherlams. 318 
such contact as did exist between the London GoVel'IIIIlllnt and the clan-
destine press must now be described. 
The London-guaranteed National SUpport Fund paid a total of fl. 531, 
000 for the direct benefit o:f' the clandestine press.319 That IDndon held 
the underground press in high esteam ia indicated in the fact that the 
second authorization of money for the National Support Fund specifically 
included the underground press as one of the intended reoipients.320 
Doubtless some of the help which the National support Fund gave to 
other organizations indirectly benefited persons publishing clandestine 
newspapers. This must have been particularly true offunds given to 
the Forgery Central and the National Fugitive Aid Organization. Some of 
those employed in the work of the olamestine press had no other employ-
ment, and led more or less of an outla-d existence. Consequently they 
needed both forged identity papers and the assistance Which the Fugitive 
Aid Organisation could offer. 
Several of the leading clandestine papers reported that they had 
been able to function largely independent; of National Support Fund 
assistance. Many received regular ocntributions from their readers and 
318Ibid. 319Hall, loo. oit., 77180.77183. 32~~. VIla, 236. 
other interested persons. 
The Watch!!prd used National SUpport Fund help only onoe, in the 
Winter of 1944-19450 321 
Similarly, Vrij Nederland apparently made very little use of euoh 
aid, except for that same winter.322 
Faith described itself as "self supporting"' and, apparently, never 
323 
received any direct assistance from the National Support Fund. 
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The Communist paper, The Truth, received no money from the National 
Support Fund and was not even a~e that London-guaranteed funds were 
available for the use of the clandestine press. The Truth did create a 
Solidariteitsfonds ("Etolidarity Fund"), whioh apparently was not intended 
for the support of the paper but for the assistance of the surviving 
families of deceased resistance '110rkera.S24 
All of the clandestine press bad oontaot with London in the sense 
that all employed London radio broadcasts. Contact other than this 
varied sharply from paper to paper. 
The Watoh!prd and Vrii Nederland both commissioned Mr. G. J. van 
Heuven Goedhart to travel to London as their representative, so that the 
Goverment might become better informed on the role of the clandestine 
prese. Mr. van Heuven Goedhart, who departed on April 24, 1944, went to 
London via Belgium, France, Andorra, Spain, and Gibraltar. In addition 
to his mission tor the clandestine press he bad several other resist-
3l!:1 
--yeijer, loc. cit., 82098-82108. 
322A. H. van Namen, July 26, 1950, 82150. 
323Bruins Slot, July 26, 1950, 82068-82071. 
324xoejemans, loc. oit., 95333. 
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tanoe commissions as well.325 
Aside from the contact via Mr. van Heuven Goedhart, The Watchword 
made no other effort to contact London directly. Shipments of The 1[atch-
110rd, beginning in 1943, travelled regularly to London via the Swiss 
Route. Back to The Watchword, as well as to some other clandestine pub-
lications, came various British and American periodicals, together with 
assorted clippings. It was in this fashion that The watchword received 
copies of the Dutch magazine published in London, Vrij Nederland.326 
Mr. Johan Gr\ba, an agent of the {Dutch) Military Bureau for the Pre-
paration cf the Return to Holland, -s parachuted into the occupied terri-
tory on the night of October 18, 1943. Grim had several missions, among 
them one of contacting the clandestine press. He -• able to establish 
suoh oontaot, and met with Mr. van Heuven Goodhart before the latter•s 
departure for England. Grb brought with him copies of the Ordinanon of 
~. with their standards of oonduat for civil servants, a docll!lent almost 
totally unknown to oivil servant or private citizen alike.327 
Grim was captured by the Gestapo at the moment he -s on his way to 
meet with a staff representative of The Watoh!ord.328 
Johan Grim, miraculously alive after World War II, recalled that he 
was received by Mr. van Heuven Goedhart who, fresh from a most painful 
experience with an organization that had been betrayed by a clever and 
resourceful agent provocateur. one .lnton van der Waals, -• understand-
ably suspicious. When Grlht offered to send a telegram to London, request-
325a. J. van Heuven Goedhart, November 9 1 1948 0 32929. One 
motivation for his departure doubtless lay in the f'aot that a current 
Gestapo bulletin offered a r.-rd of Rm. 100 000, promotion of rank, and 
the Iron Cross (Second Class) for his capture. 
326 Meijer, loo. oit., 82089, 327Ibid., 82090-82095. 328Ibid 
-· 
ing that any message chosen by Mro van Heuven Goedhart be broadcast by 
Radio Orange, this did not allay the fears of Mr. van Heuven Goedhart, 
as van der Waals, employing a Gestapo-penetrated telegraphic network 
actually in contact with the London Government, had caused Radio Orange 
to broadcast a number of such messages by requsst.329 
Mr. Meijer of The Watchword, doubted that there had been any 
deliberate hostility directed at an agent known to be from London. 
Everyone in those days, he reiterated, feared agents of the Gennan 
security polioe.330 
Hans Bialosterski, who had worked with The Watchword, escaped to 
England in November, 1943. As far as this writer is able to determine 
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he went with no mission from The watchword. During the night of April 1, 
1944, Bialosterski was parachuted into the occupied territory, together 
with a quantity of supplies for the clandestine press. Something wetrl; 
wrong with the "freight" portion of this shipnent, so that he 11as unable 
to locate any of his supplies. Although he had the assistance in hia 
search of Mr. C. J. van Paasohen of the Groep-Pieter ("Peter Group"), 
a resistance organization based in the Peace Palace at the Hague, the 
search was fruitless. Bialosterski was able to deliver to Mr. van Paa-
schen a sum of money intended to aasht the clandestine preaa, and an 
engraving ocntaining a photograph of Queen Wilhelmina, together with a 
message from the monarch for publication in the underground preas.331 
The text of the brief article is as follows: 
329J, Grun, October 20, 1948, 30029. 
330yeijer, leo. cit., 82090-82095. 
38lc, J, van Paasohen, Y.aroh 101 1950, 76726, 
My fellow countrymen: 
Regularly rww I address you by radio, alld 'When, in theae 
extraordinary times, I was offered the opportunity to oontaot 
you via the underground press I did not want to let this special 
mediiDII go unused, as everything that oan serve the cause of our 
unity must be utilized. I read in the underground press and in 
other documents how you live and struggle in these times, but I 
am able to follow even better your life through refugees who are 
living witnesses to your sufferings and struggles, to the hOpe 
that lives in you, but; above all they are witnesses to your un• 
shakable belief in victory ••• Know that you do not stand alone. 
We strive, shoulder to shoulder, for the same oause1 the cause of truth and justice, the cause of liberation. We str1ve for a 
fresh, new Netherlands, that must be forthcoming from this war ••• 
that, finally, with God •a help shall come.332 
Mr. van Paasohen delivered both the engraving and the money to the 
p,rskern (•Press Kernel"), a press-oo8rdinating body.3S3 
Agent Bialosterski looked to the establishment of a regular traffic 
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between the clandestine press and the London Government, whereby regular 
shipnents of underground papers would, in effect, be exchanged for peri-
odicals and books from the Allied world. Pllrt of the traffic was to pro-
oeed by microfilm, some of it by "droppings" at prwieusly-..rranged 
dropping areas. Suoh a service did come into being, part of it operated 
via the SWiss Route.334 
In the middle of April, 1944, Bia.losterski returned to England to 
try to secure replacements for the supplies lost when he was dropped by 
parachute. 335 
331E~, VIla, 213. 
333while several of the clandestine papers utilized the services of 
the Press Kernel, ethers held it in leas high esteem, as membership in 
such a bo~ was felt to entail extensive security risks. 
334Just how muoh material was actually delivered by this means the 
writer has beEI!l unable to determine. After September, 1944, with the 
liberation of the south, much could be smuggled through the lines. 
335Paasohen, loa. cit. 
Bialosterski was subsequently parachuted a second time into the occupied 
area, this time as a liaison officer to serve between the Netherlands 
Forces of the Interior and the press. He was established in Amsterdam, 
with the particular assignment of developing and expallding the use of 
areas as sites for ~dropping~ purposes.336 
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The Watchword found after the first Bialosterski visit that it could 
get supplies from the London Government by contacting the liaison officer 
of the Freas Kernel, a :Mr. 'lli!thrioh, of Je }4aintielldra:l.o After the arrest 
of Ml'o wnthrioh the organization IIIOVed from .Amsterdam to the Hague, keeping 
at an .Ainsterdam address a !f.r. M!Lrius de Bruin.337 Through this contact 
The Watchword was able to receive battery-operated radios for the reception 
of London broadcasts, batteries, and various Allied periodicals. Mr. 
Meijer remembered with particular affection several issues of the JiD 
Statemnan• Yet another "priceless treasure" which London supplied was 
bicycle tires, a commodity upon Which ones life might depend, quite lit• 
erally, during the last "hunger winter" of 1944-19•s.338 
Mr. Meijer, of The Watchword, while readily acknowledging the tech-
nical assistance rendered by agents Gr~ and Bialosterski, felt that 
London could have been of almost more ass:l.stanoe in another fashion. While 
it was true that the clandestine press was faced with material shortages 
and problems of every sort they were, in the main, able to meet these 
from their awn internal resources. A more severe problem, in the broader 
336Ibido1 76729-76730. 
337The writer believes this name to be a pseudo~. 
338ueijer, loc. cit., 82098•82108. 
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sel1Se, was that of intellectual isolation. Allied news broadcasts were 
helpful but they were, of necessity, short. Mr. Meijer oould remember 
with paillful clarity how every printed word reoeived from an Allied 
country was devoured by him and hill oolleagues. It might have been of 
greater assistance, he felt, if London had sent men with the vision and 
intelligence to interpret current happenings from the point of view of 
the general intellectual atmosphere prevailing in the Allied countries. 
It could have been of great assistance if, for example, Mr. van Heuven 
Goedhart oould have returned to Holland after spending a ftsrr months in 
London. Agents Grlln and Bialoateraki, while they rendered valuable 
services, had m more than a very general knowledge of what went on in 
the outside world. They ware able to detail only the latest political 
intrigues in progress in the Netherlands community in London, a matter of 
less than absorbing importance to those in the occupied terriwry.S39 
Vrij Nederland, which helped process material to be sent to London 
via the SWiss Route, was thus in almost constant contact with IDndon. 
llro A· H .. van Namen, of Vrij Nederland, had illl!.irect contact with 
the London agent, Johan G~. There existed a certain reserve towards 
this agent, although Vrij Nederland was able to employ the Swiss Route 
in his authentioation.340 
Mr. van Namen felt that the clandestine preS8, with its power to 
influence public opinion, had a tremendeus responsibility. He could 
recall serious editorial discussions as to policy that had continued for 
hours or even days. There were problema facing the underground press in 
389Ibido 
340Namen, loa. cit., 82144-82147. 
153 
which London 11as involved, or at least implicated. When writing an article 
on the aots of civil servanta atill functioning in the occupied territory, 
tor eXIIIIlple, one was faced with the difficult fact that London bad said 
little or nothing about this subjeot.3•&1 From February, 1943 on, atter 
London had issued the Cognentarx, and began to speak in much clearer 
language in support of aots of resistance, life tor the clandestine press 
11as less complicated, at least in the sense that one could usually tell 
with some degree of accuracy what the views of the London Governmant on 
a given subject might be likely to be.Ma 
Mr. van Randwijk, alao of Vri1 Nederland. recalled that the same 
agent bringing the Queen's article of lfay, 1944, alao brought some 
fl. 501 000 or fl. 100,000 for the use of the underground press.343 
Mr. van Randwijk recalled having been given an article for publi· 
cation from, ~he Allied High Command", Which he thought might have 
arrived via Bialosterski. The article, directed to the general public, 
urged the commission, without any further consultation or authorisation, 
of acts of sabotage. It also urged that Hollanders fire on Germans f'rom 
concealed positions on every occasion possible. If nothing else this pro-
posed item for publication stimulated consultation and agreement between 
the olandestim papers. All of them agreed not to publish itl Publi-
cation, they reasoned, without any qualification, might cause the Germans 
34lrhe Ordinances of 1937 • aa bas been said, were unknown to the 
public and to civil servants as well. 
342Namen, leo. cit. 
343eandwijk, loo. cit., 66909-66912. Reference here is clearly 
made to Bialosterski. While the Quean's article apparently was 
published in May, Bialosterski arrived in Holland on April l, 1944. 
to correctly regard any and every Hollander as a f'ranc-tireur•344 
faith, the orthodox Calvinist paper, had virtually no contact with 
London. It sent copies of' ita publication to London regularly via the 
Swedish Route, and received word of' their arrival. After the Swedish 
Route was closed it continued to send.material through the SWiss Route, 
The publishers of' Faith had the very definite impression that both Vrij 
Nederland and the organization in Switzerland of' Dr. Visser •t Hoof't 
deliberately withheld or edited material forwarded to London through its 
agency. The staff' of' Faith prepared, on ocoasion, elaborate reporta on 
special aubjects f'or the information of appropriate authorities in Lon-
don. There never seemed to be al\Y evidence of these reports having 
reached those to whom they were addresaed,346 
Dr. J • .A.. H. J. s. Bruins Slot, who became editor of' Feith in 
January, 1943,346 never bad al\Y contact with either agents Grtln or 
Biaaloaterski. He recalled that, on occasion, faith was offered funds 
supposed to have ccme f'rom the London Government. The of'f'ers were re-
fused as the paper was self' supportillg, 347 
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Je Maintiendr!J, had contact with London in the enese that it sent 
oopiea regularly to London via the SWiss ~oute, and, in the later period, 
received regular deliveries of foreign publications from the London Gov-
ernment, including the magazine Vrij Nederland, published in London.M8 
From the beginning those on the staff' of' Je Maintiendrai were rather 
344Ibido 346aruins Slot, loc. cit., 82063-82063. 
346J, .A.. H. J. s. Bruins Slot, "'.rhe Resistance,"· .A.ml.als of' the 
.Americen #,cade!!Y, CCXLV, P• 148. 
347J, .&. H. J. s. Bruins Slot, JUly 2e, 1960, 82068-82071. 
348K, Viehoff, October 23, 1961, 94107, 
critical of the London Government. From the earliest Radio Orange 
broadcasts it was most apparent that London 1111.s very hadly informed 
on a nUJDber of aspects of the oooupat1on. Some iJnprovement was apparent 
in the later period.349 
Je Maintiemdrai appreciated the material assistance received from 
London. including some engravings that were supplied for its use. Lon-
don radio broadcasts had been of very great value. In criticizing 
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their content Je Maintiendr&i did not want to seem to be in the position 
of bel1tt11Dg the vast importance of both Radio orange and other Allied 
broadcasts. At the same time Je l!aintiendrai was amazed at the use 
which Lol'ldon made of articles clipped from ita publication. This was 
particUlarly true of the London magazine. Vrij Nederland. Once under-
ground papers became available to the London Vrij Nederland excerpts 
from them were regularly reprinted. Mr. Viehoff0 of Je M&intiendrai0 
could recall that some humorous material was reprinted. but that Lon-
don almost never reproduced "major articles of importenoen.350 
The Communist paper. The Truth. had no direct contact with London. 
As has been noted0 The Truth relied in part on London radio broadcasts • 
The original editor. Y.r. de Groot. found Ji'adio Orange to be deficient. 
a sentiment he shared with a great 11111ey people of every political per-
suasion. He stated that the beat and most inspiring broadcasts were 
those delivered by0 "Her :Majesty Clp.emlf1lhelmina•a351 
Jtr. de Groot• a auooessor. Mr. Koejemana. had not established oon-
tact with London. nor was any assistance received by The Truth from the 
National Support Fund.352 
349Ibid •• 94104-94108. 350Ibid. 35~root. loo. cit •• 96968. 
35tKOejemans. loo. cit •• 95298-95301. 
Mr. Koejemans did receive and publish the photograph of Queen 
Wilhelmina, together with its aooompaeying message. It came to him in 
matrix for.m from an unknown source. other than this London never told 
him at all what he should publish or what it might like stressed. or 
anything of the sort.353 
Mr. Koejemans did feel that it would have been of help to the clan-
destine press if London had given it periodic reports as to what trans-
pired there and what its views on events of the day were.354 
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The Spark, the left-wing. international socialist paper. had no con-
tact with the London Government.355 
Fairly early in the occupation the Netherlands Government Information 
Service in London. in at least a certain sense, went into the field of 
clandestine publishing itself. Publication was begun of a Dutch language 
newspaper of small format entitled, De Wervelwind (The Whirlwind). printed 
on onion skin paper and scattered in Holland by Allied aircraft. 1h!!, 
Whirlwind read very much like a transcription of an earlier Radio Orange 
broadcast, not a surprising fact since both were produced by the same 
organization. Arter the manner of Radio Orange in the earlier period• 
The Whirlwind reflected a massive ignorance on the part of London of con-
ditions in the occupied territory. The successor to The Whirlwind• ll.!. 
Vliegende Hollander (The Flying Dutohma.p). was no great improvemant. 356 
Political and Intellectual Organizations 
Before World War II there were fifty-two political parties in the 
353rb1d 
-· 
95292-95296. This matrix probably came from the Press 
Kernel. 
354Ibid •• 95303-95305. 355s~. loc. cit •• 83740·83762. 
356rnt:erviewwith c. H. Evers • .April 21. 1960. 
Netherlands;. While the figure ill' a:a impreeldve one .. it must be noted 
that less than a. dozen of these po8S'e83ed any real importance. 
The Rooms-KathcUeke S"taats-Pa.rtij ("Ronan Catholic Startle Party"'),. 
one of the 1M"gesit10 -• more or len in the tradition of Christian 
DemoOl"ad;& found in other Europeaon countries and _, moderllltely oonser-
va.Uive. 
The S"ooiaall Demoora.tis-ohe Jirbeiders-Partij ("Social Democratic 
Workers' Party"')., closely rell'8mbled the pre-Hitler Socid Democratic 
Plu'ty in Gellm&ny. 
The Christeli.fk-Historbche Unie ("Uhristian Historical Union"'}, 
aond the ati-Revolution&irs Partij ("'A:nti-RevolutioD~~tey Party"')., -re 
both Pl"otestant, and both rather oonserv&tive. 
The Vrijdnnig Demoora:tbohe Bond ("'Liberal Demoorartl:ic Aa'Sooia-
'ltion"') • and the Liber&le staats-Partij ("Liberal State Party"'),. were 
both "liberal"' in the oustoma:ry Europe11111 &ense of the -rd. 
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Of minor pre""'fal" importance -s the small Nationaal Saoialis'ltische 
Beweging ("'National Socialist Uovement"')., the Dutch Nazi party. 
At the other end of the 81Peotrum 'R:II· the COIIIIliiUlistische Partij' 
Nederland ("Communist Party Netherla:nd•"'),. without represen:ta.tion in 
Parli-nt and in more or less constant trouble with the police. 
Conta.ot between the London Government a.nd political or intellectual 
groupingS' of persons in the occupied territory was slaw in coming. In 
the earliest period oommunioa.tions of any sort between Holland and 
London were, of' course,. meager. s-ince the Dutch body politic had been 
& badly fragmented one it 'lfliAt. quite understanda:ble th&t London -s 
going to be very cautious in dealing with any single party or group 
tor tear it would become too olosely identified with the organization 
in question. It would have been a brave prophet i~eed who would have 
predicted that the Socialists, the Catholics, the Anti-Revolutionary 
and Christian Historical parties, would have all gotten together with 
the Liberals and held clandestine discussions. Incredible though it 
may seem, this is precisely what happened, in the form ot the Politiek 
Convent ("Political Convention").357 The Convention met, discussed a 
wide variety of probable postwar problema, and arrangEd a postwar polit-
ical truce. Members ot the Convention travelled throughout the country, 
urging their fellow party members not to remain in administrative or 
civil service posts after their authority was seriously weakened by 
the infiltration of Dutch Nazis into key positions.358 
The Political Convention did not attempt to come into contact 
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with London until the assassination of the Dutch Nazi, General Seytfardt, 
head of the Netherlands "s.s." units. From London, Radio Orange edi-
torialized that, while the sudden passing of Seytfardt had engendered 
little grief in Netherlands Gover:anent circles, it was felt that this 
sort of activity could not be approved as a general means of altering 
the political future. Radio Orange spoke out against those who, "Want 
to be their own judge," and advised that attacks of this sort con-
stituted a "flagrant violation" of both the general law of nations and 
of specific conventions to whioh Holland was aignatory.359 Several 
members of the Convention felt that London was quite ill-advised in 
357J. Schouten, September 20, 1950, 85062-85063. 
35Bvorrink, loCo cit., 68019-68020. 
359ENQ, VIla, appendix, xxx. 
delivering an admonition of this sort. While a very great ma:ey top 
Dutoh political leaders had legal training, some of them having served 
as professors of law as well, they felt that the precise legal status 
of the occupying power was leas important than the "changed oircun-
atanoes" in which the Netherlands people lived. London, in a eommuni-
cation amuggled through Switzerland via microfilm, was rather tartly 
told that the day to day realities of the occupation might transcend 
the strict letter of the law. 360 The Convention reoeived no reply 
to this letter, although it h believed to have reached ita destina-
tion.361 
Subsequently, the Convention sent a aeries of most elaborate 
oommnn2oationa to IDndon, outlilliag the oonsensus of the body on a 
wide ra:nge of problEIIlls, indeed on nothing less than the entire postwar 
sooia.l and eoonomio organization of the Netherlands. .t. number of 
more specific reports were sent, as -11.362 
The Convention waa irritated at receiving no specific aoknowi-
edgment from London concerning its efforta. The postwar policy 
studiea were lcr:Jolln to have been reoeived in London and were studied 
there.363 
The Groot-Burgeroomitd ("Grand Citizens• Committee"), and the 
Nationa&l Comit' ("National Committee"), both came into being as the 
360vorrink, loo. oit., 68020. The Swiss Route is believed to have 
been .. ployed for thi• ommm'n2catien. 
361Ibide The writer believes that the letter in question reaohed 
Lolldon and was lost somewhere in the labyrinth of agenoies there. 
362 G. E. van Walsum, July 26, 1950, 81942-81947. 
36Sp. a. Gerbrandy, July 21, 1953, 97620-97621. 
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result of consultations between members of the Political Convention and 
those of the Groep Sohol ten ("Sobol ten Group"), a predomina!!l:ly Protest-
ant orgallization devoted to resisting in a spiritual sense the increas-
ingly pervasive efforts to "'Nazify" Dutch public life. The Scholten 
Group, l'ltlmed after Professor 1/l.ul Scholten, a famous Amsterdsm Ulliver-
sity figure, included some political leaders. The Group made studies 
of Netherlands society, and of oonstitutio:De.l. goverment, in addition 
to those of a religious or philosophical nature.364 
It 1a apparent that the Scholten Group and the Political Comren-
tion had more than a little in common. IB part to avoid the obvious 
security hazards entailed in holding joint meetings of the two organ-
izations there was formed a liaison body, the Grand Ci t1zens • Com-
mittee, made up of some fifteen members of the two organizations.366 
Since a group of fifteen persons was still too large to meet 
without arousing at least routine suspicion in German-occupied Holland, 
a working committee of some five persons, the National Committee, was 
formed. The Nat1onal Committee contained one representative from the 
Catholic, Socialist, and ,A.Irl;i-Revolut:l.onary Parties, and two non-pol-
itioal members. The National Committee, made up of Messrs. Schouten, 
Versohuur, Vorrink, Ringers, and Menten functioned during all of 1942, 
and until April 1, 1943.366 
The aim of the National Committee was to temporarily assure author-
ity sufficient to keep order if a political "Vacuum" existed at the time 
of liberation. If there was no vacuum there was to be no assumption of 
364schouten, loo. oit., 85077. 366Drees, loo. o!t., 66140. 
366Ibid., 65147-66149. 
power. Nothing was to be done in a manner not consistent with Dutch 
constitutional traditions, the Committee insisted. The members of the 
National Committee knn that auoh an assumption of power, in the absence 
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of speoitio Government authorization, •uld not be oonsti tutional in itself, 
but might be excusable under emergenoy conditions. ~ administration 
which the Committee would iutitute 111:1uld be temporary, and 110uld not 
function in such a manner as to impair the prompt, orderly restoration 
of normal democratic prooeases 0 367 
Members of the Cammittee feared that liberation might signal a 
bi1ltjeadag ("hatchet day"), onwhiohwideapread violence might be 
directed against not only collaborators lut innocent persona as well. 
The National Committee waa not intende4 to rival the Order Service, 
also engaged in the buaineaa of providing :tor a temporary administration 
in the event of a ,.vacuum", so said Mr. E. E. Menten, one of the Committee 
members. The National Committee, he pointed out, came into being at a 
time when the Order Service, particularly in the Hague, had suffered 
very severe loasea and was marly minot, or so it seemed at the time.368 
The Natio•l Committee sent to London in November, 1942, a detailed 
description of its aims, together with an offer of ita services and a 
requeat for official authorization. The message, which travelled via the 
SWiss Route, also explored legal aspects of a possible state of siege, to 
be proclaimed at the time of liberation, and recommended the furloughing 
of the Secretaries-General still left in oharge of the administrative 
departments, owing to their alleged acquiescellOe in aota of benefit to 
367sohouten, loc. cit., 85084. 
3~. E. J4enten, November 20, 1951, 94544. 
the Germans. The message also proposed the oreation, at the time of 
liberation, of a single, national radio station for the "transition 
period". A single •unity" ~paper was also sugeested, and if this 
was not to be the oase, it was urged that newspapers of an "extremist 
nature• might be regulated during this period by allocation of paper 
supplies and the physical control of printing presses. Various fiscal 
measures to be taken at the time of liberation were also proposed.369 
The National Committee urgently sought contact with London by 
the use of radio. Suoh a contaot seemed to have been located in the 
person of Anton de Wilde, believed by the Committee to be an agent 
dropped by the London Governnent. Mr. de Wilde was able to readily 
authenticate himself, since he oould, on request, have Radio Orange 
transmit whatever message might be desired. Thus it seemed clear that 
de Wilde had a trustworthy radio contact with London. The first mes-
sages for London from the National Committee to be sent by this radio 
link were given to de Wilde at the beginning of 1943.370 
The advent of the National Committee was greeted with uncertainty 
1n London. Doubtless by this time the London Goverment must have felt 
that organizations intended to provide order and fill a possible 
vacuum were becoming a glut on the market. The National Cmmnittee•a 
lengthy message outlining ita aims had been received, and Minister-
President Gerbrandywondered what sort of recognition, if any, should be 
extended to the organization. If such recognition, whether partial or 
full was to be extended, what of the timing! Should it be formally an-
&mlounoed 1n the shape of a telegram or letter addressed to the National 
369vorrink, lao. cit., 68041-68050. 37Qy.nten, loa, cit, 
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CQmmittee or in a public pronouncement? The matter was apparently 
discussed in the Cabinet, although no ln'itten record of such a dis-
cussion has survived. In the end a telegram sent in the name of ner 
Majesty Queen Wilhelmina was dispatched, dated April 1, 1943. Her 
l!.ajerly "observed with approval" the formation of the National Commit-
tee. She shared the National Committee's aversion to possible violence 
or disorder at the time of liberation. She hoped that the Conmittee 
would co8perate with the Order Service, which clearly shared at least 
some of the same objectives, or if not, state why such oo8peration 
was not desired. She stated that, at the time of liberation, the 
then-present london Cabinet was to be replaced by a "transition or 
emergency cabinet"· to consist, in so far as practicable, of persons 
drawn from the occupied territory. It was the aim of her government, 
in any event, to root out untrustworthy elements, (i.e., oolla.borators), 
and to restore the orderly, constitutional processes of Dutch govern-
ment.37l 
Unfortunately this telegram never reached its destination. At 
6t00 P~. on April 1, 1943, at precisely the same moment all over the 
country, German security police arrested all of the members of the 
National Committee,372 and a majority of members of the Grand Citizens' 
Commi ttee .. 373 
This disaster had been caused by Mr. Anton de Wilde, who, it 
appeared, was really Anton van der Waals, an agent provocateur. Van 
de Waals had, indeed, been able to send telegraphic messages to london, 
371ENQ, VIla, 163. 372Asbeck, loo. cit., 83808-83815. 
373nrees, loc. cit.~ 65150-65160. 
requesting that Radio Orange broadcast this or that message, since 
his employer, the Gestapo, had penetrated, through the simple expe-
dient of capturing the agent-operator, a "'line"' of radio-telegraphic 
communication leading to London. Messages sent over this circuit were 
not transmitted by gallant "agent" de Wilde, or even by the traitor 
van der Waals, but by a seasoned telegraphist of the German Kriegs-
marine, rounding out his thirtieth year of service.374 
The Fatherland Committee 
The Vaderland Comit~ ("Fatherland Committee"), was the direct 
successor to the late National Committee. After the demise of the 
latter organization the surviving Netherlands political leaders were 
more than a little pessimistic. They asked one another, nwhat•s the 
use? The Germans penetrated the organization, they !mow everything.n375 
Soon a telegram from London arrived through genuinely "'safe" 
channels, urging that the Committee be reconstructed. Accordingly, 
another five persons were given the dubious pleasure of constituting 
the second National Committee. To avoid confusion with another resis-
tance organization, the Nationaal Comite van Verzet ("National Resis-
tance Colmlli ttee 11'), London suggested that the second National Committee 
be called the "Father land Colmlli tte e"'• 376 
The Fatherland Committee regarded itself as the successor to the 
National Committee, but in actual fact it came to care less for the 
concept of assuming temporary power at the time of liberation, partly 
because the new Committee lived in drastically changed circumstance!to 
37~enten, loc. cit. 
375nrees, loo. cit. 
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When, in late 1941 or early 1942, the first Committee had come into being, 
resistance groups were still very lightly organized, co8rdination efforts 
ha.d not really begun. By the time the Fatherland Committee was estab-
lished any such projected assumption of power would have made for auto-
matic conflict with other resistance groups, notably the Order Service,, 
which had arisen anew from its earlier losses. To one of its members, 
Dr. Willem Drees, the job of the Fatherlam Committee now seemed to be 
more one of keeping London informed on resistance activity. He felt that 
the Fatherland Committee could not, strictly speaking, be oharaoterize.d 
as a "resistance"' organization, since it did not engage in acts of armed 
resistance, but existed more as an information center. The reconstituted 
Committee again consisted of five members, three representing as many 
political parties, two who were without political affiliation.377 
The Fatherland Committee entered into contact with the London Govern-
ment via the Swiss Route and, when speed was of the essence, employed 
clandestine radio circuits reaching London.378 
On January 7, 1944, Dr. Visser •t Hoeft, proprietor of the Geneva 
link of the Swiss Route, forwarded a paraphrased message from the Father-
land Co11111ittee for Minister-President Gerbra:al.y. Ths message was cast in 
the form of several questions: Did London regard the work of the Commit-
tee of aDW real value, and if so, was the Government prepared to recognize 
the Committee as the central source for co8rdination and advice in non-
military matters pertaining to resistance organizations? Were there 
matters about which London sought further information or regarding whioh 
London desired specific action to be taken? If so, what were they and 
377rbido 378Ibido 
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which were to be the subjects o~ ~urther information and which of action? 
What sorts of subjeots were to ramain outside the competence of the 
Fatherland Committee?379 
On A.pril 12, 1944, the Fatherland Committee reoeived a reply, again 
via the Swiss Route, from Minister-Preaiderrl: Gerbrandy. The London Gov-
ernment, Gerbrandy reported, did place real value on the work of the Com-
mittee, and urged that it take into its group representatives of other 
underground organizations. If this -s done, then the Govenunent -s 
willing to regard the Fatherland Committee as the oerrl:ral agency respon-
sible for oo8rdination and advice in matters pertaining to resistance 
organizations. London, the Minister-President said, desired information 
on or action regarding those things on whioh, in London's opinion, it was 
not well informed, or those matters most likely to be urgent problems at 
the time of liberation. A.t the moment information was sought as to the 
extent of economic repair and replacement likely to be required in Hol-
landJ the regulation o~ unclaimed asaeta of persona deceased or deportedJ 
the extent of aid required by the destituteJ the giving of aid to fam-
ilies of deportees and other war victimsJ and the nature of assistance 
to be given the unemployed. Outside the sphere of operations of the 
Fatherland Committee were to remain matters pertaining to martial law, 
and the arraignment and prosecution of collaborators. The London Gov-
erment, Minister-President Gerbralllly stated, would have later ques-
tions concerning a wide variety of subject matter.380 
The Fatherland Committee replied that it would strive to join with 
other organizations, that it appreciated London's desire to have as muoh 
379Elf'a, VIla, 171. 380Ibid., 172 • 
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oo8peration as possible, but that this oo8peration might best be achieved 
through sn intermediate representative who -s well informed on the ac-
tivities of various organizations. The Committee wished to make it clear 
that it was not in a position to try to co8rdinate future resistance ac-
tivity, that current conditions were all it could cope with. This was 
particularly true, the Committee stressed, in regard to some of the clan-
destine organizations of a necessarily anonymous character, about which 
too little data might be available.38l 
During the months that followed the Fatherland Committee wrote re-
ports on a wide range of subj eat matter. one such report urged legal 
changes in the status of Dutch police, and requested that the Order 
Service be restricted to lending •technical assistance" in the mainte-
nance of law and order at the tbne of liberation, and that the Service 
not be permitted to asslll!le power on its 01ill but remain under Govermnent 
control. 382 
The Committee made recommendations to London in regard to proposed 
changes in the forms of Provincial and local government, monetary and 
fiscal policy, agriculture, labor-management relations, and emergency 
public health measures.383 
The Fatherland Committee also made recommendations as to the treat-
ment of persons who had collaborated with the enemy.384 
In a tart message of June 2, 1944, the Committee informed London of 
the "present status" of pre"'''''ar political leaders, who bad been a target 
of bitter attacks in the clandestine press, for their supposed passiv-
ity. The message indicated that nearly all of the party leaders of every 
381Ibid. 382ll!.4•• 173. 383Ibid., 174-175. 384ll!.4•• 178ff. 
persuasion had been active in resistance work. The "current addresses" 
of the men and women in question were listed, with a result resembling a 
directory of Nazi concentration oamps.385 
Dr. Willem Drees, who was Minister-President of the Netherlands for 
several years after World War II, felt that if London had paid more at-
tsntion to the reports of the Fatherland Committse, some of which were 
painstakingly prepared by persons who were experts in their particular 
fields, things in the postwar period might l:avs bone better. 386 
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Others were irritated at having prepared elaborate studies which had 
gone unacknowledged and, if policies followed were any indication, un-
read. Among those were the studies dealing with the legal status of 
oollaborators, changes proposed in the Dutch criminal code, and so on.387 
London also requested special studies, which were duly prepared and sent 
on their way. These reports, too, often went unaoknowledged.388 
From London's point of view it-s inevitable that expert suggest-
ions would go apparently unheeded. Minister-President Gerbrandy some-
times received two or more conflicting advisory opinions from experts in 
the oocupied territory. If the hsue was one that the London Goverlll!lent 
could and did translate into policy, needless to say, someone in Holland 
was going to be disappointed.389 The position of the Fatherland Commit-
tee was, after all, only advisory in nature. London had no obligation 
to follow the suggestions of the Committea.390 
385Ibid., 181. 386J>rees1 loco cit., 65234. 
387H. A. M. T. Kolfsohoten, November 20, 1951, 94590-94592. 
388J. Donner, Jamary 301 1952, 96064. 389Ibid., 97639-97641. 
390J. R. M. van .Angeren, September 31 19531 98156-98157. 
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Collr<U.nationl The Nuoleu~o 
The Kern (8 Nuoleus"), was a nation wide reaistance-oo8rdinating and 
technical assistance body 11hich came into being in 1943 as the result 
of discussions between Mr. J. Buys of the National Fugitive .Aid Organ-
ization and Mr. van Hall of the National Support Fund. These two groupe 
became the first members of the Nucleus. It was apparent that col!rdina-
tion between the groups in question was vital to the services they per-
fanned. The Fugitive Aid Organization needed money to care for its 
charges, the National Support Fund needed help to see that the aid it 
provided reached the intended recipients and that no one received dou-
ble assistance. Later Natura, an organization providing food and cloth-
ing for resistance organizations, joined. It was followed by the Iden-
tity Forgery Central, the newspaper faith, which also operated a resist-
ance organization, the National Committee of Resistance, the Order Serv-
ice, and, somewhat later, the Council of Resistance.391 
The Nucleus customarily held meetings in both the morning and after-
noon. The morning gatherings discussed general matters of mutual import-
ance. In the afternoons the agenda was devoted to more detailed quest-
ions. Such problema as the projected need for ration stamps to be ao-
quired by the Knuckle Gang, or a likely increase in the number of fugi-
tives in a given area were disoussed.392 
In addition, the Nucleus collrdinated distribution of all sorts of 
identity papsrs, disseminated general technical information relating to 
resistance work, particularly so that mistakes, once made and recognized 
39lJ. Buys, January 16, 1952, 95498-95530. 
392Ibid., 95512. 
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as such, would not be repeated. 39:1 
The NUcleus was never a grouping of all the undergrotmd. It never 
included, for example, the clandestine press. It was not a political or 
legal discussion group, and it included neither the political National 
Committee nor its successor, the Fatherland Committee. It never dh-
cussed the problems of the period o:f' liberation, being absorbed in the 
day to day operation o:f' the reaiatance.394 
The NUcleus kept in close touch 'Iii th bus bless am industry, ad-
vising them on such matters as the methods 'Which an employer could use 
in helping his workers avoid the German labor conscription.396 
The apparent absence o:f' any contact between the NUcleus and the 
London Government, prior to the IIUIDlll8r o:f' 1944, leads this writer to 
suspect that, since those organizations represented had their own con-
tacts with London, the NUcleus saw no point to entering into the addi-
tional contact involved, complete with ita hazards. The work o:f' the 
Nucleus was largely one of' co8rdination and there was clearly little 
London could add. The NUcleus received no aid from the National Sup-
port Fund, nor is there any evidence to indicate such aid was required. 
Since the head o:f' the National Support Fw:ld, Mr. van Hall, regularly 
sat on the NUcleus there was certainly no lack o:f' contact. 
A telegram o:f' Jtme a, 1944, received from the London Govel'Jllllent, 
and believed to have been sent through the radio network o:f' the Order 
Service, put the future o:f' the Nucleus in at least aome doubt. The 
Netherlands Government did desire the ooBrdination o:f' all resistance 
393 39-L. Neher, October 26, 1964, 98484. -~., 98488. 
395Ibid. 
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groups on as broad a basis as possible. The body thus formed was to 
choose from its number representatives who would serve in a caretaker 
capacity to maintain peace and order at the time of liberation, partie-
ularly in the event of the oft-disoussed "vacuum", and to be continued in 
this capacity until the arrival of the Ministers and the Militair Gezag 
("Military Authority"), Which London planned as a temporary administration 
for the transition period. This same group of delegates, the telegram 
continued, was to serve as Royal advisers for the transition period 
following liberation.396 
This communication immediately caused some oonoern and irri'bltion in 
the Nucleus. Administrative problems of the transition period were more 
or less political matters and the Nucleus had sought to avoid "politics". 
Moreover, it was clear that London intended a body with a considerably 
wider membership than the Nucleus included, and that membership by the 
political Fatherland Committee was clearly inferred.397 
The Calvinist paper Faith sent to the London Goverment a letter, dated 
Juna 28• 1944. in 'Which it was claimed that some Nucleus members had rep-
resented, perhaps as the result of wishful thinking, their organization 
as being more all-embracing than it in actual fact was. Faith noted that 
the Nucleus did not include the clandestine press, the political party 
resistance, various study groups. professor and student resistance groups, 
or the medical resistance. 398 
Faith felt that expansion of the Nucleus to include many more groups 
396sNQ, VIIa, 289. 397Buya, loa. cit., 95332. 
398some of the groups referred to here have not been dealt with 
elsewhere in this dissertation as they had no contact with the London 
Goverment and thus are outside the terms of reference of this study. 
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might entail grave security risks. Faith doubted that the Nucleus, with 
its predominantly technical job, was very well suited to enter into 
political duties, tasks which might in turn impair its considerable 
technical efficiency, Faith hoped that the London Government would not 
try to "push" the Nucleus into being the central representative body for 
the resistance, NOtes appended to the faith letter by Dr. Visser •t 
Hoeft, of the Swiss Route, indicated that the liberal Protestant paper 
Vrii Nederland and the Socialist Watchword were in basic accord with its 
contents, 399 
The Nucleus apparently worked 1111111 and harmoniously, a fact that 
was lllt necessarily to be expected, in view of the presence of such 
diverse groups as the Council of Resistance and the Order Service, noted 
for their disagreement with each other, The Council, a late arrival to 
to Nucleus work, had originally had more than a few reservations, but in 
the end had high praise for i te operation, 400 
The Contact Commission, the Grand Resistance Advisory 
Commission, and the College of Bondsmen 
It was decided, as might have been expected, that the Nucleus was 
not a feasible organization for coBrdination on the scale desired by 
It>ndono In order to give effect to London's telegram of JUDO 8th, 
a meetinf of a score or more of representatives of resistance groupe 
was held on July 3, 1944, This was the representative body that was to 
become the Grote A4Vieaoommissie der Illegaliteit {"The Grand Resistance 
Advisory Commission"), although it was not to call itself by this name 
for a number of weeks, At this meeting were representatives of several 
399ENQ, VIIa, 272, 400Engel, leo, cit,, 98845, 
clandestine newspapers, Faith,. 11he Watchword,. Vrij Nederland, !!:!. 
Trttl;h,. and Je Yaintiendrai,. the Na.tional Fugitive Aid Organization,. 
the Council of Resistance, the Knuckle Gang,. the Order Service~ the 
National Resistance Committee, and the Fatherland Committee. A number 
of other organizations were represented by one or another of the dele-
gates of those groups already listed. These includedo School Verzet 
("School Resistance~), The National Support Fund, Zeeliedenfonds 
("'Seamen Fund"'), a support organization out of which the National 
SUpport Fund had grown originally 1 Studentenverzet ("Student Resis-
tance"'), The Identity Forgery Central, and Medisch Contact ("Medical 
Contact••), a physicians• res•istance organization. Al!D represented in 
this indirect fashion were several other clandestine newspapers, includ-
ing, De Vrije Katheder,. (The Free Catheter), De Vri,je Kunstenaar (The-
Free Artist), Ons Volk, (Our People), Chrhtofoor, and De Ks.tholiek 
Kompas:.401 
This body was clearly too large to hold regular meetings. Indeed, 
merely holding the first meeting was a very great risk to have taken. 
Accordingly, a working committee of some five members was chosen, to 
be known as the Contactcommissie ("'Contact Commission"'). The Contaot 
Commission•s membership consisted of one representative from the 
Fatherland Committee, one from the Order Service, with the three re-
maining members representing three wings or "'segments"'• as they came 
to be called, of the larger membership of the Grand Resistance Advisory 
Commission. The "left"' segment was composed of The Watchword, VriJ 
Nederland, The Truth, Je M&intiendrai, the Council of Resistance,. 
401E!Iq, VIIa, 289. 
1'73 
The Free Catheter, The Free Artist, Christofoor • and De Katholiek 
Kompe.s. The "middle"· was made up of the National Resistance Committee, 
the National Support Fund, the Seamen Fund, Student Resistance, the 
Identity Forgery Central, and Medical Contact. The "right"' segment 
comprised the Calvinist paper Faith, the National Fugitive Aid Organ• 
ization, and the l!'nuokle Gang 0 .402 
The formatton of the Contact Commission was announced in a tele-
gram sent to the London Government, dated July 12. !944, in which the 
work of the CO!llllission waa de~Jcribed. The message said that, af'ter 
11\najori ty oonsultation"' the Commission had asked the London Govern-
ment to designate a person to serve aa a "'government representative" 
on the Commission, together with an alternate or two. The Contact 
Commission would, the telegram stated, be willing to assist in a 
caretaker capacity in the event of a "vaouum" at the time of 11bera-
tion.403 
The "'lef't~ segment of the Contact Commission was not at all 
pleased with this turn of events. They oonceived of the Contact 
Commission as a necessary form of organization, in view of the ex-
cessive size of the parent body. However, they had not expected that 
the COIIII!Iission would serve as a sort of executive oounoil for all the 
resistance, or that some aort of union had thus been formed. Co!Srdina-
tion llllS a splendid idea, but the individual organizations had their 
own role to play and the emphasis should still be on the organizations 
as such. The majority rule principle, apparently established by the 
majority of' the Commission appealed to the "1ef't11' not at all. A8 
402~ •• 290. 403rbid. 
174 
they bad ollly one representative a hostile majority, :f'ashioned o:f' the 
right segment, the Order Servioe, together with any other member, oould 
easily out vote them. Matters dealing with the postwar transition pe-
riod were "political"' questions and, as such, bad no plaoe in a body 
whiob bad been assembled to oo8rdi:aate. The presence o:f' the Father-
land Committee was resented by the lett as this "political" body was 
not, in their view, really a reaietame organ1zat:l.on at an.404 
The majority o:f' 'the Contact Commission in:f'onned London o:f' the 
oomposit:l.on and views o:f' the di uenting minority, and o:f' the oontinued 
desire o:f' the majority o:f' the Commission that the London Government 
designate :ita own representative. It made no di:f':f'erence that the "lett• 
resented the presence and the vote o:f' a 8 poli tioal" body. London bad 
apeoi:f'ioally asked :f'or a body that bad as broad a base as possible and 
that was what bad been :f'ash:l.oned. To be sure problans o:f' the period o:f' 
liberation were 11politioal", but London had speoi:f'ioally requested that 
the larger body designate some o:f' 1 ts members to serve in essentially a 
"political" oapacity in the event o:f' a "vaouum" at liberation.•05 
Herein lay something o:f' a dilemma :f'or the London Government. It 
wanted the "resistame" DOt only oollrdinated, but, as muob as possible, 
united. The muoh disousaed "vacuum• oould well ocour, with a period o:f' 
some little duration intervening between the time o:f' a Gennan depart-
115 
ure or surrender and the establiabnent o:f' the Military Authority planned. 
Some sort o:f' oaretaker body would have to uaume authority in such an 
event, and London 1111D.ted as much control over it as possible. At the 
same time the "lett" segment o:f' the Contact Commission bad a valid oom-
404 ~ •• 291. 
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plaint. In a body which, apparently, was to have political respon-
sibilities, they seemed to be heavily outnumbered, If the London Gov-
ernment designated a representative, as the majority of the Commission 
desired, and if this person should prove unfriendly to the "left" segment, 
the latter body might conceivably depart the Commission. 
London •s solution was, in effect, to partially by-pass the Contact 
COI!IIllisaion and form its own "vaouum"· committee, the College van Vertrouw-
ensmannen ("College of Bondsmen"). 
A telegram from the London Government, dated August 2, 1944, created 
the College of Bondsmen and empowered Mr. L. H. N. Bosch Ridder van Rosen-
thal, former Royal Commissioner of the Province of Utrecht, to go about 
the task of formation. The members, who were named in the telegram in 
special code form, were instructed to, " ••• Prepare measures for the 
maintenance of order and peace in the event of a vacuum •••• " The Gov-
ernment was careful to make it olear that the College was to serve in 
a temporary capacity only, am to hand over ita functions when return of 
the Cabinet became feasible. Members were not to be described in terms 
of forming a "temporary administration", this London wished to make clear. 
This phrase, (Voorlopige Bewind), may have had an unfortunate connotation, 
although Loncbn did not refer to it specifically, in that it had been em-
ployed in some Order Service circles to describe their form of "vacuum" 
administration.406 
Chosen to serve on the College of Bondsmen, in addition to Mr. Bosch 
Ridder van Rosenthal, who had been well laJow:n for his o'Wll efforts in 
co8rdinating resistance activities, were: Dr. Willem Drees, of the 
406rbid., appendix, xxxiii. 
Fatherland Committee, and a Socialist; Professor R. P. Cleveringa of 
Leiden University; Mr. J. Cramer, member of the Assembly of the Province 
of Drenthe, politically a liberal Protestant; Professor Oranje of the 
(Protestant) Free University of Amsterdam, a famous resistance figure; 
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Father J. G. Stolanan, a Catholic member of Parliament and very active in 
resistance work; Mr. Lambertus Neher, representative on the Contact 
Conunission of the "middle"' segment; and Mr. Jacob van der Gaag, of the 
Council of Resistance.407 
Clearly the "left"' segment had net fared too badly in the College of 
Bondsmen. The academic community, in the persons of Professors Cleveringa 
and Oranje, would support them in some matters. They could count on the 
normal support of the Socialist, Dr. Drees, and of the Council of Resist-
ance representative, Mr. van der Gaag. Since two Catholic newspapers 
had been counted among the "left" segment they might well find an ally 
in Father stolanan, as well.408 
The Contact Commission continued to function and when, by the summer 
of 1944, the parent organization had begun calling itself officially the, 
"Grand Resistance Advisory Commission", none of the "left" segment members 
had departed.409 
In SeptEI!lber, 1944 a telegram from queen Wilhelmina let it be known 
that the London Government was in accord with both the formation and the 
composition of the Grand Resistance Advisory Commission and the Contact 
407 Oranje-Nassouw, op. cit., 363-364. 
408some special problems involving the College of Bondmnen will 
be noted in the section dealing with the Netherlands Forces of the 
Interior. 
409Later the Grand Resistance Advisory Commission came to be 
knawn as the "National 11 Resistance Advisory Commission. 
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Cormnission.41° 
The "'left" segment continued to object to the 11 political 11 activities 
of the majority, and expressed concern that less attention was paid to the 
ideological aspects of the struggle against fascism, two points of view 
perhaps not entirely consistent.4ll 
The Contact Commission did consider a variety of 11\?olicy" questions, 
many of them in response to urgent requests from the London Government 
for information and advice. Included were suoh things as the postwar 
role of the resistance, tactics concerning the latest German labor recruit-
ing drive, the advisability of personal attacks on Dutch Nazis, whether 
Jalied aircraft should deliberately fire on the Dutch personnel of 
German-operated railway trains, and problems of supplying food to the 
citiea.412 
The Netherlands Forces of the Interior 
On September 3, 1944, the London Goverment created a Dutch military 
unit containing the three largest resistance organizations, when it called 
into being the Nederlandse Binnenlandse Stri.idkrachtsn ("'Netherlands 
Forces of the Interior11 ).413 
The new organization, created by Royal Decree, was to contain the 
Order Service, the Knuckle Gang, and the Council of Resistance. The 
word "contain" is used advisedly. It was not the original intent of 
London to immediately amalgamate or fuse the three organizations. 
Motivations in the creation of this new body were various. As has 
been seen, a veritable forest of organizations devoted to studying, ad-
vising, or oo8rdinating resistance activities was already in existence. 
4l~NQ, VIla, appendix, xxxi11o 411Ibid., 297. 
412Meijer, loco cit., 84079. 413g~, VIla, 322 0 
London finally had its own body, the Colbge of BondiJllen, to provide for 
the expected "vacuun" • There still remained the problem of 'What to do 
with the large armed resistanoe organizations, particularly since rapid 
Allied advances in western Europe suggested that the services of these 
groups might soon be required or utilized in some sort of maguis or 
militia capacity. 
In 1959 the former Queen, Her Royal Highness Princess Wilhelmina, 
recalled the creation of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior in these 
words: 
••• In good time I read in the English press that the Maguis 
in France had become an official part of the Allied armed forces. 
They had acquired in their creation ••• the status of combatants, 
and they had acquired their own commander, General Koenig • 
••• I called Minister-President Gerbrandy and asked him if 
he did not feel that an initiative from our side would be a good 
idea. I also asked Mr. Gerbrau:ly if he did not think it was 
desirable that my son-in-law be charged with the command. He 
agreed completely • 
initiative 
could no 
Now the 
••• From the Allied Comm$nd, from which the real 
must proceed, we got complete cc8peration ••• Our boys 
longer be shot down by the Germans as franc tireurs. 
enemy was obliged to treat them as prisoners of war ••• 
General Eisenhower named my son-in-law as cOIIIIIBilder-in-
ohief of our armed forces, as far as those portions that came 
under his command were concerned. As far as this was a Dutch 
prerogative I issued a Royal Decree so designating him.414 
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One motivation which the London Government had in creating the Neth-
erlands Forces of the Interior must have been based on the internecine 
warfare between the Council of Resistance and the Order Service, partie-
ularly as exemplified in the running feud between Colonel Six of the 
Service and that peppery figure Jan Thijssen, of the Council, disagree-
menta already discussed. Doubtless London also felt that any political 
414oranje-Nassouw, op. cit., 363-364. 
&ims the Order Service might posss.a would be likely to be neutral-
bed by the induction into the national service of the latter organ-
ization. Import&nt in this connection was the simple fact that many 
other resistance org&nizations distrusted the ultimate objectives of 
the Order Service, whether justly or not. The incorporation or inclu• 
IJion of the Service· in the Forces of the Interior would serve to racify 
some of those who were most distrustful. 
Colonel Six himself felt that the formation of the Netherlands 
Forces of the Interior was inspired, at least in part, by the heed of 
the National SUpport Fund, the Amsterdam b&nker • Mr. Gijsbert van 
Hall. Van Hall, Whose organization supplied funds to many varied 
organizations, had become greatly concerned with the disagreements· 
between the various resistance groups.415 
To Mr. C&lje, of the Order Service, the sort of co8peretion and 
oo8rdination provided by the NUcleus had been something less than 
ideal. Clearly some sort of closer union was necessary. He recalled 
that the Council of Resistance had celebrated the birthday of Queen 
Wilhelmina, on August 31, 1944, by disabling a large number of Dutch 
telephone circuits in all parts of the country, thereby greatly 
hindering the work of the National Fugitive Aid Organization and 
the National Support Fur-d, both of which made extensive use of the 
telephone .416 
Mr. C. H. J. F. van Houten, head of the Netherlands Forces of 
the Interior section on the staff of Prince Bernhard, the Commander-
415p. J. Six, March 10, 1949, 44808. 
416ce.lje, lo c. cit., 77384-77390. 
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in-Chief of the organization, stated that some of the impetus for the 
formation of the body had oome from the occupied territory, from 
whence had arrived various telegrams requesting the creation of some-
thing of the sort.417 
Mr. van Houten recalled that there had originally been little 
enthusiasm in the Supreme Headquarter& Allied Expeditionary Force 
for the whole concept of a Netherlands maquis. The plain fact of the 
" matter was that the Frenah Foroee Fralljaises de 1' Interieur was an 
arrangement that had not worked out well in practice. Its commandant, 
General Koenig, did not have the situation well in hand at all. In 
Paris, for example, the me.guis had begun their action several days 
too soon, placing the operational plans of the Americans in grave 
danger.418 
Mr. van Houten believed that the concept of the Netherlands 
Forces of the Interior had a friend in S.H.A.E.F. in the person of 
(',eneral Bedell Smith, who was able to convince (',eneral Eisenhower 
of the value of such a proposed body. (',eneral Bedell Smith argued 
that the Dutoh case was sufficiently different and that the Nether• 
lande was less of a house divided against itself than France.419 
The same Royal Decree which created the Netherlands Forces 
of the Interior, on September 3, 1944, named Prince Bernhard, 
son-in-law of queen Wilhelmina, as CoiJIIle.llder-in-chief.420 
417c. H. J. F. van Houten, April 27, 1950, 78461-78463. 418 ..!.E.!i. 
419Ibid. It is to be doubted if neneral Bedell Smith had any 
real idea-of the real fragmentation of Dutch society. 
42~NQ. VIla, 321. 
181 
On September 5, 1944, it was announced that, ~ •• ~embers of 
the various resistance organizations ••• ,"' making up the Netherlands 
Forces of the Interior, were officially recognized by Royal Decree 
as members of the Netherlands armed forces. The phrase, n· ••• Various 
resistance organizations ••• ,"· was conunonly taken to mean the Order 
Service, the Knuckle Gang, and the Council of Resistance. This was 
so stated in a letter of November 18, 1944.421 
A special order issued by the Oberkommando of the Wehrmacht 
to German foroes in occupied Holland, dated September 30, 1944, 
decreed that members of the Dutch resistance who were served with 
regular Allied lines, providing they wore identifying insignia (arm 
bands -re considered acceptable) • were to be treated as regular 
combatants within the terms of the various Hague conventions and not 
dealt with e.s franc tireurs:.42:2 
On September 9, 1944, the Contact Commission telegraphed London 
that the three organizations, the Knuckle G~~g, the Order Service, 
and the Council of Resistance had, after several meetings, agreed on 
formation of the so-ealled Driehoek, ("Tl'iangle"'), or Delta., which 
was to represent and closely co6rdinate the three groups, in accord-
ance with instructions received from Prince Bernhard.423 
While Royal Decree may have placed the Council, the Service, and 
the Knuckle Gang under one roof, disagreement between the three was 
still very much the order of the day. Some consultation and oo6pera-
tion had been found in the earlier Donder·dagmiddagvergaderingen 
42lrbid., 322. 422Hilten, op. cit., 245. 
42~NQ, VII&, 319-320. 
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("Thursday Noon t!eeting:r"'),. in which the three had periodically dis-
cUssed mutual problems. 
In a telegram dated September 12, 1944, His Royal Highness Prinoe 
Bernhard noted the comprehe~~ive laok of unity and unwillingness to 
agree of the three groups. This was, he observed, particularly true 
at the looal level. He authorized the Contaot Commission to desig-
nate a Netherlands Foroes of the Interior commandant to serve in any 
local area where no agreement among the three oould be reached. Under 
such circumstances the oomme.ndant so chosen need not be a member of 
any of the three. Where even greater disunit.y prevailed, the local 
Order Service, Knuckle Gang, or Council units were not even to be 
considered part of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior.424 
A Radio Orange broadcast of September 18,. 1944~ ordered the 
Netherlands Forces of the Interior to assist Allied parachutists in 
those areas where landings had been made or were about to be made, 
providing such assistance was re~e:rted. Forces members were to 
identify themselves with armbands bearing the word, Oranje. They 
were to render whatever guard or patrol services the Allied forces 
might request, or to perform manual labor. They were also, where 
necessary, to arrest and guard those persons in Allied-oooupied 
territories who would be likely to aid the enemy.425 
On September 20,. 1944, the Triangle organization in the occupied 
terri tory aaked General Henri !root, an officer in the Netherlands 
East Indies Army,. to head the Netherlands Forces of the Interior in 
the oooupied terri tory. On Ootober 2:0 .. 1944, london confirmed this 
424Ibid., 320. 425Ibid.,. 322~ 
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choice, making it official.42& 
The continued separate character of the three component organ-
izations wa~ affirmed in a telegram from Prince Bernhard, received 
November 2, 1944.427 
His Royal Highness noted the differences in resistance philo-
~phy between the three component organizations, and declared that 
there were, henceforth, to be no such differences. General Koot was 
specifically designated as an adviser to the Triangle, with a '"deciding•• 
Toice.428 
On . November 4, 1944, the radio operator of the Collll1lallder •in-chief 
of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior copied the following tela-
gram, received from an unidentified British sourcet 
To all re~istanoe forces in HollaDd: 
It is with grave misgiving that we have followed the 
exchange of messages relating to the disunity which apparently 
exists between certain underground organizations. 
We, the Briti~h~ have been doing our best to supply you 
with arms with the object of your helping us kick the r~rmans 
out of your country, when the right time comes. By their pre-
sent attitude undergrour.d organizations are doing exactly what 
the Germans 110uld like them to do. They are wasting valuable 
time, please get together and long live your Queen. From your 
British allies.429 
Prince Bernhard drafted in English and dispatched the following 
reply: 
To our British allies: 
As commander of resistance forces in occupied Holland, in 
name of them all, I thank you for your earnest pressing admoni-
tion which I issued today unabridgely as order of the day to my 
forces. Your authoritative appeal will be redeeming word to 
bring forth the indispensable unity in our midst.430 
426H. KOot, September 16, 1949, 67879-67886. 
427p. J. Six, loc. cit., 4482·5. 428Ibid., 44814-44825. 
429Hilten, op. cit., 240. 430Ibid., 241. 
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As it-s constituted in both the northern (occupied) and southern 
(liberated) portions of Holland the Netherlands Forces of the Interior -• 
divided into two kinds of units, the so-called atrijdend gedeelte ("combat-
ant units"), and the niet-stri1dend gedeelte ("non-combatant units").431 
The divisions did, as it turned out, oorreapond roughly to those 
separating the more active resistance activities of the Council of Resist-
ance and the Knuckle Gang, who largely made up the "oombatant11 units,and 
the Order SerYice, relotgated to "non-o0111batant11 service. Herein may have 
been represented a special sort ot irony: The Order SerYioe, with a mil-
itary fom of organization, and containing more persona of military back-
ground, -s given largely non-combatant asslgnments, while the "undisci-
plined" irregulars of the Council and the Kmckle Gang were selected for 
a more active role. 
General Koot recalled, after World War II, that the distinction between 
"combatant" and "non-combatant" forces had caused more than a little dis-
cord and prompted charges of "discrimination"'• He had let it be known at 
the time that more "combatant" units would be created when weapons became 
available. The distinction in his own mind had always simply been ona 
of those units which were already armed and those yet to be armed.432 
The separate character of the three component units of the Nether-
lands Forces of the Interior continued until March, 1945. Colonel Six 
stated that he had been willing to give up the separate existence of the 
Order Service but that the Knuckle Gangs and the Council were unwilling 
432Ibid 
-· 
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to do so at the time.433 
In that same month of March, 1945, Peter Zuid was sent to the north 
by Prince Bernhard and made commandant of the "·combatant" units. Placed 
in charge of the "guardian troops", as the "non-combatant" units had come 
to be called, was Colonel Six.434 
The actual activities of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior in 
the liberated south can be briefly stated. The Forces perfonned a vari-
ety of services for the Allied forces, which included the Dutoh Princess 
Irene Brigade, recruited by the London Government and serving under the 
oomnand of Field Marshall Montgomery. Members of the Netherlands Forces 
of the Interior served in combatant capacities, in part, participating in 
patrols and various special missions. Their general efficiency won them 
high praise from Allied officers and a number were killed in aotion:435 
Regular communications were, by this time, maintained by radio-
telegraphy between the Forces in the oooupied territory and Allied head-
quarters at Eindhoven and Brussels; those units in the north, and London. 
Some of the material sent from General Koot in the north to the unoccupied 
south travelled via an agent dropped earlier by the London Government, Hans 
Bialosterski, who operated a clandestine radio transmitter. 436 
The "combatant" units in the north were primarily sabotage units. 
The Knuckle Gang and the Council of Resistance, as has been noted, largely 
433p, J. Six, loco cit., 44829. The writer is unable to discover 
whether, in fact, the Knuckle Gang and the Council were willing to 
abandon their separate existences at this time or not. 
4~r~. VIIa, 328o "Peter ZUid11 is a pseudonym for Major J. J. Fo 
Borghouts. 
435Houten,]poo oit., 78511. 436Koot, loc. cit. 
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made up the "combatant" units, a useful division of labor, sinoe they had 
far more experience in the field of sabotage than the Order Service. 437 
Peter Zuid also ordered the "combatant" units to stand ready for 
actual fighting, if required, in the protection of installations that 
were particularly 1 ikely to be destroyed by the Germans in the event of 
a general retreat. Thus the "combatant" units cast a protective eye over 
the eleotrioal power "central"' in Amsterdam-North, as well as various 
other faoilities.438 
In Amsterdam "combatant"' units destroyed German bunkers, vehicles, 
and railway tracks used by German military trains.439 
The Netherlands Forces of the Interior was supplied by air through 
an agenoy of the London Govermnent, the Bureau Bi.ir;ondere Opdraohten 
440 ("Special Service Bureau"), with which it worked very well. 
Materials for sabotage operations were dropped in previously des• 
ignated areas. The supply of such materials was apparently very uneven 
from area to area. 441 
"Combatant" units of the Forces of the Interior in the oooupied 
territory were particularly aotive in carrying out assignments to sabo-
tage W§b£maoht installations and German oommunioations.442 
Later, in the spring of 1945, the Commandant of the Netherlands 
437soheepstra, loa. oit., 77284. 438Ibid., 77286-77287. 
439Ibid., 77268. By this time the railway strike was in progress, 
so that the only trains operating were those under direct German control. 
440J. J. F. Borghouts, September 1, 1950, 83973-83976. 
441J. W. Duijff, October 271 1954, 98578-98579. 
442Borghouts, lao. oit. 
Forces of the Interior ordered the "'combatant" units in the occupied 
territory to "temper~ their activities, as negotiations were under way 
with German occupation authorities. 443 
Mr. van Houten belieVJed that the main value of the Netherlands 
Forces of the Interior in the occupied area may have been its general 
effect on German morale. When an armistice affecting German forces in 
the Netherlands was being discussed with German officers, those present 
readily observed an almost pathological preoccupation on the part of the 
Germans with the Forces of the Interior. The occupying power seemed 
willing to and did agree with virtually any Dutch condition, including 
the granting of very wide powers to the College of Bondsmen, providing 
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only that the Netherlands Forces of the Interior was neutralized. 
Accordingly, the Commander of the Canadian forces which liberated most 
of the northern provinces, General Foulkes, drafted an order with which 
the Ccmunandant of the Netherlands Foross of the Interior immediately 
agreed, and caused to have distributed as widely as communications per-
mitteda 
Commandant ••• of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior 
announces that, in consultation with the commanding German 
General, the following hes been agreed upon: 
1. Until the moment that the occupation is taken over by 
the Camdian army the German Wehrmaoht remains res-
ponsible for the maintenance of peace and order. 
2o The Commandant of the Netherlands Forces of the 
Interior assumes responsibility, as much as he is 
competent to do so, for the maintenance of order 
among Dutch subjects. 
3. It therefore follows that the Netherlands Forces of 
the Interior is charged with the maintename of 
order, as agreed upon with the above mentioned 
[German) General. 
443Ibido ~outen, loo. cit. 
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4. The maintenance of order includes opposition to all 
aots of aggression ••• against the German armed forces, 
both its msmbers and its property, as well as all 
objeots for whioh it is responsible. 
5. Until the moment that the oooupation is taken over by 
the Canadian army the activities of the Netherlands 
Forces of the Interio~e to be restricted to the 
maintenance of order. 
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The proclamation went on to rsmind and warn the Forces of the 
Interior not only of the opportunities whioh the moment of liberation 
might afford thieves and other criminal elements, but also of the more 
general possibility that "irresponsible" elements might try to take the 
law into their own hands and in so doing call forth German reprisals, 
whereby the lives of innocent civilians might be needlessly imperiled. 
The proclamation called for the Dutoh populace to, " ••• ~roise] 
self-discipline and behave in a manner befitting a civilized people.n446 
Jlr. van Houten, in his position on Prinoe Bernhard's staff, had 
opportunity to observe the effect of this order. It was complied with 
about "95ft"' of the time. There was no "hatchet day", as everyone had 
feared there might be. Nor did the long-expected "vacuum•• ever material-
ize. There were, Mr. van Houten stated, many persons in the Netherlands 
Foroes of the Interior in the occupied territory who felt more than a 
bitter at this turn of events. They had patiently and often perilously, 
over a period of five difficult years, built up sizeable organizations 
which were intended to help serve in the liberation of the Netherlands, 
Now they had been told, in effect, "Put away your guns and make it as 
little apparent as possible that you were ever any part of the armed 
forces.447 
445Ibid 
-· 
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Mr. van Houten felt that former members of the Netherlands Forces 
of the Interior who served in the ocoupied north, whether "combatant" or 
"non-oombatant", whould be made to understand that their organization had 
not, in fact, been created in vain, that by its very existence it had 
greatly acoelerated negotiations with the Germans and made them much 
more amenable to suggestions. He recalled that the commanding German 
General, General Blaskowitz, had himself been very apprehensive about 
possible action that might be taken against his troops by the Netherlands 
Forces of the Interior. Only weeks had elapsed since the hated "green 
polioe" had, quite literally, hunted all Dutch adult males in a final 
drive to reorui t additional laborers to serve in Germany. While the 
"green police" had usually been personnel of the Gestapo rather than the 
Wehrmacht, this was a distinction which General Blaskowitz feared many a 
Hollander might not too readily grasp or observe. Quite suddenly the 
hunted had acquired the status, aooorded official recognition by Berlin, 
of members of an a:nned force. They were everywhere, of nearly all ages, 
and some of them carried weapons and were proficient in their use. 
General Blaskowitz complained of not having slept well for several nights. 
He voluntarily drove his own automobile from command post to command post 
of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, distributing copies of the 
proclamation just quoted, as well as other Forces material. He had left 
with an automobile "half full" of printed matter and he continued on his 
mission until all was distributed.448 
Criticism of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, both at the time 
and later came from maey quarters. 
Some felt that the Trian6b organization was too large, particularly 
448Ibido 
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since it contained the Order Service, with its large and somewhat cumber-
some staff system. Jan van Bynen, who represented the Knuckle Gang on the 
TriaDgle body, held this view. Van B:ynen, a gifted planner and organizer, 
who, unfortunately, did not survive the war, held that it would have been 
far better had a single head been placed over the three organizations at 
the start. He felt that their separate existence should have been more 
sharply curtailed, and that the Triangle or Delta organizations were no 
more than clumsy outgrowths of the earlier Thursday Noon Meetings. 449 
others felt the idea of having a Netherlands Forces of the Interior 
at all to have been a mistake. Mro Hoogeweegen, of the Council of Resist-
ance, said that the organizations represented in the Triangle were too 
diverse and too firm in their views to 110rk harmoniously together. To 
him the situation was comparable to a jungle. One could as logically 
order, "King Lion, you are to form a unified command comprising the pan-
thers, the elephants, the jaguars, and so on •••• n450 
Then there was the matter of weapons. Most of the droPPing areas 
remained in the bands of the Council of Resistance, although the Knuckle 
Gang controlled some of its own. As has been noted already in another 
connection the Order Service resented this arrangement very bitterly. Mr. 
Wagenaar of the Council had been placed in charge of ordinance of the 
Netherlands Forces of the Interior. This did not please Mr. Soheepstra 
of the Knuckle Gang at all, since Wagenaar made no secret of the fact 
that he was a Communist. Mr. Soheepstra received reports that Communists 
in the Jmsterdam area were collecting weapons. The course of events in 
449p. W. Hordijk, September a, 1950, 84370-84371. 
450Hoogeweegen, loo. cit., 96098-96099. 
Greece, where Communists had employed British-supplied weapons for their 
own ends, was known at the time in Holland, Mr. Soheepstra reported.4Sl 
Colonel Six, of the Order Service, said that some 30,000 weapons 
had been dropped for resistance use in Holland. Approximately 10,000 
were delivered into Netherlands Foroes of the Interior custody and ac-
counted for. Colonel Six quoted General van Hilten, a distinguished 
Dutch military historian, as saying that the Germans captured another 
10,000. This left another 10,000 small arms unaccounted for.452 
Mr. Klijzing who, as senior officer of the (Dutoh) Special Serv-
ice Bureau, dealt with weapon droppings, stated that the Germans had 
not captured merely one-third of the arms dropped but closer to two-
thirds. Thus, if 10,000 of the weapons in questions could be accounted 
for through Forces records, there must have been very few remaining in 
private hands.453 
other persons complained that many local commanders of the Foroes 
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of the Interior had a very inaccurate oonoept of their precise legal 
position. Some, apparently, regarded the Forces as an overkoeplings-
organisatie der illegaliteit, that is a body that united under one 
command,!!! underground organizations. It naturally followed that the 
Forces acted as though it was in command not only of the Council, Serv-
ice, and Knuckle Gang components, but of all clandestine organizations. 
Since many of these other organizations performed valuable services, it 
was a matter of grave importance that their activities were sometimes 
hindered or disrupted by various local Forces commanders or persons serv-
451scheepstra, loo. cit., 77265-77266. 452P. J. Six, loc. cit. 
453F. J. Klijzing, July 28, 1948, 21826. 
ing under their ooDI!llmd.,464 
Still other Netherlands Forces of' "the Interior officers felt 
thst they were shortly to assume adminbtr~~<tive duties in some sort 
of caretaker capacity ll<fter liberation, possibly under the temporary 
Military Authority which was planned. SUch a scheme of things wu 
most emphatically not the intent of the London Government.,455 
The Contact Commission complained with some bitterness that, 
even in the top echelons in the occupied territory,. there was exhibited 
a marked tendency to ignore both the advice of the Commission and the 
College of Bondsmen.456 
In another sensitive area, local Forces of the Interior commanders 
had brought pressure to bear in an effort to restrict or suspend pub-
lication of some clandestine newspapersc.457 
Particularly unfortunate in this connection was the initial 
effort made by the Forces Commandant for the occupied territory, 
General Koot, to become acquainted with the underground press • .tot-
ing, apparently, in perfectly good faith, C-eneral Koot selected as 
his "'contact"' man virtually the only journalist of his acquaintance, 
Mr. Groeninx van Zoelen, a man apparently noted before the war for 
authoritarian and anti-semitic utterances.. General Koot subsequently 
established relations with the press through more acceptable channels,. 
but his initial effort scarcely made a favorable impression.458 
General Koot, testifying in 1949,. could see that his contact 
with the press via Mr. Groeninx van zoelen might have one to think 
454ENQ, VIla, 359. 455~., 456~. 451 ~· 
458Meijer, loa. cit., 82111-82:113. 
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he espoused a particular point of view in a political sense. General 
Koot would cheerfully admit to being and having been, ''Politically a 
blank page"'. That being the case, how could he possibly have taken 
any political point of view?459 
Mr. Jan Meijer, one of the editors of the clandestine paper, 
The Watchword, regarded the Triangle apparatus, with its numerous 
bureaucrats, as having reached proportions where its sheer bulk may 
have seriously hampered the operation of the entire resistance move-
ment. In March of 1945. Mr. Meijer recalled, Hollanders were still 
being led away by the "green police'" in very long lines. Often theBe 
columns were guarded by only one or two persons, thus attackB on the 
guards by the resistance could well have resulted in the liberation 
of at least some of the captives. That this was done all too rarely 
-s due in part to the fact that the underground. wu' as he put it .. 
"'• • .Dead still, trying to read 1ts -r through a sea of paperwork and 
inBtructions ••• ..460 
As Commandant of the Forces of the Interior in the occupied 
territory, General Henri Koot often hsd to serve as a sort of group 
diplomat in trying to get his factious and ~arrelsome charges to work 
together. That he succeeded in this capacity remarkably well and that 
all Hollanders awe him a very large debt of gratitude cannot be 
doubted. At the same time it must be noted that there were those 
'Who were by no means pleased with the Koot appointment. It had seemed 
logical that, since the Forces in the occupied territory might be par-
459Koot, loo. cit •• 67950-67953. 
46"Meijer 1 lee. cit. • 82111-82112. 
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ticipating in military operations, a military man of some distinction 
should be in command, and General Koot certainly qualified. If possible, 
the person in question should not have or have had an active affiliation 
with one of the major resistance organizations, in order to insure as muoh 
impartiality as possible. Again, General Koot qualified. Inevitably, 
however, since he was of the military and the Order Service best typified 
the military point of view, it was to be expected that he would have been 
surrounded by many Order Service people.461 
Some felt that the Order Service definitely exercised undue influ-
ence over General Koot.462 
The Council, while it had no strong objections to the choice of 
General Koot, was not consulted ahead of time about his selection. This, 
quite naturally, caused some resentment.463 
As has been said, General Koot was not affiliated with any major 
resistance organization. While this may have been a desirable attribute, 
in the sense of his being more likely to be impartial, it sometimes 
meant in actual practice that there were very large gaps in his knowledge 
regarding resistance matters, matters which were both complex and import-
ant.464 
The Great Railway Strike of 1944 
As the reader may have begun to suspect, the London Government did 
not engage in frequent attempts in the field of remote administration. 
The sole significant exception was the railway strike of 1944. 
461Gaag, loc. cit., 77816-77817. 
462w. J. van Hocrn Alkema, September 16, 1949, 67818. 
463Gaag, loc. oit., 77806. 4~oot, loc. cit., 67899. 
Radio Orange, in a broadcast dated September 17, 1944,466 ordered 
all employees of the Nederlandsohe Spoorwegen ("Netherlands Railways"), 
to cease work, effective immediately. Also involved were some bus and 
streetcar workers, and some other persons in related activities, such as 
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a number of employees of a ohain of restaurants operated by the Netherlands 
Railways. The employees struck, nearly to a man, and in so doing caused 
the German occupation forces, in a oountry where rail transport was a 
very important affair, substantial inconvenience. The strike, despite 
alternate German blandishments and threats, continued until the liberation 
of those provinces still under enemy occupation, in May, 1945. A number 
of railway workers were executed but the trains did not again move under 
Dutch direction, althoug a taw German troop trains continued to operate 
with imported crews and a limited number of Hollanders who assisted in 
their operation. 
When Holland was invaded in May, 19401 the Netherlands Railways were 
initially occupied by about 4,000 German railway personnel, who were sub-
sequently withdrawn. The German military and several civilian German 
engineering firms repaired assorted damage which the brief period of 
Dutch-German hostilities had inflicted on the Netherlands railway system. 
Once this was aooomplished the railways were handed back to the Dutch 
management. The Manager of the Netherlands Railways, Mr. G, F. H. Giea-
berger, riiiiiSined at his post. Suoh transport as the Germans required 
was ordered in advance through Mr. Giesberger, who was required to hold 
more or less daily conferences with the Bahnbevollmlohtigte ("Railway 
Plenipotentiary"), of the Deutsche Reiohsbahn ("German Railways"); 
465ENQ, VIla, 378. 
the Transportkommandant of the ll'ehrmaoht; and a representative of the 
Reiohaverkehrsministerium ("Reich Transport Ministry"). These three 
individuals were at all times rather diffioult to deal with, l!r. G1es-
berger discovered. However, they seemed satisfied to leave the Nether-
lands Railways under largely Netherlands control. As long as operation 
continued smoothly this appeared an easier course of action than taking 
over the rather extensive network of Dutch rail lines and then, of 
necessity, importing numbers of Geman railway 110rkBrs, many of whom 
were needed elsewhere.466 
Mr. Giesberger•s attitude in regard to the continued operation of 
the Netherlands Railways by their Dutch management was that while they 
worked "with"' the Germane, on occasion, they did not work "for" the 
occupying power. In the main, he argued, the continued Dutch operation 
of the Railways served Netherlands interests, as the great bulk of the 
traffic was solely for the benefit of the Hollanders.467 
The attitude of the Nederlandse Vereeniging van Spoor-en-Trauwegs-
personeel ("'Netherlands Union of Train and Streetcar Employees"') was 
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one of substantial agreement with Y~. Giesberger, according to 1!r. G. 
Joustra, Chairman of the body. The Union felt that the continued Dutch 
operation of the railways would tend to safeguard the public interest. 
This did not mean that the Union was at all amenable to rather friendly 
German overtures, including suggestions that the Union "merge"' with the 
microscopic N&tionaal 4rbeids Front ("National Labor Front"), a Nazi 
organization. Later the Germans failed in an attempt to replace the 
Union with the National Labor Front by force, and drew a rather irritable 
466G. F. H. Giesberger, August 18, 1953, 97778-97786. 467Ibid. 
response from Berlin, in which it was suggested that the Front be "bur-
ied"' as inconspicuously as possible.468 
Mr. Joustra reported that the question of continued operation of 
the railways by Dutch personnel was dealt with in the Personeelraad 
("Personnel Council"), a consultative body which represented both the 
management of the Netherlands Railways and the various Protestant, Cath-
olic, and non-sectarian railway workers• unions. The Personnel Council 
had similarly agreed that the railways continue to operate. Mr. Joustra 
said that so% to 9o% of the facilities of the Netherlands Railways, as 
they were utilized during the occupation, served the direct interests of 
the Dutch population.469 
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The core of the problem of continued operation, and a matter that 
immediately involved the London Goverl:llllent, was that of the deportations. 
Dutch Jews, demobilized Dutch army officers who were being ordered to 
Germany as prisoners of war, civilian hostages, and persons impressed 
for forced labor in Ger.maey nearly all travelled by rail on trains op-
erated by Dutch personnel. The Germans would simply contact Mr. Gies-
berger,plaoing their "order" for a train to be delivered at a given 
place and time. The moral question presented by the deportations was 
not an involved one: Should Dutch railway personnel continue to operate 
the railways and simply acquiesce in the tragic traffic of deportees? 
Mr. Giesberger recalled that, on many occasions, he received vis-
itors who particularly urged that he try to put a stop to the trans-
portation by Dutch railway workers of compatriots of the Jewish faith. 
Mr. Giesberger remembered Dr. Cornelia of the Medisoh Verzet ("Med-
ical Resistance"), who visited him on at least ten occasions, saying, 
468G. Joustra, August 19, 1953, 97846. 469rbid., 97857. 
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"You must simply say [to the Germans], '11'e won't do that any more'•" Mr. 
Giesberger replied: "Do you have orders f:rrom London] to this effeot? 
Then I•ll do it immediately.n470 
Mr. Giesberger was in contact with London through the agenoy of Mr. 
I. J. van den Bosch, of the National Support Fund, 11ho had access to a 
clandestine radiotelegraph transmitter.471 
Apparently, 11hile the management: of the Netherlands Railways 1ms 
originally in contact with London through Mr. van den Bosch, oomnruni-
oations from about the end of 1943 proceeded via other tran11111i ttera, 
probably at least in part those operated b.y the Order Service.472 
Mr. Giesberger, utilizing the van den Bosch contact, repeatedly 
asked London for guidance on the question of deportations and continued 
operation. London, he said, always answered, ftJlo nothing. Go ahead 
with your work."473 
It was argued by Mr. Giesberger,474 and othere,475 that a general 
strike declared by those in the occupied territory, prior to London's 
decision to call such a work stoppa~, would have resulted in a complete 
German seizure of the Netherlands Railways, so that the Dutch direction 
would lose any and all control. In an earlier period of the war the 
Germans might well have had sufficient personnel to reorganize operations 
in such a faahion that a majority of the Dutch personnel could have been 
forced, at gun point if necessary, to continue at their posts. This very 
470Giesberger, loa. cit., 97807·97811. 471ENQ, VIIa, 3700 
4Taw. Hupkes, August 18, 1953, 97716·97718. 
473Giesberger, loc. cit. 474Ib1d. 
475F. P. A. Landskrcon, &ugust 19, 1953, 97915·97916. 
thing did happen in France, Belgium, and most of the other German-
occupied countries .. 
The view of the London Government Walf by no means at all clear. 
The wish of the Government, Vlhich Mr. Gies·berger understood correctly 
in his indirect contact with it, was that the railways continue to 
operate, a view based on decisions made repeatedly in the Netherlands 
Council of Ministers, where a possible work stoppage was frequently 
discussed .. 476 
While London apparently desired the continued operation of the 
Dutch railways by their Dutch personnel, Radio Orange did broadcast 
on several occasions definite Netherlands Government directives for-
bidding Dutch police officers and "all others"' from participating in 
aey way in the deportations .. 477 It can be assumed that London knew 
that Dutch railway personnel were involved in these tasks and that 
nothing short of a general strike could really interrupt the traffic. 
Both the personnel and management of the Netherlands railways 
understood and agreed that an eventual strike would be called by 
London, that it was sir.-,ply a question of timing. The management of 
the Netherlands railways did manage to secrete in the safes of nearly 
all stations an extra month's salary for all personnel, intended as 
"strike" or "'invasion" money .478 
The Council of Ministers had, indeed, decided "ln principle" on 
a railway strike, with only final timing to be arranged, The decision 
as to timing was taken at a meeting held on the evening of September 16, 
476p, s .. Gerbrandy, December 13, 1954, 98946-98947. 
478nupkes, loo. cit •• 97745-97749. 
477Ibid. 
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1944, w.i th the strike to be proclaimed the next day. Only three Min-
isters were present, not including the Minister of Waterways, Mr. J. Yf. 
Albarda, under whose jurisdiction the Netherlands Railways had been 
placed.479 Albarda was more than a little annoyed when he first learned 
of the strike, in the Radio Orange broadcast of the following morning:480 
Government call for a general railway strike: 
In response to suggestions received from Holland, in con-
sultation with the Allied command, and in connection with mili-
tary actions begun today in Holland, the Government regards the 
correct moment for a general strike of railway personnel as having 
been reached, with a view to hindering the movement of enemy troop 
concentrations as much as possible. 
The Government takes full account of the heavy responsi-
bility which it bears for this decision, which was taken only 
after careful consideration. The Government believes that, in 
the given circumstances, this action is of such overriding mili-
tary importance that it can no longer be postponed. 
The Government, in full realization of the difficulties 
that will be occasioned, leaves the methods of implementing 
this directive to you, and wishes all of you, faithful and brave 
Fatherlimders, the strength to oarry out this action to the best 
of your abilities. 
This message will be repeated in the Dutch news of the 
B.B.C. at a quarter of twelve. In any event listen to this 
transmission, in which important announcements may be rnade.481 
Mr. Gl.esberger•s initial reaction in the occupied territory, once 
he became convinced that the strike order was authentic and not a 
German "trick"'• was one of irritation that London had not used exist-
ing clandestine communications networks to give the Railway manage-
ment some advance warning of the strike. Time was needed to make 
advance arrangements, to pay out the "strike"' money, and so on. In 
479L. de Jong, June 30, 1948, 16134. 
480J. W. Albarda, September 3, 1953, 98106. 481ENQ, VIla, 378. 
most instances he was able to effect payment. 482 
In its initial stages, at least in Amsterdam, the Germans may 
have actually helped to make the strike more effective, as they almost 
immediately forbade all railway personnel access to the shop and yards, 
perhaps preventing sabotage, but also keeping any workers who might be 
inclined to report to work from doing so.483 
In a broadcast dated September 18, 1944, Radio Orange appealed 
to railway workers to go underground, and appealed to the Netherlands 
people to provide shelter, food, and clothing tothe fugitives, as well 
as giving financial assistance to the families of railway workers.484 
No one needed to tell the railway workers to go into hiding at 
this point in the occupation. Those vast, institutionalized oonspira-
cies, the National Fugitive Aid Organization and the National Support 
Fund, had considerable experience in this work. The railway strike 
of 1944 was to be their biggest effort, and one marked with oonsid-
arable sucoesa. 
German reaction, aa might be expected, was rather violent. 
Railway workers were tracked dawn in a number of instances and 
executed. In the closing days of World War II the Germans were to 
further exhibit their displeasure by destroying much of the physical 
property of the Netherlands R&il~s. including track, rolling stock, 
buildings, and shops.485 
482 Gieaberger, loc. cit,, 97795-97797. 
483n, Leeuw, October 27, 1954, 98605-98608, 484g~~. VIIa, 429. 
485J, A .. H •. J,S.. '3ruins Slot, "'rhe Resistance,,. Annals of the 
AmerioanAoademy, CCXLV, p. 148, 
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By October the railway strike was being felt extensively by the 
Dutch population. Radio Orange, on October 5th, stressed the value 
of the railroad work stoppage to the Allied war effort, and pointed 
out that the acute shortages of coal in the occupied territory would 
have existed whether the railways operated or not, since the state 
Mines in the Province of Limburg were in the liberated area, and thus 
were effectively isolated in a~ event. Radio Orange did not address 
itself to the growing food shortage, made much more acute by the rail-
way strike, since some food shipments would normally have reached 
the cities from areas which remained in the German-occupied territory. 
Railway workers were warned that if they abandoned the strike they could 
expect no general pardon from the Germans.486 
When the strike continued and the month's "lnvalfion11' money was 
clearly not going to be sufficient, additional arrangements had to 
be made. The National Support Fund, guaranteed by the London Govern-
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ment, spent a total of fl. 36,000,000 on the railway strike.487 The 
Netherlands Railways themselves contributed an additional fl. 28,000,000.488 
The remaining events in the affair can be simply chromioled. At 
various times during the re.maining long months of the German occu-
pation the London Government considered stopping the railway strike. 
Its original purpose had been to impede the German defenses at Arnhem, 
however the Allied attack at Arnhem had failed. Each time the decision 
was made to continue the strike, partly because it was felt that pub-
48~~. VIIa, appendix, x:x:x:x:iv. 
487Hall, loc. cit., 77180-77183. 
488nupkes, loc. cit., 97749-97750. 
lie morale would suffer should it be discontinued, partly because of 
fear of German reprisals. The Railway Personnel Council, in hiding, 
was· asked by London if it favored continuing the strike. The reply 
was in the affirmative.489 A. query directed by London to the College 
of Bondsmen received a similar response.490 
Techniques employed by the Germans varied. They threatened the 
cities in the occupied territory with starvation, a fact at the time 
and not a mere future possibility. They offered to the railway workers 
that all would be forgiven, that they would receive "good food"' and 
"'double salary"'.491 These efforts met with little success. 
To many the railway strike of 1944-1945 stands as a national 
monument, as a final test of the Dutch nation in the months before 
liberation. 
To others it seemed and still seems to have been an ill-considered 
act that did more damage by far to the people of the Netherlands than 
it ever inflicted on the enemy. Minister Albarda felt that the London 
Government had not thought the strike problem through carefully, and 
that insufficient attention had been paid to the probable isolation 
of the Dutch oi ties from their food supplies. He believed that the 
Government had not adequately considered the problems involved in 
liquidating the strike if the attack at Arnhem should fail.492 
489Joustra, loa. cit., 97878. 
490t. Neher, August 19, 1953, 97961. 
491Hupkes 0 loc. cit., 97740-97741. 
492Albarda0 loa. cit., 98108-98110. 
Conoluaions 
In terms of the thesis advanced at the conclusion of Chapter II, 
the Knuckle Gang offers few special problems. As much as it was of 
benefit to London at all, in ita capacity as a special aUJtiliary of 
the National Fugitive Aid Organization, London could claim no credit 
in its formation. London could scarcely have been expected to lend 
very much intelligent assistance, as the nature of the tasks performed 
by the Knuckle Gang was such that only persons on the scene could pos-
sess sufficient knowledge on which to base a reasoned assessment of the 
problems of the Gang. The specializ:ed nature of the Knuckle Gang was 
such that it was to be expected that London agents sent to assist the 
body had a very incomplete understanding of its tasks. London was of 
real assistance in one major sense, that of supplying funds through 
the National Support Fund. Later • when the Knuckle Gang became part 
of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, it was of much greater use 
to the London Government, and at that point becomes more relevant to 
the thesis advanced for such contact situations. 
Since they were co8rdinate organizations, the above conclusiona 
in regard to the Knuckle Gang are equally applicable to the National 
Fugitive Aid Organization, which received only financial assistance 
from the London Government, being specifically mentioned as an in-
tended recipient of such aid in the second authorization of funds 
for the National Support Fund. It also was the creation of persons 
in the occupied territory. The Fugitive Aid Organization could cer-
tainly have been said to have been of benefit to the London Govern-
ment during the railway strike of 1944, an immense national project 
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which would have been impossible but for the Organization. 
The forgery organizations stand in essentially the same position 
as the National Fugitive .A.id Organization. They were locally founded~ 
they received aid from the National Support Fund, they rendered an 
invaluable service absolutely essential to resistance work, and thus 
benefited the cause of the London Government. In regard to the for-
gery organizations, it appeared at first glance that both London and 
the groups in the occupied territory might have been of assistance to 
each other. Note has been made of the fact that both material and 
technical assistance might have aided the forgery organizations, had 
London been able to supply them. That London often, apparently, had 
poorer facilities than persona in Holland has also been noted. Organ-
izations in the occupied territory, in turn, might have supplied 
London with forged identity papers, as was often requested. 
In examining the contact between the London Government and that 
prodigious journalistic effort, the clandestine press, one encounters 
few better examples of an activity that tends to support the efficiency 
or preferability of London's utilizing persons or institutions already 
located or in being in the occupied territory. London's own entry 
into the field of clandestine publishing, in the form of the Wervel-
wind and its successor, the Vliegende Hollander, those twin disasters 
of Dutch journalistic effort, is clear enough evidence of this. 
That both the clandestine press and the London Government came 
to be of real value to each other, particularly in the last years of 
the war, is clear. With the creation of the Swiss and Swedish Routes, 
making possible the regular receipt in London of copies of underground 
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papers, the Government came increasingly to rely on the press. not 
only as a partial source of Radio Orange broadcasts, but for intelli-
gence information as well. With the improved quality of Radio Orange 
the clandestine press came to rely on that organization quite exten-
sively. As has been noted, wndon supplied some material assistance 
to the press, as well. 
The various political and/or intellectual resistance groups, 
such as the Political Convention, the Grand Citizens• Committee, or 
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the National Committee, represent institutions which London could have 
been said to have ttutilized~ only in a very limited sense. These or-
ganizations, it must be noted, were nearly all created at the initia-
tive of people in the occupied territory. That the work they engaged in 
was of value cannot be doubted, although some legitimate doubt can cer-
tainly exist as to the extent which London really took advantage of 
the studies and reports which it received from such bodies. Certainly 
some of them offered the advantages in a long term sense of making 
possible a postwar truce in matters political, a fact of use to the 
Dutch nation but of no immediate value to the London Government. 
That London regarded them of value can be seen in the request which it 
made in urging the formation of the Fatherland Committee, after the 
demise of its predecessor • London -s understandably cautious in 
reacting too enthusiastically to the efforts of any of these groups, 
lest it be accused of bias. The National Committee, quite clearly. 
had political ambitions in its own right. 
The experience of the London Government with various resistance 
co8rdinating bodies tends to prove an exception to the general thesis 
advanced in regard to the utilization of the services of persons or 
organizations already located or in being in the occupied territory. 
London began by utilizing the locally constituted Contact Co!IDilission 
and the Grand Resistance ·Advisory Commission, but eventually found 
it necessary to by-pass these bodies • owing to their fatal factional-
ism, and set up its own separate agency, the College of Bondsmen. Lon-
don's departure from its usual practice of utilizing local organiza-
tions. it might be concluded, was occasioned by the special nature of 
the two Commissions. Both possessed a fatal weakness for Holland, in 
that they were broadly representative of a, great many divergent organ-· 
izations. Factionalism was the inevitable result as this was still 
Eolland. The general success of the College of Bondsmen indicates 
that London's utilization of locally-formed organizations was not im-
perative but simply preferable. Note must be made of the fact that in 
creating the College of Bondsmen London utilized persons already in the 
occupied territory. 
The Netherlands Forces of the Interior offers another variation. 
In that it was made up of organizations already in being in the occupied 
territory, it tends to substantiate the general thesis as advanced. In 
as much as London was able to create a new organization from the compo-
nent bodies of the Forces, it could not be said to have simply utilized 
organizations already in being in Holland. A person not already in the 
occupied territory, Prince Bernhard, was designated as commander-in-
chief. Thus this case resembles that of the Gravn Resistance Advisory 
Commission and the Contact Commission• that is, London sought to counter 
the disunity among the component members. This attempt when applied 
to the Forces of the Interior took the form of placing the component 
mElllbers under one command. 
The railway strike of 19441 while undeniably an act of successful 
•remote" administration, represents not so much a denial of the general 
rule that remote administration was unfeasible. That this particular 
act of remote administration was possible at all was due to special 
circumstances. London had successfully urged railway 1'10rkers to stay 
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on the job, in itself an act of remote administration, albeit in response 
to urgent and repeated queries from Holland. But it was officials in 
Berlin who made the decision to permit continued Dutch operation of the 
Nethel'J.ands Railways, in contrast to the policy followed in many other 
occupied countries. The railway strike does little to support the view 
that remote administration might have been possible on an expanded 
scale. It was the sort of action that could have been carried out 
only once. Had London ordered a stoppage of rail operations in 1942 or 
1943, it would not have again been possible to do so in September, 1944. 
While the railway strike is viewed here primarily as an aot of 
remote administration, one must serioualy question the wisdom of the 
policy. Certainly it may be doubted 'Whether the inconvenience caused 
the Germans outweighed the privation inflicted on the civilian popula-
tion. The writer finds himself in agreement with Minister Al barda in 
this respect, that the London Government ahould have given more careful 
consideration to the problems involved in endlng the strike, should the 
attack at Arnhem fail. Since ending the strike at all appeared almost 
immediately to be impossible it would appear that the very grave risks 
involved should have been apparent. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE LONDON GOVERNMENT AND THE MI.INTENI.NCE OF COMMUNICATIONS 
WITH THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY 
Introduction 
The fourth and final chapter deals w1 th the maintenance in various 
forms of OOIIDDunioations between the London Goverment and the oooupied 
territory. 
The initial section describes a unique and valuable means of reach-
ing the oooupied territory, that of the Netherlands Government radio 
broadcasting station in London, Radio Orange. Its relation to persons 
and organizations in the occupied territory ia explored. 
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There then follow sections on the Swiss Route and the Swedish Route, 
channels for the transmission of material between the occupied territory 
am London, operated through two neutral countries. Onoe again both serve 
as models to teat the thesis earlier advanced in relation to such contact. 
Following the material on the Swiss am Swedish Routes the history 
and developnent of Dutch intelligence organizations in London is desoribedt 
and their activities are outlined, with sections on both the Dutch Central 
Intelligence Service, and its successor, the Intelligence Bureau.' Both 
of these sections are of particular importance in that they tend to either 
disprove or offer an important exception to London's being able to main-
tain ccntaot best When it utilised persons or organizations already located 
or in being in the occupied territory. Both organizations sent agents 
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from London to the occupied territory who were parachuted "blind", i.e., 
without any reception committee, and who were able to subsequently 
accomplish a great deal. Also included is a brief account of intelli-
gence organizations formed b,y persons in the occupied territory, together 
with a short evaluation of the Dutch intelligence effort. Appended 
tables ~ize the activities of all agents of the (Dutch) Intelligence 
Bureau. 
The final chapter concludes with a study of the E9gland-Bpiel. wherein 
an Anglo-Dutch operation was organized to establish, partly with the 
assistance of over forty agents sent from London, a vast organization 
whose form and activities were specified in considerable detail b,y London. 
As such, this offers a prime chance to test again the thesis that London's 
efforts via-a-via the occupied territory were most successful when persons 
or organizations already located or in being in Holland were utilized. 
This was the major example of a London effort which did not observe this 
rule. Its outcome offers considerable insight into the general problem of 
maintaining contact with the occupied territory. 
Radio Orange 
On the evening of July 28, 1940, listeners to several short and 
medium wavelengths of the British Broadcasting Corporation heard the old 
Netherlands melody, In Naam van Orsie ("'In the Name of Orange"), played 
on trumpets, and then heard a Dutch voice proclaim, "Hier Radio Oranje, 
de stem van vrijde Nederlandl" ("Here is Radio Orange, the voice of free 
Hcllandl"). ~ueenWilhelmina was among the speakers in the original 
broadcast. The voice of Radio Orange was heard every day until after the 
conclusion of World War II, first once and then later twice a day.493 
493t. de Jong, October 28, 1954, 98706-98707. 
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In a way it was singularly appropriate that the London Government 
of the Netherlands should use international broadcasting to address it-
self to its absent population, sinoe foreign broadcasting originated in 
Holland. Starting in 1925, a Dutch station using the call sign PCGG 
(later PCJ) broadcast on medium wavelengths a regular Sunday concert, 
introduced in English, and intended for reception in Great Britain. Two 
years later the world's first regularly scheduled shortwave radio program 
began from transmitters located at the Philips Electrical Company plant 
at Eindhoven, Holland. Produced and presented by the multi-lingual Ed• 
ward Startz, the "Happy Station", as it was called, attracted wide at-
tention, since it could be received clearly all over the world.494 
In a ministerial sense Radio Orange came into being at least in 
part through the efforts of Dr. Gerbrandy, not yet the Minister-Pres-
ident, in spite of strong opposition on the part of some of his ool-
leagues. Minister-President de Geer was particularly opposed to the 
creation of such a program, as he felt that it might irritate the Ger-
mans. De Gear, a pacifist and a firm believer in strict adherence to 
international law, believed that the London Government should be cor-
rect in all respects in its dealings with the Germans, and that such 
behavior might well be reoiprocated.495 
Ministerial approval was given to the creation of Radio Orange, 
originally as an adjunct to the Regeringsvoorliohtingendienst ("Netherlands 
Government Press Service"). A significant provision was attached to this 
approval, however. All scripts were to be submitted to the Council of 
494As these lines are copied in January, 1961, the Happy Station 
program is still begin broadcast every Sunday from Holland by Edward 
Startz and has a world wide audience of thousands. 
495t. de Jong, June 301 1948, 16073-16076. 
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Ministers for clearance. This was faithfully done twice a day. Fre-
quently alterations were made, usually by Minister-President de Geer, 
who was particularly cautious about material 17hich he felt might cause 
Gennan resentment.496 Dr. Lo de Jong, of the staff of Radio Orange, told 
of the time the script editor, Mr. Boas, had written a text containing 
approximately this language: 
••• Holland must persevere, beoause eventually there will come 
the day, after victory~ when the Netherlands people will again 
receive their freedom. 97 
This clause had been returned with the penciled notation from Min-
ister-President de Geer: 
This is pure rhetoric. As my colleague Dijxhoorn has said in 
the Council of Minister~~ there is no indication that Germany can 
still suffer a defeat.4 
Minister-President de Geer forbade Radio Orange to use the oollo-
quial Dutch word for the Germans, moffen, which means much the same as the 
knerioan, "kraut&"• It was, he said, undignified for use by cultivated, 
civilized people. Later, after the removal from the scene of de Geer, 
the Dutch were to hear no less a person than their Queen employ the 
word moffen.499 
The correction of scripts by the Ministers lasted a year, although 
after de Geer departed and Dr. Gerbrandy became Minister-President, 
there was a considerable improYement. No other Minister ever included 
corrections of the sort de Geer dido500 
Mr. J. W. Lebon, the original director of Radio Orange, felt it was 
496Ibido 497Ibid. 498Ibid. 
499Ibid., broadcast of April 24, 1943, recorded by the writer at 
Redlands, California. 
500Ibid. 
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"disillusioning" to have to submit every broadcast word to the Council of 
Ministers. Since scripts had to pass a British censor after they were 
scrutinized b,y the Council, this might mean a delay of a day or two, so 
that a~ sense of the immediate seemed to have been lost.501 
Radio Orange used transmitters of the British Broadcasting Corp-
oration, placed at its disposal by the British Government. Radio Orange 
was under the control, immediately, of the London Government, in distinc-
tion to the broadcasts of some other governments-in-exile which were part 
of the regular European Service of the B.B.c.. The Dutch did seek to 
avoid broadcasting material which was in sharp conflict with current 
trends in British ideological warfare. To this end there was constant 
contact and consultation with both the B.B.c. and the Political Intelli-
gence Department of the British Foreign Service. Co8perationwith the 
British in this matter seems to have been satisfactory.502 
Initially, the B.B.c. imposed one rather important restriction on 
Radio Orange: It could transmit no news broadcasts as suoh. Comment-
aries were permitted, as was literally any other type of program Radio 
Orange oared to devise, but straight news was left to the regular Dutch 
language service of the B.B.C. whioh continued to function. The B.B.C. 
oame to modify its views on this subject, at least sufficiently to permit 
Radio Orange to broadcast a short news bulletin not exceeding one minute 
in duration~503 
501J. w. Lebon, August 29, 1950, 83313. 
502t. de Jong, October 28, 1954, 98706-98707. 
503rbido, 98710-98712. The writer had understood, apparently in-
correctly, that the duration of news bulletins permitted Radio Orange 
was lengthened in 1943, but he possesses a recorded broadcast of Sept-
ember, 1944, containing a news bulletin of only one minute in length. 
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In the eal"liest period the prima donna qualities of the Dutch Min-
ister-President and the injunction against news broadcasts were not the 
only troubles plaguing Radio Orange. There was virtually no one who had 
had any previous radio experience. Mr. Lebon had been secretary-treasurer 
of one of the various broadcasting societies which shared and still share 
time on Holland's two radio stations, but this experience was of little 
value in operating a broadcasting station as such. The Hollanders in 
England were a heterogeneous· lot, there mstly by chance. There were 
more than enough Journalists, including the stranded London correspond-
ents of newspapel"s in Holland, many of whom could write a script, but 
finding announcers· was a major problem. The voices of nearly the entire 
Dutch colony in Britain were "tested"'• Eventually two officers of the 
Netherlands diplomatic service, Messrs. Stuyt and Star Busmann, agreed 
to serve as announcers.504 
In 1942, after the Council of Ministers had abandoned its requirement 
that all text11 of Radio Orange broadcasts be submitted for clearance, 
the sta:tion wa.s placed under more complete control of the Netherlands 
Government Information Service, with Mr. Pelt of that organization assum-
ing full responsibility for the contents of the broadcasts. The oper-
ational head of Radio Orange continued to be Mr. Lebon. He was subse-
quently replaced, in the fall of 1942, by Mr. Eo J. van den Broek, who 
had headed a Dutch language radio program of the B.B.C., the Brandaris, 
intended for reception by Dutch merchant sailors. Radio Orange at this 
time was placed under a commission, which set forth lines of guidance, 
within the boundaries of Which the director had complete discretion. 
504Ibid. 
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The Ool!llliasion was chaired by the Minister-President, but was not a 
oreature of the Counoil of Ministers. It contained representatives of 
the Ministry of Sooial Affairs, the merchant marine, a Roman Catholic 
priest, a Protestant minister, and others of diverse interests and baok-
ground,505 
No aooount of Radio Orange oan ignore the Brandariao The operation 
and spirit of the Braudaris was intimately linked to the parson of Hendrik 
Johannes van den Broek, In :Mtly, 1940, Mr. van den Broek waa in Paris, 
where he had served as correspondent of the Amsterdam daily newspaper 
De Telegraaf, a post he had held rinoe 1933, Three Dutoh oabinet ministers 
were in Paris the day after Holland capitulated, enroute to London, and 
Mr. van den Broek got their permission to establish a Dutoh radio station 
in Paris. Frenoh authorities plaoed at his disposal medium wave trans-
mitters whioh oould be heard clearly in Holland. Vri1 Nederland. as the 
station was oalled, broadcast i'if'taen-minuta programs in the morning, and 
at noon, as well as one of twenty minutes in the evening, Operation began 
on May 19, 1940 and continued mtil the Gennan occupation of Paris, on 
June 11th. There 11as talk of oontinuiDg Vrij Nederland broadcasts from 
Poitiers, along with the Belgians who had a mobile broadcasting station 
there, but the Franoh capitulation ended this poasibility,506 
Van den Broek than -nt to London, travelling via Spain and Portugal, 
arriving on September 18, 1940, He worked as a news editor for a time at 
.&lgemean Nederland& Persbureau ("General Netherlands Preas Bureau") 1 a 
Dutch wire servioe. On or about May 1, 1941, he was approached by oi'i'i-
505t, de Jong, June 301 1948, 16073-16076, 
506H, J. van den Broek, September 71 1950, 84240-84241, 
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oiala of the B.B.C. who urged that he assist in the creation of a special 
radio broadcast to be directed to Dutch merchant sailors. The British 
Government felt, he was told, that morale among Dutch merchant seamen 
was not high. There was always danger, apparently, that they might desert 
the Allied servioe for berths on neutral vessels or even take up other 
oooupations. Since a merchant vessel is normally equipped with several 
short wave radio receivers, broadcasting seemed a particularly effective 
way of reaching seamen, With the approval and complete agreement of the 
Dutch London Govermnent the service, lawwn as the Bralldaria. began on 
July 1, l94lo l.dministratively speaking, the Brandaris was a creature of 
the B.B.C., ,operated by Hollanders who rS~&ined in the Netherlands Govern• 
ment service but were "lent" to the B.B.c.. Yr. van den Broek became the 
first director of the station.507 
The Brandaria had certain advantages over Radio Orange. It never 
had to submit ita scripts· to the Dutch Council of Ministers and it was 
never forbidden to broadcast regular news bulletins. It was generally 
true that the Bralldaria could broadcast IIMI.terial based more on conjec-
ture or hearsay evidence. The station could and did broadcast items 
beginning, "We were told the other day by someone••••" As an official 
Netherlands Gover:anent station Radio orange was not permitted to do this. 
While the Brandaria was intended pri!IMI.r:l.ly for merchant sailors, it was 
listened to by numbers of Hollanders in the occupied territory and else• 
'lllhere on terra firma, a fact duly mted in the opening announoementa of 
eaoh broadoast.508 
607Ibido The name Brandaris is that of the fire towers on the 
Dutch ia~ of Tersohelling. 
SOSc. J. G. Spoelstra, Maroh 8, 1955, 99019-99022. 
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Before the fusion of Radio Orange and the Brandaris there existed 
eome resentment of the latter by Radio Orange, At the lOoth broadcast 
of the Brandaris. held in a theater auditorium, the entire Dutch Council 
of Ministers was present. This was the sort of support 'l'lhioh Radio 
Orange had found difficult to mustero509 
In November of 1942 the Brandarh was absorbed by Radio Orange, 
with the director of the Brandaris. Mr. van den Broek, becoming the 
director of a "n~ Radio Orange.610 
Dro L. de Jong, of the staff of Radio Orange, felt that the 1'ua1on 
had done much to enliven and improve the quality of the broadcasts. Both 
the persons of Mr. van den Broek snd another associate of the Brandaris. 
the talented Mr. Cornelia J. G. Spoelstra, an author with a considerable 
international reputation earmd under the name of "A. den Doolard", had 
represented valuable additions to Radio Orange.611 
Mr. van den Broek regularly spoke in the broadcasts of Radio Orange 
as the Rotterdammer, a name deriving its significance from the fact that 
Mr. van den Brcek 'W.S a native of Rotterdam, and intended to signify the 
determination of the Netherlands people to rise above such adversity as 
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the destruction of the center of the city of Rotterdam. 
As head of Radio Orange Mr. van den Broek found that he had ready 
access to the Minister-President, Dr. Gerbrandy. They met regularly each 
week to discuss problems relating to the broadcast1r. 513 
When, in the fall of 1944, Mr. van den Broek was sent to the liber-
509lll!S.• 610sroek, loc. cit., 84244-84248, 
51IL. de Jong, October 28, 1954, 98710-98712. 
5l2Broek, loc. cit., 84275-84276. 513Ibid,, 84268. 
ated south of the Netherlands to head a new broadcasting station located 
there, Herrijzend Nederland ("Emergent Netherlands"), Mr. Spoelstra 
became head of Radio Orange, a position he held until the end of World 
War II.514 
Another problem facing Radio Orange, and one over which it oould 
exercise no real control was that of German jamming. Jamming is the 
practice of broadcasting noise. often a squealing or buzzing sound, on 
the wavelength of the station with which one wishes to interfere. Since 
Radio Orange broadcast on only one long wavelength and two medium wave-
lengths,51S as well as over several shortwave transmitters, the Germans 
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found it praotical to set up jamming stations to interfere with Radio 
Orange. The jamming activity often made reception of the long and medium 
wavelengths difficult or even impossible, particularly in the areas of 
the large cities, near which the Germans located moat of their jamming 
stations. .As any broadcast station operator will testify there are cer-
tain "dead" spots, not necessarily too distant from the transmitter 1 in 
which his signals will be received very badly or not at all. This applied 
of course to the German jammers. A listener might well be in a "dead" 
spot for the jam.~er but be able to receive Radio Orange perfectly well. 
Some listeners found the shortwave frequencies more attractive, in that 
shortwave radio "skips" • so that jamming signals might be regularly in-
audible a relative short distance away in all directions from the jammer 
operating on these frequencies. The main difficulty was that, while many 
514gpoelstra, loc. cit •• 99040-99042. 
515The medium wave stations fall within the American broadcast band, 
the long wave station was on 200 kilocycles, a frequency employed for 
broadcasting in Europe, although not in the United States. 
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radios made in Europe receive shortwave broadcasts as a matter of course, 
failing components, not defective enough to affect medium wave reception, 
might make shortwave reception impossible. With critical shortages of all 
sorts of electronic supplies, particularly radio tubes, many Dutch radios 
by 1943 or 1944 were ailing. Some gallant substitutes for unobtainable 
components were devised, but most listeners lacked the technical knowl-
edge necessary for such improvisation.516 
Aside from purely technical problems Radio Orange was faced with yet 
another major difficulty: That of reliable sources of information to 
use in preparing broadcasts. During the earliest period the (Dutch) 
Central Intelligence Service was not able to supply much information to 
Radio Orange on conditions in the occupied territory, a state of' affairs 
not surprising since it lacked such information. The earliest copies 
of clandestine newspapers from Holland were made available to Radio Orange 
only in the summer of 1942. The starr of Radio orange could and did 
monitor the Nazi controlled domestic Dutch radio stations and was able to 
infer some things as a result. They regularly received copies of the 
legally-published Dutch press whioh travelled to London via Sweden or 
other neutral countries. Also available to Radio Orange was a daily 
publication of the British Ministry of Information, the News Digest, a 
compendium of excerpts from leading European newspapers, including some 
published in German oooupied Holland. Once the Dutch Bureau InlichtingEIIl 
("Intelligence Bureau"), the successor to the Central Intelligence 
516rnterview with Will Baumgarten, August, 1959. Baumgarten, who 
spent the war years in the Hague, told the writer that reception of 
Radio Orange in the Hague was so difficult that he listened instead to 
the Home Service of the B.B.c.. The Home Service was carried on so many 
waveler.gths that German jamming was a practical impossibility. 
Service, was fUnctioning efficiently it was able to supply considerable 
material to Radio Orange. This was particularly true after the SWiss 
Route for intelligence information carne into being. By 1944 the traffic 
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of clandestine newspapers, intelligence reports, oo~entaries on all sorts 
of political, social, and economic matters, had reached avalanohe pro-
portions, with hundreds of pages a week being delivered.517 
Mr. Spoelstra was rather unsatisfied with the quality and extent of 
material supplied to Radio Orange by the Dutch Intelligence Bureau prior 
to September, 1944. He reported that Radio Orange made extensive use of 
the B.B.C. Monitoring Report, in which resumes of important broadcasts 
made that day in various countries were included, having been prepared 
from transcriptions made by the B.B.C. Monitoring Servioe.518 
C~ioations with the occupied territory 1mproved greatly after 
the liberation of the southern provinces, so that word of a projected 
German aotion, particularly if related to something in the nature of 
new German forced labor recruitment measures, would reach an intelligence 
gathering agency in the unoccupied area in the middle of the morning and 
would be included in the next program of Radio Orange or the Dutch service 
of the B.B.c., whichever happened to be sooner.519 
A very limited source of information, athough one drawn on particul-
arly in the early years, was the l!lngelandvaardera ("Travellers to England"), 
the refugees who went to Englan:i from Holland. Dr. L. de Jong found 
these individual reports of very little value. The Engelandvaarders 
were generally simple people, "•••Wbo could report about conditions at a 
517L. de Jong, June 30, 1948, 16087-16088. 
518c. J. G. Spoelstra, July 23, 1948, 20108-20109. 519Ibid 
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pot and pan factory ••• and tell who the Dutch ~zi in their village was, 
but could give no idea of broad movements or currents of thought in Dutch 
public life •••• n520 
Often the travellers, when they had reached England by way of neutral 
countries, had been weeks or months enroute, so that their information 
was badly out of date. 
Thus, since there were no clandestine papers or intelligence reports 
available in the earliest period, Radio Orange broadcasts for some time 
tended to be filled with accounts of the life of the Dutch oolony in 
London, including such things as "actuality" reports of the commission-
ing of officers in the Primess Irene Brigade. The staff of Radio Orange 
was not proud of these programs, but had little else to offer in their 
place. They were well aware that there were numerous things of more 
immediate interest and importance to their listeners.521 
An early problem facing the staff of Radio Orange was whether they 
should make attEillpts to broadcast instructions to civil servants. Correct-
ly speaking, this was a matter of policy for the London Gover:rment to 
decide and then relay to Radio Orange, but Mr. Lebon could see no harm in 
trying to "prod" the Government a bit into making up its mind on this 
policy issue. Certainly this neither the first nor the last time in 
history when officials concerned with news publication would themselves 
have a hand in the formulation of policy. Mr. Lebon got nowhere with 
his initial efforts, indeed !.~nister-President de Geer complicated 
matters by taking the attitude that civil servants in the occupied 
520t. de Jong, October 28, 1954, 98710-98712. 521 Ibid 
-· 
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area should simply oollperate with German authoritiesz 522 
Mr. Lebon went to the London Government repeatedly to try to get a 
clear statement of opposition to the Nazi-inspired Winterhu1p charitable 
drive, a direct Dutch counterpart of the German Winterhilfe campaign, 
known more for the Hilfe, or "assistance", which it rendered to its Nazi 
collectors than to the supposed recipients of the funds. Mr. Lebon was 
never able to get suoh an expression of opinion from the London Govern-
ment in the earlier period, On his own initiative he prepared a series 
of broadcasts criticizing the !interhulp, trusting to luok that no one 
listening in London would realize that he was not necessarily expressing 
a view officially held, Good fortune prevailed and he was later able to 
mook the dismal failure of the Winterhulp campaign in succeeding broad-
oasts.523 
Aa will be seen, instructions to civil servants were forthcoming in 
later broadcasts, 
.An even more serious problem was one of whether Radio Orange should 
inspire acts of resistance or not. Again the problem was one of the 
London Govermnent•s really having to take a stand before Radio Orange 
oould express a viewpoint, and again the London Government was pressured 
for a public stand, Since Radio Orange had some independent discretion, 
particularly after the departure of Minister-President de Gear, Mr. Lebon 
and his associates readily recognized that they possessed a considerable 
responsibility, Suggestions to persons in the occupied territory that 
bore no relation to the real situation there would be likely to be rejected 
by large numbers of persons, thereby damaging the prestige of both Radio 
522Lebon, loo, cit., 83318-83320, 523Ibid,, 83323, 
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Orange and the London Government. Since London was badly informed during 
the earlier period about conditions in the occupied territory, and no one 
knew this better than the staff of Radio Orange, it naturally followed 
that very little advice on resistance activity was offered.524 
In April of 1942 Radio Orange was faced with a highly specific 
problem along the lines just mentioned. It was learned that the German 
authorities intended to institute the use of the Star of David, to be 
worn by all Dutch Jews, effective May 1, 1942. Since this was an event 
of major importance Radio Orange could scarcely ignore it. At the same 
time it was decided that no major effort would be made in broadcasts to 
organize opposition to the measure. Such an action could scarcely be 
planned in London in view of the sparse information available and might 
lead to very extensive German reprisals, all the more so because it had 
been instigated by Radio Orange. The station did broadcast a brief item 
protesting the German regulation. Listeners were not specifically urged 
to take any action but they were told, without editorial comment, of 
recent events in Belgium, where the earlier application of an identical 
German ordinance had resulted in many gentiles donning the Star of David 
themselves.526 
Mr. van den Broek was at all times deeply aware of the terrible 
responsibility which he bore in regard to broadcasts urging resistance 
activity. It appeared to him that Radio Orange could be most effective 
by both fully publicizing and urging resistance to those German measures 
intended to couple the Netherlands economy to the Nazi war effort. These 
measures included the labor draft, the requisitioning of stocks of raw 
624t. de Jong, loo. oito 525Ibid., 98723. 
materials and finished goods, and similar activities.526 
Minister Albarda, of the London Government, was very dubious of the 
value of broadcast 
all, also included 
instructions to the resistance. The enemy was, 
527 in the audience. He felt that men who, 
after 
••• Sit safely at a table in front of a microphone and give 
instructions to the underground are in a less adequate position to 
assess a oom~licated situation than people on the scene in 
Holland •••• 5 8 
The essential problems have been stated, what of the actual broad-
casts? They did attempt to give instructions to civil servants, to the 
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resistance, and to the public in general. They also attempted to further 
a senee of national unity in a country 'Which had always been divided to 
some extent. 
Of major importance were the numerous broadcasts over Radio Orane;e 
of Queen Wilhelmina. As much as aey single thing the House of Orange 
was a symbol of Dutch unity during the period in question. Her scripts, 
which were invariably her own creation, remind one of the direct prose of 
Winston Churchill. It may not be an exaggeration to say that, but for the 
obscure language in which they were delivered, they might have attracted 
widespread international attention. They reflected, even in the face 
of the worst disasters, an unshakable belief in the ultimate triumph of 
the Allied oause. Religioua themes or allusions frequently appeared, 
although the Queen, a Protestant, tactfully avoided references which 
526Broek, loco oit., 84256-84260. 
5a~The Germans often left one Radio Orange frequency clear of 
jamming in order that they might listen themselves. An alert listener 
could sometimes locate this channel in time to make use of it. 
SZSAlbarda, loa. cit., 98065. 
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might offend Holland's large Catholic population. Widespread ori tioism of 
Radio Orange was offered and continued to be offered, but critics nearly 
always specifically exempted the royal addresses. Part of this attitude 
undoubtedly simply represented respect for the sovereign, but part also 
reflects the single minded determination of one person which in itself 
came to be a central symbol of Dutch hopes. EVen the Communist leader, 
Mr. Saul de Groot, who could scarcely be accused of harboring an ex-
oessive royalist bias, paid high tribute to the speeches delivered by 
Queen Wilhelmina over Radio Orange. 529 
The writer has selected as representative a royal address of May 61 
1942, delivered on the occasion of the German execution of seventy-two 
Dutoh hostagelto 
MY fell0r1 countrymen: 
ll'ith you, with our compatriots in east am west, and with 
the entire civilized ~rld, I was deeply shocked at the news of 
the execution of seventy-two of our fellow countrymen. 
With you I wish to pay homage to their memory, homage to 
their courage and their love of country. 
Holland shall never forget the martyrs who fell for her 
liberation. Name by name, person qy person, their memory shall 
continue to live with us. 
We know the executioners of the seventy--two who have just 
fallen. Many of us kllow, unfortunately, that there are many 
others who have been murdered, the deaths of whom are unkno1121 
to us and may not beoome known until later, if then. 
Even though we do not know their numbers we must remember 
and honor them. 
My countrymen, I have an urgent assigmnent for you. So 
that you may all enjoy maximum personal security you must see 
that oo incautious word is uttered which oan lead to the im-
prisoument or murder of a countrymen ••• ! must ask you in these 
difficult days to keep silent on all subjects which can be of 
529Groot, loco cit., 96968. 
value to the enemy, again, regardless of the person to whom you 
are speaking. 
See to it that when you telephone you are not overheard. 
Realize that when you write letters the enemy lies in wait. 
Remember that the same is true when you use public conveyances 
or are in other public places where people gather together. 
Only a few days separate us from the lOth of May. I do 
not need to say how much I will be united with you in my 
thoughtlf on that day. In the past, the past that has brought 
so much suffering both for Holland and the Dutch East Indies, 
the indestructible will of the people to be free has not been 
bent or broken. In these days that will serves as a most 
convincing witness for all. In the future, the blood and 
tears of the present will bring the birth of a new, united 
free Holland in all areas. 
And DtJW my countrymen we will not despair, we will remain 
steadfast, we will triumph, because we fight against the forces 
of darkness with a clear conscience, for a cause that is just 
and for justice itself.530 
There were, as has been noted, many government messages which did 
not come from the Queen. Some were read for the guidance of civil 
servants by the regular announcers, some by the Minister- President 
Dr. Gerbrandy. Whatever the ramifications of the early period and 
Minister de Geer•s proposed honeymoon with the Germans, by November 
17, 19421 civil servants in the occupied territory were being told in 
plain language that they had been "left behind" in order that they 
might protect the citizenry from hunger, forced labor, deportation, 
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robbery, murder, and Anton Mussert and his Dutch Nazis. Anyone who failed 
to do his duty in this connection was likely to be regarded as insubord-
inate or worse, they were warned 0 531 
Eight days earlier, on November 9, 1942, civil servants had been 
warned specifically not to coBperate with the labor draft, with any 
532 
measures mistreating Jews, or with the "Nazifioation" of the schools. 
53~NQ, VIla, 412. 531Ibid., 416. 532rbid., 415. 
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In a broadcast of October 2, 1943, civil servants were specifically 
placed on notice of the existence of the Cgmmentary of 1943. which ampli-
fied the earlier Ordinances of 1937. providing guides for the conduct of 
civil servants in their dealings with the occupying power. They were 
told that copies of the Commentary were widely circulated within the 
civil service.533 
Frequent warnings were subsequently directed to civil servants not 
to co8perate with various German measures calculated to recruit additional 
laborers for service in Germany. In a broadcast of October 21, 1943, both 
civil servants and the civilian population as a whole were warned not to 
co8perate in any way with the deportation of Dutch Jews. 534 
On May 14, 1944, Radio Orange called two Utrecht policemen, Messrs. 
Huizinga and Bltlllen (or "Bl1.111er") by name, and said that reliable reports 
indicated that they had assisted a German press gang in raids on the local 
population to forcibly recruit laborers for work on Wehrmacht install-
ations. Huizinga, Blumen, and any others who engaged in such activities 
faced a possible death penalty or life imprisonment after the war, the 
broadcast stated.535 
Radio Orange, as has been noted, was used both to proclaim the rail-
way strike of 1944 and to give additional instructions to railway workers 
and other com ernedo 
When the Netherlands Forces of the Interior was called into being by 
the London Government Radio Orange was repeatedly used to transmit mea-
sages, some of them quite involved, to personnel. Extensive use was also 
made of the station in the liberated south, Eerrijzend Nederland, (~er-
533rbid., appendix, xvi. 534rbido 535Ibid., 428-429. 
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gent Netherlands"). 536 
Aside from messages direoted to civil servants or others in public 
positions, Radio Orange very .frequently a·ddressed instructions or advice 
to more general groups o.f the Netherlands people. Ma~ o.f these messages 
tended to stress the obvious, although as it turned out what might seem 
obvious to a less law abiding people than the Dutch had to be metiou• 
loualy spelled out, 
The Dutch public was .frequently urged not to donate to the Nazi• 
inspired Winterhulp, as has been said, They were told in massive detail 
o.f the "high operating expenses,. o.f the organization, and given the names 
o.f Dutoh Nazis who were regularly siphoning o.f.f a part o.f the .funds .for 
their own use.537 
Workers were repeatedly urged not to voluntarily accept employment 
in Germany. In the earlier period o.f the war the Germans had some success 
in getting Dutch laborers, lured by supposedly attractive working condi-
tions and compensation, to do just this.538 
Dutch employers, some o.f whom had adopted a "business as usual n 
attitude towards the occupation, were urged to help their employees 
escape the labor draft, otherwise, as Radio Orange bluntly pointed out, 
they might not have any employees after the war, To budding Dutch 
industrialists a reminder was given that, if Germany should win the war, 
it appeared highly unlikely that the Dutch region o.f the lleioh would ba 
the scene o.f any industrialization on the scale that Hollanders had oon-
templated,539 
5361.!!!§... 322 • 
539Ibid., 414. 
537Ibid,, 409-410. 538rbid., 413. 
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On April 7, 1943, DUtch students were warned by Radio Orange not to 
sign any agreements with the Germans, supposedly enabling them to continue 
their studies. Such agreements had served as little more than a handy 
registration device for labor recruitment in the past.540 
In a broadcast of April 10, 1943, Radio Orange quoted from the under-
ground press, urging resistance to the forced labor draft. In a sense 
the media of information had come the full circle, since the clandestine 
press had often drawn from Radio Ora~e. Increasingly, as time went on, 
Radio Orange was to quote items from the clandestine press, some of them 
quite lengthy.541 
On April 30, 1943, demobilized officers and men of the Dutch a~ 
were given advance warning that they faced re-internment in prisoner-of-
war camps in Gennany. 542 On May 19, 1943, Radio Orange warned them not 
to report for such re-internment. Some. although perhaps too few, heeded 
this warning and went into hiding. 543 
Following the murder of General Seyffardt, a leading Dutch Nazi 
leader, presumably by resistance worlrers, Radio Orange broadcast a 
warning to those in the underground not to "operate their own judicial 
system". The broadcast, thus phrased since excessive reprisals for 
attacks of the Seyffardt sort were feared, clearly expressed no grief 
at the sudden passing of the General. 544 
On July 31, 1944 Radio Orange broadcast detailed instructions to 
Hollanders on how to go into hiding. Since a general strike of all rail-
-y employees was ordered scarcely two weeks later this advice was un-
540Ibid., 417. 54Irbid., 419. 
543Ibid., 422. 544Ibid 
-·· 
appendix, :x:xx. 
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doubtedly quite timely. 545 
On January 2, 1945, word had arrived of the beginning of the last of 
the great German labor recruitment progrwns. Radio Orange urged its 
listeners in the occupied territory not to request or apply for the offi-
oial exemptions, as these were not always honored when granted and too 
often turned out to be, in effect, simply another registration device. 
This broadcast was directed specifically to both civil servants and the 
general public.546 
And, on ~y 6, 1945, this final instruction from the London Gov-
ernment was broadcast over Radio Orall!;e: 
Warning of the Government: 
Reports reaching us from the western part o£ the Netherlands 
are such that the following points are brought to the attention 
of the Netherlands people by the Dutch Government: 
1. The unconditional surrender of the Germans is a fact. 
2. Citizens should remain quiet as long as Allied troops 
have not arrived. 
3. Citizens should avoid all deeds and demonstrations 
which, in these last hours, could lead to unnecessary 
blood letting among the populace in the northwestern 
provinces. 
4. The Netherlands Forces of the Interior should under-
take only those assignments that are given to it by 
ita designated Commandant. 
s. It is forbidden £or anyone to appear on the street in 
an old Dutch anny uniform.547 
Criticism of Radio Orange was massive and widely expressed, both 
in the occupied territory and elsewhere. 
If one is to believe their founders, several agencies which supplied 
intelligeme information to the London Government came into being at 
545rbid., 42:6. 546rbid., 429. 547Ibid., 432. 
least in part as the result of the dissatisfaction of their proprietors 
with the quality and content of Radio Orange broadcasts. 
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Dr. A. L. Oosterhuis, a Deltzijl physician who created the "Swedish 
Route", reported that he was originally motivated to do this by Radio 
Orange. He had, he said, 
••• Listened with a friend to the nonsense that Radio Orange 
peddled ••• [and come to the conclusion] that something should be 
done ••• to better inform the people [in London].54& 
One of the reasons which moved Dr. Visser •t Hooft to set up the 
Swiss Route was the widespread criticism of Radio Orange which reached 
him from the occupied territory.549 
The Council of Resistance, which operated an intelligence agency 
that frequently sent material of a military, economic, political or social 
nature to London, felt that little or none of the data which it had gath-
ered was reaching Radio Orange, as broadcasta frequently presented sub-
jeots in auoh a way as to clearly indicate no acquaintance with infer• 
mation with which the Council had sought to aupply it. The staff of 
Radio Orange appeared to the Council to be misinformed on a wide variety 
of subjects.550 
Midshipman Dogger, in rendering his report on the Order Service 
when he arrived in England, was a little more tactful in his criticism, 
saying that he felt "favorable alterations" in Radio Orange might be 
effected. He also cri tioized the satirical Watergeus ("Sea Beggar") 
program of Radio Orange, which used limericks to poke fun at the Germana 
548A. L. Oosterhuis, Decamber 7, 1948, 36867o 
549yr • .A.. Visser •t Hooft, December 8, 1948, 37106o 
550Wagenaar, loo. cit., 95159•95160. 
and their Dutch assistants, describing its humor as grove 0 ooarse").551 
An intelligence group operated in conjunction with the clandestine 
newspaper, The Watchword (Het Parool), came into being because Radio 
Orange seemed to reflect the laok of information available in London. 
At the most critical moments in the war, it seemed, one tuned in Radio 
Orange, in itself a perilous activity, and heard a running account of 
a soccer match between an English and a Dutch team. By 1941 the "wild-
est" sort of rumors were being circulated by the man in the street in 
Holland, end it seemed to The Watchword that Radio Orange should begin 
to broadcast something a little more pertinent and authoritative so that 
the information vacuum might be filled, to some extent at least.552 
Former Minister of Waterways in the London Government, Albarda, 
made the criticism that some of the material broadcast by Radio Orall!;e 
had its origin in official acts of the London Government, some origin-
ated with writers and commentators of the station itself. The diffi-
oulty was tbat it was sometimes impossible to tell whether persons 
speaking on Radio Orange programs presented their own views or those of 
the Netherlands Government.553 
Dr. L. de Jong, speaking in defense of Radio Orange, pointed out 
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that domestic Dutch radio broadcasting both before and after World War II 
had been organized to serve various religious, political, and regional 
groupings within the Netherlands, but that such a service was beyond 
the scope or capabilities of Radio Orange. Since it had to broad-
551E~, VIIa, 671. 
552F. J. Goedhart, February 16, 1949, 41648. 
553Albarda, loo. cit., 98054. 
cast a single program to the entire population it was inevitable that, 
along with its other shortcomings, there would be those who would be 
bound to find its programs unsatisfaotory,554 
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In addition Dr. de Jong found that there were oritios of Radio 
Orange who disliked the very process of interpretation involved in 
broadcast commentaries, They were, as he put it, using an English 
phrase, " ••• Those who want to make up their own minds ••• • 555 The diffi-
culty with these arguments was that the broadcasts were not intended 
just for the reception by a select group of intellectuals but by the 
broad mass of the Netherlands population as well, which included a great 
number of people who totally lacked the background information to, 
" •• ~ke up their own minds ••• ," and needed to have things explained 
to them. Also, of course, Radio Orange '118.8 not allowed to broadcast 
news bulletins for quite some time. IJinoe this was true, oommentariea 
were a rather desirable form of program.556 
In addition to the ban on news broadcasts in the early period 
Radio Orange had not been helped any by the need to submit scripts to 
the Council of Ministers or by the general defeatist attitude of 
Minister-President de Geer.557 
Dr. L. de Jong felt that there had been a substantial improve-
ment achieved in the program in late 1942 and early 1943 with the com-
1ng of Messrs. van den Broek and Spoelstra, both of whom were well 
~ ~ 
suited for the work and had ~perienoe gained in operating the 
Brandariso558 
554t, de Jong, loc. oit., 98706-98707. 566rbid. 566rbid 
-· 
557rbid., 98710-98712. 568Ibid. 
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Nr. van den Broek had known full well at the time that there had 
been bitter criticism of Radio Orange. The British postal censors, 
who read all mail sent from England to foreign countries, frequently 
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gave Mr. van den Broek excerpts from letters written by resident Holland-
ers to persons abroad, excerpts in which Radio Orange was· often spoken 
of in terms that were anything but complimentary. Mr. van den Broek 
was willing to agree with many of their criticisms, particularly the 
one sometimes voiced that the irJne of the broadcasts· may have been un-
duly optimistic. The point had to be made, in this connection, that 
Radio Orange often reflected the tempered optimism of British news 
agencies, of which Radio Orange naturally made extensive use. Mr. van 
den Broek had a high regard for the accuracy of these British sources. 
Such an outlook was bound not to please the "all is lost"· school of 
thought, a body of opinion particularly sizeable after the loss of the 
Dutoh East Indies~559 
Radio Orange was, on occasion, better informed on events in the 
occupied territory than was apparent in its broadcasts. Ux. Spoelstra 
received a report from the (Dutch) Central Intelligence Service of a 
revolt of sorts in the area of Twente, Holland. He was told that the 
report had been received from a Central Intelligence Service agent on 
the spot who had transmitted it from a clandestine station to London. 
No mention of the revolt had appeared in the press legally published 
in Holland. Under the circumstances Radio Orange refrained from any 
mention of the uprising, which had not been publicized by the Germans 
fearing that otherwise the existence of the agent might come to be 
559Broek, loc. cit., 84271-84274. 
suspected. 560 
The former Minister of Justice, van Angeren, acknowledged that 
Radio Orange sometimes seemed to be presenting the views of the London 
Government when, in actual fact, the opinions expressed were those of 
commentators or script writers. This was the reason for the frequent 
conferences between Mr. van den Broek and Minister-President Gerbrandy • 
.At the 1ta111e time Mr. van Angeren firmly believed that Radio Orange had 
to be given a certain amount of latitude. As he put it, • ••• If ~adio 
Orange J had had to run to the Council of Ministers ... to ask the Gen-
tlemen if this [or that J could be s&id ••• .,n· then both the morale and 
the quality of programs would suffer.561 
Radio Orange was criticized for the fact that it fre~ently had 
broadcast authenticating messages used by the agent provocateur Anton 
van der Waals in infiltrating underground organizations. Neither the 
staff of Radio Orange nor Mr. Reyneke van Stuwe, a Dutch B.B.C. em-
ployee who had the job of forwarding mess~~~gee for the resist!Eilce to 
Radio Orange, had any notion of their real meaning other than that 
they were secret messages which had originated with the intelligence 
agencies·.562 
Minister van Heuven Goedhart felt that the Netherlands people had 
been well served by Radio Orange. He had lived in the occupied territory 
until April 24, 1944, when he had departed for London. This, coupled 
560c. J.G. Spoelstra, July 23, 1948, 20108-20109. 
561J. R. M. van Angeren, September 3, 1953, 98184-98185. 
562E11CI, VIIa, 728. Using captured codes and transmitters the 
Germans penetrated several circuits of communication with London. One 
such circuit was used to "authenticate" van der Waals. 
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with his extensive resistance experience,. put him in a better than 
average position to assess the value of the broadoasts.563 
Finally. note must be made of the fact that, although the Council 
of Resistance was one of the numerous critics of Radio Orange, its 
founder, Jan Thijssen, regarded Radio Orange highly enough so that in 
his Manifesto, cited earlier, he urged his readers not only to listen 
to the broadcasts but, if possible, to take them dawn stenographi-
oally.564 
The SWiss Route 
Repeated mention has been made of the clandestine ZWitserse Weg 
("Swiss Route"'), the clandestine channel of conmrunication running 
through SWitzerland which linked the occupied territory with the London 
Government. 
Like many another instrumentality of the London Government, as 
the SWiss Route in time came to be, the organization did not initially 
come into being as the result of initiative taken by the London Gov-
ernment. Rather it was first conceived of by a Dutch subject resident 
in a neutral country. Dr. Willem A. Viaser •t Hooft .. General Secre-
tary of the World Council of Churches, was at his headquartera in 
Geneva when German forces oooup:l.ed Holland. He continued in this 
capacity during am after World War II. Dr. Visser •t Hooft soon 
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found himself receiving reports on conditions in German-occupied Holland. 
Some such material came in letters passed through the German cenaor, 
~rome letters were sruggled out. Representatives of Dutch business 
563a. J. van Heuven Goedhart, May 2, 1955, 99176. 
564Ellq, VIIa, 267. 
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:f'irms, particularly those working :f'or German account, were sometimes 
permitted to travel to Switzerland. Such commercial travellers o:f'ten 
visited Dr. Visser •t Hoo:f't, bringing him further in:f'ormation on current 
li:f'e in the Netherlands. From his visitors he was able to learn o:f' the 
earliest resistance e:f':f'orts, particularly those engaged in U,y churches 
and by the universities. Later he received more material o:f' a gen-
eral nature. He passed on information thus acquired to London and to 
the Dutch East Indies. He was given an added impetus in this connec-
tion as he received many complaints :f'rom the occupied territory about 
Radio Orange, reports which stressed the apparent lack o:f' umerstand-
ing on the part o:f' the London Government o:f' conditions in Holland.565 
Dr. Visser •t Hoo:f't was in ciorreapondenoe with Minister-President 
Gerbrandy in London, so that he was happy, in early 1942, to accept 
an invitation :f'rom Gerbrandy to travel to London and hold discussions 
on his oontaot with Holland. In London Dr. Visser •t Hoo:f't met with 
Dr. Gerbrandy and with various other o:f':f'ioials o:f' the London Govern-
ment. Al!long those he :f'ound he was best able to work with was the 
Secretary-General o:f' the War Conduct Department, Mr. 1 ... H. J. Iovink 0 
Dr. Visser •t Hoo:f't entered into a written agreement which acknowledged 
the criticism and shortcomings o:f' Radio Orange, and the need :f'or a 
determined e:f':f'ort to increase and strengthen what it called "'spiritual" 
contact between the London Government and the Netherlands people. It 
was :f'urther a:f':f'irmed to be o:f' the utmost importance that persons o:f' 
prominence in Holland be in:f'ormed o:f' the plans and intentions o:f' the 
London Government. To this end a "'center" was to be established in 
565visser •t Hoo:f't, loa. cit. 
SWit&arland, with the oo8permtion of the Dutch diplomatic establish-
ment there and, ".-•• Various re~rident Hollanders ••• , .. which would act> 
as a two"'lr!l:y link between the Dutch population and its absent Govern-
ment .. This center, to be responsible to the War Conduct Department, 
was particularly to concern itself witht 
••• The oolleotion and processing of reports regarding 
spiritual movements [in Holland) , spiritual resistance to Na-
tional Socialism, the battle on the church and school fronts. 
changing views of the social and political future, and the atti-
tude toward Germany ••• 
The forwarding, possibly summarized, of important books or 
periodicals which may still appear in Holland. 
The forwarding to Holland, at least to leading persons, of 
material giving a closer insight into the views of the c~vern­
ment on the present and future.566 
A sum of money, the exact amount not specified in the document, 
was to be made available for the center.567 
On his return from London Dr. Visser •t Hoeft was n·extraordin-
erily delighted"> to receive in Geneva Miss Hebe Kohlbrugge, who had 
managed to make her way from Holland to Switzerland, bringing with 
her a large collection of very valuable intelligence material. She 
was ready to return immediately to Holland and set up there a center 
for the assembly of material to be sent via Dr. Visser •t Hoeft. This 
she did, and the Swiss Route really came into being.568 
Miss Kohlbrugge arrived back in Holland on August 2, 1942, making 
her way illegally across the border, through "barbed wire and rhododen-
drons" near the village of. Putte.569 
568Ibid. 
569H. Kohlbrugge, February 17, 1949, 42252-42253. 
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The de~ired center was e~ablished in Amsterdam. ~ince the use 
of regular couriers seemed to involve too great a riBk. a photographer 
-~ found who could produce greatly reduced copies: of the original 
documents. These microfilms were then secreted in the bindings of 
books sent to Srdtr:erland by ordinary mail.. 111". H. van Randw:ijk of 
Vrij Nederland., with which Miss Kohlbrugge also had an association. 
-~ to help collect the material to be sent via this new SWiss· Route. 
Since political items were desired, Miss Kohlbrugge. who did not feel 
competent to evaluate ~oh material, enlisted the assistance of Mr. 
Stufkens. a member of Parliament. Thilt -s in accord with the w:i shes 
of Dro Visser •t Hooft. Miss Kohlbrugge believed that Dr. Visser •t 
Hooft desired that Mr. Stufkens alone be charged with this responsi-
bility.570 
Miss- Kohlbrugge had gone to SWitzerland with introductions from 
Dr. J. Koo»mans and Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine. Dr. Visser •t Eooft 
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had particularly uked that Mr. Sloteme.ker de Bruine read through the 
material to be forwarded. This Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine agreed to do.571 
Miss Kahlbrugge regularly received and passed on to the SWiss 
Route military intelligence reports from the Order Service, having 
established contact with that organization through Mr. van Randwijk 
of Vrij Nederland.572 
Thus the Dutch end of the SWiss Route wa11, in large measure. 
operated by persons closely a11sooiated with Vrij Nederland. This 
made for some friction with the Order Service, which had its reserva-
tions about both Vrij Nederland and the fashion in which the Dutch 
570rbid., 42245. 571Ibid,. 572Ibid. 
ter.minus of the Swiss Route operated. This suapicion was reciprocated, 
since the staff of Vrii Nederland had its own reservations about the 
Order Service.573 
As things developed much of the Swiss Route material travelled 
from Holland to Switzerland bW courier rather than through the mails. 
Miss Kohlbrugge, as has been noted, preferred postal shipnents in the 
interests of personal safety. others, including Mr. Slotamaker de 
Bruine, felt the courier service to be superior, since one definitely 
knew through return of the courier of the safe arrival of shipnents. 
The organization and operation of the courier service is very nearly a 
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dissertation topic in itself'. Not only did couriers have to cross the 
Belgian, French, and Swiss fromtiers, they also had to have either a 
German-approved reason for suoh a journey, or else be equipped with very 
carefully forged papers. Both methods were employed. Mr. W. E. A. de 
Graatf, of' the Philips Electrical Works of Eindhoven, Holland, made 
some twenty-two trips on legitimate business from Holland to SWitzer-
land, travelling with completely valid ideuti ty papers and carrying 
with him a great many rolls of microfilm destined for Dr. Visser •t 
Hooft and his assistants. others travelled on forged identity papers 
of the Belgian Chamber of Commerce. Several persons were notable in 
helping establish the courier route and keeping it functioning smoothly, 
particularly Mr. J. H. Weidner, a Dutch businessman resident in FraiJOeJ 
Mr. J. G. le Jetme, a Dutch student at Louvain University! and a Mr. 
Bartels.574 
573Ibido 
57~. H. Slotemaker de Bruins, December 7, 1948, 36543. 
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As f~ aB can be determined the Germans never intercepted a courier 
ahipment of the SWias Route. They did arrest one of the couriers who 
was finally released with his shipment still intact, concealed in a 
tube of toothpaste which he had among his personal effeots.575 
An escape route was also operated by a related organization, 
whereby persons were conveyed from Holland to either Spe.in or SWit-
z.erland. l.!r,. Weidner estimated that the organization had safely con-
veyed about 1,000 persons, including 118 American aviators, 200 persons" 
of French nationality~ about 580 Hollanders, and another 100 or so of 
other nationalities.576 
Fortunately the escape line and the dooument courier service of 
the SWiss Route were sufficiently separate so that when, in February_. 
1944, the Gestapo broke up the escape line,. arresting about 100 of its 
personnel, the courier service could continue to function undetected.577 
At the same time the postal shipment of material from Holland to 
switzerland continued. As nearly as this writer can determine, in 
1944 one postal shipment was intercepted by the Gestapo, owing to some-
one's having tried to secrete too long a length of microfilm in a book 
binding. Whether the Gestapo appreciated the full significance of 
their discovery is even less certain. Shortly thereafter the Allied 
invasion of southern France, which began on August 15, 1944, put an 
end to passenger and mail connections linking Holland and Switzer-
land, thus terminating both the courier and postal services of the 
Swiss Route and effectively discontinuing the activities of the 
575J. G. le Jeune, June 16, 1949, 58369,. 
576J. H. Weidner, June 17, 1949, 58603,. 577rbid. 
organiza'l;ion.578 
By late 1943 Dro Vias:er •t Hoeft found himself faced with an in-
creasing flood of material. Amsterdam frequently added a commentary to 
items it forwarded, as often neither the original authors nor their 
relation to current Dutch society were known or under~ood in London. 
Dr. Vi&ser •t Hoeft also added commentaries on occasion. Military items 
received by the SWiss Route were processed by the Dutch military attache 
in Bern, General A. G. van Trioht, with ~om Dr. Visser •t Hoeft found 
he was able to work very well indeed.579 
All material received from Holland that was to be forwarded was 
photograJlhed a second time in Geneva and then "thinned"' b~· a special 
proce1111 developed by a Dutch engineer resident in Switzerland, Mr. 
Eisma. These films, which could contain a great deal of printed mat-
ter in very little space, were bound into books and consigned by a 
SWi1111 publisher, via the German Lufthansa airline, to a bookstore in 
stockholm. where they were collected by Dutch consular officials and 
forwarded to London.580 
Once material reached London it was usually processed, sorted 
out, and dispatched to the appropriate agencies by the Bureau lnlicht-
ingen ("'Intelligence Bureau"'). On occasion, as will be seen, this 
presented speciaJ: difficultie~S.581 
578Kohlbrugge, loc. cit., 42259-422110. 
579visser •t Hooft, loo. cit., 37175. 
580J. G. van Niftrik, Deoamber 7~ 1948r 3665lff. The writer 
believes this "thinning"' technique involved dissolving most of the 
film base away with an appropriate solvent, possibly amyl acetate. 
581A subsequent section deals with the Intelligence Bureau. 
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During its- operation the SWiss Route conveyed a vast amount of 
material. Part of this consisted of rnili tary intelligence reports. 
some gathered by domestic Dutch intelligence agencies, private groups-
of persons who assembled intelligence material, and others· by london-
dispatched agents active in Holland, agents who often contacted the 
Swiss Route through the Order Service or some intermediate organiza-
tion.582 
Non-military reports came from a wide variety of sources and 
covered nearly every conceivable subject. It was through the Swis·s 
Route, in large measure, that the London Government received copies of 
the clandestine press. The Dutch, as a nation, are very much given to 
the printed mrd. Such energie& as were not channeled into the clan-
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destine pres·s or other forms of resistance activity, often went into 
'"study'" groups and into the preparation of discussion papers, mono-
graph&, and the like.583 
A$ has been noted, the SWiss Route was intended to be a two-way 
street, with london's reactions to materials sent to it to be expressed, 
together with the views of the Londm Gover!llllent on nntters of both 
ourrent and future interest. Unfortunately questions from the ocou-
pied territory, some of them of an urgent nature, all too often simply 
met with silence from London. 
The .AmBterdam office repeatedly requested of london instructions 
on both the &Crt of material desired and whether the types of material 
582The activities of these organizations are discussed later. 
583A partial list of non-military items forwarded by the Swis~ 
Route in its first year of operation is to be found in the appendix. 
It represents only a fraction of what was to be conveyed in later years. 
provided were useful. No reply to thes111 questions was ever reoeived.584 
The well known internstional jurist, Dr. J. H. IV. Verz:i;fl,. to-
gather Yli th a· group of his colleagues·, prepared and sent via the Swiss 
Route to London a lengthy report on various legal problems. He never 
received any reply at all. After the end of the war, in JUne, 1945, 
~. Veraijl complained of this, and was told by the Dutch Foreign 
Minister, Mr. van Kleffens, that the report had never been received 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accordingly, Dr. Verzijl wrote 
Dr. Visser •t HOO:t't informing him of this fact. Dr. Visser •t Hoo:t't 
made inquiries of his own through the Dutch Intelligence Bureau and 
was· told that Dr. Vertijl•s• report had most dacideily been delivered to 
585 the Ministry o:t' Foreign Affairs and a receipt had been obtained. 
Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine, of the Amsterdam terminus of the SWiss 
Route, got the impression repeatedly that the London Government could 
only have filed 8/.We:y some important documents which had been sent it 
without ever reading them at a11.586 
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Prior to the liberation another report, one on postwar monetary 
policy,. wal!r prepared by a leading Dutch fiscal expert, Mr. Ridder,. 
working in oo:rl{lunotion with others. The report cautioned against certain 
monl!rtary "mistakes·"' which mould be avoided in the polltwar period. 
After the war the Government proceeded to do precisely what Mr. Ridder 
and his associates had cautioned against. Since he felt that his 
advioe would have been accorded careful consideration Mr. Ridder 
abo made inquiries. He was told by the officials in question that 
584slotemaker de Bruine, loa. cit., 36608ff. 585rbid. 
sasrbid. 
his views would have been highly regarded, had any suoh report been 
received. A further investigation did reveal that the report had 
reached London, but had not been recognized for what 1 t was and had 
been carefully looked up in a safe as of "no significance". 587 
Inquiries sent by the Amsterdam office of the Swiss Route on any 
subject almost invariably went unanswered. A person totally unknown in 
Holland was chosen by the London Government to serve as Minister of 
Finance. Amsterdam asked for particulars and received no answer. an 
December 6, 1942, Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina made a radio address 
which seemed to indicate proposed oha:tt';es in the postwar status of the 
Dutch East Indies. Owing to technical difficulties the broadcast was 
badly heard in Holland and consequently a text was unavailable. 588 In 
the Jervelwind (Whirlwind), a Dutch language newspaper published in 
London and scattered at irregular intervals by the Royal Air Force in 
Holland, there had appeared an aooount of the address. A summary o£ 
the speech had also appeared in the London nekly, Vrij Nederland, 
which reached Holland. The two versions did not agree. .Ainsterdam 
naturally asked London for an authentic text of Her Majesty's remarkao 
589 No reply was received to this inquiry, either. 
On oooasion the SWiss Route in Amsterdam received requests from 
the London Government for speoifio information which had been given to 
the Belgians in London, transmitted through a clandestine radio oirouit 
to Belgi urn, and then forwarded through the Dutch oorrtaots of a Belgian 
587Ibido 
588This was before the period when any systematic effort was 
made to prepare diotaphone recordings of Radio Orange broadcasts. 
589slotemaker de Bruine, loo. cit., 36610. 
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underground organization to Amsterdam. During the entire period in 
question the Swiss Route was in good working order in both directions. 
Whatever motivated London to aot in suoh a devious fashion was beyond 
the comprehension of anyone in Amsterdam.590 
All told, Amsterdam did receive via the Swiss Route some 700 sep-
arate items. While some of these did originate in London, including 
regular shipnents of the London Vri.1 Nederlam, much of what Holland 
received had oot been collected or dispatched by London at all but was 
the result of the patient, untiring efforts of Dr. Visser •t Hoo1'to 
Many articles appearing in Swiss papers and magaaines were microfilmed 
and sent to Holland, as were i terns originating in other countries and 
available in Switserland.591 
In Geneva Dr. Vi sssr •t HDoi't was having his own, similar troubles 
with London. As long as Mr. Lovink, with whom Dr. Visser •t HDoft had 
made the agreement setting up the SWiss Routs, remained as Secretary-
General of the War Conduct Department, Dr. Visser •t HDoft found that 
when reports were sent to London he received in response an answer, 
giving the reactions of the London Government. This was particularly 
useful in that it gave Dr. Visser •t Hooft a clearer idea of What types 
of material London desired. Once Mr• Lovink was sent off to China, 
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as Dutch .Ambassador, much less was forthcoming from London. This event, 
which coincided with the Ge~an occupation of Vichy France, also marked 
a considerable slowing down of the courier route, which had operated 
through Vichy territory as much as possible.592 
Dr. Visser •t Hoeft, who aoonwas in receipt of numerous complaints 
seoibid., 36611. 59lrbid., 36610. 
592visser •t Hooft, loc. cit., 37114. 
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from Holland about London's wa.yward silence, felt that the London Govern-
ment may have sometimes spoken or behaved as though it had not received 
materl. al forwarded to because the initial processing of Swiss Route 
reports in London was conducted by the military. persons who might not 
grasp the true signifioanoe of non~ilitary material, and thus fail to 
forwa.rd it to the appropriate agency. Dr. Visser •t Hooft observed 
that the (Dutoh) Intelligence Bureau sent oomnn.mioations to the occu-
pied territory that were in complete conflict with material which the 
Fatherland Committee had sent via the Swiss Route• and 'llhich, indubitably, 
had reached London. under the oirollllstanoea, this seemed all the more 
reason to add a commentary to forwa.rded material.593 
In the meantime a storm of formidable proportions was brewing in 
Amsterdam. By 1943 the Dutch terminus of the Swiss Route had more or 
less deoided to form a "political commission" • which would lay special 
stress on ideological problems in the analysis of material to be forwarded 
via the SWiu Route. The body. to be oompoaed of Slotemaker de Bruine. 
van Randwijk, Stufkens, Cramer, and van Namen, all of whom were markedly 
liberal or even socialistic in outlook. would give political or ideol-
ogical material more intensive attention. To this suggestion Miss Kohl-
brugge dissented most vigorously. A "commission" had not been authorized 
for the Dutch terminus of the Route, muoh less a "political" commission. 
If there must be a political body it should at least include represant-
atives of the Anti-Revolutionary, Christian Historical, and Catholic 
parties. Miss Kohlbrugge was told that the oommiasion would forwa.rd 
Catholic and Anti-Revolutionary material. that it made no difference to 
593Ibid •• 37175. 
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those concerned that material sent on did not agree with their own partic-
ular points of vi~. She protested that the persons in question did not 
"outrank" her, that the London aovernnerrt had intended that the Swiss 
Route £unction only as a ,.mail box", and that since members of the Oomm• 
ission were socialistically inclined, the Route would be changed so that 
the London Governnerrt would be •informed" from a socialist point of vi~. 
She contacted Dro Visser •t Hoeft through a Dro Koopmana, who wrote 
Geneva telling of the projected changes. Apparently Dr. Visser •t Hoof't 
refused to take sides, so that Kiaa Kohlbrugge, outnumbered, was over• 
ridden. Shortly thereafter she departed the Swiss Route, having earlier 
given up her work with Vri1 Nederland in order to devote full time to the 
Route.594 
The political commission, llil.ioh did come into being, had a f~ res-
ervations about Miss Kohlbruggeo They did not ask her to serve on the 
Oolllllission itself as it was felt that her background information was in-
sufficient for the tasko Moreover, they were wary of her close ties with 
the Order Service, not because of any alleged shortcomings of the latter 
organization in a political sense, but because the Service, in their view, 
had had a very bad record of losses to the German security police. Thus 
it was felt that a~ fresh information which reached the service, via 
Miss Kohlbrugge or any other means, could all too likely find its way 
into German hands, even though the Order Service had the best will in the 
world.595 
That the political dommission made a determined effort to forward 
59~ohlbrugge, loco cit., 42245. 
595N. Stufkens, March 15, 1949, 45158. 
material of every ideological complexion was repeatedly stated by its 
members.596 
After Miss Kohl brugge departed the Swiss Route she took her feud 
with the Amsterdam management of the organization to Colonel Six of 
the Order Service, who, not unexpectedly, agreed. It was decided by 
Miss Kohlbrugge and Colonel Six that several entire "cshipnents"' of the 
Swiss Route 'lll:)uld be monitored, so that it might be determined if items 
were being misused or withheld. This they were able to accomplish by 
getting the photographer Who prepared the Swiss Route microfilms in Am-
sterdam, Mr. Prins, to prepare an extra copy of each for Kohlbrugge and 
associates. M'iss Kohlbrugge•s point of view was that it was imperative 
that the "changed" nature of the Swiss Route become known in London 
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as speedily as possible.597 A first attempt was made to send this infer-
mation to London with the cooperation of an agent of the Intelligence 
Bureau, Mr. G. A. van Borssum Buisman, who was working with the Order 
Service's intelligence organization and was soon to return to England. 
At the time he accepted uncritically the thesis that the Amsterdam end 
of possibly the Geneva office of the Route withheld items of importance 
destined for London. Upon reflection, and he had more than ample time 
for reflection, since the Gestapo had arrested him before he was able to 
return to England, it seemed to him that the evidence of the intercepted 
microfilms had not really substantiated this allegation. One item had 
' 
been returned from Geneva, to be sure, but with a notation that it con-
596rbid., also: Slotemaker de Bruine, loa. cit., 36543. 
597KOhlbrugge, loa. cit., 42287. 
flicted with an earlier report.598 
Someone ebe was soon to have ample time for reflection, in this 
instance Miss Kohlbrugge, who tried to make the journey to England, 
carrying with her a choice selection of the purloined microfilm. Miss 
Kohlbrugge, equipped with a defective and forged identity card, was 
arrested by the Gestapo, specifically on the train going from Tilburg 
to Amsterdam~ on or about April 3, 1944. As she saw the Gestapo agent 
approach she placed the roll of microfilm in the handbag of the woman 
seated next to her in the train, a total stranger, and hoped for the 
best. It was her good fortune that her action was not observed and 
that the woman turned out to be trustworthy. Thus it was that Miss 
Kohlbrugge was simply arrested for having forged identity papers, a far 
lees serious charge than that of espionage. She was, after a time, re-
leased. She was later told by associates that the woman to whom she 
had given the microfilm had close contacts with Vrij Nederland and was 
thus able to see that the film was kept from the hands of una.uthoriz.ed 
persons.599 
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M it turned out, Miss Kohlbrugge's informants were badly informed. 
Weeks; after her arrest Mr. J. le Poole, active in underground wrk and 
associated with the SWiss Route, was a;pproached bj' a Ur. Theo Verhaar 
of Amsterdam who said, "Relatives of mine have given me a little match-
box with microfilms, which they received from a third party ••• ! don't 
know if it is of any importance but take a look.". Mr. le Poole did 
take a look and discovered, to his amazement, that he had been given 
598G. A. van Borssum Buisman, June 9, 1949~ 57473. 
599Kohlbrugge, loc. cit. 
a SWiss Route shipment of some months before. The organization had, 
II S 1 J.<'! 600 in his words, ••• prung a ea . •· 
It had seemed to Colonel Six that a reading of the oopied dia-
patches did not Bupport the view that political censorship was involved, 
although some items given to the SWiss Route in Amsterdam for forward-
ing might have been withheld. The correspondence between l!r. Slota-
maker de Bruine, in Amsterdam, and Dr. Visser •t Hooft indicated that 
there was definitely a bias involved. Colonel Six said that all he 
had attempted to do was to inform U>ndon of the changes in the mechan-
ism of the SWiss Route, i.e., the creation of the political commission 
in Amsterdam, and of its probable effect, and let London decide for it-
self.601 
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Cslonel Six did approve of Amsterdam adding a commentary to material 
forwarded, he would readily agree that this was necessary. As an ex-
ample of material withheld by the Swiss Route in Amsterdam he offered 
a report prepared by persons associated with the clandestine press and 
quoted a letter from Hr. Slotemaker de Bruine to Dr. Visser •t Hooft, 
saying that the item in question had been withheld as it was of "too 
little importance"•602 
Apparently some items of a sufficiently minor or obscure charac-
ter were not forwarded by Amsterdam. A report on the importation of 
draught horses in the North Veluwe district was withheld as being of no 
conceivable interest to the U>ndon Government. The author of the report 
600J. le Poole, June 7, 1949, 56856. 
60lp. J. Six, March 10,. 1949, 44935. 602~ •• 44952-44957. 
apparently agreed that it need not be sent to London.603 
The disasters befalling Miss Kohlbrugge and Mr. van Borssum 
Buisman apparently did nothing to deter Colonel Six. His espionage 
conducted against the SWiss Route continued until about April 20, 
1944.604 Mr. van Namen of the poli ti oal commies ion believes that the 
es-pionage conducted by Colonel Six and !.!iss Kohlbrugge upon the Swiss 
Route Vlll.s discovered before Miss Kohlbrugge's arrest.605 
Some of the Order Service oomplaints about the SWiss Route sub-
sequently did reach London, enough ao that the head of the Intelli-
gence Bureau, Dr. Somer, became temporarily convinced that'lhe SWiss 
Route was withholding material, specifically military reports sent by 
the Order Service. This view Dr. Somer expressed in a letter to the 
Minister-President, Dr. Gerbrandy, dated August 12, 1944.606 
In a flood of ensuing correspondence Dr. Visser •t Hooft ex-
plained that some material that might appear to have been ''withheld" 
from the microfilm traffic consisted of letters exchanged with Mr. 
Slotemaker de Bruine pertinent to the operation of the Route itself and 
of no other importance, and that no single item of Order Servioe ori-
gin had ever been withheld, abridged, edited, or anything of the sort. 
He further explained that when the Swiss Route added a commentary, aa 
it often did to for'Wil.rded items, it was clearly labelled as such. It 
-s a riddle to Dr. Viaser •t Hcioft why any official fuss should have 
been made of his not forwarding to London what were essentially inter-
603N. Stufkena, l.!ar ch 15, 1949, 45158 .. 
604Randwijk, loc. cit., 54421. 
606ErlQ, IVa, appendix, lx. 
605Namen, loc .. cit., 52234. 
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office memoranda exchanged between Mr. Slotemaker de Bruine and him-
self.607 
On October 29, 1945, after the liberation of the Netherlands, Dr. 
Somer wrote the Dutch Minister of War. stating that he had finally 
oome to realize that any material withheld by Dr. Visser •t Hcoft oon-
sisted solely of correspondence between Visser •t Hooft and the Jmster-
dam terminus of the Swiss Route. 608 
The Swedish Route 
To some extent the ZWeedse Weg ("Swedish Route"), oame into being 
as a result of the apparent shortcomings of Radio Orange. The Ger-
mans had permitted Dutch coastal shipping to continue to travel be-
tween the Dutch port of Delfzijl and other points, particularly Sweden 
and Finland, This traffic was in the German interest. and Delfzijl 
offered a particularly attractive route· in terms of effioienoy, link-
ing the Law Countries and parts of Germany with several Swedish ports. 
A Delfzijl physician, Dr. A. L. Oosterhuis, had earlier used this con-
tinuing link with a neutral country to smuggle persons out of Holland, 
Sometime in the spring of 1942 he listened with a friend to Radio 
609 Orange and observed, ", •• The nonsense they peddled.,." Aooord-
ingly, he decided to try to use hh contaot with Sweden as a route 
for intelligence information. in order that London in general and 
Radio OraJl!;e in particular might be better informed, This did not 
seem to be a difficult thing to do. As a~ port inspector or customs 
official will testify the average merchant vessel comes well equipped 
607Ibid. 608rbid., lx:vi. 
609aosterhuis, loa. oit., 36867ff. 
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with place$ of concealment. In this contest the ship's officers and 
men have a signal advantage in that they are likely to know the craft 
far better than most inspecting officials. Thus it was that Dr. Oos-
terhuis came in contact with the Netherlands Consul-General in Stock-
holm, Mr. Ao M. de Jong. Mr. de Jong had just established an intelli-
gence contact with London. This had come about as a by-product of a 
journey by de Jong to London in May, 1942. His principal mission had 
to do with numbers of Dutch refugee$ then resident in Sweden. I£ pos-
sible he would like to arrange for the transportation of these persons 
to England. During his visit in London Y.r. de Jong was approached by 
Colonel Rabagliatti of the British Secret Intelligence Service, who 
wcndered if de Jong wculd be willing to help in gathering reports rela-
ting to oonditions in the occupied territory. lfll'• de Jong was willing, 
end a Mr. van Bylandt of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
sat in on some of the talks so that the London Government was appraised 
or the matter. It was agreed that Colonel Rabagliatti would forward 
to the London Government all reports received in the oonneotion.610 
Accordingly, some time in June of 1942, the new service came into 
being. Dr. Oosterhuis collected oopies of underground newspapers, 
intelligence reports gathered by several private intelligence organ-
izations, including the Dutch tuctor et Emerge group and the Belgian 
Wim organization. WShipments~ from these two organizations to be for-
warded to stockholm were delivered to Dr. Oosterhuis in the form of 
microfilm. This was the exception rather than the rule. Dr. Ooster-
huilt himself did not have facilities to prepere microfilm. Most of 
6lOA. M. de Jong, March 3, 1949, 43945. 
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the material was thus sent in the form of documents, sometimes quite 
sizable bundles of them. These packages were given to the captains of 
the coastwise ships fer ocncealment and delivery.6ll 
Although discovery of these relatively bulky shipments would seem 
to have been a real hazard, as far as this writer can determine no such 
event did occur. The efforts of Dr. Oosterhuis were eventually thwarted 
by the Gestapo, as will be seen, but not as the re•ult of the discovery 
of a concealed package or packages. 
Dr. Oosterhuis also forwarded to SWeden for shipment to England 
replacement parts for the engines of Dutch vessels which had departed 
Holland and were then operating in England as coastwise shipping, 
either fishing or hauling freight. Their large numbers meant that they 
played a vital role in the British economy. ~pares"' of one sort or 
another were often unavailable in Britain.612 
Dr. Oosterhuis had available for his use the services of a clan-
destine transmitter which was operated by a Mr. Koning, also of 
Delfzijl, a member of the Merchant Marine Academy of that city. The 
station, which was in contact by radio telegraph with London, was 
used to transmit intelligence reports that were of an urgent nature~ 
including such things as German troop movements or the location of 
ships carrying ammunition.613 
Dr. Oosterhuis employed the regular sea route to warn London of 
the arrests, in April of 1943, of members of the National Colll!littee. 
Included in this warning was a statement of the fact that the National 
Committee had been betrayed by the provocateur Anton van der Waals, 
6lloosterhuis, loa. cit •• 36867. 6l2Ibid. 613Ibid. 
- -
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together with a description of van der Waals and a reminder that he 
had been able to "legitimate"' his activities by causing authentica-
ting messages to be transmitted over Radio Orange.614 
The clandestine radio station brought word of the coming arrival 
from London of the agent of the Dutch Intelligence Bureau, Mr. G. A. 
van Bor~sum Bui.man, who was to establish contact between the Intelli-
genoa Bureau and the Order Service. Mr. van Borssum Buisman did 
arrive and was introduced to the Order Service by Dr. Oosterhuia.615 
In stockholm Consul-General de Jong received and forwarded the 
SWedish Route shipments. He also regularly interviewed the captains 
and arews of Dutch vessels calling at Swedish ports, to gain from them 
new information on conditions in the occupied territory. Questions 
from London were regularly sent back to Dr. Oosterhuis in the inevi-
table hidden paokages.616 Included were instructions for the con-
struotion and operation of another clandestine radio transmitter, 
complete with a transmission schedule and two new codes, for use with 
the new station.617 
The new transmitter W&S" assembled, but Mr. !l. Vader and Mr. H. 
Deinum, who were charged with its operation, were unable to establish 
contact with England awing to technical difficulties.618 
Early in 1943 Consul-General de Jong made a second trip to London. 
614Ibid. 
615Ibid. The writer is unable to determine which agency in 
London was in contact with the Koning transmitter, &1 though he 
believes it to have been the (Dutch) Intelligence Bureau. 
616A. M. de Jong. loa. cit., 43945ff. 617Ibid. 
618!.!. Vader, May 5, 194'9,. 49212. 
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There he was told that he would now receive instructions directly 
from the 1'I'8W Dutoh Intelligence Bureau, which had oome into being in 
November, 1942, after his first trip. He was introduced to t~jor 
Broekman, in charge of the Intelligence Bureau.619 
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Consul-General de Jong had not gotten along too well with Colonel 
Rabagliatti of the British Secret Intelligence Service and he did not 
get along much better with Major Broekmlln. The two'"'l'l'&y traffic contin-
ued, with bicycle tires • coffee • flour • sugar, and cognac being included 
in some of the shipments destined for Holland.620 
In JUly of 1943 Major Broekman, who was in poor health, resigned 
from his position as head of the Intelligence Bureau and was succeeded 
by Dr. J. :M. Somer. Dr. Somer soon came to feel that all was not well 
in Stockholm and travelled there to discuss matters with Consul-General 
de Jong. While feeling that Consul-General de Jong had done valuable 
pioneer work in establishir~ an important link with the occupied terri-
tory Dr. Somer had several specific complaints about Mr. de Jong's 
methods. The Intelligence Bureau had sent to Stockholm for forward• 
ing to Dr. Oosterhuis several rolls of microfilm. It was expected 
that Mr. de Jong would forward the actual films. Instead he had an 
enlarged oopy made of each frame of film and forwarded, therefore, 
a large bundle of the resulting paper prints. Since Stcckholm was 
a forwarding point for the swiss Route, and one in which the micro-
films concealed in books consigned to a SWediSh address were sometimes 
re-processed, de Jong had ready access to facilities enabling him to 
619.a.. M. de Jong, leo. cit. 
62°Ibid. 
do this·.62l 
Consul-General de Jong had made the enlarged prints, he told Dr. 
Somer. beoause Dr. Oosterhuitt lacked facilities with which to process 
microfilm. De Jong felt that he had no authority to order Dr. Ooster-
huis to establish such facilities-.622 
Dr. Smner disagreed with de J'ong•s unwillingness to use micro-
film. De Jong seemed to have a passion for sending great packets of 
paper to HOlland, on which the message was written in "huge"' letters.623 
Then there was the episode of the Order of Orange Nassau. Dr. 
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Oosterhuitt had reported to de Jong that further military espionage re-
ports-, which he had forwarded from a man in the Dutch Province of Fries-
land, would not be forthcoming, as the mn in question, 1/ll'. van Straten, 
'Was dying of cancer. London authorized the awarding to Mr. van Straten 
of the Order of Orange Nassau, a decision which it announced both by 
re.dio to Dr. Oolterhuis and, later, through Consul-General de Jong. 
De Jong sent to Dr. Oosterhuis a miniature Order to be given to Mr. van 
straten personally. This was delivered.624 Dr. Somer dittapproved of 
this action since he regarded the security risks involved as excessive. 
Awarding the Order would create a favorable impression in Friesland, 
to be sure. but this was also the sort of thing people were too likely 
to talk about.625 
On July 23, 1943. German security police arrested Dr. Oosterhuis 
62I.r. M. Somer, J\me 16, 1948,. 14938. 
622A• M. de Jong, loc. cit., 43992. 
623J. M. S(J)lller, February 28, 1960., 76398. 
624eosterhuis., loc. cit. 625somer, loc. cit. 
and several of his associates. They had been betrayed by the captain 
of one of the vessels which had helped them with the SWedish Route, 
a Mr. F. J. M. Aben. Both Dr. Oosterhuis and Consul-C.eneral de Jong 
had known that, long before the war, Captain Aben had been a member 
of the Dutch Nazi Party, but both felt this to be a thing of the past 
and that he -s basically reliable. He had been willing to take con-
siderable risks and seemed to be able to accomplish anything 9 Both 
had had at least momentary doubts about his loyalty but one had to take 
some calculated risks, under the ciroumstances.626 
The activities of the SWedish Route continued for a time at least. 
Ml'. D. Boerema took over the work of assembling material to be for-
~ded to stockholm, while contact with ship captains was reBstab-
lished by Mr. P. Veninga, who -s assisted by a Mr. Hammingh.627 
In September, 1943, Dr. Somer relieved Consul-General de Jong 
of his intelligence duties. This work: was taken over by two others, 
Mr. Lindenburg am Mr. Gevers Deynoot, with de Jong remaining in his 
old post as Consul-General.628 
There followed an episode about which there is some disagreement. 
What is agreed is that between September 20 and October 5, 1943, de 
Jong, acting in his capacity as Netherlands Consul-General, interned 
some four Dutch coastwise vessels in Swedish ports, together with 
their crews. This occasioned a sharp response from l.!ro Lindenburg, 
who promptly telegraphed London, expressing the fear that further 
626eosterhuis, loc. cit., 36945. 
627E. A. c. Meijlink, June 2, 1949, 56489ff. 
628somer, loo. cit., 76415. 
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activity of this sort might sever the intelligence contacts operating 
through such maritime traffic. De Jong was subsequently forbidden by 
the Minister of Trade, Agriculture, and Shipping to engage in further 
internmenta.629 
This action very nearly put an end to the intelligence traffic 
of the Swedish Route. The Germans, understaniably enough, 11ere re-
luctant to allow Dutch vessels to travel to Sweden when they faced 
possible internment. German vessels continued to make the journey, 
and since they often had at least partly Dutch crewa some intelli-
gence information was smuggled out. It has been estimated, however, 
that fully 98% of such Dutch crew members carried no intelligence 
information.630 
The all important question remained, of course, one of motiva-
tion. Why did Consul-General de Jong intern the vessels? Why did 
he choose this particular time for their internment? 
The most immediate conclusion, not necessarily correct, is that, 
irritated at having been relieved of his intelligence duties, he de-
cided to retaliate by closing the Swedish Route. This conclusion has 
been denied most vehemently by Mr. de Jong, wr.o had had the matter of 
internment under advisement for several years and felt that the time 
for ~ch action had finally arrived.631 
Since Dr. Oosterhuis and his immediate associates had been 
arrested in late July of 1943 it was obvious to Mr. de Jong that the 
629
.1. !l. de Jong, loo. cit., 440Z6t'fo 
630w. t. c. Lindenburg, December 7• 1948, 36970. 
631A. M. de Jong, loc. cit., 44026. 
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Germans were well aware of the existence of the Swedish Route. Cap-
tain Aben, in betraying Oosterhuis, had delivered to the Germans a 
packet of intelligence materials destined fer Stockholm. This being 
the case, de Jcng reasoned, the internment of some of the coastwise 
vessels was necessary to protect the captains who had participated in 
this work from German reprisals. Sinoe Swedish vessels also traded 
with German-occupied Holland de Jong hoped that the Route might be 
maintained by their agency. This never came to pass, however.632 
In 1942, apparently, the captains of several of the vessels con-
cerned had formed a deputation and approached de Jong with the suggest-
ion that he might intern their vessels. There seemed worse places to 
spend the war than Sweden. They were told by Consul-General de Jong 
that, while he did indeed possess the authority from the London Govern-
ment to intern Dutoh vessels, he felt the value of the Swedish Route 
to exceed any advantage accruing to the Germans from the trade in 
which they were engaged.633 
There is some evidence available to indicate that 1~. de Jong 
might have had other valid reasons for refusing to intern the vessels 
in an earlier period and then decide to intern them subsequently. 
For such an internment to be effective the co8peration of Swedish port 
and coast patrol officials was clearly necessary. It appears that 
Swedish officials were sounded out on several occasions before Ootober, 
1943, about the possibility of internment, and their response was neg-
ative, since they were under incessant pressure from the Germans. 
Reasonably reliable evidence suggests that the fall of 1943 was about 
632Ibid. 633Lindenburg, loo. cit., 37030ff. 
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the time at whioh the SWedish authorities in question became convinced 
that Germany V«>uld lose the war and that German pressure and threats 
could be paid less heed.634 
Apparently the Germans had removed some Dutch coastal vessels 
from Holland to Norway where they were undergoing conversion for serv-
ice as minemweepers, a fact of which Consul-General de Jong was 
aware.635 
The Central Intsllige.noe Service 
Before the German invasion ot the Netherlands in May, 1940, 
Dutch intelligence services, as much as those of a military character 
as were active, existed under Section G.S. III of the Dutch General 
Statt. The 110rk of this organization did nat, apparently, include 
plans for the maintenance of aoi!Bilunioations with a possible exiled 
regime, should Holland be occupied by one or another of the belliger-
ents in an armed conflict. 
In 1939, the month is uncertain, Mr. L. H. N. Bosch Ridder van 
Rosenthal, the Royal Commissioner for the Province of Utrecht, was 
visiting in Portugal and held personal conversations with an American 
military attache whom he had met aocially. The American expressed 
the opinion that a war was in the offing, and that on this occasion 
the Netherlands would be occupied by Gel'IJaii forces. He told Mr. 
Bosch Ridder van Rosenthal that the .Ulies in World War I had had very 
great trouble establishing intelligence contact with German-occupied 
Belgium as there were no pre-existing contacts upon which they could 
build. He urged the Hollander to use his influence to try to get the 
634p;. H. Schuur, SeptEII!lber 9, 1949, 667BB. 635Ibid. 
Netherlands Gover:aneo.t to set up some sort of system which could be used 
for communications with British or American intelligence agencies should 
future need arise.636 
Mr. Bosch Ridder van Rosenthal himself felt that Holland was likely 
to be engulfed in the prospective conflagration, so on his return to the 
Netherlands he established oontaot with the head of G.S. III, Major-
General J. W. van Oorschot, telling him of what the American military 
attache had reoammended.637 
Neither General van Oorschot nor his colleagues 1n G.S. III made 
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any such advance effort to provide for a nucleus of possible agents, to 
equip them with radio transmitters, or anything of the sort. They did 
not, as General van Oorschot remembers it, even think about such a possi-
bility. To even consider it, let alone recommend such a course of action, 
lllluld have been futile. Such action would have conflicted with Holland's 
policy of studied neutrality, or so the Government would have argued.638 
General van Oorschot's one activity involving a departure from strict 
neutrality turned out rather badly, although through no fault of his own. 
This was the so-called Venlo incident. 
In brief, in October of 1939, British intelligence officers came into 
contact with officers of the Ge:nnan General Staff who had their doubts 
about the ability of Germany to wage a successful war. Captain s. Payne 
Best, of the British Secret Intelligence Service, arranged for meetings 
to be held with representatives of the German group in Holland at Venlo, 
near the German border. The contact had come into being with the help of 
6~osenthal, loa. cit., 35926. 637Ibid. 
638J. W. van Oorschot, July 6, 1949, 59777 • 
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a German refugee resident in Holland, a Dr. Franz Fischer. Although 
Holland v1as neutral the arrangement of such meetings was not as simple as 
one would suppose. The Dutch Army was deployed along the entire German 
border as a precautionary measure • While the frontier was open ll!.llllerous 
Dutch road blocks and military oheck points had been established. 
Clearly the oo8peration of Dutoh authorities was going to be required. 
Captain Payne Best, together with Major R • H. Stevens, a British military 
attache at the Hague, approached General van Oorschot with his problem. 
General van Oorschot agreed to lend his co8peration to this activity, and 
detached one of his officers, a Lieutenant Klop, who was given authority 
to pass through the Dutch military cordon and assist the Germans to enter 
Holland. Arrangements were completed and several meetings between the 
Germans and the British were held. The British learned of extensive dis-
satisfaction within the German officer corps and they were told of a plan 
llhereby a junta of officers 11\3uld take Hitler prisoner, form a substitute 
governnent, and negotiate an "honorable" peace treaty with Great Britain 
and France. unfortunately for nearly all concerned the Gestapo became 
aware of the negotiations, penetrated the German organization, and sub-
stituted its own negotiator, in the person of Walter Schellenberg, for 
the talks. On November 9, 1939, German security forces crossed just over 
the frontier and on Dutch soil arrested (or kidnapped} Messrs. Best, 
stevens, Klop, and Lemmens, their Dutch chauffeur. All were carted off 
to jail in Germany where they spent the duration of the war, with the 
exception of Lieutenant Klop, who 'MIS wounded in an exchange of gunfire 
with the Germans and died within a few hours.639 
639s. Payne Best, from a B.B.C. radio broadcast of 19491 quoted in: 
ENQ, IIa, appendix, lxxxviiio 
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Following the Venlo incident the Netherlands Government promptly 
disowned General van Oorschot's action. He was removed from his command 
as head of G.S. III. He was replaced by J. F. M. van de Plassche, who had 
been head of the foreign section of G.S. III. Both General van Oorschot 
and van de Plassche were present in London When the Dutch government-in-
exile came into being. General van Oorschot, although still under some-
thing of a cloud as the result of the Venlo incident, was placed in charge 
of the Dutch military mission Which was sent to London at the start of 
the German invasion of the Netherlands. Van de Plassche continued to 
preside over G.S. III.640 
A Royal Decree of July 19, 1940, set up the Centrale Inliohtingen-
dienst ("Central Intelligence Service"'). The organization, which was to 
be given control over the intelligence activities of the Ministries of 
Justice, Defense, and Foreign Affairs, was made responsible to the Min-
ister of Justice. At its head the Decree placed a counsellor of the 
Ministry of Justice, Mr. F. van •t sant, who was elevated to a rank 
"corresponding to that of ll.ajor General". 641 
Viewed from various points of view the e.ppoin'bnent of Mr. van •t 
Sent was a strange one. He was a person of undoubted ability and those 
who worked with him had a high regard for his skill. At the same time 
there would appear to have been others with more experience. Mr. van 
•t Sant came to England as the head of Queen Wilhelmina •s personal 
security force. 642 He had had earlier eontact in World War I with the 
British Secret Intelligence Service. There were those who felt that Mr. 
640A. Q. H. Dijxhoorn, July 23, 1948, 19986. 
641E~. IVa, appendix, v. 
642oranje-Nassouw, loa. cit., 274. 
van •t Sant was particularly well aui ted for the position in that 
these previous contacts should make harmonious coBperation with the 
643 British more likely. 
Neither General van Oorschot nor van de Plassche was consulted or 
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employed in the work of the Central Intelligence Service. The writer has 
yet to encounter an entirely satisfactory explanation as to why General 
van Oorschot was not entrusted with at least some of the responsibility 
entailed in the Central Intelligence Service, if not its command. From 
the creation of that body the work of G.B. III was effectively suspended, 
with its officers performing other taska.644 
The reason most frequently offered for General van Oorschot's being 
passed over was, needless to say, the Venlo incident. That this may have 
been an indiscretion, at least in view of the Dutch posture of neutrality, 
is not to be doubted. By the same token one might have supposed that an 
ex post facto appraisal of the Venlc incident, in the summer of 1940, 
might have caused someone to realize that General van Oorschot had had a 
clearer view of Holland' a probable future with her Nazi neighbor than that 
held by the Dutch Government of the time. The head of an intelligence 
organization is not likely to be in the public view, particularly in war 
time, so there could have been no question of his selection being bad 
from a publicity point of view. At this point one did not need to worry 
about possible offense to the Germans. 
While there were those Who found General van Oorschot "too elderly" 
in 1940 (he was sixty-five), it is interesting to note that, four years 
643F. van •t sant, l'ovember 3, 1948, 31880. 
644oijxhoorn, leo. cit., 20028. 
later, General van Oorschot was not considered too old to be placed in 
charge of the Bureau Biizondere Opdraohten ("Special Service Bureautt), a 
Dutch sabotage agency entrusted with tasks which at the time were much 
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more extensive and emoting than the initial requirements of the Central 
Intelligence Service in 1940.645 Nor was there a~ serious suggestion 
that the British had any objection to General van Oorschot. That the Venlo 
affair had ended in disaster was not ascribed to General van Oorschot, 
indeed Payne Best quite candidly argued that the fact that he and Stevens 
had failed to recognize the Gestapo agents provocateur for what they were 
had resulted in the debaole.646 
There was no accord in London on the subject of the Central Intelli• 
gence Service. The Minister of Justice, Mr. Dijxhoorn, wished that the 
"WOrk of G.S. In simply be continued and expanded. Messrs. van Oorschot, 
van de Plassche, and Major c. M. Olifiers, also of G.S. III and in London, 
had the required experience, why not let them continue? As far as ur. 
Dijxhoorn was concerned Mr. van •t Sant had no particularly visible qual-
ifications as the head of an intelligence organisation. Mr. van •t Sant 
had become head of Queen Wilhelmina •a bodyguard only at the time of the 
German invasion--before that he had been Police Commissioner of the Hague. 
Possibly Mr. van •t Sant might have some uses in arranging the selection 
of agents in oo8peration with the British, Dijxhoorn was willing to concede 
645J. T. Furstner, July 30, 1948, 23597. 
646Payne Best, leo. cit. The reader is advised that no detailed 
British documentation on specific aspects of joint Dutch-British 
intelligence activities is available. British subjects involved are 
usually barred by the Official Secrets• Act from relating events or 
their own knowledge. Thus the writer has had to rely on Dutch sources 
for such information and acknowledges that they may be incomplete. 
as much. Dijxhoorn suspected that Mr. ve.n •t Se.nt, with little experi-
ence with government or politics, would have a fearful job simply find-
ing his way around the three Dutch ministries concerned. 647 
The Central Intelligence Service, as might be imagined, was charged 
primarily with acquiring information concerning the Ge~e.n-oooupied ter-
ritory and establishing and maintaining contact with Holland through the 
use of agents employing rad1o.648 
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Since no agents had been left behind in Holland some had to be sent. 
The first of these might conceivably have been Mr. van •t Sa:rrt himself, 
since he originally had the courageous plan of being parachuted into 
the garden of hia friend Y.r. Menten, e. banker residing at lfa~ond. Mr. 
van •t Sant was deterred from this proposed operation as it was pointed 
out that the precision of night parachuting was not great and one was 
extraordinarily lucky to actually land a~here in the vicinity of a 
desired spot. It was further pointed out that Warmond and environs 
consisted largely of water and that better dropping sites might be 
found in the northern provinces. 649 
Before the sunmer of 1940 had came to an end the first agent of 
the Dutch Central Intelligence Service had been successfully para-
chuted into the Netherlands. L. A. R. J. van Eamel was parachuted 
during the night of August 28, 1940.650 
Van Hamel's background and training, as things turned out, set a 
pattern for future operations. He was, as were nearly all Dutch agents 
dispatched by both the British and various London Government agenoies, a 
647 . 648 Dljxhoorn, loc. cit., 19989. Sant, loco cit., 61644ff. 
64'9H. F. L. K. van Vredenburch, January 18, 1950, 73120. 
650 P~ J. Six, March 10, 1949, 44787. 
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Dutch subjeot.651 Van Hamel was trained in espionage techniques in a 
special British school, the British supplied him with a code, a radio 
transmitter, and training in its use. The messages which he sent to 
England, after his arrival in Holland, were received at a British station 
and then passed on to the Dutch Central Intelligence Service. "Traffic" 
from the Dutch destined for van Hamel took the reverse route. It was 
sent at the appointed hour when the British station, which communicated 
with scores of agents in a number of enemy-occupied countries, had a 
schedule with van Hamel. Thh was in no way regarded as unfair or un-
reasonable by the Dutch. They were on British soil, after all, and it was 
understood by both parties from the start that radio communication with 
the continent 1rould have to be ohameled through the agency of the host 
power.652 
Van Hamel had been given as a mission the task of setting up a series 
of espionage centers, each independent, and each operated in conjunction 
with a radio transmitter which would carry the data thus collected to 
London. They were to collect material primarily of a military nature.653 
It was hoped that it might be possible to return van Hamel to England, 
where, it was expected, his experience 1rould enable him to play a leading 
role in the Central Intelligence Service.654 
Agent van Hamel was to be all too typical in yet another sense: He 
was captured Within a very ffiW weeks of his arrival, on October 14, 19401 
651otto M. Wiedemann, a Bureau Inliohtipgen agent sent out on the 
night of September 19-20, 1943, was a British subject of Dutch origin. 
652F. van •t Sant, July 27, 1949, 61677ff. 653P. J. Six, loa. cit. 
65~. van •t Sant, November 3, 1948, 31972. 
to be exact.655 However this is not to say that his mission was a fail-
ure. His activity in the brief period given to him was extensive and 
he left behind at the time of his arrest a large espionage apparatus 
which was to aid the Allied cause and plague the Germans for many months 
to come, and, indirectly, for the duration of the war. 
Most later agents were dropped with radio operators. The agent 
would gather information, code it, and the radio operator would then 
contact London and transmit the data thus prepared. Some radio opera-
tors were also supplied with their 01111 separate codes. Van Hamel, 
dropped alone, was his own radio operator. While hastily trained in 
the technique of transmitting Morae oode. 656 van Hamel had llO knowl-
edge of the inner workings of radio. On his arrival he found his set 
inoperative. He enlisted the assistance of Mr. J. C. A. van den Hout, 
who had been a radiotelegraphiat 1n the Dutch Army, and was able to 
get the transmitter on the air and contact London before the end of 
August. Military reports were tre.nsmi tted to London, w1 th contacts 
occurring two or three times daily on oooe.sion.657 
Van den Rout was provided w1 th e. copy of van Hamel's code and 
continued to remain in contact with !Dndon after the arrest of van 
Hamel. Soon after van Hamel was arrested, van den hout took a second 
transmitter, which he had constructed, to the Hague and left it with 
655From a dossier collected by the Netherlands Ministry of 
Justice on the arrest of van Hamel, in: E~, IVa, 47-48. 
656nMorse" is the popular designation for the dots and dashes used 
in telegraphic code, but actually the dot-dash system used in radio for 
many years is not the original system of Morse but the so-called inter-
national code, better adapted for radiotelegraphy than true Morse. 
657J. c. A. van den Hout, May 25, 1949, 54263ffo 
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lfll'o A. J. J. Buys, so that Buys could help continue the 110rk. This 
turned out to have been a wise precaution as van den Hout was arrested 
by the Gestapo on october 21, 1940, a week after van Hamel.658 
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Mr. Buys, in the meantime, continued to maintain contact with Eng-
land. Buys' transmitter was used to tell London of the location of 
German ammunition dumps and powder magazines. London was also informed 
of the departure from Rotterdam of a number of amphibious vessels loaded 
with German troops. It was suspected that this was a training exercise 
for the projected invasion of England. Thus alerted, the Royal Air Force 
was able to locate and attack the vessels in question, apparently in-
flicting serious damage on tham.659 
I. Mr. van Gruting also assisted Buys in carrying on the work of 
van Hamel. When it became apparent that the Gestapo was energetically 
seeking van Gruting his work, was in turn, passed on to Mr. W. J. M. J. 
d•J.'quino Much of the information that the organization was passing on 
to London at this point was actually collected by still another organ-
ization, the van Hattem Group, an extraordinarily active body headed by 
a student mmed van Hattem. The van Hattem Group, which gathered both 
eocnomio and military reports, was later to develop into the "spy" sec-
tion of the Order Service, a very important intelligence organization 
indeed 0 660 The Buya~an Grutin-d•J.quin organization continued to 
function for the best pe.rt or two years after the arrest of van Hamel. 
Mr. d•J.quin and his associates were arrested on July 23, 1942, attar 
658Ibido 
659J.. J. J. Buys, March 10, 1950, 76870. 
660W. J. M. J. d•Aquin, April 29, 1950, 7867lffo 
the ubiquitous agent provocateur Anton van der Waals had succeeded in 
penetrating their organization.66l 
The financing of van Hamel •s operations came from within Holland. 
Just after his arrival van Hamel appeared at the office of Mr. E. E. 
Menten, a Warmond banker. Van Hamel displayed credentials in the form 
of an unfixed photographic print, which woJild darken when exposed to 
light unless it was specially treated, and informed Mr. Menten that hilt 
address had been given him in London as one who might be able to help 
him with funds needed for the fulfillment of his mission. Mr. Menten 
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gave him money and continued to suppily funds as long as they were needed.662 
Van Hamel also created directly another group to carry on radiotele-
graphic communications with London. This organization,WQioh was headed 
by Mr. P. B. M. ten Bosch, with Mr. Sloth Blaauwboer serving as radio 
operator, forwarded the dispatches of another private, "'free enterprise"' 
intelligence organization, the so-called ":A.. C."' Group. The very exten-
sive "A.C .... reports were passed on to the ten Bosch group by Mr. H. J. de 
Koster.663 
The "A. C." reports apparently originated with Dr. Meindert Brouwer, 
a Bilthoven physician who built up quite an extensive private espionage 
apparatus with a number of assistants. The "A.C." organization had 
close contacts with the espionage branch of the Order Service, indeed 
the "A.C." group deserves some of the credit for the formation of the 
former organization. Some of the 11A.C. 11 reports were thus forwarded 
661~. 
662E. E. Menten, May 2, 1950, 79164ff. 
663H. J. de Koster, June 7, 1949, 56678. 
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by the Order Service to London, about whioh more will be said later. 
The Gestapo eventually caught up with the ".A..C." group. Very few of the 
organization, made up of a number of talented souls, survived their 1m-
prisonment. Dr. Brouwer, an alumnus of several concentration camps, was 
one who did, although he was formally sentenced to death by the Gestapo 
on at least three separate oocasions.664 
surrounding the "A.C." group and Dr. Brouwer's sanitorium flantwiik 
is more than a touch of mystery. Patient Willem van Tuyn, who was sub-
ject to fits and seizures, presided over a clandestine radio transmitter 
which sent ooded ".A..C." reports and received in return various messages, 
including some addressed to the Order Service. ;\t'ter the war it became 
painfully apparent that the "A•C•" station had not been in contact with 
any Allied station. The obvious remaining possibility, unless van Tuyn 
had been the victim of a cruel hoax on the part of some other clandes-
tine group with its 01111 transmitter, was that he was unwittingly in 
touch with the Gennans. While German counter-intelligence and security 
forces were later to establish a very elaborate network of contacts 
with london, using the codes and wavelengths of captured agents, there 
is no tangible evidence that this was the case in the "A.C." affair. 665 
The Germans most concerned with such matters, Giekes and Schreieder, 
were more than willing to furnish complete information on their exten-
sive and varied activities; moreover, the data which they supplied, 
some of which can be corroborated from other sources, appears to be 
correct. If an official German agency was "playing" the "A.C." sta-
tion neither officer was aware of it. I. regular unit of the Gennan 
664M. Brouwer, March 30, 1949, 46036. 665.I!l.!S· 
army, devoted to the detection and looation of all unathorized radio 
transmissions did traok down the transmitter in question, thus leading 
to the arrest of those concerned, but there is no evidenoe which points 
to replies being sent b,y a German unit located in HOlland. Giskes 
doubts very muoh if such an aotivity oould have been conducted from 
Belgium or Luxembourg 'Without his knowledge. It ia barely possible 
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that ~.m.its in Germany or in aome other German-oooupied country might 
have been responsible.666 As nearly as the writer can determine the let-
ters •A.C." were arbitrarily chosen b,y van Tuyn as a designation for 
his transmitter. It was a pathetic faot that numbers of Hollanders 
built clandestine stations on their 01111. initiative, seeking to 
contact London. suoh transmissions were sometimes received in England 
but, for obvious reasons, went Ull&llll'lfered. 
The "A.C." reports that were sent to Bngla:nd via ~. ten Bosch's 
agenoy reaehed him through an intermediary, Mr. H. J. de Koster.667 
Through van Hamel's own station, operated with the assistance of 
van den Hout, arrangements were made with the Dutoh Central Intelli-
gence Service, whiohwas aoting in oonjuBotion with the British Seoret 
Intelligence Servioe in the van Hamel assignment, to return van Hamel 
to Bngland. It was provided that van Hllmel was to be picked up on the 
Tjeukemeer, a large lake in the Province of Friesland, by an amphi-
bious aircraft during the night of October 12-130 1940. Van Hamel 
appeared at the appointed time and place, as did the airoraft, but the 
weather was so unfavorable that a landing oould not be attempted. He 
666J. Sbhreieder, Maroh 11, 1949 0 45075-45079. 
667xoster0 leo. cit. 
tried again on the night of the 13th and 14th. The aircraft, a two-
engined Dutch Fokker plane, flew overhead, apparently attempted a land-
ing, found this unsafe, and departed. Van Hamel and his acoompaeying 
party were arrested by Dutch "lake" police who turned them over to the 
Gestapo. 668 
In spite of very extended questioning the Gestapo was able to get 
nearly nothing out of van Hamel. Under threat of having all his living 
relatives in Holland put in a concentration oamp he would tell the Ger-
mans precisely one thing: The exaot location where he had been para-
chuted in Holland, information whioh was of no particular value in any 
event. He refused to divulge his oode or his security oheck,669 the 
names of his assistants, or the source of his financial assistance. 
In WU'IIIond, van Hamel 1 s personal banker, Mr. lllenten, spent the entire 
winter and spring momentarily expecting a visit from the Gestapo. Van 
Hamel never betrayed him.670 
The agents of the Central Intelligence Service llho followed van 
Hamel were of widely varying quality. The next to follow was Mr. c. H. 
van Brink, who was parachuted into the oooupied territory during the 
night of NOvember 18, 1940, with the assignment of reporting on both 
military objectives and civilian matters with military implications. 
Van Brink made extensive use of friends and family in providing him-
self with lodging, intelligence information, and quarters in which to 
6~~. IVa, 47-48. 
669The security oheok consisted of agreed""'lpon "mistakes" in a 
telegram, such as a mistake every sixth oharaoter. If the oheck was 
omitted, London was to understand that the agent had been captured. 
67~enten, loc. cit. 
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set up his transmitter. His reports dealt primarily with defenses in 
671 and around the harbor of Rotterdam. Van Brink: did not build up an 
organization Which carried on his work after his departure. After the 
failure of a plan to pick him up by amphibious aircraft, he proceeded 
to England via France, Spain, Portugal, Curacao, the United States, and 
Canada, a journey which consumed about ten months. At the time of his 
arrival in England, in September of 1942, there was no Dutch intelli-
gence agency in operation. The Central Intelligence Service was dor-
mant and its successor had not yet come into being. Those Dutch ofi'i-
cera receiving him displayed very little interest in his accomplish-
menta.6'12 
Agent W. B. Schrage and J. J. Zomer, who served as Schrage's radio 
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operator, arrived in Holland on the night of June 13, 1941. Schrage's 
mission consisted primarily of collecting military ini'ormation and data 
on the Dutch transportation system, although it was hoped he would gather 
some economic data. Both Schrage and Zomer contacted and 110rked with 
a n1.811ber of the groups which the original agent, van Hamel, had created. 
Their mission could be described as quite successful. They transmit-
ted to London masses of useful material, including quantities of' olas• 
sified!eh£macht documents assembled by a German soldier of pro-Dutch 
sympathies, Feldhaus von Ham, who later managed to reach England and 
joined the Dutch army there.673 Agent Zomer•s transmitter was located by 
the Germans, with the result that he 'Wll.s captured on August 31, 1941.674 
671c. H. van Brink, March 23, 1949, 45589. 672
.!!!!9.•• 4561Bff • 
673w. c. J. M. van Lanschot, May 31, 1949, 55388. 
674F. van •t Sant, November 3, 1948, 31979ffo 
After a tbne it was noticed in London that messages, which con-
tinued to arrive from Zomer 1s transmitter, did not contain the proper 
security checks. Thus London assumed that he had been captured, was 
being forced to transmit, and,aocordingly, terminated the contact.675 
Schrage, left without a radio operator, continued to collect mil-
itary material of a most elaborate and varied nature, including plans 
of German air fields, anti-aircraft installations, harbors, coast de-
fenses, searchlight batteries, and military telephone exchanges. Even 
if Zomer had still been free to transmit messages to London, much of 
the material oolleoted by Schrage oould scarcely have been communicated 
by telegraph. Schrage then came into contact with Cornelia Sporre, an 
agent of the British Special Operations ExeCutive, with whom he had 
been trained in an English parachute school. Together they set out 
for England in a twenty-four foot boat equipped with an outboard motor, 
departing Holland on November 13, 1941. No trace of thEI!l was ever un-
covered and they are assumed to have beEIIl. drowned. 676 The writer 
believes that some of the material gathered by Schrage reached London 
by another route. Schrage did establish telegraphic contact with 
London after the arrest of Zomer, using a transmitter set up by van 
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Hamel and operated by P. B. M. ten Bosch, over which he sent some forty-
three messages to London. 
l!r. A.. E. A.1 blas, of the Ceiitral Intelligence Service, was para-
chuted in July, 1941, with the mission of gathering data on the effects 
of Allied air raids on Holland, ascertaining the locations of various 
675rbid. 
676o. Q. R. ~~lock Houwer, June 10, 1949, 58116ffo 
specific German factories in Holland, and the collection of information 
on the production and consumption of petroleum products in the Nether-
landa,677 
Jlblas contacted a number of groups gathering intelligence infor-
mation, and brought the resistance group surrounding the clandestine 
newspaper Ret Parool into contact with London. Jlblas helped make 
arrangements whereb,y a British vessel would pick up and bring to Eng-
land several Dutch political leaders. That this operation ended in 
failure was due to no fault of Alblas.678 Alblas was able to fulfil 
much of his mission, partly with the assistance of others Who helped 
gather some of the desired information. 
At some point in the winter of 1941, probably in December• 
Alblas received a new code which had been brought him from London by 
another agent, W. J. van der Heyden, who delivered in Holland by means 
of a clandestine coastal landing on December 9, 1941.679 
Shortly thereafter• on February 13, 1942, van der Reydenwas cap-
tured by the Germans. He divulged Alblas•a new code as well as his 
own, so that the Germans, who had already picked up and transcribed 
Alblas•s transmissions, were now able to decode them. It was decided 
not to ~rrest Alblas for the moment, rather to "control" his messages 
and see what information he was sending. When it became apparent 
that Alblas had come da:rgerously close to unraveling a special oper-
ation of German counter-intelligence, the so-called England-Spiel, he 
677J, Idema, September 16, 1949, 66708. 
678F, J. Goedhart, February 16, 1949, 41644. 
679w. J. van der Reyden, July 30, 1949, 62811. 
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was arrested,680 
That van der Reyden was not a wise choice as an agent was widely 
believed in Holland after World War II. He had been a member of the 
Dutoh National Socialist Party at one time, a fact which the Dutch had 
originally pointed out to the British, who were eager to employ van dar 
Reyden•s talents as a professional radio operator, a job he had held on 
various merchant vessels. The Dutoh had additional reservations about 
van dar Reyden, as an even cursory examination of his personal life 
indicated extended involvement in financial transactions of a question-
able nature.681 
On July 23, 1941, Mr. S, E. Hazelhoff Roelfzema reached London 
:from the occupied territory and presented to the Dutch and British 
intelligence services a rather ambitious plan for the establishment 
of regular channels of communication whereby persons oould be trans-
ferred to and from the occupied territory. Particularly distinctive 
was the proposal that clandestine landings on the Dutch coast be em-
ployed, as earlier schemes had invariably preferred the use of air-
craf't or travel through neutral countries.682 
Colonel Rabagliatti of the British Secret Intelligence Service 
was quite enthusiastic about the Hazelhoff Roelfzema proposals, an en-
thusiasm which seems to have been :fully shared by Mr. van •t Sant, head 
of the Dutch Central Intelligence Service. It was agreed, on August a, 
1941, that the Central Intelligence Service and its British counter-
680J. Schreieder, July 13, 1948, 16954. 
681E1~, IVa, appendix, xxvi, 
682s, E. I~zelhoff Roelfzema, November 26, 1948, 34971. 
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part would oo8perate in the creation o£ the sort o£ arrangements envis-
aged by v~. p_azelho££ Roel£zema.683 
Anglo-Dutch agreement on the matter was to have been expected, 
as Mr. van •t Sant seemed to work well with Colonel Rabagliatti. This 
was, it will be recalled, one o£ the reasons behind the choice o£ Mr. 
van •t Sant £or this post. 
Six days after accepting the Hazelho££ Roel£zema organizational 
plan, on August 14, 1941, Mr. van •t Sant resigned as head o£ the Cen-
tral Intelligence Servioe.684 Few personalities or events in the entire 
period of the war caused mere comment and controversy in Dutch oiroles 
than van •t Sant and his leadership o£ intelligence activities. Thus 
an examination o£ the subject must be made. 
The reasons £or Mr. van •t Sant•s departure at this time seem to 
have been various. Although he tendered his resignation he was, 1n 
e££ect, di soharged £rom this position by the Minister-President, Dr. 
Gerbrandy. Basically, Dr. Gerbrandy was motivated by the laok o£ 
confidence which w~. van •t Sant enjoyed in a wide variety of places 
and among varied members of the Dutch community. 
Some o£ this laok o£ confidence was based on Mr. van •t Sant•s 
having received payments £rom the British Secret Service during and 
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just after World War I. The sum which was widely quoted waa.g2o,ooo.685 
Since there was substance to these reports, even Dr. Gerbrandy 
was willing to oonoede that van •t Sant•s value had thereby been de-
creased.686 
683F. van •t sant, July 27, 1949, 61786. 684Ibid 
-· 
686spoelstra, loo. oit. 686p. s. Gerbrandy, May 20, 1949, 63622££. 
Mr. van •t Sant was certainly widely distrusted by underground 
organizations and their members in Holland. Some travellers from 
Holland had specifically been warned to have no dealings with van •t 
Sant when they reached London.S87 
Apparently there also existed considerable dislike and distrust 
of I'r. van •t Sant in the Dutch East Indies. This was very definitely 
a factor in his removal, indeed it may have been the deciding faotor.saa 
Mr. van •t Sant himself explained that monies paid him by the 
British Seoret Service in World war I were not in the nature of com-
pensation for services rendered but were simply to reimburse him for 
personal expenses incurred ani for the reimbursement of others who had 
2a2 
assisted him in this work. He undertook these activities with the prior 
knowledge and express approval of the Dutch Government of that day. 
All information which he gathered and supplied to the British was also 
given to the Netherlands Government. On occasion he gathered material 
primarily for the Dutch military intelligence organization, G.s. III, 
which was also made available to the British. If expenses for a given 
intelligence operation were assumed by the British the Dutch ordinarily 
paid a portion of the costs, as they had benefited from the information 
as well. In the reverse situation the British would compensate G.S. III 
for part of the costs of whatwaa, essentially, a Dutch activity. sag 
As far as the Minister-President, Dr. Gerbrandy, was concerned, 
the reason for the discharge of Mr. van •t Sant was that he both 
sa~. den Boer, July 27, 1948, 21527. 
sa~. N. van Kleffens, August 22, 1949, 63a7a. 
sa~. van •t sant, November 3, 1948, 3192aff. 
lacked the confidence and engendered the active suspicion of numbers 
of persons in London and elsewhere, so much so that his usefulness had 
come to an end. Dr. Gerbrandy spoke to van •t Sant in this vein: 
••• You have served me well, I am satisfied with you. Yo~ 
have been cautious and you have been prudent in dealings with 
the British. Co8peration has been excellent but, unfortunately, 
I cannot save you because you are too vulnerable. It is un-
fortunate that our oo8geration has become impaired by the mis-
trust of [others ] •• ,69 
Mr. van •t Sant•s successor, who was chosen as acting head of the 
Central Intelligence Service, was Captain R. P. J. Derksema, who had 
assisted Mr· van •t Sant earlier. The same Royal Decree691 which 
accepted ths resignation of Mr. van •t Sant and installed in office 
Captain Derksema also moved the Central Intelligence Service from the 
Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the Interior. It was further 
provided that contact between a~ official Dutch agency and the Brit-
ish intelligence agencies would be channeled either through the Min• 
istry of the Interior or the Central Intelligence Service directly.692 
This point in the history of the intelligence agencies marks an 
added deterioration of relations between the Dutch and the British. 
While Mr. van •t Sant had worked well with Colonel Rabagliatti of the 
British Secret Intelligence Service he had worked much less well with 
the British sabotage organization, the Special Operations Executive. 
Under Captain Derksema relations with the Special Operations Executive 
underwent very little improvement and, in addition, it rapidly appeared 
that Derksema and Colonel Rabagliatti did not get on at all well. 
690p. s. Gerbrandy, July 30, 1948, 23651. 
691E~, IVa, appendix, vii, 692~. 
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Since the Hazelho££ Roel£zema organization was a creature o£ Colonel 
Rabagliatti and l.lr. van •t Sant, it did not reoeive the friendliest 
reception £rom Captain Derksema., 893 who was finding that his rank 
contrasted sharply with that of Major-General, which Mr. van •t Sant 
had held, and that he had great di£i'ioulty in gaining ready access 
to both Dutch Ministers and British o££ioiala.694 
Captain Derksema did agree to proceed with the Hazslho££ Roeli'-
zema activity, although it was almost entirely an affair regulated by 
lv!r. Hazelhoi'i' Roe1£zema, who was placed in charge o£ the operation; 
by Colonel Rabagliatti; and by Mr. van •t Sant. Mr. van •t Sant con-
tinued to oonoern hbnseli'with individual agents to be dispatched, 
even though he was, once again, a counselor attached to the lfinistry 
ot Justice, from whioh the Central Intelligence Service had been oi'i'i-
oially divoroed.695 
Several Hazelhoi'£ Roeli'zema amphibious operations to Holland were 
arranged without Derksema exercising any control over them or even 
having any detailed knowledge o£ what was to take place. 896 
Even the Minister-President, Dr. Gerbrandy, looked on the Hazel-
hoi'£ Roeli'zema organization as simply a "continuation" oi' the van •t 
Sant intelligence regime.697 
Mr. Hazelhoi'i' Roeltzema recruited agents with a certain minimum 
amount of co8peration from Captain Derkllerna. The British Royal Navy 
693Hazelhoi'i' Roeli'zema, loo. oit., 34S4li'i'. 
694R. P. J. Derksema, July 30, 1948, 23170. 
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695Hazelhoi'i' Roeli'zema, loc. oito 69Elnerksema, loo. oit., 23200££. 
697p. s. Gerbrandy, May 20, 1949, 53724. 
attended to the details of delivery by sea. Sinoe plans oalled for 
a British vessel of about motor-torpedo boat proportions to lie off 
the Dutoh coast, with a rowboat to be used in the actual landing, ex-
tensive training operations in this sort of activity were held on parts 
of the Engliah coast whioh most nearly resembled those areas that would 
bs used in Holland. Those persons involved received the usual train-
ing in radiotelegraphy and in cryptography. They were also trained in 
the use of small arms. Co8perationwith the British in all these act-
ivities was e:x:oellent.698 
The formal operations of the Hazelhoff Roelfzema organization 
really cormnenoed on November 24, 1941, when Pieter Tazelaar, who had 
travelled to England with Mr. Razelhoff Roelfzema, was delivered 
ashore in Holland with a specific mission from the London Government. 
He was to escort to London, via a sea connection of the Hazelhoff Roel-
fzema organization, two people, a Captain P. M. H. Tielens, of the 
Dutch General Staff, and Dr. Wiardi Beolane.n, of the staff of the under-
ground neWBpaper Het Parool (The Watchword). Dr. Beckman, together 
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with Mro F. J. Goedhart, had written a rather spirited critique of the 
London GoVel'lllllent in general, and Radio Orange in particular, which had 
found ita way to London via the services of agent AJ.blas. London had 
toldAlblas to "stop playing politics" but had, none the less, read his 
telegrams and noted the particular interest and apparent talents of Dr. 
Beckman. Tazelaar was not accompanied by a radio operator, nor did he 
take any radio equipnent with him, hence he continued to communicate with 
London through the transmitter of AJ.blas.S99 
698c. Krediet, March 3, 1949, 44084-44086. 699Goedhart, loo. cit. 
A rather more controversial agent, 'If. J • van der Reyden, who was 
landed in Holland by the Hazelhoff Boelfzema organization on December 9• 
1941, had as his mission the training in new cryptographic methods of 
agents and groups set up by earlier agents. Note has been made earlier 
that van der Reyden was captured and did divulge information which 
seems to have led to the capture of the agent Alblas. Before the dis-
patch of van der Beyden there occurred an exchange of letters between 
Captain Derksema and Colonel Babagliatti over the utilization of van 
der l'lf!Yden. Captain Derksema was most strenuously opposed to the em-
ployment of van der Reyden. pointing out not only his pe.st adherence 
to the Dutch National Socialist Party but the faot that he was ener-
getioally sought by creditors and seamed to be in various sorts of 
other personal difficulties as well. Rabagliatti replied that both the 
Secret Intelligence Service and the Hazelhoff Roelfzema organization 
were aware of van der Reyden•s shortcomings. but felt that his qual-
ifications. particularly in the field of radio, were so outstanding 
as to merit his receiving special consideration. As luok would have 
it van der Reyden•s radio equipment was lost in landing in the surf 
and he -s able to send only one telegram to London. forwarded through 
the transmitter of an earlier agent of the Central Intelligence Service. 
whose oode name was "Vermeulen" and who was associated with the Order 
Service. 700 
Meanwhile. Pieter Tazelaar had enoountered an unexpected difti-
culty. in that Captain Tielens refused to go to London. Tielens had• 
it appeared• taken an oath to the Germans when, at the time of the 
700gNQ, IVa. appendix. lxviio The writer ia• quite frankly. 
unable to aooount tor "Vermeulen". 
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armistice of May, 1940, Dutch officers were paroled and kept from 
being sellt to Germany as prisoners of war, providing that they swore 
that they would not participate in hostilities against the Reich. Mr. 
Te.zelaar contacted Dr. Beolanan through an intermediary, his colleague, 
Mr. F. J. Goedhart. Beolanan -~ willing to depart and London designated 
701 Mr. Goedhart as Tiel ens' replacement. 
Thus it was that, on January 18, 1942, a party made up of Tazelaar; 
Dr. Beolanan; Mr. Goedhart; Midshipnan Dogger, who later wrote a report 
about the Order Service; and a Mr. Fasdeloup, proceeded to the beach 
resort of Soheveningen, where the amphibious landing was to take plaoe. 702 
While a reconstruction of precisely what transpired has proven to 
be difficult it appears that the British motor-torpedo boat which was to 
have made ootrtaot never reached ita destination, since it went aground 
on a sand bar mar the Hook of Holland. A Ge:rman patrol captured Dr. 
Beolanan, Mr. Pasdeloup, and Mro Goedhart, who carried with him a oom-
plete file of the clandestine newspaper, The Watchword. Mr. Tazelaar 
and Mr. Dogger evaded capture. 70S 
On the following evening a landing was effected. Mr. Hazelhoff 
Roelfzema rowed ashore and went to a public telephone to try to contact 
Tazelaar. A curious side effect of the poor ooBperation between the 
Hazelhoff Roelfsama organization and the Central Intelligence Service 
had been that Hazelhoff Roel:f'zema had never learned that Dutoh ooinage 
had bean replaced, and that the silver ooins which he tried to use in 
the telephone had been replaced with zino ones of different size. 704 
701Goedhart, loo. oit. 702Ibid. 
704Hazelho:f'f Roelfzema, loc. cit., 34890. 
This time Tazelaar and Dogger were actually captured b,y a German 
patrol, but managed to elude their captors after a few minutes. Both 
had had enough of the "sea route" and informed London of their intent-
ion to proceed to England via SWitzerland, which they did successfully, 
arriving in London on April 13, 1942. 705 
On February 2, 1942, the Central Intelligence Service acquired a 
new head, Colonel M. R. de Bruyne of the Royal Netherlands Marines, 
who had been brought from the Dutch East Indies originally to head the 
BUreau for the Preparation of the Return to Holland. At the same 
time the Central Intelligence Service was moved from the Ministry of 
the Interior, where it had resided for less than five months, and 
placed under the control of the Netherlands Navy. It TI&S felt that 
a person with greater military expsrienoe should run the Service. 
Apparently no consideration was given, even then, to the possibility 
of employing those officers already in London from G.S. III, or using 
or revitalizing the G.S. III apparatus, which had been allowed to be-
come dormant. 706 
Colonel de Bruyne had been transferred from the Indies, as has 
been noted, to head the Bureau for the Preparation of the Return, in 
which capacity he had already acquired some intelligence experience in 
the London sphere. This experience the Central Intelligence Service 
inherited. Also inherited was a feud of sizeable proportions between 
Colonel de Bruyne and Colonel Rabagliatti of the British Secret Intel-
ligence Service.707 
705G. A. Dogger, February 16, 1949, 41327. 
706 Furstner, lee. cit., 23560. 707Gerbrandy, loa. cit., 53702. 
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The Hazelhoff Roelfzema organization continued its operations 
for a time. During the night of February 23, 1942, it set on shore 
two agents, Jonkheer E. W. de Jonge and his radio operator. E. Rad-
ema. De Jonge and Radema were, in effeot, joint agents of the Dutoh 
Central Intelligence Service and the British Seoret Intelligence Ser-
vice.708 
De Jonge's mission was that of collecting military, naval, and 
economic data. 709 He was successful in sending a great nunber of tele-
grams to Landon, as well as reports which eventually reached London via 
the Swiss Route. 710 He was largely instrumental in establishing the 
Kees intelligence gathering organization which functioned for the 
duration of World War II. 71I Radema had, it appeared, been given an 
exceptionally bad identity card in London, a defect which was speedily 
remedied by forgers in Holland. Radema continued to act as de Jonge's 
radio operator. or major importance in the organization 'Whioh de 
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Jonge created was Mr. c. Dutilh, a man of exceptional talents. EVen-
tually Dutilh had the misfortune to oome in contact with the ubiquitous 
agent provocateur Anton van dar W&als, with the inevitable result, Dutilh 
was betrayed and arrested. De Jonge was arrested on May 23, 1942, 
and Radema on May 29, 1942.712 
Upon his capture de Jonge followed the instructions he had been 
70BtN.a, IVa, 107. 
709E. Go May, July 21, 1948, 18748ffo 
7lot~. IVa, appendix, lxix. 
7llp. L. baron d' Aulnia de Bourouill, February 16, 1949, 41517££. 
712E~, IVa, appendix, lxix. 
given in London. He apparently gave at least part of his oode to the 
Germans, as he was authorized to do, but he did not divulge the au-
thentioating "security check" which was to be included in each tele-
gram. Gestapo code specialist E. G. May, ~o interrogated de Jonge, 
found him "decidedly unoommunioative". 713 
The Gestapo, using de Jonge•s transmitter and as much of his code 
as they were able to piece together, tried to establish contact with 
London, desiring both to "feed" the enemy false or misleading reports 
and learn, if possible, of Allied plans. 714 
The last genuine telegram from de Jonge was received in London on 
May 18, 1942. London, of course, had no way of knowing, at least imme-
diately, of the arrest of de Jonge on May 23rd. However the receipt 
over the de Jonge oirouit, on June 6, 1942, of a badly coded telegram 
lacking any security check, caused immediate suspicion in London. Al-
together Lon<bn received some nine telegrams sent by the Ge:nnans over 
de Jonge•s transmitter. They were speedily identified for what they 
were, and the Dutch section of the British Secret Intelligence Service, 
through ~ose hands wireless communications with agents passed, pointed 
this out in a special memorandum to the Dutch intelligence officials 
oonoerned.715 
During the night of March 12, 1943, the Hazelhoff Roelfzema 
organization delivered ashore agent J. Emmer and his radio operator, 
Jollkheer F. D. Ortt. Emmer, who arrived with faulty identity papers 
7l3yay, loo. cit. 
714J. Sohreieder, July 13, 1948, 17148. 
71~~. IVa, appendix, xxviii. 
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which had to be replaced locally, had aa a part of his mission the 
gathering of data on the coastline of Holland, partinent to more 
landings of the Hazelhoff Roelfzema. sort. 716 He was also given a 
mission of military reporting by Colonel de Bruyne. 717 It is known 
that '&nmer and Ortt were in oontaot with agents Radema and de Jonge. 
Emmer and Ortt apparently were captured by means of German radio di-
rection finders which were able to pin point the location of Ortt•s 
transmitter. 718 
Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema did not have the highest opinion of the 
security arrangEII!ents of Colonel de Bruyne. One day he went to visit 
the Central Intelligence Service, and found in a room "with swinging 
doors". accessible to anw passer-by, a large map of the Dutch coast on 
~ich the sites of his amphibious landings were prominently marked. 719 
After the "delivery" of Emmer and Ortt by the Hazelhoff Roelf-
zema organization nothing seemed to go properly. In a subsequent op• 
eration a small boat was supposed to land near Katwijk and pick up 
a number of people to be assembled by a sailor named Maassen. The 
party assembled on shore ran into a German patrol and, in the ensuing 
gun battle, Maassen was killed. The final operation occurred on May 
11, 1942, When a small boat was supposed to meet agent: de Jong and 
deliver something to htm, probably a radio set. The British vessel 
bearing the Hazelhoff Roelfzema party had soarcely gotten in position 
716K. Bolle, March 10, 1950, 76905. 
117M. R. de Bruyne, Ootober 20, 1948, 50268ff. 
71~~. IVa, appendix, lxix. 
719Haze1hoff Roelfzema, loc. cit., 54975. 
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when it found itself in the middle of a naval engagement between an-
other unit of the British Royal Navy, oonduoting separate operations 
nearby, and some nine Ge:nnan "E" boats seeking to disrupt these op-
erations. By "lying low" the Anglo-Dutoh foroe was able to escape 
detection by either side in the encounter and, eventually, depart the 
scene. Contact with agent de Jonge, however, proved impossible. 720 
Mention must be made at this point of a Central Intelligence 
Servioe agent sent out just before this period who bore no relation-
ship to the Hazelhoff organization nor, for that matter, to any other 
operation. 
While captain Derksema was still in oharge of the Central Intel-
ligenoe Service Jonkvrouwe J. c. c. R8ell, then a secretary in the 
Dutoh Legation in Pretoria, Union of South Atrioa, travelled to Lon-
don to offer her assistance to the intelligence services, arriving in 
Britain on December 31, 1940. She was accepted and trained as a joint 
agent of the Central Intelligence Servioe and the British Secret Intel-
ligenoe Servioe. She was trained in cryptography rut not in the use 
of radio or in parachute jumping. Her instructions were to go to 
Lisbon, pose as a pro-Ge:nnan Hollander and trereby gain permission to 
travel to the Netherlands. Qnoe she reached Holland she was to oon-
taot officials of the Netherlands Railways and gather reports on German 
troop movements. This latter mission appears to have been a British 
one, as the Dutoh gave her the additional task of gathering data on 
the political trustworthiness of Dutoh oivil servants. 721 
720ibid., 34963-34965. 
721R. P. J. Derksema, May a, 1950, 79093. 
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She was given neither contact addresses nor anw special means of estab-
lishing her identity as an Allied agent, other than the names of one or 
two Dutoh officials known to be in London.722 
Jonkvrouwe R8ell departed England by air on August 14th or 15th, 
1941. In Lisbon she got in touoh with German consular officials, and 
after six weeks of posing as a Nazi sympathizer she 11as able to obtain 
a visa for Holland. She made the journey to the Netherlands, travel-
ling by way of Munich. She arrived in the Netherlands on October 1, 
1941, and almost immediately oontaoted Mr. Posthumus Meyjes of the 
Netherlands Railways. She had, as has been said, m speoial method 
of identifying herself as an Allied agent, other than simply saying, 
"I have an English fr1end.n723 
Mr. Posthumus Meyjes, as a loyal Hollander working with the Neth-
erlands Railways, was faoed with something of a dilemma. His under-
ground contacts told him that Jonkvrouwe R8ell•s name appeared on a 
list of untrustworthy persona, largely on account of her pro-German 
utterances in Lisbon and her return to Bolland with German approval. 
There was every likelihood, he was warned, that Jonkvrouwe R8ell was 
an agent provocateur• possibly sent by the Gestapo to test out the 
reliability of Dutch personnel and confirm the wisdom of having left 
the operation of the Netherlands Railways in Dutch instead of German 
hands. There was a possibility, he acknowledged to a colleague at the 
time, that this woman was a genuine London agent, but it seflllled doubt-
ful that London oould possibly have engineered an approach to him that 
was so completely amateurish. It seemed that if the Gestapo was send-
722 8 723 Jonkvrol.l'lle J. c. c. R ell, May 24, 1949, 54313. Ibid. 
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ding a provocateur this might very likely be the way he or she would 
behave. In any event Posthumus Meyjes reported to the Germans that he 
had been approached bw Jonkvrouwe R8ell, whereupon she was arrested. 
She was detained for a tUne in Holland and, in 1942, transferred to 
Germaey where she spent the rest of the war in various concentration 
camps. 724 
The death of the Hazelhoff Roelfzama organization foreshadowed 
the passing as well of the Central Intelligence Service. !!attars were 
made somewhat more difficult and more complex since the person of Mr. 
van •t Sant again was added as a complicating factor. Mr. van •t Sant 
had continued to oonoern himself with the dispatch of agents during the 
Hazelhoff Roelfzema interlude, as has been noted. Following this he 
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sent a memorandum to Minister-President Gerbrandy in which he requested 
that he again be given control over agents to be sent to Holland. To 
make matters worse Colonel Rabagliatti of the British Secret Intelligence 
Service and Mr. van •t Sant entered into a so-called "gentlemen's agree-
ment", wherebw neither the Secret Intelligence Service nor any Dutch 
agency would send agents to Holland without the advance knowledge and 
approval of both gentlemen concerned. Mr. van 't Sant, from his posi-
tion in the Ministry of Justice, had no authority to enter into any 
such agreement at this point. Needless to say the agreement was not 
binding on the London Government. Minister-President Gerbrandy ap-
pointed Mr. A• H. J. Lovink, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
Mr. c. J. Warners, one of his personal advisers who had formerly been 
Head of Technical services, Post, Telephone, and Telegraph, Netherlands 
724p. T. Posthumus Meyjes, March 10, 1950, 76685. 
East Indies, to study the entire problem of intelligence services am 
make basic recommendations. At the moment Dutch government agencies 
concerned with clandestine contact 111 th the occupied terri tory were 
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two in number: The Central Intelligence Service, which was concerned 
with gathering i.llt'ormationJ and the Military Bureau for the Preparation 
of the Return to Holland, 'llhich was ooncer:lllld both with making military 
preparations for the period of liberation and the establishment of con-
tact 111 th resistance organizations, inoludi ng sabotage organizations. 
This division of labor corresponded to that of the British Secret Intel-
ligence Service and the Special Operations Executive. The first rec-
ommendation made by Lovink: and Warners was that the Dutch form one 
combined "spy am assorted purposes" agency, as the ,Americana had done 
with their Ofi'ice of Strategic Services. This proposal was turned 
down, partly because the British preferred to maintain two services 
themselves and felt it 'II'Ould be awkward to have the Dutoh employ a 
radically different form of organization.725 
The final report of Meaars. tovink: and Warners consisted largely 
of an attack on Mr. van •t Sant, in which even his loyalty was impugned. 
It was proposed that a new intelligence agency be set up. 726 
On June l, 1942, Colonel de Bruyne departed the Central Intelli-
gence Service. 727 Mr. Warners and Mr. Lovink: were installed as joint 
acting heads of the Central Intelligence Service. Intelligence activ-
ity came to a virtual halt. When, on September 18, 1942, Mr. c. H. 
van Brink:, one of the earliest Central Intelligence Service agents to 
72~Ml. IVa, 170-171. 726Ibid. 
727M. R. de Bruyne, May 10, 1949, 50419. 
be sent to Holland, returned to London e.f'ter a journey through neutral 
countries, he found very little interest expressed in him or his mis-
sion. It seemed to him that there was, in effect, no Dutch intelli-
728 genoa agency at the moment. Th1s was a correct estimate. 
The Intelligence Bureau 
On November 213, 1942, by Royal Decree, a new Dutch intelligence 
agency, the Bureau I!!liohtipgen ("Intelligence Bureau") 1111.s created, 
to begin operation immed1ately.729 
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The Intelligence Bureau was to be under the control of the Ministry 
of ll'ar and -s to have the task of assembling and transmitting to the 
appropriate ministries all reports that were of importance to the aeou-
rity and peace of the Kingdom, the conduct of the .Allied war effort, 
and the preparation of the return to Holland and the restoration of 
orderly government. Stress was laid in the Royal Decree on the duty of 
the head of the Intelligence Bureau to report promptly to the appropriate 
Ministers information gained that was of particular importance to their 
departments. The Intelligence Bureau was to have exclusive control over 
the sending of agents and other parsons to the occupied territory, pre-
sumably a provision included with the extracurricular activities of Mr. 
van •t Sant in mind. 730 
Major H. J. Broelanan became the first head of the Intelligence 
Bureau, a position he held until he became ill in March, 1943, so that 
he was replaced, at first temporarily, by Dr. J. M. Somer, who also held 
the r&llk of Major. Dr. Somer officially succeeded Major Broelanan in 
728c. H. van Brink, March 23, 1949, 45618ff. 
72!L -:to~, IVa, appendix, x. 
July, 1943. Dr. Somer had arrived 1n London the previous January, after 
an escape from the occupied territory. '7Sl 
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The Intelligence Bureau, then, was concerned not only with purely 
military reports to be acquired from the occupied territory in one way 
or another but with strategic information in the broadest sense. Herein 
lay a special difficulty that was :1111ver really resolved: While the 
Intelligence Bureau was charged with informing appropriate ministries 
of material that waa of importame, since it was manned by persons 
predominantly military in experience or outlook, items of a non-mil-
itary nature might be handled with leas than oonsumate effioiencyo One 
approach to the problem might have been to have a committee to screen 
incoming material, to be composed of the military, economists, and 
those with special political knowledge. An even better solution would 
have been to employ individuals with sufficient knowledge in the three 
fields described so that they could at least realize What was of vital 
import. A principal difficulty with this approach was that such per-
sons were simply llOt ava:l.lable in London. The London Goverment, as 
was the case with other gove!'JIIIIents in exile, was in many respects an 
amateur affairo While it was headed by Dutch political leaders who 
had left Holland many of its other members were persons 'lllho happened 
to be living or travelling abroad at the time of the German invasion, 
plus those who managed the perilous business of escaping from the oc-
cupied territory. 
It was the Intelligeme Bureau which sat at the London end of 
the SWiss Route and the Swedish Route. On more than one occasion the 
73lE~, IVa, appendix, xiio 
Bureau simply failed to recognize as vital reports forwarded to it, 
with the result that they were buried and forgotten. It will be re-
called, for example, that a Dutch fiscal expert, Dr. Ridder, prepared, 
in conjunction with his colleagues, a comprehensive atudy intended to 
warn the ~ndon Governnent against possible or probable "mistakes" 
which it would bs likely to make in monetary policy just at the end 
of the war. This study was forwarded to ~ndon via the SWiss Route 
and the Intelligence Bureau. It should have reached the Ministry of 
Finance but it clearly never did. The Government went ahead and made 
precisely the mistakes of which Ridder and his associates had warned. 
After the close of hostilities Ridder complained of this and was told 
that his views would have bsen moat highly regarded but that they were 
never received by the Ministry of Finance. The report in question 
definitely had reached the Intelligence Bureau in London.732 
One must note in all fairness that the problem was one partly of 
bulk. From the very sparse contact with the occupied territory that 
characterized the early days in ~ndon things progressed to the stage 
where the Swiss Route offices in Berne and Geneva were photographing 
and passing on to stockholm, for forwarding to London, hundreds of 
pages per week. At various times the backlog of unprocessed reports 
was substantial, sufficiently so to necessitate the acquisition of 
additional storage space. 
It was also the Intelligence Bureau which operated the Swisa 
Route processing station in Stockholm. Stockholm functioned, in ad-
dition, as a kind of observation post. Travellers to and from Germany 
732slotemaker de Bruine, loc. cit., 36608ffo 
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and German-occupied countries were common in Sweden and they could 
o:f'ten supply useful bits of information. stockholm was a useful 
place to purchase copies of German-controlled ttlegaltt newspapers 
published in Holland, publications likely to be quite revealing when 
read with a practiced eye. 
Another "observation" post operated by the Intelligence Bureau 
was one at Lisbon, with much the same purposea as that at Stockholm. 
The Lisbon post is well remembered in Holland for another reason, in 
that it was headed :f'or some time by lll'o Maas Geesteranus. lfaas 
Geesteranus appears to have functioned well as an intelligence o:f'fi-
oer, and was apparently very talented illdeed in facilitating the evac-
uation of Dutch refugees, who frequently appeared in Spain and Por-
tugal.733 
Unfortunately, what caused more than a little unfavorable atten-
tion to be paid to Mr. Maas Geestera:cus seems to have been that he had 
a very poor money sense. He purchased automobiles which remained in 
a garage since no diplomatic number plates were available for them. 
He also seems to have purchased in 1942, at a price of approximately 
tl4,100, a vessel which, from photographs, gives something of the 
impression of a smaller commercial fishing boat. This craft was sUP-
poaedly intended :f'or use of the Intelligence Bureau staff in arre.nging 
a quick escape should the Germans invade Portugal. Altogether Mr. 
Maas Geestera:cus appears to have a shortage in h1a accounts totalling 
approximately 126,700.734 
73~~. IVa, appel:ldix, x. 
734::R. E. Samers, July 30, 1949, 62755. Values given are in 1942 
dollar currency, derived from aoootmts kept in Portuguese escudos. 
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In September, 1944, the Intelligence Bureau established an ob• 
servation post in the liberated south of Holland, at Eindhoven. This 
post had several tasks. It was to serve as liaison with British in-
telligence, since British and Canadian troops were the first to enter 
Hollan:l. It was to help "connect" the London Gover:anent with various 
clandestine radio networks used in the occupied territory for domestic 
communications in co8rdinating resistance work and exchanging intelli• 
genae infoJ'J!Btion. The most important of these were those operated 
by the Council of Resistance and the Order Service. The Intelligence 
Bureau was also able to make extensive use of clandestine telephone 
networks 'l!hich linked the occupied and unoccupied parts of the ooun-
try. In all these functions the Intelligence Bureau was moderately 
successful and functioned with distinotion.736 These contacts via 
Eindhoven were to be used particularly to gain information on the gen-
eral economic state of the occupied territory; on the state of supplies 
of food and medicine; on any German destruction of property, actual or 
contemplated, including inundations; and, finally, information on any 
German troop evacuations. 736 In these endeavors the Bureau was also 
moderately successful and gathered much material that was of' consider• 
able value not only to the conduct of' the war but in the transition 
period after the German capitulation as~well.737 
The reader is directed to an appended chart of' agents of' the In• 
telligence Bureau which 1s largely self-explanatory. 
Intelligence Bureau agents were usually recruited by Major Broek• 
man of' the Bureau, who often asked the opinion of' Mr. Seymour, his 
735c. L. w. Fock, July 27, 1948, 21387. 737Ibid 
-· 
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opposite number in the British Secret Intelligence Service, of the fit-
ness of the candidate. Agents came from units of the Dutch armed forces 
in Bngl&lld, the merchant marim, and from the ranks of refugees from 
Holland. Some were spotted by their commanding officers, who were in-
structed to be constantly on the lookout for likely candidates. Othera 
were suggested by security officers who screened civilians of Dutch na-
tionality who arrived in Britain. On occasion persons volunteered their 
services for the Intelligence Bureau without any prior recruitment or 
recommendation and were aooepted.738 
Nearly everything the Dutch received in the way of agent training 
or supplies came from the Brithh. This wes part of the price Holland 
paid for not having made any sort of advance preparations for a German 
occupation. There "118re in the Netherlands community in London no ex-
perts in wireless, cryptography (save for one in the Foreign Ministry), 
parachute jumping, or in the general field of agent training.739 
No special psychological examinations were given to prospective 
agents, at least as fa.r as this wr:l. ter 1s able to determine. Persons 
selected for training as agents were, to be sure, subjected to several 
weeks of training during which they were exposed to a wide variety of 
different situations am their reactions noted. This wes done in ad-
vance of their specifically being told of the purpose for which they 
were selected, although most had long since managed to guess their pro-
spective role. There can be little doubt that persons who were emo-
tionally or psychologically unfit were selected and did become agents, 
738H. Go Broekman, July 27 • 1948, 21227. 
739J. M. Somer, February 28, 1950, 76367££. 
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but an examination of the appended chart will suggest that "the rate of 
success was quite respectable. Several were shot down in flying to 
Holland or had the bad fortune to drown in parachuting, but the vast 
majority of Bureau agents were delivered dry, alive, and of scund limb 
and of these none was captured on arrival. A ff1W were prevented by 
assorted disasters from operating, usually through the loss of their 
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radio equipment or radio operator, or the nearness of the Gestapo, but 
most carried out at least part of their mission. Even agents who survived 
a few scant weeks, as can be seen, still might make major contributions. 
They left behind functioning organizations, some of which continued in 
full operation until the end of World War II. Radio equipment which 
agents delivered to intelligence-gathering organizations often survived 
their own arrest, having been S'ecreted elsewhere, and continued to be 
operated by persons trained by the London agenta • tapping out, vi tal 
telegrams for the attention of London. 
Agents were trained in parachute jumping by the Royal Air Force; 
and in general intelligence-gathering techniques and in cryptography 
by the British.740 
The specific missions which were assigned to agents were deter-
mined by the Intelligence Bureau• in oollperation with the London Gov-
ernment. There were no more agents with dual missions from the Dutch 
and from the British Secret Intelligence Service.741 
Where an agent was to work with clandestine organizations in Hol-
land he was given special training by the Bureau itself, since the 
British Secret Intelligence Service lacked personnel sufficiently 
740rbid •• 76332ff. 741Ibid. 
trained in the lore and circumstance~ of underground organisations 
peouliar to the Netherlan~. Instruction in this subject would vir-
tually have to be given in the Dutch language and almost none of the 
British personnel knew any Dutch at all. 742 
Forged identit,y papers were also supplied to agents by the British. 
While much of the training received by Intelligence Bureau agents was 
at the hands of the British, the Bureau was in frequent touch with its 
trainees, who were often visited by Dutch officers.743 
Most of the agents· were accompanied by a radio operator. The 
earlier practice of training a single person in both espionage tech-
niques and in wireless telegraphy was largely abandoned. This offered 
at least an advantage in time, since both an agent and his radio opera-
tor could be trained si~ultaneously and be ready for the field sooner. 
Some persons might not be suitable for both tasks. A recurrent disad-
vantage was that, as can be seen from the chart, agents· were sometime~r 
~teriously handicapped by the capture or disability of their radio 
operator. One particularly difficult case was that of J. E. van Loon,. 
who was dropped as radio operator with Agent A· w. M. Ausems on the 
night of February 29, 1944. Van Loon was temperamentally completely 
unsuited to serve in this capacity, and has the dubious distinction 
of having been, as far as this writer can determine, the only agent 
~rent to Holland by any service to have been formally disoharged from 
the employ of the London Government while in the field. In this case 
742rbid. Some of the agent-traineeS' knew less English than was 
supposed~the time and, on occasion, failed to grasp part of what 
was told them by their British instructors. 
743J. M. Somer, JUne 16, 1948, 14790. 
:ros 
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,A:usems was able to find assistance from the radio operators of successive 
agents, although with great difficulty, since they already had a consid-
arable work load. The Ji,usems-van loon problem was aggravated by the 
fact that it was van loon who had been instructed in cryptography,. not 
Agent Ausems. As a result london had on two occasions to send special 
cryptographers to assist Ji,usems.744 In addition, the van Loon affair 
was partly the concern of a ••check"' agent, K. A. Mans, dropped on the 
night of August 4, 1944, who had as part of his mission to make in-
quiries into the matter. 
Radio operators were trained in wireless telegraphy and given at 
least a cursory knowledge of radio theory. They generally knew enough 
to set up their equipment, erect a suitable transmitting antenna, and 
establish contact with london. There were, it will be recalled, 
radio operators of the earlier Central Intelligence Service who had 
been unable to establish contact without enlisting local teohnioa.l 
assistanoe.745 Should a London-trained radio operator be confronted 
by damaged or inoperative equipment he might lack the knowledge to 
effect rapaira. 
A number of frequencies were made available by the British for 
clandestine Dutch use. After portions of France were libera.ted, in 
the sl1!11ller a.nd fall of 1944, a :munber of additional channels were 
withdrawn from their former use by the French Maquis and placed at 
74~hese were J. de Blooys, who arrived on May 7 • 1944 and G. B 
Buunk, who arrived on June 5, 1944. 
745Bureau agents may have been no better in this respect. In the 
later period resistance groups often had technical specialists available 
who could effect repairs immediately, thus making the lack of know-
ledge on the part of the agent less a.pparent. 
the diaposal of the Dutoh. Agenta or others operating clandestine 
transmitters who wished to communicate with London, assuming they were 
in posseasion of an approved code, had to have crystals calibrated to 
oscillate on the London-approved frequenciea. These crystals had to 
come from the Briti!rh. This was not an arbitrary rule laid down by 
London, it was simply that the crystals were not available at all in 
the occupied territory. More than one transmitter was silenced, either 
temporarily or permanently by lack of a crystal.746 
An agent with material of less than top priority would probably 
send it by the SWiss Route, often through a "'out-out•• or intermediate 
person. The ever-present menace of mobile German radio direction 
finding stations made the transmission of lengthy telegrams a most 
perilous" activity~ although this was done on occasion. The agent 
might code the telegram himself or this might be done by the radio 
operator. In addition to the code, supplied by the British who used 
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a uniform system of codes, eaoh agent or operator had a security check, 
that is some sort of departure from the text which was used to authen-
ticate the telegram as being prepared and sent free from duress. The 
security check, and each was different, might consist of making a mis-
take in the text every eleventh character, or making a stock mistake in 
the letter "r" or something of the sort. The security check was supposed 
to be inconspicious, but still reoogni~eable, so that if the agent was 
to be captured and forced to transmit under duress, or if any unauthor-
ized person employed hia code, this faot would become immediately 
apparent. All telegrams from agents of the Dutoh Intelligence Bureau 
746somer .. loc. cit., 14821. 
were received, together with those of all other Allied intelligence 
agents· in Europe. in a central station operated in England by the 
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Br-itish Secret Intelligence Service.747 Thh ,.central'• could also, of 
course, tran~it to the agents telegrams for their information or guid• 
ance. Once the central station received a telegram from a Dutch Intelli-
gence Bureau agent it was decoded and then passed to the Dutch as it 
stood at that point, without paraphrasing, without correction or inter-
polation. Whether the security check was included, partly included, 
or omitted was also stated on the face of the decoded telegram. Since 
the security checks consisted, in the main, of certain predetermined 
mistakes, and since manw telegrams were received only very imperfectly 
owing to the law power of the portable transmitters supplied the opera-
tors and to interference, it was often impossible to tell whether se-
curity checks had been included or not. Often more than the security 
check was lost in transmission. The Dutch would spend hours puz.aling 
over badly mutilated telegrams, trying to ascertain the sense of them. 
"Dummy'~ letters had to be inserted for trial purposes-- eventually 
most could be figured out to some extent. There was frequent consul-
tation between both the Bureau and the British Secret Intelligence 
Service as to the content of some messages. Dr. Somer, who did much 
of this work, found that, after a few messages, he could recognize the 
style of the sender and identify the person preparing it without see-
ing the signature. a helpful facility since the signature might well 
have been "'buried"' under statio at the receiving station. He did 
receive telegrams sent by the Germans. This was expected as agents 
747rbid. 
generally were instructed to give their oode to interrogators after 
some questioning, but, if possible, not to divulge their security 
cheok or checks. Some of these messages transmitted or inspired by 
the Germans were reoeivedwith sufficient clarity so that the omission 
of the security oheok was immediately apparent. others contained ob-
vious "Germanisms", the stock mistakes make by Germans using Dutch or 
even by Hollanders used to employing German in their dailywork.74S 
From the ohart it will be noted that most of the agents worked 
with some intelligence-gathering organization in Holland. Some did 
so at the express direction of London, others because a given organ-
ization was conveniently at hand. 
Generally the intelligence organizations in the occupied terri-
tory can be placed in three categories: Those Which were founded by 
London agents, those founded by a resistance organization originally 
established for some other purpose, and those established by private 
persons solely as intelligence agencies. 
Among those founded by London agents were the Kees group, founded 
by E. W. de Jonge, put ashore as an agent of the Central Intelligence 
Service in the Hazelhoff Roelfzema days, the A!breoht group, founded 
founded on the initiative of the first Intelligence Bureau agent, H. G. 
de Jonge, and the Barbara group founded by Intelligence Bureau agent 
G. A· van Borasum Buisman after his arrival in June, 1943. 
The best known of the intelligence organizations founded by 
groups originally established for some other purpose were those 
operated by the Qrder Service and the Council of Resistance. That 
748rbid. 
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or the Council was sometimes called the Radiodiemt, ("Radio Service"'), 
and had originally been a part of the Order Service. It was presided 
over by Jan Thijssen. The proprietor of the Order Service, Colonel 
Six, was awarded, after World War II, the Military William's Order, 
the highest Dutch deooration.749 It can be guessed that this award 
was granted more for the intelligence services rendered by the Service 
than for ita other aotivites. Since it did contain numbers or persons 
with a military background, the Order Service was ideally equipped to 
engage in espionage, particularly as concerned military matters. The 
Order Service had an admirable record for protecting the radio opera-
tors assigned to it from capture by German direction finding stations. 
Sinoe direction finders oould only give the approximate location, it 
was always necessary for suoh German units to send a vehicle into the 
area, followed by persons on foot equipped with portable receivers. 
The Order Service organized for transmitter locations an elaborate 
system of lookouts, some fixed and some on bicycle, who could warn 
the transmitter operator, sometimes by telephone, of the approach of 
such aotivity.750 
The Parool, ~atchword) group was founded by the clandestine 
newspaper which bore the same name, as was the Spijker group, which 
published an underground weekly.751 
The Dienst Wim was unique in that it was founded by a foreign 
749 Interview with c. H. Evers, April 21, 1960. 
750 P. J. Six, November 30, 1948, 35705. 
751E. Deinum, May 17, 1949, 53208. The Spijker wa~t a brand of 
automobile made in Holland, llhioh was ancient and much loved. 
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resistance body, the Belgian Rinus organization, which operated its 
own courier route for documents which ran through Lisbon. 752 The 
pienst Wim had contact w1 th London through Dutch agents, as well as 
through the Rinus organization. The Dutch B.R. group was formed from 
a remnant of the Dienst Wim which had survived Gestapo arresta.753 
Generally intelligence organizations were not formed by under-
ground organizations which had specialized functions, with the excep-
tion of the clandestine press, already noted. One finds no intelli-
genes organizations established, for example, by the National Support 
Fund, the Forgery Central, or the National Fugitive Aid Organization. 
By their very nature they would have imperiled the lives of thousands 
had they taken on such a hazardous function. One exception must be 
noted: The Rolls Ro:voe intelligence groups grew out of a support and 
shelter organization that specialized in assisting the inmates of pris-
ons and concentration camps.754 
Finally there were those groups established by private persons 
solely as intelligence organizations. Of importance in supplying 
London with valuable material was tsotor et Emerge, a group which 
later became Fiat Libertas.755 The Packard intelligence group oper-
ated, among other things, a transmitter which supplied meteorological 
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data to London, useful in planning air force raids on European targets. 756 
752J. le Poole, Juns 7, 1949, 56860ffo Rinus "Was the code name 
of a Belgian named Vandermeerssohe. 
753Ibid., 56886ff. 
7S4K. L. de Vries, June 7, 1949, 57043. 
755J. M. Kielstra, February 17, 1949, 42349. 
75~r. Vader, May 5, 1949, 49260ff. 
Still another intelligence group Which was formed as such was the 
b!arinier organization, which, as can be seen from the appended chart, 
had several regional branches and was quite active. In the same cat-
egory was the Geheime Dienst Nederland ("Secret Service Ketherlands 11 ) 1 
an organization which collected a prodigious amount of material, some 
of which was very highly valued bo' the British and Canadian forces at 
the time of the liberation of the lietherlands. Although the Geheime 
Dienst Nederland was the organization from which Dr. Somer himself had 
oome prior to travelling to England, relations were not close with the 
Dutch Intelligence Bureau at the start, although, as the chart demon-
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strates, they improved greatly later. At one point the Geheime Dienst 
Nederland sent its own representative, a Mr. Jansen, to London, After 
a harrowing trip over the Pyrenees, on foot and in the dead of winter, 
he was arrested by police in Spain. From his prison cell he managed to 
get the Dutch Consul to send a wire to Dr. Somer, requesting assistance 
in proceeding to London, The reply was short and to the point: "B,I. 
[the Intelligence Bureau) is no travel 1!rureau."757 Later the Bureau 
did assist Mr. Jansen in reaching England but he had less than fond 
memories of the whole affair, in spite of this fact. 
Without trying to detract from the most valuable services rendered 
by the Geheime Dienst Nederland, note must be made of the fact that it 
did represent a source of some financial difficulties just at the end 
of the war, Recognizing that some of the private intelligence organ-
izations had sizeable staffs who had done nothing but gather ir>..formation 
for Allied account for months or years, utilizing aid from the National 
757w. J. B. Jansen, February 16, 1950, 51866. 
Support Fund and moving on forged identity papers, the Bureau made 
available to most of the private intelligence organizations varying 
amounts of money for the orderly liquidation of their organizations. 
It was widely felt that the Geheime Dienst Nederland had had expend-
itures in this regard far in excess of reasonable limits. 758 
Those serving in these various private intelligence organizations 
came from all walks of life, with the academic community being extra-
ordinarily well represented. Some of the work involved was as dramatic 
as that of preparing a plan of a German airfield.759 some of it was as 
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prosaic as the preparation of a statistical abstract of diesel fuel oon-
sumption figures, supplied by a loyal Dutch civil servant who had access 
to German records. 
It is difficult to determine the precise importance or signii'i-
canoe of the Netherlands intelligence gathering effcrt, whether partic-
ipated in by agents from London, private intelligence organizations in 
Holland, or a combination of the two. 
It is an undeniable fact that, by the closing year of the war, 
what had been a trickle had become a flood; that by telegraph and micro-
film Major Somer and his staff were receiving a vast quantity of mate-
rial on military, economic, social, and political subjects from the 
occupied territory. That this material was of value in the immediate 
postwar period can scarcely be doubted, although ~' the nature of the 
processing given material received in London some important items of a 
758J. M. Somer, February 24, 1950, 76044. 
759It once happened that the Bureau discovered that several 
different groups had--independently mapped the same airfield, with 
results which were, fortunately, in almost exact agreement. 
non-military nature were certainly mislaid. 
As has been noted the operation of the British Official Secrets 
Act makes impossible any attempt to assess the precise value of infor-
mation gathered by the Dutch to the Allied war effort. It is known, 
for example, that the ~ intelligence group supplied London with 
detailed reports on the German V-1 and V-2 weapons which Dr. Somer 
described as "very exact and very useful". 760 One has no way of de-
termining whether these particular reports were really of use or not. 
Much would have depended on whether they reached London in advance of 
similar reports of other derivation, and on the exact nature of the 
material contained therein. 
When the First Airborne Division dropped into what appeared to be 
a German trap at Arnhem, 761 there were those in London who wondered how 
or why the elaborate Dutch intelligence network had apparently failed. 
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The fact of the matter is that some advance word of warning of the Ger-
man deployment was given by the Dutch intelligence organizations, as the 
First Airborne's commanding officer, Major-General R. E. Urquhart relates: 
••• Already • however, Dutch resistance reports had been noted 
to the effeot that "battered panzer remnants have been sent to 
Holland to refit", and Eindhoven and Nijmegen were mentioned 
as reception areas. And during the week an intelligence officer 
at SHAEF • poring over reports and maps, came to the conclusion 
that these panzer formations were the 9th and possibly the loth 
Panzer Divisions. It was likely that they were being re-equipp-
ed with new tanks from a depot in the area of Cleves, a few miles 
760 Somer, loa. cit. 
761There is no evidence to support the view that the Germans had 
any advance warning of the Arnhem attack. It was apparently just a 
matter of chance that German armored units were stationed in the area, 
since they had been sent there for recuperative purposes. The writer 
feels this point should be made clear, as a very widely believed 
account has it that a person or persons disloyal betrayed the Allied 
oause by "leaking" word of the battle plan to the Ge:nnans. 
over the Gennan border from Nijmegen and Arnhem. The SHAEF 
officer's opinion was not shared by others and, even as our 
preparations continued, 21st Army Group Intelligence were 
making it plain that they didn't see eye to eye with SHAEF 
over the panzer divisions. Nothing was being allowed to 
mar the optimism prevailing across the channelo762 
In this instance whoever gathered and prepared the original 
report in the field had underestimated the Gennan strength. However, 
it was up to SHAEF to make its own assessment of the situation, to 
ask for further details (and there is no evidence to show that it had 
cb re this), since the warning had been given. 
The Epgland-8piel. 
While the Dutch intelligence agenoies had gone through the devel-
opment just described, another sort of Netherlands "contact" activity 
was experiencing a parallel growth. On the British side there was, 
in addition to the Secret Intelligence Service, the Special Operations 
Executive (or "s.O.E."), a sabotage organization which also sought to 
establish contact with resistance organizations in various German-co-
oupied countries and promote their growth. The closest thing to tl:e 
S.O.E. 'Which the Dutch developed prior to March 15, 1944, when the 
Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten ("Special Services Bureau"), a nearly-
identical twin for the s.o.E., came into being, was the Bureau Mili-
taire Voorebereiding Terugkeer ("Military Bureau for the Preparation 
of the Return to Holland"). The Military Bureau for the Preparation 
of the Return (or "lE.V .T •"), still had pretensions of being partly an 
intelligence organization, since it was initially supposed to collect 
reports relating to the military aspects of the return of the London 
Government to Holland. The British were less than entirely fond of 
762R. E. Urquhart, ,A,rnhlllll (New York, w. W. Norton, 1958), p. 9. 
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this arrangement, a view consistent with their aversion to "hybrid" 
t t . 763 oon ac agenoles. 
The M.V.T. also formulated plans for the creation of a "home 
front" type of military organization which might be employed in the 
ocoupied territory at the time of liberation. In oharge of the M.V.T. 
was Colonel M. R. de Bruyne, late of the defunct Central Intelligence 
Service. 
One of Colonel de Bruyne's first tasks as head of the M.V.T. was 
to examine a British plan for a joint S.O.E.-M.V.T. operation to be 
764 lmown as, Plan-Holland. 
Briefly, under the terms of Plan-nolland, organizers were to be 
parachuted into Holland, and were to train groups of men to oarry out 
certain sabotage missions at the time of a "United Nations" invasion 
of the continent. The organizers would also enter into conmmnication 
with London by means of radio and arrange for dropping sites, where 
quantities of explosives and related sabotage supplies might be deliv-
ered by parachute. 1~bers of men would have to be recruited to carry 
these stores away from the dropping site. Altogether the delivery of 
some 22,950 pounds of supplies was contemplated. It was estimated in 
the Plan-Holland summary that a total of 1,070 men would have to be 
recruited, and that participation in other underground activities 
would have to be rigorously excluded. The plan envisaged the dis-
ruption of railway communications by blocking and destroying rail 
76~he M. V .T. was an outgrowth of the earlier Bureau for the 
Preparation of the Return. The non-military aspects of the earlier 
Bureau were transferred, on May 21, 1942, to the newly-created War 
Conduct Department. 
764p;~, IVa, appendix, ovi. 
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lines; obstructing road communications in a fashion similar to rail 
lines; disabling telecommunications, with explosives in the case of 
underground cables, falling poles where wires were overhead. The 
grounding of German fighter aircraft was contemplated by means of 
armed attacks on German airfields, wherein beth the aircraft and their 
fuel supplies were to be destroyed. 
The Dutch reaction, in a letter from Colonel de Bruyne to the 
Special Operations Exeoutive, 765 w.as not entirely favorable. Colonel 
de Bruyne began by noting Plan-Holland assumed a closeness of ocntaot 
between the London Government and the armed resistance groups which 
did not, at the time, exist. He pointed out that densely populated 
Holland was not the place fer extensive armed guerilla activity. 
There was, as he expressed it, no place to hide. In his view the 
ends desired, those of disrupting various forms of German communi-
cation, could be as efficiently accomplished by means less apeotao-
lar. One could, for example, stop communications by rail by mixing 
carborundum in the oil of Diesel locomotives, or by cutting the power 
supply of electric railway lines, of which there were a number in 
Holland. Similar, less direct methods could be employed with tele-
communications. Colonel de Bruyne doubted if armed attacks against 
German airfields could succeed at all, as he was certain the Luftwaffe 
would have taken precautions against just such a possibility. Colonel 
de Bruyne felt that the idea of making advance preparations for the 
disruption, at a given signal, of German communications was still an 
excellent one. He believed, however, that it would be better to 
765Ibid., cviii. 
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supply the leaders of armed resistance units already in Rolland with 
the objectives desired and let them recommend more of the means, 
requisitioning those necessary supplies.766 
As it turned out agents were dispatched by the s.o.E., working in 
co8peration with the M.V.T., to see what could be arranged along the 
lines suggested by Colonel de Bruyne. Once they made contact with the 
armed resistance they were then to advise London and arrange for the 
dropping of supplies. The agents were trained entirely by the British, 
and were given Britsh codes and identity checks, as had been the case 
with the Intelligence Bureau agents. They virtually never saw Dutch 
officers during their training. Some of the Special Operations Ex-
ecutive instructors, unlike those of the Secret Intelligence Service, 
knew Dutch, and in some cases had clearly lived in Holland or the 
Dutch East Indies. ~ before, the agents were instructed to divulge 
their code if pressured, but to withhold their identity check. If 
instructed to do so they were to transmit for the Germans. The omis-
sion of their identity check would be sufficient to alert London to 
their capture. 767 
The first regular operational team of two agents dispatched in 
this connection, H. ~. G. Lauwers and Thijs Taconis, was dropped on 
the night of November 7, 1941. tauwers was sent primarily as the radio 
operator, Taconis was an expert in sabotage. 768 In actual fact one 
earlier team, that of Cornelia Sporre and Huib Albert Eomburg, had 
766~· 767F.. u. G. Lauwers, July 23, 1948, 20265. 
768schreieder, loc. cit., 17014. 
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been sent out in September to examine the possibilities of the sort under 
consideration. Homburg was arrested, eventually escaped, and returned 
to England. He had little to report on his mission, but apparently 
the Germans had failed to learn of its mture. Sporre was drowned in 
an attempted crossing of the North Sea. 769 
Taconis contacted a Captain van den Berg of the Order Service, 
who offered the assistance of men who would help secrete the supplies 
to be contained in a "dropping", a parachuted freight shipment of sa-
botage materials. Lauwers, after some trouble with his radio trans-
mitter, contacted London and arranged for the delivery. The ground 
party was on hand at the appointed time and place end the first ship-
ment apparently arrived without incident. Unknown to van den Berg or 
Taconis the ground party contained an agent provocateur, not of the Ge-
stapo, but of the Abwehrstelle Niederlande (German military counter-
intelligence), one George Ridderho£. Ridderho£ reported to the head 
of Abwehr III£, Oberstleutne.nt H. J. Giekes, telling of the S.O.E.-
M.V.T. operation, of which he, Ridderho£, had learned a great deal. 
That the plans of this joint Dutch-British operation should be so 
readily available seemed to Giskes to be a little too good to be true. 
His first reaction was to say to Ridderhof, "Gehen Sie zum NOrdpol 
mit diesen Gesohichtenl" (Go to the NOrth Pole with these tales&). 
Later, when the Wehrmacht, in its counter-intelligence capacity, had 
become rather extensively involved in the affair it came to be called 
Fall Nordpol ("North Pole Affair"), The German Sicherheitsdienst. 
which was also involved, called the episode the England-spiel ("Eng-
769Ibid. 
land GIUile"). Too good to be true or not, the Abwehr and the Sicher-
heitsdienst simply moved in on the operation. Captain van den Berg 
and his associates were arrested. Direction-finding units had detected 
Lauwers almost immediately and transcribed his transmissions. It was 
a relatively simple matter to determine the place of operation, take 
Lauwers prisoner, and seize his transmitter. Under pressure Lauwers 
supplied some of the details of his code, little was needed as the 
information obtained from the earlier captured agent of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, van dar Reyden, was sufficient to make breaking 
the code feasible. 770 
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Lauwers agreed to transmit some messages for the Germans, using the 
dictated English language text given him by Giskes• assistant, Hunte-
mann, whose facility with English was reasonably good. After a ft!IW 
sessions, in which he was "controlled" by a German radio operator, who 
sat next to him wearing a headset with which he could hear the Morse 
transmission, Lauwers was replaced by a German military operator. 
Tpose immediately supervising the operation felt Lauwers not to be 
entirely trustworthy, a suspicion in which they were correct. He had 
omitted his security checks ar.d, in addition, worked the characters, 
"CAU**GliT11 and "WORKED BY JERRY SINCE ••• " into two of his messages. 
This went unnoticed by the German monitor, who apparently knew no Eng-
lish and took any departure from the text as a simple mistake made by 
an inexperienced radio operator. Unfortunately it would seem that the 
operator who copied the message at the Special Operations Executive 
"'central" in England knew no English either, as these extra characters 
770Ibido 
were either ignored as errors in transmission or ~decoded" along 
with the rest of the message, in which case they would have become, 
of course, meaningless gibberish. 771 
The Anglo-Dutch plan was to drop a series of sabotage instructor-
radio operator teams, using each to build a new "line~ over which 
supplies could be delivered, each with its own radio link, its own 
dropping sites, its own store of explosives, and its own personnel. 
This, starting with the Lauwers-Taconis "line"'• was precisely what 
was done. The S.O.E.-M.V .T. dropped agents and their radio operators, 
one after the other. Each one set up OC!nlmlnications with the s.o.E. 
"central~ station, each arranged for "droppings" and the necessary 
personnel to convey away and hide the ahiiJ!lent. From London things 
seemed to be going smoothly. From Berlin's vantage point they were 
also going smoothly. The Wehrmacht and the Sioherheitsdienst met 
each new group of arrivals, who, after extensive questioning as to 
their missions, aedes, et cetera, were carted off to imprisonment in 
a former Roman Catholic seminary, naw a Gestapo prison, at P~ren, Hell• 
and. The canisters of explosives, small arms, ammunition, clothing, 
and even food were laboriously trucked to warehouses, and, with typical 
German thoroughness, exhaustively cataloged and indexed. Eaoh nline" 
was supposedly independent, but London had made the fatal mistake of 
having eaoh new team of organizer end radio operator received by a 
reception committee made up of members of the 111ine" to have been 
most recently established. Tlms there vras an unbroken chain stretch-
ing back to Lauwers and Taoonis (who was arrested a few days after 
771Lauwers, loo. cit., 20511. 
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after ~uwers). .Ul the Germans had to do was to keep straight which 
"line" they were supposedly operating at the moment, and which code 
was applicable. Agents of the Dutch Intelligence Bureau, even those 
of the old Central Intelligence Service, had been dropped "blind", 
partly in recognition of the hazards of reception committees. Some 
of the earlier s.o.E. agents, and there had been a few before the Plan-
l~lland was developed, had also been dropped "blind"• 
In London the omissions of some of the agent security checks were 
noted. As had been the case with regular intelligence agents, the 
heavy interference on the low power radio circuits meant that many 
telegrams were received in badly distorted fonn, so that it was often 
quite impossible to be quite certain about the security checks. 
A former official of the s.o.E., speaking for the head of the 
Dutch section, explains the decision regarding the security checks in 
this fashion: 
••• The most important result of the penetration of these 
operations was that, as it took place at an early stage it 
led to complete German control. An important contributory 
cause of the penetration, and particularly of its continuance 
was that the omission of the security checks by certain W/r 
operators was ignored • 
••• Investigations were held at various periods after the 
original penetration had begun, but in each case a decision 
was taken to continue the operations. These decisions were 
reached after taking into consideration the personalities 
and characters of the agents, and with the knowledge that 
the seouri ty checks had been proved in other cases to be in-
conclusive as a test ••• 772 
The British seemed satisfied, and the Dutch, not having any dif-
ferent evidence to present, were willing to go along with this view. 
The telegrams sent by the s.o.E.-M.V.T. agents (or by the Germans, 
77~1~, IVa, appendix, cxxii. 
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depending on one's point of view at the moment) were received by the 
Dutch after they had been decoded and paraphrased, with a notation as 
773 to whether the security check had been given or not. 
Meanwhile, in Holland, the Germans were having some problems of 
their own. On the night of June 26-27, 1942, George Jambroes and 
Joseph Bukkens were dropped into their midst. It appeared that these 
latest arrivals had as their mission the construction of a large sa-
botage organization, to contain some 1,067 men and, in its general 
lines, greatly resembling the familiar Plan-Holland. However it was 
provided that the Order Service would be placed in charge of carrying 
out this mission. This precipitated a major crisis for the Germans. 
If the Order Service supposedly became a part of the operation, traf-
f'io with London would soon be at an end, since an organization as big 
as the Service was bound to have contacts of' its own with London. A 
telegram was sent to London, arguing that the Order Service was "not 
suited for this task" and urging that "agents from London" create the 
proposed organization on their own. London, to the relief of the 
Sicherheitsdienst and the Wehrmacht, agreed. 774 
Another crisis arrived by parachute during the night of' September 
24-25, 1942, in the person of' one Roelof Christiaan Jongelie, a new 
agent who had been sent with some sort of special mission having to 
do with Plan-Holland. He had carrier pigeons, special photographic 
equipnent, and he looked suspiciously like a "control" agent, whose 
job it was to verify the state of health and freedom from imprisonment 
of' earlier agents. Many of' the captured agents, on being confronted 
773sruyne, loc. cit., 30532. 774schreieder, lee. cit., 17000f'f'. 
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by the German penetration of the network, talked quite freely, feeling 
that they had been betrayed in London and that, if this was not the 
case, the absence of the security check in their telegrams would 
serve to alert the British. Jongelie refused to tell much of his 
mission at all. So London was told that he had suffered a "brain 
concussion" • Daily medical bulletins were sent, with a final one 
reporting his tragic passing. Jongelie was, however, very much 
alive. 775 
London began to give the organization which, as far as it knew, 
was doing nicely, some minor sabotage assignments entirely aside from 
any projected Allied invasion plans. On the night of July 23, 1942, 
there arrived Gerard Jan van Hemert, with a mission of destroying a 
radio transmitter at Kootwijk, Helland, which was used by the Germans 
in regulating "U"' boat traffic. ~ooordingly, Sohreieder caused a 
story to be fed into the network of the German Wire service, the 
Deutsohes Nachriohtenbureau, of an unsuccessful attack on a radio 
transmitter in Hellam. At the same time the correct "line" to Lon-
don carried a similar account, This seemed to satisfy London. Later, 
acts of the genuine Dutch resistance and ordinary industrial or rail-
way accidents were reported to London as acts of the s.o.E.-M.V.T. 
776 
agents • 
.Another problem soon arose. The famous agent provocateur, .Anton 
van der Waals, came to Kriminal Direktor Joseph Sohreieder of the 
Sioherheitsdienst and reported that he had penetrated the operations of 
one Willem Johan Niermeyer, a parachuted London agent. Niermeyer, his 
775Ibid., 17156. 776Ibid., 17137, 
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code. and his transmitter were captured forthwith. Niermeyer. as it 
turned out. had nothing to do with the S.O.E.-JJ.V.T. operations at 
all. He was an intelligence agent. apparently sent by the British 
Secret Intelligence service with the tacit approval of the Dutch. 
Sohreieder was tempted to add yet another "line" to his collection. 
but Niermeyer represented a special problem! He had not been sent 
to Holland to act as a sort of clandestine freight agent. as had so 
many now in Haren prison. His job was supplying military information. 
Schreieder could give the British and the Dutch incorrect reports. and 
this was a tantalizing possibility. but London might discover that the 
reports were incorrect and oome to suspect other "lines"· as well. 
Schreieder could give them accurate information. in which case he 
would be guilty of treason. He could give them bits of minutia. or 
information that was badly out of date. There seemed no point to this. 
A few telegrams were sent over Niermeyer•s circuits after his capture 
and then no more. Since Uiermeyer had nothing to do with the s.o.E.-
L!.V .T. operation. London suspicions were not aroused. for London Nier-
meyer was just one more intelligence agent who had been oaughto777 
Still another crisis arose when LoDdon requested the return to 
England of agent Taooniso "Taoonis" • or the Germans to be more precise. 
sent a message• highly recommending an "assistant" • a certain "Antoon" • 
and urging that "Antoon" be sent. "Antoon", a German agent. travelled 
on his way supposedly to London. via Paris• where he was "captured" by 
the Gestapo in a restaurant in full view of French resistance workers. 
who dutifully reported this fact to London.778 
777J. Sohreieder. February 18• 1949. 42607-42609. 
778J. Sohreieder• JUly 130 1948• 48227-48241. 
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In an even more resourceful operation the Gestapo forwarded to 
London via a penetrated courier route a perfectly loyal Dutchman, a 
Mr. H. Knoppers who, as far as he personally knew, had been contacted 
by a fellow resistance worker who arranged for his clandestine travel 
to London. What Knoppers did :not know was that his "colleague" was 
the agent provocateur Ridderhof. The departure of Knoppers was an-
nounced to London over one of the "lines" and he was billed as playing 
a "leading role" in the Order Service. Knoppers duly arrived in Eng-
land, having, completely unknown to him, been shepherded painstakingly 
along the way by a veritable corps of Gestapo agents, Wehrroacht off-
icers in mufti, at cetera. He was closely questioned by the Dutch 
and the British in England, who oould certainly find :nothing wrong 
with hiln. It did appear that he knew practically nothing about the 
Order Service. Someone in London might have wondered about this 
strange lack of knowledge for a supposed expert, but apparently no 
one did.779 
Haren prison, in the meantime, was slowly filling with agents 
from Lo:ndon. one would have supposed that word of the debacle might 
somehow have leaked out, as there were both Dutch employees and civil-
ian Dutch hostages in Haren as well. As a matter of fact various 
messages intended for London do seem to have been smuggled out.780 
Simple bad luck aeems to have accounted for none of these reaching 
London for some time. Some were apparently delivered to persons who 
claimed, perhaps a little too grandly, to have good resistance con-
779n. Knoppers, May 3, 19481 48227-48241. 
78<1.1. J. E. Me Ste;yns 1 February 16, 1949, 41244. 
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neotions. Still others seemed to have been sent over "private" trans-
mitters which were not actually in contact with London. One or two 
may have been received in London over legitimate circuits but in suoh 
garbled form that identification of the prisoners in question was im-
possible. wndon received warnings of "betrayal" or of supposed Ge-
stapo "infiltration" at least onoe a week, and would have given suoh 
warnings only passing attention if they did not name names olearly. 781 
One report from imprisoned agents did reach an Order Service 
transmitter, so that on June 23, 1943, the following telegram arrived 
in wndon: 
Voor Kolonel DeBruyne stop Aoht paraohutistenwaaronder 
Doulin en Drake waken geleden gearresteerd. Code-slagwoord 
friend Marius bekend. 
TI!ANSLATIOll 
For Colonel de Bruyne. Eight parachutists, among them 
Doulin and Drake arrested weeks a~o a Code-reoogni tion word, 
"Friend Mar ius known [in wndon?] 8 
The British were not able to make immediate sense of this, but 
it is to be said to the credit of Colonel de Bruyne that he immediately 
spotted "Doulin" as one of the s.o.E.-M.V.T. agents, Pieter Dourlein, 
who had been parachuted on the night of March 90 1943. The warning 
was actually received after the last agent sent in connection with 
the Plan-Holland operation was dispatched, on May 21, 1943. Alto-
gather some fifty-two men and one woman had been dropped in this 
undertaking, not counting Homburg and S]?orre, who never became en-
meshed in the machinery of the §ngland-Spielo Forty-seven were even-
78lA. H. K. Lovink, July 24, 1948, 20979. 
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tually to die in a camp in Germany. One, Jan Molenaar, was killed 
when he parachuted, on March 3, 1942. The Germans released Lauwera, 
and George Dessing, of the second •line•, after the end of the Epgland-
Spiel. Beatrice W. M.A. Terwindt was spared because of her sex, al-
though she spent the war in German prisons. Two agents escaped from 
Haren and made their way to England. 783 
On the night of August 29-30, 1943, two agents imprisoned in 
Haren, Johan Bernard Ubbink: and Pieter Dourlein, escaped. The Germans 
now had to face the real danger that London would learn of the England-
Spiel in this fashion. London was advised over one of the "lines" 
that the two had been "captured"' by the Gestapo and were, it was feared, 
being groomed as agents provocateur and should be treated with extreme 
caution. Dutch and German police were circularized to the effect that 
Messrs. Ubbink and Dourlein were "esoaped street robbers". Their 
photographs were widely distributed and even included in the weekly 
newsreel sho'Wll in motion picture theaters. 784 
Ubbink and Dourlein stayed hidden in Holland for several weeks, 
during which time they sent another telegram to London describing the 
plight of their comrades in Haren, and then departed for England, 
travelling via SWitzerland, France, and Spain, including a harrowing 
crossing of the Pyrenees. They sent telegrams to London from Switzer-
land and Spain, so that by the time they reached London in early April, 
19441 their fame had certainly preceded them. Thanks in large part to 
their efforts the German penetration of the s.o.E.-M.V.T. network had 
been discovered. After two or three days in England they were both 
?83J. B. Ubbink, July 23, 1948, 20704. 784Ibide 
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thrown in jail. Ubbink in particular, who had suffered greatly in the 
crossing of the Pyrenees, was in ill health. Neither would quite say 
that they were treated as badly as they had been by the Germans, but 
British jails were clearly not a vast improvement. Both believed 
later that they were imprisoned as a security precaution sinoe they 
arrived shortly before the "D" Day invasion of the continent. During 
their imprisonment they had been questioned almost entirely by the 
British, and at least one Dutoh officer, Major Somer of the Intelli-
gence Bureau, had tried to gain their release. 785 
For a time after the first telegraphic warnings reached London 
neither side was certain that the other was aware of the true state 
of affairs. The Germans were still trying to achieve the principal 
purpose of the England...Spiel, not that of simply playing an elaborate 
and deadly triok on the Anglo-Dutoh oontaot organizations, but rather 
one of learning something of Allied invasion plans. In terms of its 
true objective, then, the England-spiel was a German failure. Not 
even a good hint of the desired nature was·ever forthcoming from 
London. 
The British and the Dutoh, onoe they felt the German penetration 
to be a fact, were inclined to see just how far their German "col-
leagues were prepared to go in appearing to oarry out Allied orders. 
Thus London directed its "agents" to liquidate several leading Dutch 
National Socialists. This order, needless to say, was not carried 
out. It was Giskes, of the Abwehr, who had the last word, in a tele-
785J. M. Somer, June 16, 1948, 14862. The writer has been un-
able to determine whether the German warning about the "defection" 
of Ubbink and Dourlein ever reached London, and, if so, whether it 
caused London to question the loyalty of the two men when they 
themselves finally reached England. 
327 
gram dated April 1, 1944, directed to the heads of the Special Oper-
ations Executive in London. It was in English: 
Messrs. Blunt Bingham and SUcos Ltd. London 
In the last time you are trying to make business in 
Netherlands without our assistance stop we think this rather 
unfair in view our long and successful oo8peration as your 
sole agema atop att mver mind whenever you will come to 
pay a visit to the ContineDt you may be assured that you 
will be received with same care and result as all those 
you sent us before stop So long.786 
Conclusions 
Radio Orange, needless to say, stands apart from much of the 
rest of this dissertation, in that if offers little evidence on the 
desirability of London's employing persons or organizations already 
located or in being in the occupied territory. Rather the exper-
iance of Radio Orange is relevant to another postulate advanced as 
part of the conclusions to Chapter I, that one of the main tasks 
which the London Governnent could perform was the maintenance of 
contact with the occupied territory, as well as the procurement of 
information from that territory. Through radio broadcasting it was 
technically possible to establish such contact, and the history of 
Radio Orange indicates that this was feasible in other respects as 
11911. While persons in the occupied territory were not directly 
utilized in the transmission of these programs, it must be :ooted that 
Radio Orange did not achieve great effectiveness until it had wider 
access to reports from the occupied territory, reports gathered in 
large part by persons and organizations already there. 
One might safely conclude that the London Governnent did have a 
786E~, IVa, 878. 
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llj'lllbolic value and that Radio Orange, as a dramatic symbol of Dutch 
nationhood, tended to dramatize the very fact of the London GovEJrn-
ment. 
There can be no better example of London's having utilized per-
sons or organizations already located in or in being in the occupied 
territory than the Swiss and Swedish Routes. While it is true that 
Dr. Visser •t Hoeft was himself located on neutral ground, in SWitzer-
land, part of the impetus for the establishment of the organization 
which he helped create came from Holland proper. Furthermore, with-
out the painstaking work of those assembling materials at the Amster-
dam terminus of the Swiss Route 1 t would have represented little more 
than a listening post which relayed the impressions of an occasional 
traveller. Similarly, impetus for the SWedish Route, minor though it 
was compared to its Swiss counterpart, came from the occupied terri-
tory, in this case almost entirely so. 
As the reader is reminded above, one of the chief functions of 
the London Government, vis\ vis the occupied territory, was the es-
tablishment of lines of communication facilitating the bilateral flow 
of information. That London, in taking partial advantage of the op-
portunities afforded by the Swiss Route and the SWedish Route, did 
just that, is obvious. U0 te must be made of the fact that these 
routes were, as has often been charged, too nearly in the nature of 
a one-way street. London, possibly to avoid appearance of partisan-
ship, too often failed to reply to important communications from the 
occupied territory, when an ilmoouous word of acknowledgment would 
have been in order. 
329 
The intelligence agencies offer no special problems in terms of 
this dissertation. They do, of course, represent an example of the 
maintenance of communications with the oooupied territory, as would 
any functioning intelligence agency under the circumstances. That 
they repeatedly made extensive use of both persons and organizations 
already located or in being in the occupied territory has been made 
abundantly clear. The intelligence agencies did dispetoh agents from 
England for service in Holland, and, in this sense, use was not being 
made of local people or organizations exclusively. The explanation 
of this apparent exception appears in the simple fact that, in the 
relationship in question, the London Government possessed a certain 
technical monopoly, an attribute which it lacked in most other clan-
destine activities. Before effective espionage work could be done, 
at least if radio communications 'Mire to be employed, both the oorreot 
Oode and the all-important crystal, necessary for successful operation, 
were required. These could not very well be delivered by any means 
other than that of en agent from London. It can be seen, as illus-
trated in the example of the first agent, van Hamel, that persons al-
ready in Holland could carry on with the code and radio gear of a de-
parted agent, once the essential items had been delivered. As has 
been noted, in many important resistance activities of a technical 
nature London could supply only money and moral support, as persons 
on the scene had a monopoly of ths special knowledge necessary for 
suooess. Espionage represents, therefore, a special exception. 
The Eggland-spiel appears as an excellent negative example of 
London's having functioned more efficiently in its oontaot with the 
330 
occupied territory when it utilized those already present in that ter-
ritory. The operation plan of this S.O.E.-M.V.T. (England-spiel) ac-
tivity envisaged the creation of a vast organization of London's design 
and to be motivated by London's plan. It was to be set up not by local 
people but by agents dispatched from London. One oan certainly assume 
that the German capture of all agents and supplies dispatched in con-
nection with the England-spiel operation qualifies it as a complete 
failure from the Anglo-Dutch point of view. 
It is true that the missions of the original England-spiel agents 
had been tempered in accordance with Dutoh objections to p].an-Hplland. 
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so as to get the advice of persons in the occupied territory before 
proceeding further, but it must be noted that subsequent agents were 
given instructions closely following the original Plan-Holland. It is 
also true that Plan-Holland. as it was originally drawn, provided that 
the organization to be set up would make wide use of resistance forces 
already in being in the occupied territory. Eowever, when it was pointed 
out in London that these resistance forces did not, at the time in 
question, exist in sufficient numbers, preparations were still con-
tinued. Thus the effect was one of an organization planned from Lon-
don. 
FINAL COM:LUSIONS 
The final conclusions of this dissertation are as follows: 
1. The London Goverment could not provide for the maintenance 
of domestic order, for the economic welfare, or for the general safety 
of its citizens in the Gennan-oooupied territory. Thus "remote" ad-
ministration was generally unfeasible, save for the special exception 
of the railway strike of 1944. 
2. The London Government could serve to maintain communications 
with the occupied territory. Examples offered of this activity are 
the Swiss and SWedish Routes, Radio Orange, and the various intelli-
gence agencies. 
3. Another feasible activity of the London Government was the 
granting of assistance to selected organizations in the occupied ter-
ritory, some of which might themselves perform tasks benefiting the 
general welfare. The following are prime examples of this activity: 
The National Support Fund; the National Fugitive ,Ud Organization and 
the Knuckle Gangl and the forgery organizations. 
4. The London Government served as a fooua of national unity 
and maintained its own existence in order to be available to govern 
the Netherlands at the conclusion of hostilities. Radio Orange served 
as an important instrumental1 ty in bringing the Goverment and its 
absent population into closer oontaot, particularly in its presentation 
of addresses by the Dutch scvereign. 
5. The London Government was moat likely to be successful in 
performing all of the functions described above when it utilized the 
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services of persons or organizations already located or in being in 
the occupied territory, rather than attempting to dispatch persons to 
Holland or create such organizations from the vantage point of London. 
Among those organizations or activities tending to support this thesis 
are the following: The National Support Fund; the National Fugitive 
Aid Organization; the Knuckle Gang; the Order Service; the Council of 
Resistance; the Swiss and SWedish Routes; the clandestine press1 and 
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the various political, intellectual, and resistanoe-co8rdinating bodies. 
the 'fi!?gland-spiel episode is offered as important negative proof of this 
postulate. As partial exceptions to the rule appear London intelli-
gence agents and the creation by London of the College of Bondsmen 
and the Netherlands Forces of the tnterior. 
APPENDIX 
Partial text of the Commentary of 1943 on the Ordinances of 1937. 
1. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is at war with Germany. Occu-
pation of a portion of Dutch territory does not alter this 
fact. 
2. The Ordinances of 1937 remain in force unimpaired. 
3. While the double responsibility of the civil servants to the 
occupying power and to the Netherlands Government presents 
difficulties. the Queen and Her Goverment remain the law-
ful sovereign and continue to possess the right to draw the 
boundaries of activitw on the part of civil servants so that 
their authority may not be exceeded or eo that they may not 
commit acts of treason. 
4. The force of sections 2 and 3 of the Ordinances of 1937 can-
not be diminished by mere enamy proclamation. 
5. In particular the following is of importance: 
a. While Netherlands civil servants have to refrain from 
acts or omissions in the line of duty that injure 
the German war effort they may not in any respect 
co8perate in such a fashion as to further that war 
effort. 
b. The administrative organs may not be incorporated as 
part of efforts that further the German war effort. 
c. Every measure which measUre which has the effect of 
furthering this "'lll.r effort must be refused. 
d. While the Ordinances provide for resignation of a 
civil servant when he may be furthering the enemy 
war effort. this may in some circumstances be an un-
wise course of action since the civil servant resign-
ing may be replaced by a collaborator. 
6. While, by the proclamation of total war. Germaey seeks to 
add the total Netherlands 118.r potential to her own. under 
no circumstances may Dutch oo8peration be extended. This 
has been specifically provided in the name of the Nether-
lands Government in a radio address by the Minister-Pres-
ident. February 4• 1943. 
334 
7. The following German measures are intended to draw the Nether-
lands war potential into the German war effort 1 
a. The Arbeitseinsatz C"Iabor Pool"]. In connection with 
the J.rbeitseinsatz the following sorts of activity are 
forbidden: 
(1) The utilization of Dutch labor exchanges to re-
cruit workers for service in the German war 
effort. 
(2) Disclosure of material contained in municipal 
vital-statistics registers so as to benefit 
the recruitment of workers. 
(3) Oo~peration of rationing services with the 
forced-labor service, so that rationing cou-
pons are withheld from those who do not report 
or register in the various age groups. 
(4) Co8peration of the Dutch police in the location 
of those Dutoh workers who decline to go to 
Germany or to other destinations. 
b. The requisition of goods and raw materials: The Rules 
of Tend Warfare permit requisitions, including those 
from municipalities, only for the benefit of the army 
of occupation. This limit must not be exceeded ••• 
c. The taking of hostages as a coercive measure: Co8p-
eration in the location, arrest, or imprisonment of 
persons intended as hostages is forbidden. 
d. Taking Dutoh citizens into the German military ser-
vice: It is forbidden to coBperate with any measure 
that makes possible or furthers such recruitment. 
8. Under the obligations imposed by international law the oc-
cupying power is obliged to respect the laws of the terri-
tory occupied, exoept when it is absolutely impossible to 
do so. In addition, the occupying power is bound to respect 
the honor, family bonds, faith, and the open conduct of 
religious worship. The deportation of any resident of the 
occupied territory to Germany or anywhere else outside 
HOlland is in direct conflict with the Rules of Land war-
fare. The deportation of Jews, or the use of deportation 
as a measure either of coercion or punishment, is like-
wise forbidden. 
9. In observance of the Ordinances of 1937 very serious short-
comings have developed, in part due to the following: 
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The infiltration of the administrative service by collab-
orators; the presence in the administration of civil serv-
ants who are not conscious of their duties under the ~­
inances; the unexpected length of the occupation; and the 
widespread circulation of enemy propaganda expressing con-
trary views. 
10. The responsibility for the implementation of the Ordinances 
of 1937 rests on every administrative organ and on every 
civil servant individually and personally.787 
j!rtial text of broadcast delivered over Radio Orange, April 17, 
1941. bY Minister of Economic Affairs, M. P. L. Steenberghe, promising 
repayment of sums advanced in the occupied area to the dependents of 
Dutch merchant sailors in the Allied service. 
CompatriotsJ Last week the [German controlled] Hilversum 
radio station spread the report that the British Government, 
through the Netherlands Shipping Committee in London, is sup-
posed to have threatened Dutch sailors with the withdrawal of 
support for their families if they fail to continue to sail in 
the Allied Service. After this came the announcement that the 
Germans, for their part, would stop support being given to the 
family of any Dutch sailor who sails in the British service or 
in any ship which serves British interests. 
It appears that the above-mentioned German announcement 
came from someone who calls himself the "Commissioner for Sea 
and Inland Waterways". He appears to ignore the faot that 
there is a legal, Royal Netherlands Government, that has the 
complete support and agreement of those in both the occupied 
territory and the overseas territories in its fight against 
the usurper • 
••• In this connection I can report the following: The 
Netherlands Government stands ready to guarantee, indeed guar-
antees, all pa~ents which have been intended for the families 
of seamen or are to be made to them in the future. This gov-
ernment guarantee applies to the entire amount of sums that 
have already been agreed on for payment on a weekly or a monthly 
basis. In the event that enemy activity permits payment, I 
urge all Hollanders in the occupied territory to help support 
those left behind Qy the seamen. In this connection they can 
rest assured that the sums which they expend will be paid baok. 
787ENQ, VIIa, 60, 
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NOw a short word to the sailors themselves: 
On a number of occasions already I have expressed the grat-
itude of the Netherlands Government for the valuable work you 
are doing, so muoh in our best traditions, traditions that are 
also being maintained in the occupied territory by the resolute 
attitude taken against the oppressor, We could never permit a 
state of affairs to arise in which those you hold dear would 
suffer because you did your duty in the struggle for the liber• 
ation of our oountry. You can continue to perform your duties 
in the magnificent manner in Which you have acted so far, safe 
in the assurance that you will b3 thanked for your contribution 
by those you have left behind,78 
Excerpts of testimony of Mr. J. van der Gaag. delivered before 
the Inquiry Commiuion of the Netherlands Parliament, March 31, 1950, 
relating to the "character~ of the Council of Resistance, 
The Chairman: I think it would be useful to proceed to the 
oharaoter aDd goals of the Council of Resistanoe •• .We would like 
to have your view• on this subject. 
Mr. van der Gaagr "Character"' is :not a good word. "Char-
acter", as we use it today, carries more of a connotation of a 
specific political color. I joined the Council of Resistance 
exclusively to engage in resistance, One could better speak 
of the "taak" of the Council of Relristance. It seems that 
there was a certain distribution of tasks between the various 
resistance groups. As far as I can ascertain the distribution 
of tasks was approximately this I The K.P. [Knuckle Gang J was 
primarily occupied with raids on ration-distribution offices. 
The O,D, [Order Service] concerned itself with the period after 
liberation, while the Council of Resistance devoted its ener-
gies to sabotage and the removal from the scene of traitors 
and S.D. [Geman security police] agents, 
The Chairman: The K,P, did that tool 
Mr. van der Gaag: Yes, but the K,P, was primarily con-
cerned with attacks on ration-distribution offices, partly 
because the Council of Resistance did not consider this within 
its goals, That is not to say that, from time to time, the 
Council didn't take part in these activities, The organiza-
tions were not as sharply separated as that, 
The Chairman: You said that the word "character" was not 
788E~, VIIa, appendix, xxxi. 
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appropriate that one should speak of "task". 
Mr. van der Gaag: Yes. 
The Chairman: I really wonder about this now: Is that 
really so? There was not really a~ agreement between the 
organizations as to purposes and goals, was there! I still 
think the word "character• is better, beoause each group 
carried out the "task" for which, by its own peculiar circum-
stances, it was best equipped. The phrase "distribution of 
tasks" implies that there was some sort of agreement--that is 
to say that one group would do this and another that, lf!lile I 
have the impression that the "task"' evolved on its own, within 
each group individuallY••• 
Mr. van der Gaag: You mean, therefore, that the direction 
[of '\\Ork] of a particular resistance organization spoke of the 
character of that group? I can only state that acts of sabot-
age and the removal of specific persons were done principally 
~ the Council of Resistance, that raids on ration-distribution 
offices were carried out in nearly all instancesby the Knuckle 
Ga~. .An actual a~reellll8nt was never reached, but in the Thurs-
day N!>on :Meetings LCounoil of Resistance, Order Service, 
Knuokle Gang], the distribution of tasks was a very definite 
item of discussion. 
The Chairman: It came under discussion, then, whether a 
given act was more within the mture of a given group? 
Mr. van der Gaag: Not withiJl the "mture"· but the "ex-
perience"• When, tor example, it was known that a specific 
group was experienced in the handling of dynamite, to be used 
in the destruction of a railway, let ua say, or was equipped 
with the tools for the loosening of rails, then it stands to 
reason that this group 'WOuld do that sort of work. Therefore 
[in this example] they would say, "Let the Council of Resist-
ance do itt" 
The Chairman: Bow was the Council of Resistance organ-
ized? 
Mr. van der Gaag: Natio:nally. 
The Chairman: How was ••• [the national organization] rel-
ated to the local units? 
Mr. van der Gaag• Communications with some districts were 
difficult. From time to time someone went to the east or the 
south to ascertain how many people were available for Council 
activities: at the same time local commanders delivered reports 
of actions in which they or their group had participated. Haw 
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me.ny people belonged to the Council of Resistance l ahsll never 
be able to say with any certainty--after the war people told me 
that they had belonged to the Council of Resistance-- people of 
whom I, as Chairman of the Council, had never heard. 
I travelled from time to time [on Council business) to Fries-
lam. Freek [Gerben Wagenaar) took a particular interest in the 
"dropping1 areas in North Holland. y.nge Jan [Jan Thijssen] was 
in charge of radio communication•• Thus there was a division of 
labor. In meetings of the Council we would decide that someone 
would go, on the following week, to, let us say, North Brabant, 
to make contact with Jan, Piet, or Gerrit to blow up this or that 
railway or this or that factory. 
The Chairman: There was, then, a direct contact between 
the leaders of the Council of Resistance and the different 
group oomwurlera? It 'WOuld seem logical that the contact 
110uld be maintained by couriers, so that the group COilllliUlders 
would not know the identities of the Council leaders. 
Mr. van der Gaag: Well, I did go personally to Groningen, 
Friesland, and Brabant on various occasions. 
The Chai1'11lall• But an effort was made to presene as much 
anonymity as possible in the organization. 
Mr. van der Gaag: We did hsve in mind the principle of 
having as little personal oontaot aa possible. At the same 
time people were often afraid of dealing with a person totally 
unknown. 
The Chainnan: You said that you cannot say with certainty 
how many people took part in the Council of Resistance. For 
example, the Order Service appears to have had some 1001 000 
persons in its organization. At the same time the Knuckle Gang 
numbered some 1,000 to 2,000. When you hear those figures 
could you classifY the Council as to size? 
Mr. van der Gaag: I 'WOuld guess the total to be about 
2,000 active, working members, who regularly carried out 
Council of Resistance assignments. There were perhaps another 
20,000 who, when a given aadgmnent was in their own immediate 
neighborhood and within their competence, took part. Beyond 
that, there were perhafs 50,000 who said, "I belong to the 
Council of Resistance, and the simple fact of that state-
ment constituted their entire contribution. The core consisted 
then, of no more than 21 000 people, including our couriers. 
The Chairman: How was your work carried out? When, for 
ex11111ple, there was an aot of sabotage or something of aome 
specialized sort to be carried out, in, let us say, Fries-
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land, did you sent a specialist or use someone in the local 
area? 
Mr. van der Gaag: That cannot be simply ant!Wered, Things 
were so arranged that in the leaderahi~ of the Council we had 
a combat commander [gevechtsoommandant ], First it was Lapge 
Jan [Thijssen], later Freek [Gerben Wagenaar]. They saw to 
the implementation of Council policy decisions ••• The sabotage 
assigq&enta that were to be carried out were usually received 
from Engl~d by ~g§o• Ienge Jan and Freek saw that they 
were carr1ed out. 
Excerpts of the Manifesto of the Council of Resistance, published 
about September, 1943. 
Council of Resistance in the Kingdom of the Netherlanda: 
Declaration: 
For an extended period of time the Netherlands people, 
and, in particular, resistance workers, have felt the lack of 
a central body that could offer direction to the general reaist-
ance of the Netherlands people. In order to fill this serious 
void, the greater part of resistance organizations in this 
country have decided to accept common representation in the 
Council of Resistance. The goal of the Council of Resistano& 
is: The oo8rdinat:l.on of the acta of resistance in the Nether-
lands through central determination of the time, place, method, 
and nature of acts of resistance. To that end the Council will 
keep itself informed through the aid of pertinent specialists 
in the fields of military affairs, transportation, and econ-
omics, The Council of Resistance in its entirety accepts res-
ponsibility for all deeds that are done in agreement with its 
policy decisions. 
Policy decisions in regard to apeoific acts of resist-
ance are to be communicated only to the commanders of resist-
ance groups, In connection with the demands 11hioh the Council 
of Resistance makes of the Netherlands people at least the 
following shall be valid: The Council is unalterably opposed 
to extortionate prices being charged for food, in violation 
of price controls, and it shall not hesitate to employ the 
most severe means of punishment against those engaged in such 
acts. Similar action may be taken against those irresolute 
persons in the administration who shirk their true duty to 
the community, Our war for liberation can only be success-
fully completed if every member of the community is willing 
789Gaag, loa, cit., 77775. 
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to lend his or her fullest oo8peration. 
The Council wishes to stress that, no matter how difficult 
it may seem, it must count on the complete support of all Dutch 
subjects. There is only one alternative: One is for or against 
our national liberation. The possibility of pursuing a third 
ocurse, one of watchful waiting, has past. We stand on the eve 
of very difficult decisions--the Netherlands people must be 
united, united in their ideals, united in their active resist-
ance so that future acts of the enemy can be faced squarely. 
We ask our countrymen to support completely the general 
principles laid dawn here ••• 
General Principles of the Council of Resistance for: 
The Recapture of Prisoners of War and Forced Laber. Do 
not report. In so far as 1s possible, manufacture false doc-
uments to give the impression of having been given official 
exemption. Do not reside at home, but other than that try to 
continue a normal life; neighbors and acquaintances of such 
persons should curb their curiosity, and not try to learn 
details of each particular aituation, llhile at the same time 
lending as much aid as possible, even if it is not solicited. 
If you are forced to go to Germany miss no opportunity, 
either on the trip to Germaey or in Germany itself', to escape 
and return to Holland. 
Radio. Don't brag about hidden radios. Practically all 
police discoveries of hidden radio equipment have resulted 
from somaone•s talking too much and the subsequent betrayal 
of secrets disclosed in this fashion. Hidden radios can be 
discovered up to a distance of about half a meter by means of 
an ordinary magnetic compass, 'Which 1s attracted by the magnet 
in the loudspeaker. He who possesses the security to listen 
regularly to Radio Orange broadcasts should, if possible, take 
them down stenographically. 
Registration. Do not answer official forms that may be 
sent you for eompletion, evan if punishment for non-completion 
is threatened. If officials follow in persons to complete 
such forms, avoid them by not answering the door, or. if 
impossible. give them false answers. If possible be absent. 
Destroy forma which you receive, denying receipt. If 
you are foroed to fill them in do so as badly as possible, 
and/or write letters to the agenoy concerned, asking a very 
great many questions. In this fa1hion the 'WOrk of admin-
istration oan be made more difficult. 
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TAe Pillory: 
TAe Cringing Persons. The Council of Resistance will plaoe 
in the pillory of public opinion those who still give no sign 
of knowing what their duty is in these times. Reference is here 
made to some leading functionaries in both the civil service and 
in private business. This is to serve as a last warning. 
Presence at the Commission of Deeds of Resistance. Repeated-
ly it has come to our attention that the public, oivil servants, 
or the police have stupidly and ungratefully tried to hinder 
acts of resistance, or to arrest resistance workers. The Council 
warns such persons that they may expect punishment and that, in 
their neighborhood, the Council will place them in a pillory of 
public opinion. 
The Council asks the oo8peration of Hollander• in the dis-
tribution of its bulletina.790 
tetter prepared by the editors of the staff of Vri:! Nederllllld, 
to aooompe.ey the Council of Resistance Manifesto forwarded to Ipnd.on 
via the Swiss Route, dated about October. 1943. 
From the Manifesto 1 t will clearly appear what view of 
life the authora take. Many persons in this country feel 
that the Council of Beaistanoe represents a Communist activ-
ity. We are not in a position to positively ascertain the 
true faots. To be sure, both the Signaal, which is clearly 
a Communist newspaper, and the oran:!ekrant [Orange Paper), 
whicA has unmistakable Communist sympathiea, have published 
the 'Ma.ntfesto in its entirety. Various members of the Council 
of Resistance are kn01m. to us by name and are, in general, 
immature persons. 
In our view, the Council of Resistance is a war phenom-
enon, an indication of a sort of Balkanization of resist-
ance movements, a kind of counter-terror or reprisal, that, 
in the field of resistance work, does have a oertain sense 
to it. Warning should be given against the pretensions which 
the [Council) has of speaking with apparent national auth-
ority. The Government can decide for itself how far this 
mentality is to be rejected for other resistance objectivea. 79l 
79~~. VIIa, 267ft. 
791E~, VIIa, 267. 
Excerpts of a report submitted to the London Governnent, April 
17, 1942, by MidshiJ!!Ian G. A. Dogger, des or ibing the Order Service. 
Report 
Shortly after the capitulation there appeared in the Neth-
erlands a number of underground organizations. This led to a 
great deal of confusion. Jonkheer s. [ohimmelpenninok] under-
took to "roof in" these organizations. He proposed to do this 
by choosing three outstanding Hollanders as a sort of colle-
giate directorate, and to contact representatives of the lead-
ing organizations and induce them to serve under the leader-
ship of this Triumvirate, as it was to be called, At that 
point Jonkheer S. •s o'Ml task would be completed, 
He began to seek the membership of this board, He had 
to try to find prominent citizens wno had not acquired their 
prominence through earlier leadership in a political party. 
Jonkheer S. did this so that anyone could, regardless of hia 
convictions, enter the organization. Since Jonkheer s. further 
realized that our people would be timid if faced with an or-
ganization "led by the military", he had, as one of his 
strongest principles, the requirement that the majority lead-
ership must be civilian, He proposed, thersfore, the choice 
of a Triumvirate composed of two civilians and one mdlitary 
man .... 
Jonkheer s. possessed organizational ability of a high 
order, together with an exceptional human understanding. 
During a year and a half he gave of his fullest. Two and a 
half months I lodged at his house, while the Gestapo sought 
me most. energetically. His own capture may well have been 
hastened by his sheltering me, as there is some possibility 
that evidence located at my former residence may have led 
security police to his home. Jonkheer S, never referred to 
this hazard. This was an indication of his courage.,, 
The Triumvirate described above acted on these assump-
tions: If German collapses, and, as a result, the Germans 
leave Holland, or if the country Should be freed by some 
other means, a vacuum would exist in the Government of the 
Motherland, In this period the Netherlands people 'IVOuld 
have to be ruled qy Hollanders who themselves had experi• 
enoed the occupation. They could better appreciate the 
feelings of the Netherlands people,,.The Netherlands people 
would wish nothing else, they would be afraid that the London 
Goverment would not understand them a:ey longer. 
The Triumvirate accordingly accepts its duty tot 
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Immediately after liberation take control of the Mother-
land for Her Majesty the Queen; to strive for the preserva-
tion of peace and order in the country--if necessary ~ 
force--and, immediately after that has been achieved, to 
offer a reborn Netherlands to Her Majesty and further im-
plement Her will. 
In order to install this -remporary Administration~ a 
militarily organized apparatus had to be built up. The 
Triumvirate ••• decided to begin ~ bringing unity into all 
existing military organizations. 
Jonkheer s. now divided his task: 
1. Preparation for the assumption of authority ~ the 
Triumvirate. 
2. The combining of existing military organizations. 
Since he himself was not a military man, he left the 
latter task to Lieutenant-colonel Versteagh ••• Who assumed the 
title of "Chief of Staff'•. 
Towards the attainment of the former objective, oonfer-
enoes were held with numerous prominent Hollanders ••• 
.A.greemenbs were made with experts in the fields of public 
nutrition, transportation, et cetera. 
Lieutenant-colonel Versteegh built up the militarily-
organized order Service in consultation with Jonkheer s •• 
who had over-all direction. To that end the country was 
divided into approximately twenty Regions ••• The Regions 
were further subdivided into Districts, under the direct-
ion of a District Commandant, who further divided his Dis-
trict into IDealities, and so on, down to groups of ten or 
fifteen persons. 
Those personnel of the Royal Netherlands Navy still 
surviving were organized ~ Rear Admiral H. Jolles, who 
promised his complete co8peration. The mission of the 
Royal Navy was made that of protecting harbors so that 
invading ships could land there. 
The municipal police were tied into the organization, 
as were the Royal Constabulary ••• Eaoh Regional Commandant 
received instructions to organize, in addition to his ord-
inary Order Service Groups, reserve units, consisting en-
tirely of military persons. These reserves were to be or-
ganized into batallions, divided into regiments, platoons, 
et cetera. All of this was provided in the "General Orders" • 
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in 11hioh a very important point was the rule that the reserv-
ists were to assume active status only on orders of the Re-
gional Commandant, after he was properly authorized to do so 
by the fnati onal ] Staff. 
There was to be created, although it was to be separate 
from the Order Service, an intelligence service, charged with 
the collection of all reports that ~uld be of importance for 
the direct conduct of the war: Plana of air fields, data con-
cerning factories working on German aooomtt, et cetera. At 
the same time this organization sought and seeks oontaot with 
England. 
A clandestine network of radio transmitters and receivers 
was established to insure that the General Staff would be able 
to maintain constant ccntact with all parts of the Netherlands. 
In addition to those facilities already described, others 
are urgently required. Some means of making the Order Service 
known to the entire Netherlands people, at the appropriate 
moment, is needed. 
Mention should also be made of the extraordinarily ex-
pensive character of underground ~rk. Arrangement:s for the 
acquisition of false identity papers, ration documents, travel 
money, all are items in great demand. 
On November 13, 1941, Jonkheer s. was arrested ••• We have 
continued his work. 
On llovember 25, 1941 I met Peter Tazelaar, who told me of 
his mission. Regardless of haw much it disturbed us that 
London asked for [the transportation to England] of a pol-
itician, we gave him the fullest help... It was decided 
that on his return to London he 110 uld take with him a rep-
resentative of our organization, a task for which I was 
chosen, since I was a member of the Triumvirate. I was 
given the following mission: 
To report to Her Majesty and request support and help for 
the work in Holla:al., particularly support and help to be ren-
dered by the following means: 
1. Recognition by Her Majesty of the Order Se117ice. 
2. Arming by the London Government of the Order Service. 
3. Financial support to be rendered by the London Gov-
erment. 
4. The establishment of reliable, safe communications 
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between London and the Order Service [in order] 
to carry out the objectives just listed ••• 
1. Recognition. 
Along side the Order Service stand other groups. among thsm 
one formed by the earlier leaders of political parties. These 
political leaders have concluded a truce, to be effective for a 
period of three years following the liberation of the Mother-
land. 
While there have been attsmpts made from both sides to come 
to agreement considerable differenoes still exist between the 
Order Service and the political group. Among others. was the 
reluctance on the part cf the Order Service to admit to member-
ship those llho were not going to sene simply as good Hollanders 
but aa Socialist Party member• or as adherents of some other 
political faith. 
At the same time this political group distrusted us. sinoe, 
after the first negotiations. they came to the conclusion that 
we desired a "military dictatorship". From the foregoing it 
should be obvious that this h not even being contemplated. It 
also appeared that the Order Service had very little enthuaiaam 
for the political parties. There exist• in Holland considerable 
public distrust and dislike of the pre-war political parties. 
In order to avoid, in such circumstances. a divided country. a 
"T111111porary Administration• was proposed. Unity 110uld be achieved 
in the following fashion: Along with outstanding Hollanders. 
the earlier political leaders would form a "Recommendations 
Committee", whioh. after the proclamation of the "Temporary Ad-
ministration" as the lawful government. would make ita voice 
heard to explain to the Netherlands people that they. the pol-
itically or otherwise prominent persona, were in complete agree-
ment with the Triumvirate and the Tsmporary Administration. 
such an announcemext 110uld reach nearly the complete populatio11. 
and everyone could understand the basic reasonableness of 
actions and regulations of the Triumvirate. In this fashion 
everyone who waDted to fol!aw his own little road to freedom 
would be restrained by the leader of his own political party. 
The negotiations between the Service and the political group 
were resumed at about the time I left Holland. so I do not 
know of further developne:at:1. 
2. Arming of the Order Service. 
To achieve our objectives (the maintenance of law and 
order at the time of liberation. by force if necessary) 
weapona must be available. In order to make posaible the 
clandestine ahipnent of weapons from England to Holland a 
special arrangement has been devised in Holland. Thh ar-
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rangement is Ul!lder study by authorities 1n England. 
If the organization is supplied with weapons, there i1 
the possibility that, with eventual Allied landings in Hol-
land, the Order Service could be of positive assistance in 
a military sense. 
3. Financial 1111poort. 
Underground work is inordinately expenli ve. Until now, 
that help moat urgently needed hal been a1sembled and oon-
tri buted by Dutchmen of good will and adequate means. The 
whole question offers the greatest problems-- no one is in-
clined to donate funds for unknown purposes, particularly 
since persona have obtaimd money under false pretenses in 
this fashion. At the same time an organization's security 
is weakened in sc ru as secret information 1a divulged to 
potential contributors, As a result, there ia n>t neuly 
enough money available 1n Bolland for underground activity. 
In addition, funds are needed for the support of relatives 
of re1istanoe workers, including particularly those impris-
oned,, ,Upon rey departure from Bolland I made an agreement 
with those remaining behind, whereby a given code phrase 
broadcast by Radio Orange would indicate the extent of help 
to be forthcoming. With reference to method, the London 
Gover11111ent could guarantee the repayment of loans to the 
resistance organizations. Blli'ficient funds could be bor• 
rowed on this basis. 
4. pre communicatiou. 
By means of the already-existing radio network oper-
ating between Colonel Rabagliatti and one of hil Dutch 
agents in Holland, the orgallization which I represent 
can be contacted ••• 
(Signed) G. Ao Dogger, 
:Midshipnan, Naval Service. 792 
Partial Hat of itena forwarded by the SWiu Route in the first 
year of its operation, complied by Mr. Slotemaker de Bruiae, Aplster-
S!Y!l· 
792 
1. .Medical Report of January 11, 1943. 
2. tetter from Professor Qranje, (Famou• resistance worker, 
Free University of Jmsterdam), 
ENQ, VIla, 245ff, 
M7 
3. blio Health 1n the etherlands. (A report by the 
Medical Resistance organization • 
4. The Status of Mayors. (A report). 
5. A Letter from the Editors of Vrij Nederland. 
6. Facts and Observations 
Epd of February. 19~. 
underground activitY:• 
7. Netherlands Youth Af'ter the War. (A report.) 
a. Theses. (Several of a aeriee of monographs on a variety 
of subjeote prepared by members of the Anti-Revolutionary 
Party). 
9. eo arations of the etherlands Refonned Church and the 
Rnmen Catholic Church. Both dated February 21, 1943, 
a protest relating to Nazi interferenae ~th hospitals). 
10. ulations Pertainin to Jews in the Nether-
th an acoompa:ey1ng commentary • 
11. Society .After the War=ioport VI. (One of: a aeries 
prepared by a group of the Dutch Refonned Church). 
12. Provisional Orientation for Co8peration. (A plan of 
the central trades' union organization for a new fed-
eration in the postwar period, prepared specially for 
the illi'onnation of: the London Government). 
13. )(onetary pevelopnenta 1n Holland Since May 10. 1940. 
14. Legal Status as of: 1943. (A report prepared by Indo-
nesian nationalists resident in Holland on their 
present status and future plana). 
15. Economic Life 1n the Province of: North Brabant. 
16. Kingdom of: the Greater Netherlands. ( A report pre-
pared by persons associated with the Colonial Insti-
tute in Jlnsterdam, dealing with proposed ohangeao 1n 
the constitutional relationship between Holland and 
her overseas territories). 
17. Insulinde. (An anozzymous report on questions relating 
to Bolland and her relations with her overseas terri-
tories). 
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18, Netherlands Mr:l.culture After the Jar. 
19, estion. (Including a fn copies of 12!!. 
~=-~.....::=-•• a clandestine student newspaper of 
20. Civil Servants. (Copies of a clandestine publication 
by and for civil servants, seeking, among other thing•, 
to further amplify the ordinances of 1937). 
21. The Jewish Question. (.A report), 
22. IAw at Restoration. (Legal and constitutional problems 
likely to be attendant to liberation). 
23, Situation in the Prison camps as of February, 19~. 
24. tetter from the Members of the tmsterdam pistrict 
to the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice, 
(Dealing with the "unpatriotic* acts of Dutch jud-
icial authoritiel)o 
25. Drugs MOst Urgently lj!eded, (.A list prepared by the 
Kedical l!esista!lOe in case drugs should be sent to 
Holland), 
26. ,tnti-Revolutionary Concepts. (Prepared by members of 
the .Anti-Revolutionary Party). 
27, The Church and Iaternaticnal Reconstruction. (Obser-
vations prepared by a Reformed Protestant church study 
group). 
28. The J.l!!sterdam Stock Bxcha;cge in the IAst Four Months of 
~· (.A report). 
30, Organization for Health Care, (A report inuing from 
medical circles). 
31. Principles of our !l'oreipt Policy, (Prepared by the 
Netherlands Union). 
32. and the Inter-
33, Some Netherlanders on the Future• (An anonymous report 
which, in the opinion of those persons operating the 
SWiss Route. represents the views of lllllilY ). 
34. he Conditions in erstoort and Vu ht. ( A report on 
German oonoentration oampa in Holland • 
35. The auestion of the fhysioians. July, 1943. (A de-
scription of a protraoted. although unsuooessful 
attempt by Dutoh Nazis to seoure oontrol of the Dutoh 
Chamber of Medioine). 
36. !mprhoned Offioers. (A report by the Order Servioe). 
37. Critique of Radio Orange. (.1. report).793 
793s1otemaker de Bruine. loo. oit •• 36549-36550. 
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Agents of Intelligence Bureau, tegendt O.D.a Order Service; R.v.v.: Council of Resistanoel Alb.: Albrecht; 
G.D.No: Gaheiffie Dienst Nederland; F.L.: Fiat Libertas; ~.: Marinier; "B.R." is full name of group. 
NAME 
Joage, H. G, de1 
Bergman, AoJ 
Gerbranda, P. RaJ 
Bourouill, 
P. L. Baron d' Aulnis; 
Borssum Buisman, 
a. A. van; 
DATE MISSION 
DISPATCEED 
March 12, 1943 Collect military and econ-
omic reports. Contact 
[political J National Com-
mittee, bring same into 
contact ~th O.D. 
March 24, 1943. Organize an escape route 
through Spain. 
March 24, 1943. Same as BergJDano 
June 10, 1943 
June 22, 1943 
Establish a group to trans-
mit weather data to England. 
Contact !l.ar. 
Contact and bring instruct-
ions to O.D., Trouw, and to 
Grand Citizens' Committee • 
ACTIVITIES; GROUPS AFFILIATED 
WITH1 MEANS OF CQMMUNEATION; 
FINAL DISPOSITION. 
Formed successful intelligence 
organization. Worked with Alb. 
Used radio, written reports. 
Arrested, November, 1943, while 
crossing Pyrenees. 
Fatally wounded, same day, 
when aircraft delivering 
him shot down, crashed. 
Survived above crash; mission 
accomplished, No formal group 
affiliation but had contact 
with Mar., and Kees. Returned 
safely to England, 
Mission accomplished, also coJP 
tacted National Committee. 
Worked with numerous groups, 
incl. Mar., Packard, Kees, 
active until end of war. 
Mission accomplished. Formed 
"Barbara" Group, worked with 
Kess. Used radio, written 
reports. Arrested February 6, 
1944, survived -r. 
(A 
en 
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Agents of Intelligence Bureau. Legend: O.D.: Order Service; R.V.V.: Council of Resistance; Alb.: Albrecht; 
G.D.N.: Geheime Dienst Nederland; F.L.: Fiat Libertas; Mar.: Marinier; "B.R." is f'ull name of group. 
NAME 
Letteboer 1 Ho; 
Hoelanan, P.; 
Grisnignt, R. Ao; 
Stok, H. van der; 
Wiedemann, Otto M.; 
[British subject]. 
DATE 
DISPATCHED 
June 22, 1943. 
September 19, 
1943. 
September 19, 
1943. 
September 19, 
1943. 
September 19, 
1943. 
MISSION 
Radio operator for van Buisman 
Borssum. 
Same as Letteboer above, also 
to contact SWedish Route. 
Same as above. 
Cryptographer, microfilm 
expert for O.D., F.L. 
Establish contact with 
F.L. 
ACTIVITIES; GROUPS AFFILIATED 
WITH; MEANS OF COMMUNICATION; 
FINAL DISPOSITION. 
Sent a large number of tele-
grams, worked with O.D. Used 
radio. Located by German 
radio direction finders. 
Arrested, February 3, 1944. 
Few particulars available. 
Worked with o.D.; used radio. 
Killed on November 5, 1943. 
Sent maey telegrams, worked 
with o.D., used radio. 
Located by German radio direo~ 
ion finders, arrested, 
February 2, 1944. 
Mission accomplished, worked 
with O.D., F.L. No direct 
contact with London. 
Arrested, February 2, 1944, 
died in concentration camp. 
Mission accomplished, worked 
with F.L., R.v.v., Mar., 
used radio, written reports, 
arrested, July 18, 1944. 
~ 
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NAME 
Schreinemachers, 
w. J.; 
.&lebeek, 
J. L. T. M. van; 
Verhage, M. 
Diesfeldt, J. H. 
DATE DISPATCHED MISSION 
October 8, 1943. Economic reporting, bring 
messages and advioe to O.D. 
October 8, 1943. Radio operator for Schreine-
machers. 
November 6, 1943 Microfilm expert for Barbara 
Group founded U,y van Bcrssum 
Buisman. 
November 6, 1943. Radio operator for Barbara 
Group. 
ACTIVITIES; GROUPS AFFILIATED 
WITH; MEANS OF COMMUNICATION; 
FINAL DISPOSITION. 
Lost baggage in dropping. 
Worked with G.D.N., radio 
contact with London via van 
Borssum Buisman. Returned 
to England, August, 1944 • 
Lost radio set on dropping, 
inactive. Arrested on 
December 5, 1944 (may have 
been 1943, faot is disputed). 
OWing to numerous arrests in 
Barbara Group had little con-
tact with same. Worked with 
O.D. and G.D.N. Reported to 
liberated area, Eindhoven, 
September 9, 1944. 
See above. Worked with O.D., 
sent a great number of tele-
grams to London. Located bJ' 
German radio direction finders. 
Arl'ested, July 12, 1944, 
executed at Vught. 
gj 
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NAME 
Steen, Ho; 
Adriaansen, J. 
J.usems, A. W. M. 
DATE 
DISPATCHED 
January 10, 
1944. 
Jaruary 10, 
1944 
February 29, 
1944. 
MISSION 
Contact R.v.v., regulate finan-
cial arrangements of "support" 
organizations, deliver various 
radio sets. 
Radio operator .f'or Steen. 
Contact R.v.v., help set up 
intelligence service or R,v.v., 
ooBrdinate various intelligence 
e.f'.f'orts, deliver message .f'rom 
Minister-President Gerbrandy, 
ACTIVITIES; GROUPS AFFILIATED 
WITH; MEANS OF COMM!JNICATION; 
FINAL DISPOSITION, 
Mission accomplished, Worked 
with R.v.v. and "Hein" org-
anization (probably set up 
by him), used radio. Located 
by German radio direction 
finders, arrested, !.!arch 14, 
1944, executed, September 
5, 1944. 
Worked brie.f'ly for Steen, 
then J.usems (below), ran into 
difficulties, worked with 
R.v.v., used radio, towards 
end sent locally-gathered 
reports. Arrested, July 14, 
1944, executed, August 8, 1944. 
Mission accomplished, greatly 
hampered because of lack or 
radio operator. Worked with 
R.V.V., various other groups. 
Continued to function until 
end of war. 
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NAME 
Loon, J. E. van; 
Faber, J. 
Leus, Ho; 
Waal, M, W, van de; 
DATE 
DISPATCHED 
February 29, 
1944. 
April 10, 1944, 
April 10, 1944, 
Me.y 7, 1944, 
MISSION 
Radio operator for Ausems. 
Deliver iDatructions for O.D., 
R.v.v., [political] National 
Committee, Fatherland Com-
mittee, and illegal press. 
Radio operator for Faber. 
Contact G. de Jong. 
Csi~P_ificance unknown], 
ACTIVITIES; GROUPS AFFILIATED 
WITH; MEANS OF COO.'UNICATION; 
FINAL DISPOSITION. 
Fell cut with Ausems, sent 
only reports which he him-
self had collected, Incredib~ 
inept, placed on nation-wide 
police "wanted" list for 
stealing bicycle of German 
officer, Discharged as 
agent by London, December 11, 
1944. 
Mission accomplished. Sent 
many telegrams, worked with 
R.v.v., Spijker, Alb., 
contacted organizations op-
erating escape lines, had 
contact with College of Bonds-
men. Used radio, Active 
until liberation. 
Sent many telegrams, worked 
with R,v,v., located by Ger-
man radio direction finders. 
Arrested, December 17, 1944, 
Executed, March 8, 1945. 
Inoperative, arrested N~y 10, 
1944, died in German camp at 
Sandborstel, April 27, 1945. 
(A 
"' 
"' 
Agents of Intelligence Bureau. Legend: O.D.: Order Service; R.V.v., Council of Resistance; Alb,: Albrecht; 
G.D.N.: Geheime Dienst Nederland; F.L.: Fiat Libertas; UAr.: Marinier; "B.R." is full name of group. 
NA],lE 
Visser, W.; 
Blooys, J, de; 
Brandjes, J •; 
Mooiweer, K, C.; 
DATE 
DISPATCHED 
May 7, 1944. 
May 7, 1944. 
Juns 5, 1944. 
June 5, 1944, 
mission "A", 
MISSION 
Radio operator for van de 
Waal, deliver radio trans-
mitter to Alb,, deliver funds, 
messages, and microfilm. 
Deliver four radio sets to 
R.v.v., deliver microfilms 
to Ausems and aot as crypt-
ographer for same, 
Radio operator for G.D.N., 
deliver microfilms to G,D,N. 
Mission "A": Deliver set for 
Visser (above), deliver sup-
plies to Mar., aot as crypt-
ographer for Visser, 
ACTIVITIES; GROUPS AFFILIATED 
WITH; :MEANS OF COMMUNICATION; 
FINAL DISPOSITION. 
Radio set damaged on land-
ing. Further details uncer-
tain. Had contact with 
Alb., 11B.R.11 • .Arrested, 
December 21, 1944. 
Worked as cryptographer for 
Ausems, had contact with 
R.v.v. Arrested December 
31, 1944, shot and killed 
trying to escape. 
Had little contact with G.D.N. 
Worked with !lb., used radio, 
reported back in liberated 
territory at Eindhoven, 
November 5, 1944, 
Mission accomplished, worked 
with Rinus. Used radio, via 
Visser. Reported baok in 
liberated territory at Ein-
dhoven, November, 1944. 
(A 
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NAME 
Mooiweer, K. C.; 
Dijokmeester, F. T.; 
Buunk, G. B.; 
DATE 
DISPATCHED 
December 31, 
1944, mission 
"B" • 
June 5, 1944 
June 5, 1944 
(or July 5, 1944, 
uncertain). 
MISSION 
Instructions for Alb., de-
liver radio set to Smid 
(see below), financial 
mission (nature uncertain), 
preparation dropping areas 
eastern Netherlands. 
Contact o.D., help oo8rdinate 
resistance organizations. 
Establish oontaot with 
Ausems, work as cryptographer 
for same, deliver radio sets 
to various groups. 
ACTIVITIES; GROUPS AFFILIATED 
WITH; MEANS OF COMMUNICATION; 
FINAL DISPOSITION. 
Mission accomplished. Worked 
with Alb, Rinus, and with 
British Special Air Services, 
(a pilot escape line). Helped 
survivors of the battle of 
Arnhem escape. 
Mission accomplished. Worked 
with o.D., Mar., .A.lb., R.v.v., 
Keea, used radio-telephone 
as well as radiotelegraph, 
relayed messages in this manner 
to low-flying aircraft, first 
to do so. Active until end of 
war. 
Worked with Ausems, O.D., also 
with an intelligence group in 
Overijasel. Also had contact 
with Special .A.ir Services 
(see Mooiweer, above). Used 
radio, also communicated with 
London through agents of the 
(British) Special Operations 
Executive. Arrested, January 
10, 1945, executed, April 4, 
1945. 
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NAME 
Hooyer, G. F.; 
Mans, K. A· 
Sutherland, M. A. 
DATE 
DISPATCHED 
June 5, 1944 
(or July 5, 
1944~ uncer-
tain). 
August 4, 1944. 
August 4, 1944. 
MISSION 
Deliver microfilms to Kees, 
act as radio operator for 
Kess, cc8rdinate resistance 
activity. 
"Control" agent sent to 
verify reliability of con-
tacts with Mar., Spijker 
group, also freedom from im-
prisonment of agents Visser, 
l.!ooiweer, Ausems, Adriaansen, 
van Loon. Deliver radio sets 
to Spijker, work with Mar. 
Radio operator for Mans. 
ACTIVITIES; GROUPS AFFILIATED 
WITH; MEANS OF COMMUNICATION; 
FINAL DISPOSITION. 
Sent a large number of tele-
grams, including an exchange 
of ideas between the London 
Government and the College of 
Bondsmen. Worked with Kees, 
used radio. Arrested Decem-
ber 1, 1944, executed Maroh B, 
1945. 
Mission accomplished. When 
work with Mar. was completed 
worked with Packard and O.D. 
Used radio, arrested November 
10, 1944. Escaped, arrested 
again, escaped again, worked 
with intelligence groups, 
active until end of war. 
Mission accomplished. Worked 
with Alb., O.D., used radio. 
Arrested, November 11, 1944, 
escaped, reported hack in 
May, 1945. 
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NAME 
Brauw, 
Jonkheer R. de; 
Smid, M. ••l 
Rijsewijk, 
.A • .A. M. van; 
Kouwenhoven, 
Gerard 
Bemmel, C. H. van; 
~TE 
DISP.rCHED 
.August 7, 19440 
•ugust 7, 1944. 
September 1, 
1944. 
October 5, 
1944. 
October 51 
1944. 
MISSION 
Establish contacts dealing 
with financial arrangements 
of "support" groups, contact 
B~. 
Radio operator for de Brauw, 
built up radio group tor B.R. 
Radio operator for O.D., de-
liver five radio sets to O.D. 
Radio operator for Mar. in 
Province of Groningen. 
Same as Kouwenhoven above. 
ACTIVITIES; GROUPS .AFFILIATED 
WITH; MEANS OF COMMtHJICATION; 
FINAL DISPOSITION. 
Worked with B.R., and Kees, 
later collected and forward-
ed military reports himself. 
Used radio-telephone (aee 
Dijckmeester, above). ar-
rested, October 14, 1944, 
died May 4, 1945 in German 
camp at NeuengMmUio 
Badly separated from de Brauw 
in dropping precess. Had 
contact with ,&lbo Active 
until eud of war. 
Mission apparently accom-
plished. 
Worked with Mar. Groningen1 
lost radio set in Gestapo 
raid of November 10, 1944. 
Inactive, thereafter, not 
captured. 
Worked with Knuckle Gang in 
Assen, used radio, also con-
tact with Mar. Killed in 
gun battle with Gestapo, 
March 28, l945o 
~ 
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NAME 
Ensink, G. L. 
Koopnans, H. 
Hoogewooning, 
F. J. 
Bouman, P. 
Mulder, M. R •I 
DATE 
DISPATCHED 
October 6, 
1944. 
October 6, 
1944. 
December 30, 
1944. 
February 24, 
1945. 
March 26, 1945. 
MISSION 
Radio operator for 
Mans, see above. 
Radio operator for 
Mans, see above. 
Radio operator for 
Alb. 
Radio operator for 
Alb., deliver various 
radio sets. 
Radio operator for Mar., 
deliver five additional 
radio sets to 1~ar. 
ACTIVITIES; GROUPS AFFILIATED 
WITH; MEANS OF COMMUNICATION; 
FINAL DISPOSITION. 
Mission at least pertly 
accomplished, worked with 
Mar., used radio, inactive 
after November 11, 1944. 
Not arrested. 
Never able to establish 
oontact with London. Arrest-
ed, November 11, 19441 ex-
ecuted, March 8, 1945. 
Established contact, worked 
with Alb. Located by German 
radio direction finders, 
arrested February 271 1945, 
executed March a, 1945. 
Mission accomplished, worked 
with Alb., active until end 
of war. 
Some work with Mar., radio 
sets delivered. Used radio. 
Arrested .April 16, 1945. 
Died in jail, April 23, 1945. 
Cil 
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NAME 
ll'eelinck, H.R •l 
Vries, W. de; 
Jrumen, E. Ti. 
DATE MISSION 
DISPATCHED 
April 4, 1945. Military. Liaison between 
Allied forces and resistance 
organhationse 
April 4, 1945. Radio operator for Weelinck. 
April 11, 1945. Radio operator for G.D.N. 
ACTIVITIES 1 GROUPS AFFILIATED 
WITHJ MEAJ<S OF COMMUNICATIONt 
FINAL DISPOSITION. 
Mission accomplished. Had 
no contact with intelligence 
groups as such. Used radio. 
Active until end of war. 
Same as Weelincko 
Parachuted in error into 
Lcosdrecht Lakes, drowned. 
794Based on lists found in: E~, IVa, 326; ENQ, IVa, appendix, lxviii; and on a file of London 
Government agents prepared by the writer from the testimony of approximately 100 witnesses. 
~ 
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CJrHER SOtlRCES 
----• Personal interview with Wilhelm Baumgarten, August, 1959. 
----·• Personal interview with c. H. Evers, April 21, 1960. 
ABSTRACT 
The present study deals with the relations of the Netherlanis 
"London" Govermnent with the Gennan-oooupied territory during World 
war II. 
The writer begins with the postulate that the London Government 
might be expected to provide in some measure for the maintenance of 
domestic order, for the welfare and safety of its citizens in the 
occupied territory; that it would be able to maintain communications 
with that territory; to serve as a focus for national unity; and to 
maintain its existence in order to assume authority at the time of 
liberation. 
Owing to the nature of the German occupation, the London Govern-
ment could neither directly engage in "remote" administration nor 
provide directly for the welfare and safety of its citizens. A single 
major exception appears in an effective railway strike ordered by 
the London Government. 
London was able to assist organizations Which did act in the 
general welfare. These include the National Support Fund, which ex-
pended $68,000,000, repayment of which was guaranteed by London; the 
Fugitive Aid Organization, which concealed and fed as many as 5001 000 
persons at one time; and groups preparing forged identity papers. 
Examples of London's maintenance of Communications w.i. th the occu-
pied territory include clandestine "routes" for intelligence gather-
ing purposes, operated through neutral countries; Radio Orange, the 
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Netherlands government broadcasting station in London; and the dis-
patch by the London Government of agents to Holland to gather infor-
mation there. 
The London Goverrnnent did serve as a focus of national unity, as 
well as remaining intact to be able to function at the conclusion of 
hostilities. Radio Orange served as an important instrumentality in 
bringing the Government and occupied Holland into closer contact, par-
ticularly in its presentation of addresses by the Dutch sovereign. 
One of the principal conclusions of this dissertation is that 
(with a few exceptions) the London Goverrnnent was most successful 
when it utilized the services of persons or organizations already 
located in the occupied territory, rather than attempting to dispatch 
individuals to Holland or create such organizations from London • 
.Among those examples supporting this postulate, in addition to the 
aid and contact organizations listed above, are three large armed 
resistance co8rdinating bodies. The England-spiel episode is offered 
as negative proof, in that it represents an extensive activity planned 
and executed by London which ended in total disaster. As partial ex-
ceptions to the rule appear London intelligence agents who, for tech-
nical reasons, were alone able to arrange initial contact with England; 
London's creation of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior, a militia 
composed of members of the three largest armed resistance organizations; 
and the establishment by London of the College of Bondsmen, a resistance 
oo8rdina.ting organization called into being to replace a locally-formed 
organization in which a political deadlock existed. 
Sources are largely official Dutch documents. the testimony of 
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persons concerned, and published personal accounts. 
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